1. The main question involved for consideration in this writ petition is whether the benefit of free railway passes and privilege ticket orders (P.T Os), admissible to the railway employees, can be computed in terms of money under the provisions of S. 33 C of the Industrial Disputes Act, or not. The facts giving rise to the controversy are that the opposite party 2, was a railway employee working as assistant loco foreman in Northern Railway, Lucknow, at the relevant time. On 21 December, 1982, he applied for three sets of free passes from Lucknow to New Delhi and back, from Howrah to Jammu Tavi and back and from Varanasi to Rameshwaram and back for himself, his wife, his son aged 17 years and two unmarried daughters. The passes, according to opposite party 2, were not issued as a result of which the benefit of free passes for the calendar year 1982 lapsed after 31 December, 1982.

2. There is no dispute between the parties on the point that a railway employee is entitled to three sets of free railway passes and six P.T Os in one calendar year. The benefit of passes and P.T Os. lapse, with the end of the each calendar year. The opposite party 2 moved an application under S. 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act for computation of benefit of three sets of free passes, wrongly not issued to him, in terms of money to the tune of Rs. 12,560. A true copy of the application has been filed as annexure 2 to the writ petition.

3. The claim of opposite party 2 was contested on behalf of the railway administration. A copy of the written statement has been filed as annexure 3 to the writ petition. In the written statement, it was not denied that opposite party 2 was a railway employee and was also entitled for the passes as claimed. However, in reply to Para. 5 of the petition, wherein it was asserted that opposite party 2 had applied for three sets of passes, it has been stated in Para. 2 of the written statement that Para. 5 as framed was not admitted. As a matter of fact, there is no specific denial of the fact that such an application was moved. It has been pleaded in the written statement that opposite party 2 had moved the application under S. 33-C(2) of the Act after two and a half years, thus, the claim was time barred, as according to Para. 11 of Pass Manual, the applications are preserved for a period of one year and the relevant registers for two years following the year to which the passes relate. Due to weeding out of the record as per provisions of Pass Manual, the relevant record was not available. Another point raised, was that the benefit was not computable in terms of money under S. 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act.

4. The Presiding Officer, Central Government Labour Court, Kanpur, by order, dated 17 December, 1985, allowed the application of Opposite party 2 and computed the benefit of free passes in terms of money, as claimed, for a sum of Rs. 12,560. The Tribunal, in its order, has observed that the main contest on behalf of the railways was on the ground of want of record. It has also been observed that it is a common ground that no pass was issued to opposite party 2. The Tribunal found that the pass index card register is a register only relating to entry of passes which are issued, and it is to be maintained for two years. It is not a register for entering applications for issuances of passes. It has also been observed that there is no rule, that the applications for passes should be destroyed within a year or two. The application for passes moved by opposite party 2 was recieved by the despatch clerk Sri S.K Bharti, in the loco foreman's office at Lucknow. He was not examined by the railway administratration to deny the fact of receipt of the application. It is also observed that no limitation is prescribed for moving Labour Court under S. 33 C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. In view of the above facts and findings recorded on their basis by the Labour Tribunal, it is not possible to hold that as such application was moved merely on the ground that the application was not available with the railway administration.

5. The learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the applications should not have been entertained by the Labour Court and the claim should have been treated as time barred. In this connection he has placed reliance on Rama-krishna Ramnath Biri Manufacturing, Kamptee v. Labour Court, [A.I.R 1963 Bom. 200]. This case lays down that overstale claims should not be encouraged, but the question whether there is or is not unreasonable delay, is to be decided by the Labour Court in its discretion. It may he noted that no limitation is prescribed for moving an application under S. 33 C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, therefore, there is no question of the application being barred by limitation as urged. The limitation will not depend upon the provision for weeding out records in office of the petitioner. All that has to be examined is whether there has been unreasonable laches in moving the application. The question whether the claim was belated or not, was considered by the Tribunal and it chose to entertain the claim and decided it on merits. Since the claim has been decided on merits, in my view it will not be appropriate to throw out the claim of opposite party 2, at this stage on the ground that it was a belated claim.

6. It has next been submitted on behalf of the petitioner that S. 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act is not applicable. Free passes and P.T Os. are only concessions which are extended to the railway employees by the railway administration. The concessions, facilities or privileges are not computable in terms of money. In support of this contention, the learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon a case reported in The Bombay Gas Co. Ltd. v. R.N Kulkarni* Court, Bombay, [A.I.R 1965 Bom. 172]. In that case the question involved was regarding privilege leave. The relevant observation made in Para. 8 of the judgment is as follows:

“We have already quoted Paras. 25 and 26 of Sri Naik's award, and it is quite clear from those paragraphs that the privilege leave was considered as a benefit necessary for the worker, because he needs rest and recuperation, … quite apart from these expressed grounds for the conferment of that benefit, it is well known that privilege leave is a sort of benefit granted to an employee so that he may recoup health after a long period of work and return to work refreshed. In short, it is a benefit which would have little meaning if it were not to be actually enjoyed by the worker and instead the workers were to be given a monetary privilege. It seems to us that this is the fundamental basis for the grant of this benefit of privilege leave, and if so, it is implicit in the nature of that benefit and the purpose for which it is granted that it ought not to be allowed to be converted into money, except perhaps when ultimately the worker retires with privilege leave to his credit, which is not the case here so far as either of two respondents-employees is concerned”.

In the abovenoted case, reliance was placed upon a case reported in 1961 — II L.L.J 113. In that case’, the workmen were ordered to be reinstated but the employer failed to reinstate them. They had claimed, inter alia, leave pay for the period during which the employer had failed to reinstate them. The Supreme Court observed;

“It is not disputed that there is no provision of encashment of leave in the appellant company and, therefore, when full salary was taken into account in the seven applications, there was no question of any leave pay being paid as encashed amount over and above the full salary”.

The Court had taken note of the observation that there was no provision for encashment of the privilege leave.

7. Another case relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner is reported in Shalimar Paints, Ltd. v. Third Industrial Tribunal of West Bengal, [A.I.R 1971 Cal. 90]. In that case, it was held that in absence of a condition that employer should bear employee's travelling expense from residence to work place, he could not claim extra allowance when he shifted his residence to a more distant place. The allowance cannot be claimed as part of wages under S. 2(rr) of the Industrial Disputes Act. It has further been observed that the condition as referred to in S. 2(rr) of the Industrial Disputes Act connotes a concession specifically provided for in the form of free travelling or travelling at a reduced rate.

8. On the basis of the cases cited above, the, learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the privilege of giving free travelling pass or P.T Os. by the railway administration to its employees, is nothing but a privilege and not wages. That being the position, according to the counsel for the petitioner, the privilege or concession cannot be computed in terms of money. It is a privilege that can only be enjoyed to have facility of free travelling or travelling on concessional rates. It cannot be converted into money.

9. The learned counsel for the opposite party 2 has submitted that the concession of free travelling and P.T Os. is covered by term ‘wages’ under the Industrial Disputes Act. He has placed before the Court S. 2(rr) of the Industrial Disputes Act which reads as follows:

‘2(rr). ‘Wages’ means all remuneration capable of being expressed in terms of money, which would, if the terms of employment, express or implied, were fulfilled, be payable to a workman in respect of his employment or of work done in such employment, and include

(iii) any travelling concession;

(iv) …

but it does not include

In view of the definition of the word ‘wages’ quoted above, there is little doubt that travelling concession provided by the employer to his employees is included in ‘wages’. I, therefore, find no force in the arguments advanced on behalf of the petitioner that travelling concession is not wages. In the two cases referred to above the position was quite different. There is hardly any doubt that the facility of free passes and P.T Os., made admissible by the railway administration, to its employees is a ‘travelling concession’, therefore, it is wages.

10. I again find no force in the submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the word ‘travelling concession’ used in Cl. (iii) of Sub sec. (rr) of S. 2 relates to a concession made admissible by the employer to the employees for going to and back from the place of work. There is nothing which could lead to the inference that the meaning of ‘travelling concession’ is to be confined only to travelling to one's office or factory alone. In this connection, learned counsel for the petitioner has further submitted that any concession granted, can only be in connection with the work which the employee is to perform by virtue of his employment. In my opinion, this is not necessarily so. In the present time, we find that the things have gone much beyond the narrow compass of everything connected with the official work in factory or office. For instance, in many organisations including the Government, benefit of leave travel concession (LTC) is admissible to the employees. Different organisations have different rules in that connection. An employee may avail leave travel concession for any part of the country just for sight seeing, holidaying or taking rest, namely, something which is not directly or apparently connected with performance of his duty in the course of his employment but still the employer extends the concession by providing him part or full, free travelling. I, therefore, do not find any substance in the submission made on behalf of the petitioner that the travelling concession mentioned in S. 2(rr)(iii) of the Industrial Disputes Act relates only to travelling in connection with discharge of official duty or travelling between the place of residence and the factory or office.

11. The question that has yet to be considered is that even though the travelling concession is part of wages, whether it is computable in terms of money. Section 33 C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act provides as follows:

“33-C (2). Where any workman is entitled to receive from the employer any money or any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money and if any question arises as to the amount of money due or as to the amount at which such benefit should be computed, then the question may, subject to any rule that may be made under this Act, be decided by such Labour Court as may be specified in this behalf by the appropriate Government (within a period not exceeding three months)”.

From the provision quoted above, it is clear that what is ordered to be paid under S. 33 C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, is the money or any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money. That is to say, all those benefits which an employer extends to an employee, are not necessarily such which can be computed in terms of money. There may be benefits which can well be utilised and enjoyed only. In a given case, a benefit which is made admissible by the employer to the employee may form part of wages but may not be computable in terms of money. In this connection, we may again refer to definition of the word ‘wages’, which says that ‘wages’ means all remuneration capable of being expressed in terms of money, payable to a workman in respect of his employment or of work done in such employment. Therefore, in general terms, any remuneration which is capable of being expressed in terms of money is ‘wages’. But after providing as above, there comes a clause providing that certain things are included in ‘wages’. Clause (iii) provides ‘travelling concession’ as included in wages. Then comes yet another clause providing what is not included in ‘wages’. The items which are not included in ‘wages’ are bonus, gratuity, any contribution paid or payable by the employer to any pension fund or provident fund or for the benefit of the workman under any law. It may be noted that the items which have been excluded from the definition of the terms ‘wages’ are those which are certainly capable of being expressed in terms of money but they have been excluded from ‘wages’. Similarly certain items, in my opinion, like travelling concession, has been included, which cannot always be capable of being expressed in terms of money.

12. Generally a provision for including a thing in the definition is meant to extend the meaning of the definition and to give a meaning to the ‘included term’ which ordinarily would not be so, looking to the main definition of a particular thing. In a way, it can be said that it is like giving a fictional meaning to the term included in the definition. The same would be the position in regard to things which are excluded from the definition of a particular word. The necessity of exclusion or inclusion arises when it is found that without doing so, the definition would not cover the term included or it would be, in any case, very doubtful. In ‘Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes Twelfth Edition, page 270-71’, a discussion about the word ‘include’ occurring in a definition has been made. According to the discussion, the word in respect of which ‘includes’ is used, bears both as expended statutory meaning and its ordinary popular and natural sense whenever that would be properly applicable. So the meaning which is given to a word following ‘includes’ is ordinarily not the natural meaning of the word or in any case it may be disputed whether the word means in its natural sense what is attributed to it by including it in a definition. To the same effect are the observations made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in a case reported in Commissioner of Income Tax, Andhra Pradesh v. Taj Mahal Hotel, [(1971) 3 SCC 550 : A.I.R 1972 S.C 168].

13. So what has emerged from the discussion made above, is that though the word included in the definition does not actually mean what is provided in the definition, yet it signifies the ‘word’ defined. That is to say, a benefit which may not be capable of being expressed in terms of money so as to be called ‘wages’, but by its inclusion in the definition of ‘wages’ it will be taken as ‘wages’ or signifying ‘wages’. It will have the effect of being ‘wages’ even though not capable of being expressed in terms of money. But for the purposes of S. 33 C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, it shall have to be a benefit capable of being computed in terms of money. It will, therefore, have to be seen whether the benefit of free passes, viz. travelling concession, though included in the definition of the word ‘wages’ is computable in terms cf money or is capable of being expressed in terms of money.

14. Travelling concession is capable of being computed or expressed in terms of money or not, will depend upon the terms and mode and manner in which the concession is given to the employees. In certain cases, it may be possible to express it in terms of money, but it may not be so in other cases. In my opinion, so far it relates to free passes and P.T.Os Admissible to the railway employee, such a concession is not capable of being expressed in terms of money. An employee of railways is a part of organisation which runs the railways. Quite rightly, in this background, that it was thought appropriate and proper to provide some facility or concession to the staff who, in his own way, contributes in the running of the railways. This facility is available to the railway employees since a very long time, atleast much before leave travel concession (L.T.C) etc., came into existence. The purpose, obviously, was that if a railway employee has to undertake a journey, he may have a free travelling or concessional travelling. Under the Pass Manual, three sets of passes and six sets of P.T Os., arc admissible to a railway employee in one calendar year. If the concession allowed is not utilised within one calendar year, it lapses. There is no accumulation of passes and P.T Os. What is most significant is that the railway administration does not make any payment in terms of money to the employees on account of the fare chargeable for travelling by train. It is only a sort of authorisation to travel by train, free of charges or on concessional rates. It is not known if an employee would avail of the facility or not. There are many who do not avail of it but some of them do avail it. It is also uncertain as to what would be the destination of different employees availing of the opportunity of free travelling passes or P.T Os. For these reasons I am of the view that, as it is, travelling concession made admissible to the railway employee by way of free travelling passes and P.T Os., though would be part of ‘wages’ but it would not be capable of being expressed or computed in terms of money. The travelling concession by way of free travelling passes or P.T Os., is in kind and can only be utilised and enjoyed. It is not to be converted into money. The question which arises then is, what is the effect of including ‘travelling concession’ in the definition of ‘wages’. The effect is that it becomes a vested right legally enforceable by the employee. The concession does not remain type of a concession, which may depend upon the discretion or sweet will of the employer. It does not remain open to the employer to withdraw such concession on the ground that it is his choice or discretion to extend or not to extend that concession. It can be enforced in various ways. In a given case, if the employee applies for free travelling passes but the railway administration refuses the same illegally, the employee can approach the appropriate forum for a direction to the employer to issue free travelling passes and to set aside the illegal order. Yet in another case, if the employer sits right over the, matter and does not pass the necessary orders on the application for free passes, the employee can certainly get necessary directions issued for consideration and disposal of the application. Another consequence, out of many, may be that in case the employer illegally refuses to issue free travelling passes by reason of which the employees had not been able to undertake the journey and it resulted in some injury to the employees, the employee can bring a legal action against the railway administration for damages for the injury suffered by???. He may file any other suit or take???ourse to any other legal remedy open to him in case of wrongful refusal to issue passes, but this would not mean that the concession of free travelling is capable of being computed in terms of money under S. 33 C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. In this connection I may further observe that on behalf of the opposite parties, nothing has been brought to the notice of the Court to indicate that there is any provision providing for travelling concession. This factor was taken into consideration in the cases referred to earlier in this judgment namely A.I.R 1965 Bom. 172 and 1961 — II L.L.J 113.

15. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also tried to submit that the application under S..33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act was not entertainable as it involved a question of entitlement which could not be, decided in the proceedings under S. 33 C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act and in connection with the same he placed reliance upon (1969) 2 SCC 199 : A.I.R 1970 S.C 209; (1969) 2 SCC 400 : A. I R. 1970 S.C 237; 1979 L. & I.C 982; and 1974 L. & I.C 1018, but I find that the submission made is not tenable as I have already found that travelling concession is covered by the term’ wages’ under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act. Therefore, the question of entitlement is not involved. It is a different matter that the kind of ‘wages’ involved in this case can only be utilised or enjoyed but could not be computed in terms of money.

16. In the result, the writ petition is allowed and the order passed by the Labour Court, dated 17 December, 1985, contained in annexure 1, is hereby quashed. There, would however, be no orders as to costs.