A.N Dikshita, J.:— The concept of reverence to woman was (he hall-mark of Hindu society reverberating with the ancient scriptural maxim and echoing with sermons that Gods reside where women are honoured. However, with the passage of time such honour to women stood mitigated and it further saw the losing of all sacrosanct regard to women who gradually succumbed to a dreadful ordeal of sharing the status of a wife with the other woman as co-wife Nineeth century and his era saw the upsurge to uplift the downtrodden women who were unable to sustain the ignominies and a revolt was brewing in their fold for vindicating their status in the society. Reforms for their emancipation became the demand of the day. Gigantic efforts were made from all quarters to emanicipate them and inviting them to share the life on equal level. Modern society frowned upon plural marriages resulting in the enactment of the laws prohibiting such performance of plural marriages and also for adequate punishment in one form or the other for those who venture to violate the sacred fibres of a Hindu marriage.

2. The petitioner who was a commissioned officer, may be on account of the urges, fell a prey to the dictates of sentimental emotions in the performance of another marriage during the lifetime of his wife and thus earned the punishment of removal from service. The instant petition has been filed for quashing the order of the Central Government dt. 13-6-1977 (annexure V to the writ petition) whereby the petitioner has been removed from service. Precisely the facts are: The petitioner on being granted a Short Service Commission in the Indian Army was posted as a Second Lieutenant at Joshimath (Indo-Tibet Border) in U.P in Infantry Battalion known as 5-Grenadiers. He was made an acting Captain in March 1972 while in August 1975 he was granted regular commission. During July 1972 the petitioner married Km. Manjushree and had three children from her. Sometime later on 25-11-1974 the petitioner marrried one Dr. Gargi who on coming to know about the first marriage of the petitioner complained to the authorities against such reprehensible conduct of the petitioner which was dreaded by the society and prohibited in law. A show cause notice dt. 6-8-1976 emanated on account of this alleged sacrilegious marriage from the authorities calling upon the petitioner to submit a detailed explanation against the complaint made by this alleged second wife Dr. Mrs. Gargi which was accordingly done by the petitioner and the factum of marriage with Dr. Mrs. Gargi was denied, however, the petitioner vide another letter dt. 8-10-1976 was called upon to submit explanation in view of the documents which established beyond doubt the performance of this marriage. Again the petitioner submitted an explanation. However, a show cause notice dt. 16-12-1976 was sent by the Army authorities enclosing thereto copies of the complaint, a marriage certificate and twenty photographs of the ceremony besides other material in regard to the marriage of the petitioner with Dr. Mrs. Gargi and calling upon the petitioner to submit his explanation. The petitioner submitted a detailed explanation to the show cause notice again denying the performance of the marriage on various grounds. The explanation of the petitioner was considered by the respondents but finding it unsatisfactory vide order dated 13-6-1977 the petitioner was removed from service.

3. Aggrieved by the order dt. 13-6-1977 removing the petitioner from service the instant petition has been filed for quashing the order of removal by means of a writ of certiorari.

4. The case of the petitioner is that the Deputy Secretary who has singned the order dated 13-6-1977 was not competent to pass the order of removal of the petitioner from service inasmuch as he had no such authority and the order would be bad for want of appropriate jurisdiction as the appointing authority of the petitioner is the President of India and in the absence of any such power having been delegated by the President of India in favour of the Deputy Secretary the order is illegal having not been passed by the authority competent to do so. The impugned order is further assailed on the ground that it is not a speaking order has been passed by the Central Government mechanically without the application of mind to the facts of the case in complete disregard of the material available on record. The petitioner has also made another grievance that a proper enquiry has not been conducted in accordance with law and the principles of natural justice have been defiantly violated by the respondents as no proper opportunity to defend himself was afforded to the petitioner. Moreover, the petitioner has been denied the opportunity to show cause in respect of the punishment proposed to be awarded by the authorities and as such also the impugned order is bad and illegal.

5. The petitioner has then averred that the performance of the plural marriage though not conclusively established would only be deemed to be an unbecoming conduct which would be punishable u/s 45 of the Army Act, 1950 (hereinafter called the Act) and though the petitioner at no stage has been charged for such unbecoming conduct the order of removal having been passed on the basis of his unbecoming counduct is liable to be quashed. It has been asserted by the petitioner that R. 14 of the Army Rules. 1954 (hereinafter called the Rules) provided for termination of an officer service on account of misconduct but the contracting of a plural marriage even if proved would not amount to a misconduct for resorting to R. 14 inasmuch as the misconduct as contemplating by R. 14 of the Rules would only mean misconduct in the dicharge of duty. Futher resort to the application of R. 14 of the Rules would be permissible only it the trial of the officer by court-marital is inexpedient or impracticablc and that too such a satisfaction dispensing with the trial by court-martial shall be recorded in writing which has not been done. The petitioner has further alleged that the regulations framed u/s. 192 of the Act which provide for power to frame such regulations would not be attracted in the case and consequently the action under Para 333 of the Regulations is unwarranted. Lastly the petitioner has vehemently stated about the non-performance of the marriage with Dr. Mrs. Gargi and the whole episode as well as the enquiry is the outcome of the malice of respondent 1. The very enquiry was thus vitiated on account of the mala fides of respondent 1.

6. A counter-affidavit has been filed on behaif of the respondents denying the allegations as stated in the writ petition. This counter-affidavit has been sworn by Lt. Col. M.S Pawar, respondent 1. It has been asserted on behalf of the respondents that the petitioner had contracted marriage with Dr. Gargi during the lifetime of his wife. The allegations of bias or malice against respondent 1 have been categorically denied by him on oath. It has been strenuously asserted that the respondents were fully justified in taking the action as contemplated by the provisions of the Act, the Rules and the Regulation. The legality of the order has been maintained.

7. A rejoinder-affidavit to the counter-affidavit has also been filed reiterating the averments as contained in the writ petition.

8. Counsel for the parties have been heard at great, length.

9. Now before taking up the other submissions on behalf of the petition it would be appropriate to examine the allegations of mala fide, bias and malice as have been attributed by the petitioner to respondent 1 on account of which the action has been allegedly taken against the petitioner. Learned counsel for the petitioner has strenuously urged that the impugned order is the outcome of the machinations of respondent 1 who was ill disposed against the petitioner and had avowed to wreak vengeance in view of the obdure resistance of the petitioner to oblige respondent 1. The petitioner while being posted during the course of his service in the Battalion where respondent 1 was the Commanding Officer was in charge to supply stores for Headquarters Troops and such articles were not meant for sale for private use. It has been submitted on behalf of the petitioner that he incurred the displeasure of his Commanding Officer (respondent 1) for his failure to arrange for a pair of wind proof trousers and sleeping bags (American) and some other provisions. Such stale allegations which may invite the displeasure of a senior officer appear on the very face of it to be very unconvincing in the absence of any cogent material. In reply to such averments as contained in para 13 of the petition the respondent 1 in para 23 of the counter-affidavit has denied and has dubbed it as nothing but a tissue of lies. This is the solitary incident as has been alleged by the petitioner which has ignited the wrath of the Commanding Officer (respondent 1). Patently it appears incomprehensible and in any case such a displeasure or fury would persist to the extent as has been alleged by the petitioners appears to be ingenuous. Such pleas of bias or malice are fashioned to smear the action taken against a delinquent officer. Such displeasure as has been alleged by the petitioner in the denial of even adhering to customs prevalent in the Army for the presentation of a memento by the officers to a newly married couple also reveal the outcome of ingenuity. In the counter-affidavit filed by respondent 1 this incident has been fully explained by respondent 1 who has clearly stated that such a memento was arranged and latter on presented. The petitioner's contention is that apprehending injury to his career, an interview was sought with the Military Secretary in some time Oct. 1972 as provided under Para 106 of D.S.R During such interview the petitioner conveyed his apprehensions and grievances against his Commanding Officer (respondent 1) and requested the Military Secretary to post him away from the command of Lt. Col. M.S Pawar (respondent 1) and this interview added fuel to the fire in earning further annoyance of respondent 1. The petitioner was thereafter posted out to Headquarter I Corps as Camp commandant though in Oct. 1975 the petitioner was again posted back to his parent battalion under the command of respondent 1. It has thus been stressed that respondent 1 was always and all through on the look out to cause injury to the interest of the petitioner on account of his deep annoyance. Such allegation of bias and malice have been categorically repudiated in Para 25 of the counteraffidavit where it has been stated that the petitioner's seeking such an interview with the Military Secretary was without appropriate permission from the Battalion and its immediate higher authorities. A signal dated 7-10-1972 was consequently received by respondent No. 1 from the 9-Mountain Brigade at Joshimath directing respondent 1 for furnishing reasons after obtaining the petitioner's personal explanation for by-passing the Brigade. The explanation which was sent by the petitioner on 26-10-1972 affirmatively expressed his extreme happiness in the Unit and reposition of full faith in his Commanding Officer (respondent 1) who looked after the interest of the petitioner on more than one occasion. The other incidents of harassment as alleged by the petitioner against respondent 1 are again denied by respondent 1 and in any case such trivial incidents do occur in a routine manner and cannot be branded as the outcome of bias or malice. Refusal to sanction leave has been attributed by the petitioner as malicious though respondent 1 in the counter-affidavit has strongly denied such insinuation and in Para 26 of the counter-affidavit it is evident that on more than one occasion respondent No. 1 had granted leave to the petitioner, We are satisfied that the basis of bias or malice has been ingenuously alleged so as to cover the delinquent act of the petitioner in marrying Dr. Gargi in utter violation of Para 333 of the Regulations.

10. Now before proceeding to examine the merits of the action taken under R. 14 of the Rules read with S. 19 of the Act, it would be appropriate to peruse the relevant provisions of Para 333 of the Defence Services Regulations (for short the Regulation), R. 14 of the Army Rules and S. 19 of the Act which are reproduced below:

“Para 333 Plural Marriages.

(A) The Special Marriage Act, 1954 and Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 lay down the rule of ‘Monogamy’ that neither party has a spouse living at the time of marriage. These Acts also provide for decrees of nullity of marriage, restitution of conjugal rights, judicial separation and divorce and also orders or alimony and custody of children. The Hindu Marriage Act applies to all Hindus, Budhists, Jains and Sikhs and also applies to all other persons (with certain exceptions) who are not Muslims, Christians, Parsis or Jews by religion. Christians, Parsi and Jews are also prohibited under their respective personal laws from contracting a plural marriage. Thus no person who has solemnised or registered his her marriage under the Special Marriage Act and who is a Christian, Parsi or Jew or to whom the Hindu Marriage Act 1955 applies, can now remarry during the lifetime of his or her, wife or husband. Sub-para (C)(a) and (b) below apply to such persons only. A Muslim or such other person to whom the Hindu Marriage Act does not apply and whose personal law does not prohibt polygamy or Polyandry can marry during the life time of his or her, wife or husband and sub-para (B) and (a) to (h) below apply to such persons only.

(B) Plural marriage by persons in whose case it is permissible:

(a) No person subject to the Army Act except Gorkha personnel of Nepalese Domicile can marry again within the lifetime of his wife without prior sanction of the Government. The circumstances under which such Gorkha personnel can contract a plural marriage are:

………………………………………………………………

(g) Cases where it is found that an individual has contracted plural marriage without obtaining prior Government sanction as require 1 in cl. (a) above will be dealt with as under:

(i) Cases of Officers will be reported through normal channels to Army Headquarters (AG/PS 1) with the recommendations as to whether ex post facto sanction is to be granted or administrative action is to be taken against the individual.

(ii) Cases of JCOs and OR will be submitted to the GOC-in-C Command who will decide whether ex post facto sanction should be obtained or administrative action should be taken against the individual. In cases, where it is decided that administrative action should be taken against the individual his service will be terminated under order of competent authority.

When reporting cases to higher authorities, intermediate commanders will endorse their specific recommendations with reasons thereof. Here too recommendations will be singed by the Commanders themselves or be personally approved by them. Also an opportunity to show cause against the order of termination of service will always be given to the individul concerned.

(h) In no circumstances will disciplinary action by way of trial by Court-Martial or summary disposal be taken against an individual who is found to have contravened the provisions of cl. (a) above. If, however, the individual is also found to have committed another offence connected with his act of contracting a plural marriage, disciplinary action for the connected offence may be taken and progressed in the normal manner.

(c) Plural marriage by persons in whose case it is not permissible.

(a) ………………….

(b) When it is found, on receipt of a complaint from any source whatsoever, that any such person has gone through a ceremony of plural marriage, no disciplinary action by way of trial by Court-Martial or summary disposal will be taken against him, but administrative action to terminate bis service will be initiated and the case reported to higher authorities in the manner laid down in sub-para (B)(g) above. In case where cognisance has been taken by civil court of competent jurisdiction the matter should be treated as subjudice and the decision of the court awaited before taking any action. When a person has been convicted of the offence of bigamy or where his marriage has been declared void by a decree of court on grounds of plural marriage, action will be taken to terminate his service under Army Act S. 19 read with Army R. 14 or Army Act S. 20 read with Army R. 17 as the case may be. No ex post facto sanction can be accorded as such marriages are contrary to the law of the land.”

11. Rule 14.

“14. Termination of service by the Central Government on account of misconduct —(1) When it is proposed to terminate the service of an officer under S. 19 on account of misconduct, he shall be given an opportunity to show cause in the manner specified in sub-rule (2) against such action:

Provided that this sub-rule shall not apply :—

(a) where the service is terminated on the ground of conduct which has led to his conviction by a criminal court; or

(b) where the Central Government is satisfied that for reasons, to be recorded in writing, it is not expedient or reasonably practicable to give to the officer an opportunity of showing cause.

(2) When after considering the reports on an officer's misconduct, the Central Government or the Chief of the Army Staff is satisfied that the trial of the officer by a court martial is inexpedient or impracticable, but is of the opinion, that the further retention of the said officer in the service is undesirable, the Chief of the Army Staff shall so inform the officer together with all reports adverse to him and he shall be called upon to submit, in writing, his explanation and defence:

Provided that the Chief of the Army Staff may withhold from disclosure any such ref ort or portion thereof, if, in his opinion, its disclourse is not in the interest of the security of the State.

In the event of the explanation of the Officer being considered unsatisfactory by the Chief of the Army Staff, or when so directed by the Central Government the case shall be submitted to the Central Government, with the officer's defence and the recommendation of the Chief of the Army Staff as to the termination of the officer's service in the manner specified in sub-rule (4).

(3) ……………………

(4) When submitting a case to the Central Government under the provisions of sub-rule (2) or sub-rule (3), the Chief of the Army Staff shall make his recommendation whether the officer's service should be terminated, and if so whether the officer should be:—

(a) dismissed from the service; or

(b) removed from the service; or

(c) called upon to retire; or

(d) called upon to resign.

(5) The Central Government after considering the reports and the officer's defence, if any, or the judgment of the criminal court, as the case may be, and the recommendation of the Chief of the Army Staff, may, dismiss or remove the officer with or without pension or call upon him to retire or resign and on his refusing to do so, the officer may be compulsorily retired or removed from the service on pension or gratuity, if any, admissible to him.”

12. Section 19.

“19. Termination of service by Central Government.—Subject to the provisions of;his Act and the rules and regulations made thereunder the Central Government may dismiss, or remove from the service any person subject to this Act.”

13. From the above relevant provisions of Para 333 of the Regulation which have been extracted in regard to plural marriages it is revealing from the record that a complaint was received by the authorities from one Dr. Gargi that the petitioner had married heron 25-11-1974. Thereupon a show cause notice dated 6-8-19 emanated from respondent No. 1 calling upon the petitioner to submit a detailed explanation against the complaint. In the explanation submitted by the petitioner the allegation of marriage with Dr. Gargi was denied by the petitioner and it was stated that Dr. Gargi was trying to blackmail him Another letter dated 8-10-1976 from the respondent was delivered to the petitioner wherein it was mentioned that from the documents it has clearly emerged and established beyond doubt that the petitioner had married Dr. Gargi during the lifetime of his first wife Smt Manjushree. Another opportunity was afforded to the petitioner to submit his explanation. An explanation was again submitted. Consequent to the recommendations [of the Army Authority a show cause notice dated 16-12-1976 was sept to the petitioner and was received by him. Copies of the complaint, marriage certificate and twenty photographs of the marriage ceremony showing, the petitioner solemnising marriage with Dr. Gargi were enclosed with the show cause notice. The petitioner was called upon to submit his explanation by 12-12-1977 and also to return the notice and the documents. The petitioner submitted his explanation to the show cause notice dated 16-12-1976. The performance of the marriage with Dr. Gargi was denied on the ground that the details of the marriage ceremony had not been given in the complaint of Dr. Gargi nor performance of Saptapadi which is an essential ritual and customary to Hindus and thus the petitioners contended that no marriage was ever performed as provided under S 7 of the Hindu Marriage Act. The fact that Dr. Gargi was about 39 years of age while the petitioner was only 32 was also highlighted by the petitioner and it was further stated that the petitioner was already married having his wife and children References to the annoyance of his Commanding Officer, respondent 1, were also detailed in the explanation by the petitioner. It was further pleaded by the petitioner that in support of her complaint Dr. Gargi had neither given her statement nor any witnesses were produced in spite of the petitioner's challenging the factum of marriage. However, the petitioner received the order dated 13-6-1977 of the Central Government whereby the petitioner was removed from service.

14. After appraising the material on record and considering the same the Officer Commanding, respondent 1 sent his comments and recommendations to the higher authorities. The respondent 1 recommended that administrative action be taken against the officer (the petitioner) in terms of Para 333 of the Regulations. On being satisfied the authorities vide letter dated 16-12-1976 issued a show cause notice under R. 14 of the Rules. This show cause notice has been recited in extenso in para 2 of the supplementary-counter-affidavit of respondent 1 and which is reproduced hereunder:

“Show cause notice under Army Rule 14.

1. Complaint has been recevied from Dr. (Mrs.) Gargi, Principal Arya Kanya Mahavidyalaya, Bundelkhand, Jhansi, that IC-21/194 Capt. R.K Pathik of 5-Grenadiers married her according to Hindu rites on 25th Nov. 1974. She also stated that on the same date the marriage was registered at Arya Samaj, Sipri Bazar, Jhansi, and certificate obtained in token of the same. Photograph was also taken at the time of marriage showing Capt. R.K Pathik and Dr. (Mrs.) Gargi putting Jaimala around the neck of each other and the necessary other function was done. She has further stated that after the marriage Capt. R.K Pathik visited her at Jhansi and other places till Oct. 75. Thereafter he (Capt. Pathik) stopped visiting her. On 5th Feb. 1976 Dr. (Mrs.) Gargi met Major General SDS Yadav. GOC 7 Inf. Div. at Ferozpore and reported him the full fact of the case. She also saw that Capt. R.K Pathik was staying with the first wife Smt. Manjushree and children at that station. Major General S.D.S Yadav called Capt. Pathik in the presence of Lt. Col. M.S Pawar and Dr. (Mrs.) Gargi. Capt. Pathik admitted before them the factum of him marriage with Dr. (Mrs) Gargi. As per the service record of the officer he has married to Smt. Manjushree who has got children and the marriage still subsisting.

2. The above conduct of Capt. Pathik is reprehensible and has rendered him unfit for retention in service. He is hereby called upon to show cause within 25 days of this notice as so why his service be not terminated under the provisions of Army R. 14 read in connection with Army Act 1950. If no reply is received from him within this specified time it will be presumed that Capt. Pathik has no point to urge in favour of further retention in service. Copies of the correspondence from Dr. Gargi are enclosed to enable the officer to prepare his defence.

3. Chief of Army Staff consider that the officer has committed grave misconduct through his above act and his further retention in service is undesirable. He has thus directed that the officer be asked to show cause why his service be not terminated administratively under Army Rule 14.

4. Receipt of the notice may please be acknowledged.

Sd. Lt. Col. Offg. DPSE.”

15. The authorities, came to the irresistible conclusion that the petitioner had in fact during the subsistence of his marriage with Smt. Manjushree his first wife With whom he had three children had also married Dr. Gargi thus inviting issuing of the show cause notice dated 16-12-1976 under rule 14 of the Rules.

16. Admittedly the action had been taken under R. 14 of the Rules. A show cause notice was issued under sub-rule (2) of R. 14 of the Rules by the Chief of the Army Staff. This foundation of the jurisdiction of the Central Government or of the Chief of the Army Staff to issue a show cause notice is the satisfaction either of the Central Government or of the Chief of the Army staff. An officer's misconduct has to be considered on the basis of the reports and also that the trial of such officer by a court-mahial is inexpedient or impracticable so as to form the opinion that further retention of the officer in service is undesirable. The contention of the petitioner before us is that resort to R. 14 read with Para 333 of the Regulations was improper and bad inasmuch as recourse to try the petitioner by court-martial has been not adhered to without achieving any satisfaction of either the Central Government or of the Chief of the Army Staff as to how it was inexpedient or impracticable. The provisions for the trial by court-martial are enjoined in section 108 of the Army Act which provide for four following kinds of court-martial;

(a) General Court-Martial;

(b) District Court-Martial;

(c) Summary General Court-Martial; and

(d) Summary-Court Martial.

17. It has been submitted on behalf of the petitioner that he was liable to be tried by a court-martial for the ‘unbecoming conduct’ as enjoined in S. 45 of the Act which is reproduced below:

“45. Unbecoming conduct—Any officer, junior commissioned officer or warrant officer who behaves in a manner unbecoming his position and the character expected of him shall, on conviction by court-martial, if he is an officer, be liable to be cashiered or to suffer such less punishment as is in this Act mentioned; and, if he is a junior commissioned officer or a warrant officer be liable to be dismissed or to suffer such less punishment as is in this Act mentioned.”

18. Indeed, had the petitioner been proceeded for an unbecoming conduct then on conviction by the court-martial he was liable to be cashiered or suffer such less punishment as provided but it was found that the petitioner was not guilty for the unbecoming conduct under S. 45 of the Act and instead for the misconduct for violating Para 333 of the Regulations. Trial by court-martial of the offences have bee laid down in Chap. VI of the Act but once the authorities decided to proceed for the misconduct as provided in Army R. 14, recourse to trial by court-martial was not at all required. The meaning of the word ‘misconduct’ in Webster's New International Dictionary is: “Mismanagement, wrong or improper conduct; bad behavior; Unlawful behavior or conduct.” The Regulations prohibited plural marriages. Even a punishment for the offence of bigamy is prescribed in Ss. 494 and 495 of the IPC. It is thus amply clear that the petitioner in performing marriage with Dr. Gargi during the life-time of his first wife was guilty of unlawful conduct which would be deemed to be a ‘misconduct.’ The authorities were free to take such suitable action as was found expedient looking into the violations of Para 333 of the Rugulations and action under R. 14 of the Rules and section 19 of the Act would not suffer for lack of jurisdiction while taking the final action under the Act. R. 14 as has been reproduced above clearly provides that it is the absolute discretion of the authority and on arriving at a satisfaction that trial by court-martial was neither expedient nor practicable then it cannot be said that the action under R. 14 is a colourable exercise of the power. However, Para 333(B)(h) which has been reproduced above provides that in no circumstance will disciplinary action by way of trial by court-martial or summary disposal be taken against an individual who is found to have contravened the provisions of cl. (a), namely, contracting a plural marriage as has been done by the petitioner with Dr. Gargi. It was thus clearly within the right and competence of the respondents to have not proceeded against the petitioner through court-martial. Their action in proceeding by way of an administrative action was fully covered under Parr 333(C)(b) of the Regulations. There is no merit in the contention on behalf of the petitioner that resort to action within the meaning of R. 14 of the Rules and section 19 of the Act was bad and improper and action ought to have been initiated by way of a trial by court-martial. Once it is enjoined in the provisions the disciplinary action by way of trial by court-martial was not permissible and was in fact prohibited, the respondents were left with no other option but to proceed against the petitioner by way of administrative action as provided.

19. At the instance of the petitioner the original records were produced before us by the learned counsel for the respondents and the decision to take administrative action as provided is wholly justified. However on being satisfied that trial by court-martial was neither expedient nor practicable the authorities sent a show cause notice to the petitioner under R. 14 of the Army Rules for contravention of Para 333 of the Regulations. It cannot be denied that the petitioner was subject to the Regulations. True the Regulations must not transgress the statute but we do not find any disharmony in the Regulations and the provisions of the Act. S. 19 of the Act when read harmoniously with R. 14 and Para 333 of the Regulations clearly provide that the authorities were competent to take action as has been taken against the petitioner. Moreover, it was not imperatively necessary for the authorities to proceed against the petitioner by a trial through court-martial as S. 19 clearly provides “subject to the provisions of this Act and the Rules and Regulations”, such a hormonious intent of R. 14 of the Rules and Para 333 of the Regulations which stand happily reconciled. On the basis of the material which has been produced before us it is manifest that a show cause notice was sent to the petitioner calling upon him to submit his explanation and defence in respect of the allegation that the petitioner had performed plural marriage. The original records produced before us as well as the facts on the file show that the authorities had provided more than one opportunity to the petitioner to explore the veracity of the complaint. Relevant documents in respect of the marriage as well as the photographs were sent to the petitioner which showed that the petitioner had married Dr. Gargi. Even the proposal to send a show cause notice was sought by Lt. General R.D Hira, G. from the Chief of the Army Staff who had accorded his approval. The explanation of the petitioner to show cause notice was duly considered by the respondents. Lt. Gen. E.A Vas after minutely examining the explanation commented while submitting the case, to the Chief of the Army Staff that “the photogtaphs of the marriage ceremony and the marriage certificate establish beyond doubt that he (petitioner) contracted a plural marriage when his fust marriage was subsisting. His behaviour, therefore, has been highly reprehensible and irresponsible. He has wilfully disregarded rules and regulations and has brought the prestige of a service officer to disrepute and shame. The misconduct of Capt. Pathik when judged in its totality is undoubtedly scandalous and detrimental to Army discipline. Such a shameful conduct is unworthy of an officer and sets a very ugly precedent for others in service, I therefore, agree with the GOC-in-Central Command and recommend that Cap S.X Pathik be removed from service in terms of Army R. 14. On your approval the case will be referred to the Government for necessary action”. The Chief of the Army Staff approved the action. Whereafter the case was passed on to the Central Government for taking appropriate action. The Central Government ultimately passed the order for removal of the petitioner from service under R. 14 read with S. 19 of the Act Thus there was no procedural infirmity in proceeding against the petitioner. Moreover, the petitioner was afforded adequate opportunity and as discussed above explanations were submitted by the petitioner on more than one occasion and later on to the show-cause notice which were duly considered by the Army authorities as well as the Central Government.

20. In the case of Chief of Army Staff v. Dharampal Kukrety, (1985) 2 SCC 412 : AIR 1985 SC 703 the Supreme Court has held that action under R. 14 is wholly permissible. The facts in that case were that Major Dharampal was proceeded against and tried by a court-martial but latter on before the conclusion of such proceedings action under R. 14 of the Army Rules was taken and more so when in a different situation the delinquent officer was found not guilty by the court-martial. In this case the Army Officer was proceeded against for trial by a court-martial but before the findings could be confirmed action under R. 14 of the Rules was initiated and it was held by the Supreme Court that such an action under R. 14 would neither be without jurisdiction nor unwarranted in law. In the instant case no trial by a court-martial was held and the action to proceed against the petitioner under R. 14 was taken. The Supreme Court in Dharampal Kukrety's case (supra) had gone to the extent of approving action taken under R. 14 even when the findings of the court-martial were not confirmed. No doubt another trial by court-martial was not feasible but to resort to R. 14 of the Rules was found to be legal. The Supreme Court has thus approved that action under R. 14 of the Rules can be taken independently irrespective of any other provision which may be correspondingly attracted.

21. Learned counsel for the petitioner then urged that the action would be deemed to have been taken under S. 18 of the Act and not as provided under S. 19 of the Act, It has thus been urged that the manner in which the petitioner has been removed from service would fall within the scope of S. 18 of the Act. But the said provision relates only to the pleasure of the President which is his own individual privilege as distinct from the powers given to the Central Government u/s. 19 of the Act. S. 18 of the Act reads as under:

“18. Tenure of service under the Act.—Every person subject to this Act shall hold office curing the pleasure of the President.”

22. A bare perusal of the above S. 18 of the Act would distinctly reveal that the powers u/s. 18 are quite distinct from the powers of the Central Government under S. 19 of the Act reproduced earlier. Any action taken by the Central Government as contemplated u/s. 19 of the Act though in the came of the President would not mean that the action has been taken under S. 18 of the Act. Learned counsel for the petitioner has tried to assail the order of removal of the petitioner from service on the premise that S. 18 nowhere provides for the removal of the petitioner by delegated authority. Indeed the power of the President to dismiss public servant at pleasure is outside the scope of Art. 77 of the Constitution and such powers cannot be delegated by the President to any authority and are exercisable by him alone in the manner prescribed by the Constitution, but in the instant case the action has been taken by the Centra! Government under S. 19 of the Act. It would be be a futile exercise to urge that the action in the removal of the petitioner has been taken within the postulates of S. 18 of the Act when it is very distinctly emerging that the Central Government has taken the impugned action within the meaning of S. 19 of the Act. The order has been passed by the Central Government and it is immaterial as to who has signed it. The decision of the Central Government is there and as such it cannot be said that the order is bad being without jurisdiction. Moreover, the original records placed before us clearly reveal that the Central Government had taken the action which was translated into the order by an officer of the Central Government. We think that neither the order suffers from any jurisdictional error nor is otherwise bad in law.

23. Learned counsel for the petitioner then submitted that the order should fall on the ground that it is not a speaking order as no reasons whatsoever have been given. We are unable to find any merit in this submission. It is now settled law that where an authority makes an order in exercise of its quasi-judicial function the reasons in support of the order must be recorded. No doubt every quasi-judicial order must be clothed with reasons. There is no disregard of the requirements of law when we find from a perusal of the order that the petitioner was removed from service after considering the behaviour and conduct and the plural marriage performed with Dr. Mrs. Gargi while his previous marriage with Smt. Manjushree, his first wife, still subsisted. This order further amplifies after recording reasons that it had been passed after the show-cause notice was served on the petitioner and reply thereto was received as well as the recommendation of the Chief of the Army Staff and all these facts were examined by the Central Government before passing the order. We find that adequate reasons have been mentioned, in the order itself. We have not to lose sight of a singular fact that the action of removal from service was taken against the petitioner in view of the plural marriage having been solemnised by the petitioner Dr. Mrs. Gargi while his previous marriage with Smt. Manjushree, his first wife, was subsisting. We are thus of the view that the impugned order clearly discloses the reasons and the material on which action was taken.

24. Learned counsel for the petitioner then contended that Para 333 of the Regulations which imposes a restriction is ultra vires. We are unable to agree to such a fanciful submission in view of the fact that bigamy or plural marriage have been frowned upon by the society and the Legislature immediately took appropriate remedial step to curb this evil. Necessary amendments were made in the existing law of the land and it was in the fitness of things that the Defence Services much less the Army which is a disciplined force has to act the tune with the law as existing. While applying the test of reasonableness we have to consider this aspect in the surrounding circumstances as well as the facts of the case. In any case it would be highly preposterous or a sad day to permit an officer of the Army or of the other Services to maintain scores of women as wives when the law otherwise prohibits it. There restriction so placed by Para 333 of the Regulations was in conformity with the law of the land and it cannot be said that such a restriction is bad or unreasonable. Such a restraint was in the interest of discipline as well as for the welfare of the general public. We are thus of the clear view that Para 333 of the Regulations was suitably enacted and is intra vires.

25. Another submission on behalf of the petitioner is that the Regulations have no statutory force. But here again we are unable to accept it. While going into the facts as regards plural marriage which is constitutive of the grievance of the petitioner having no violation we may state that the Act, the Rules and the Regulations and instructions thereunder govern the fate of the officers of the Army. It has been strenuously urged that on the basis of the Regulations as framed under Para 333 no misconduct in marrying again would be deemed to have been committed inviting action under the Act. The technical gloss put up on behalf of the petitioner does not appeal to us and we are supported to that extent that the Regulations do govern the petitioner. In the case of Capt. Virendra Kumar v. Union Of India , (1981) 1 SCC 485 : AIR 1981 SC 947. Justice Krishna Iyer speaking for the Bench observed:

“Ss 21, 22, 27 and 191 to 193 together within the residuary executive power cannot be done by technical truncation of the sense and sweep of the rules.”

26. We are thus unable to find any merit in the submission that the Regulations as framed under the provisions of the Army Act have no statutory force. Their non-publication may not be of any avail as the provisions of the Act, the Rules and the Regulations are coextensive. Chapter IV of the Act provides for conditions of service where S. 19 is embeded.

27. Action has been taken against the petitioner in exercise of the powers conferred under R. 14 read with S. 19 of the Act. Para 533(C)(b), already quoted in the earlier part of this judgment, provides that when it was found on receipt of a complaint that any person had gone through a ceremony of plural marriage no disciplinary action by way of trial by court-martial or summary disposal will be taken against him but administrative action to terminate his services will be initiated and the case reported to higher authorities. In the instant case on the receipt of the complaint administrative action was taken. It thus emerges clearly that the Regulations provide the manner and are to assist R. 14 and S. 19 of the Act.

28. On the contracting of a plural marriage without obtaining prior Government sanction the manner in which the case has to be proceeded has been prescribed in Para 333(B)(g)(i) which has already been quoted above. Further Para 333(B)(h) of the Regulations, already quoted, provides that in no circumstances will disciplinary action by way of trial by court-martial or summary disposal be taken against an individual who is found to have contracted the provisions of clause (a) above. For such violation of the Regulations is contracting plural marriage the misconduct committed by the petitioner fell within the ambit of R. 14 of the Rules. Learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance upon the case of A.L Kalra v. Project and Equipment Corpn. of India Ltd., (1984) 3 SCC 316 : AIR 1984 SC 1361 and Glaxo. Laboratories (I) Ltd v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Meerut, (1984) 1 SCC 1 : AIR 1984 SC 505. These decisions are of no avail to the petitioner in view of a cardinal fact that the violation of the Regulations would always be deemed to be misconduct.

29. The contention of the petitioner that the order had been signed by the Deputy Secretary to Government of India and also not in the name of the President, in the circumstances of the case, is without any merit. It ex facie says “the Central Government hereby order that the said Captain R.K Pathik shall be removed from service forthwith”. The order was only communicated by one Sri R.K Ramanamurthi, Deputy Secretary to the Government of India, after the decision to remove the petitioner from service was taken by the Central Government. There is thus every reason to reject the averment that the Deputy Secretary had no such jurisdiction Moreover, there is no allegation in the petition that the order was not made by the Central Government. Even otherwise this submission further stands repelled in view of the decision in R. Chitralekha v. State of Mysore, AIR 1964 SC 1823 wherein it has been laid down that an omission to comply with those provisions does not render the administrative action a nullity. In this case the law on the subject was well settled and the decision in Dattatraya Moreshwar v. State of Bombay, AIR 1952 SC 181; State Of Bombay v. Purushottam Jog Naik, AIR 1952 SC 713 and Ghaio Mall and Sons v. State of Delhi, AIR 1959 SC 65 were approved and affirmed.

30. Lastly, it was submitted though subduedly that all the material required by the petitioner in support of the defence were not made available and thus the principle of natural justice was violated. On the other hand it is glaringly apparent from the records that no document which was connected with the allegation of plural marriage was withheld by the authorities much to the detriment of the petitioner. We find from the record that all the papers in respect of plural marriage were made available and furnished to the petitioner for submitting his explanation. Nothing has been pointed out as to which of the documents were not supplied which were relevant to the factum of plural marriage. The submission of the petitioner is neither merited nor has any substance. We thus find that the instant petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution has no force and deserves to be dismissed.

31. In the result the petition is dismissed. However, we make no order as to costs.

32. Petition dismissed.