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  • Section 17 of the Provincial Small Causes Court Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act).
  • Order IX Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • ARTICLE 226 A CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
  • Section 17 of the Small Causes Courts Act
  • SECTION 5 LIMITATION ACT
  • Order IX, Rule 13 of C.P.C
  • Order 9 Rule 13 of C.P.C,
  • Section 152 of C.P.C
  • 1963 Act Section 5
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Cites
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • Section 17 of the Provincial Small Causes Court Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act).
  • Order IX Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • ARTICLE 226 A CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
  • Section 17 of the Small Causes Courts Act
  • SECTION 5 LIMITATION ACT
  • Order IX, Rule 13 of C.P.C
  • Order 9 Rule 13 of C.P.C,
  • Section 152 of C.P.C
  • 1963 Act Section 5
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The dispute arose from a small causes suit filed by the landlords (Respondents No. 3 to 7, hereinafter "plaintiffs") for ejectment, rent, mesne profits and water-tax against the tenants (petitioners/defendants). An ex parte decree was entered against the defendants on 30-3-1987. The defendants stated they first learned of that decree on 5-5-1987 and on 6-5-1987 applied to set aside the ex parte decree, alleging non-service of summons. The defendants also applied that their prior payment by money-order of Rs. 975 towards rent (allegedly received by the plaintiffs on 21-4-1986) should be taken into account and that only a personal bond should be required under the proviso to Section 17 of the Provincial Small Causes Court Act (the Act).

The trial court on 14-5-1987 permitted the defendants to deposit half the decretal amount in cash and furnish security for the other half by 10-7-1987. The defendants made several applications for time extensions, deposits and for correction of the decree to take account of the Rs. 975 receipt. On 4-8-1987 the defendants deposited Rs. 590.25 in cash and furnished security for Rs. 590.25, which the trial court accepted and issued notice to the plaintiffs under Order IX Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure (C.P.C.), staying execution proceedings for ejectment.

The trial court later, by order dated 4-10-1988, rejected the defendants' application to set aside the ex parte decree, finding (1) the defendants had not proved they learned of the decree on 5-5-1987, and (2) the application under Order IX Rule 13 C.P.C. was not maintainable for non-compliance with the proviso to Section 17 of the Act. On revision, the revisional court (judgment dated 29-4-1989) held the defendants had proved non-service and timely knowledge of the decree but upheld that the proviso to Section 17 had not been complied with. The defendants then filed the present writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging the trial and revisional court orders and the ex parte decree.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the ex parte decree could be set aside on the ground that summons were not served and the defendants informed the court promptly upon learning of the decree.
  2. Whether the courts below were correct in holding that the defendants failed to comply with the proviso to Section 17 of the Provincial Small Causes Court Act, and hence that an application under Order IX Rule 13 C.P.C. was not maintainable.
  3. Whether a court may, or may be treated as having, extended time for compliance with the proviso to Section 17 (including by implied exercise of inherent powers), and whether a party should be penalised for a mistake or delay caused by the court.
  4. Whether the deposit and security furnished by the defendants on 4-8-1987 satisfied the proviso to Section 17 when account is taken of a prior rent payment (Rs. 975) later acknowledged and adjusted by an amendment to the decree under Section 152 C.P.C.
  5. Whether the revisional court erred in refusing to grant relief or condonation for delay given the factual matrix (deposits, security, correction of decree) and the defendants' contention that they sought adjustment of the Rs. 975 from the outset.

Arguments of the Parties

Defendants' (Petitioners') Arguments

  • The defendants had sent a money-order of Rs. 975 towards rent which the plaintiffs admitted receiving during the pendency of the suit; the ex parte decree ignored that admission and should have been adjusted before determining compliance with the proviso to Section 17.
  • The trial court itself permitted the defendants time to comply with the proviso to Section 17 and the defendants complied within the time granted; a party should not suffer for an error of the court, and the courts below erred in holding the court had no jurisdiction to grant such time.
  • After the decree was corrected on 22-8-1988, the shortfall (if any) could and should have been condoned on the defendants' condonation application of 13-5-1988; the correction delayed their ability to demonstrate full compliance.

Plaintiffs' (Respondents') Arguments

  • An application under Order IX Rule 13 C.P.C. is deemed filed only on the date the judgment-debtor complies with Section 17 of the Act; the court has no power to extend the time for compliance with the proviso to Section 17, and therefore the defendants' application was time-barred.
  • The defendants' condonation application filed on 13-5-1988 was inordinate and unexplained; the courts below correctly rejected it.
  • Both courts below found the deposit and security furnished on 4-8-1987 were short of the full decretal amount because mesne profits were not included; consequently Section 17 was not complied with and the application under Order IX Rule 13 C.P.C. was not maintainable.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court in This Opinion
Hukum Khan v. Ist Addl. District Judge, Nainital The Division Bench held that where a court approved deposit of cash and security, it had jurisdiction to extend time for furnishing any security; if delay was caused by court directions, the court could exercise inherent powers (Section 151) to relieve the applicant. The present court relied on this authority to support the proposition that no party should be penalised for the mistake of the court and that the trial court's act of permitting compliance could be treated as an exercise (actual or implied) of power to permit compliance.
Smt. Mohommadi v. Smt. Abna Begum Followed Hukum Khan: where an application under Section 17 was preferred in time, party should not suffer due to court error; the court accepting a bond should examine any deficiency and either require another bond or register the bond furnished. Relied upon to show that the trial court should have examined adequacy of deposit/security and that a party should not be disadvantaged by court error; supports remanding for reconsideration.
Smt. Ram Piyari v. Budh Sen Affirms that substantial compliance with Section 17 is possible: if the two conditions (court direction and furnishing of security) are satisfied before expiry of limitation or in suitable cases even afterwards, the application may be deemed presented on that later date; relates to application of Section 5 Limitation Act for sufficient cause. Used to support the view that substantial compliance (and deeming of presentation date) can cure timing defects and that Section 5 Limitation Act considerations may apply where conditions are satisfied later; the court cites this to argue the defendants should not have been non-suited solely on timing grounds.
Mt. Bipti v. Kali Din Referenced within Ram Piyari as authority for deeming an application presented on the date the conditions are fulfilled; supports substantial compliance principle. Cited as part of the chain of authorities supporting substantial compliance and the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act in appropriate circumstances.
Ibrahim v. The Dy. Director of Consolidation One of the decisions relied upon by respondents asserting that the court has no jurisdiction to give time for compliance with Section 17 and that an application under Order IX Rule 13 C.P.C. is not maintainable unless proviso to Section 17 is complied with. The court acknowledged that the respondents relied on this line of authorities but contrasted those decisions with the authorities favouring relief where the court's own conduct caused delay; the court found the revisional court had not properly reconciled those positions in light of the facts.
Zahir Hasan v. Ist Additional District Judge, Gorakhpur Relied upon by respondents as supporting the proposition that courts lack jurisdiction to extend time for compliance with Section 17; Order IX Rule 13 applications must comply with proviso to Section 17. Noted as part of the counter-authorities relied on by respondents; the present court distinguished the effect of those authorities in the factual matrix where the trial court gave time and the defendants complied pursuant to court orders.
Swami Pratap Singh v. State of U.P. Listed among decisions relied on by respondents for the proposition that courts cannot grant time to comply with Section 17 and applications under Order IX Rule 13 are not maintainable without compliance. Recognised by the court as supporting respondents' contention; the court nonetheless held the revisional court had not properly applied other authorities and facts to avoid penalising a party for court error.
Shanti Prasad Gupta v. Dy. Director of Consolidation Another decision relied on by respondents for the strict view that Section 17 compliance cannot be time-extended by the court. Noted by this court as part of the body of decisions urged by respondents; the court found these authorities did not justify the revisional court's failure to consider the trial court's grant of time and the defendants' subsequent compliance and related corrections to the decree.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded by analysing (1) the factual record of what the trial court had done, (2) the defendants' conduct in making deposits and furnishing security pursuant to court directions, (3) the defendants' claim regarding the Rs. 975 rent receipt, and (4) the legal authorities on whether a party may be penalised for a court's mistake or whether the court may, expressly or impliedly, permit compliance with Section 17.

Key elements of the court's reasoning were:

  • The revisional court recorded a finding that no party should be punished for a fault of the court, yet in the same breath denied defendants the benefit of the trial court's extensions of time. The court identified this as a patent contradiction in the revisional court's findings (para 14).
  • The defendants had, from early on (application dated 14-5-1987), asserted that they had sent Rs. 975 which the plaintiffs had received; the revisional court's finding that the defendants did not claim this benefit in July 1987 was contrary to the record (para 15). The decree was later corrected under Section 152 C.P.C., which acknowledged the mistake in the decree preparation.
  • Authorities (Hukum Khan, Mohommadi, Ram Piyari and related cases) establish that a party should not be penalised for the court's error and that substantial compliance and court directions can cure timing defects in appropriate circumstances; the court relied on these to conclude the defendants should not be non-suited merely because the court may have lacked jurisdiction to extend time formally (paras 16–22).
  • Even if the trial court formally lacked power to extend time, the fact remains that the trial court permitted compliance and the defendants complied (deposit and security on 4-8-1987). On this basis the court considered it reasonable to treat that compliance as having been effected under the court's orders (para 21).
  • The revisional court failed to re-assess whether the deposit and security, when considered along with the admitted Rs. 975 and the subsequent correction of the decree, satisfied the proviso to Section 17; the present court found this omission required reconsideration by the revisional court (paras 21, 30–31).

After reviewing the authorities and the record, the court concluded that the revisional court had not approached the problem correctly: it had both recognised the principle that parties should not be penalised for court mistakes and yet refused to give effect to the trial court's extensions and the defendants' compliance. Consequently the revisional court's judgment suffered from error and required reconsideration.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court set aside the order of the Additional District Judge, Bareilly (Order XIII) dated 29-4-1989 in Smt. Masih Das v. Ramesh Chandra Saxena and remanded the matter to the revisional court for fresh consideration in the light of the observations made in this judgment (para 23).

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The revisional court's order rejecting the defendants' revision is set aside and the revisional court must reconsider the defendants' revision afresh, taking into account (a) that the trial court granted time and the defendants complied with deposit and security on 4-8-1987, and (b) the defendants' contention and evidence that Rs. 975 had been received by the plaintiffs during the suit and was later reflected by correction of the decree under Section 152 C.P.C.
  • Costs: The parties will bear their own costs (para 24).
  • Precedential effect: The judgment interprets and applies existing authorities about substantial compliance, court error and the power (actual or implied) to permit compliance with the proviso to Section 17. The court remanded for reconsideration rather than laying down a novel categorical rule; the decision primarily directs re-examination of facts and application of existing principles to those facts.

    Masih Das v. Court Of Addl. District Judge

    R.B Mehrotra, J.:— A small causes suit has been filed by the present Respondents No. 3 to 7, who are admittedly the landlords of the premises in dispute against the petitioners, who are admittedly the tenants. For convenience, the respondents are hereinafter described as ‘plaintiffs’ and the petitioners are hereinafter described as ‘defendants’. The suit was filed for the relief of a decree for ejectment of the defendants from the premises in dispute and also for rent and mesne profits alongwith water-tax.

    2. The plaintiffs obtained an ex parte decree against the defendants on 30-3-1987. The defendants claim that they came to know of the said ex parte decree on 5-5-1987, and immediately on the next day i.e on 6-5-1987, they moved an application, supported by an affidavit, wherein, the defendants stated that they had no knowledge of the said suit, as the defendants were never served with any summons and the said ex parte decree has been obtained without service of any summons on the defendants. On 14-5-1987, the defendants moved an application for complying with the proviso of Section 17 of the Provincial Small Causes Court Act (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’). In this application, the defendants stated that a money-order has been sent of Rs. 975/- towards rent of the house, which has been received by the plaintiffs during the course of the suit. As such, the defendants should be permitted only to execute a personal bond for compliance of proviso to Section 17 of the Act. Alongwith application, a photostat copy of the original receipt of the money-order for Rs. 975/-, showing receipt of the aforesaid amount by the plaintiffs on 21-4-1986, was filed. The trial court, vide its order dated 14-5-1987, permitted the defendants to deposit half of the decretal amount in cash and security for half of the decretal amount by 10-7-1987. However, before the aforesaid date i.e, 10-7-1987, the defendants moved an application on 26-5-1987 that the plaintiffs' suit has been decreed ex parte on 30-3-1987, wherein the plaintiffs had admitted the receipt of a sum of Rs. 975/- from the defendants on account of rent and mesne profits during the pendency of the case but the said amount has not been adjusted in preparing the ex parte decree. As such, the ex parte decree, may be amended suo motu. In the aforesaid background on 10-7-1987, the defendants moved another application, saying that so far as the rent is concerned, the defendants have paid the rent but the exact amount of the decree is not being ascertained. The original record may be summoned, so that the defendants may deposit the full amount. On the said application, the court directed the original file to be summoned, fixing 23-7-1987. On 23-7-1987 the court granted one week's time for complying with the court's order dated 14-5-87. On 30-7-87 an application was moved on behalf of the defendants, seeking one month's time for depositing the decretal amount on the ground that the defendant Masih Das had fallen ill on the said date. The application was allowed and 15 days' time was granted to the defendants for complying with the court's order dated 14-5-1987. On 4-8-1987 the defendants deposited a sum of Rs. 590-25 paise in cash and furnished security for a sum of Rs. 590-25 paise, which was duly accepted by the trial court. The trial court issued notice on defendants' application under Order-IX Rule 13 of C.P.C to the plaintiffs and also stayed further proceedings in execution case for ejectment of the defendants. The defendants claim that the notice was issued to the plaintiffs, after the trial court was satisfied that proviso of Section 17 of the Act has been complied with. The plaintiffs contested the said application on the ground that the defendants' application, under Order IX Rule 13 of C.P.C is barred by time. It was also contended that the summons were duly served on the defendants and there is no justification for setting aside the ex parte decree.

    3. For completing the narration of facts, two facts may also be noticed, that the defendants' application dated 26-5-1987 for correction of the decree due to the error of the court was ultimately allowed some time in July 1988 and the decree was corrected on 22-8-1988, and an application was moved on 13-5-1988 on behalf of the defendants for condonation of delay in depositing the balance of decretal amount if any, and a sum of Rs. 186/- was deposited with the stipulation that if any amount is found short on the basis of the correction of the decree, the said amount may be permitted to be deposited.

    4. The Judge, Small Causes Court, vide order dated 4-10-1988, rejected the defendants' application for setting aside ex parte decree both on the ground, that the defendants have failed to prove that they got information of the ex-parte decree on 5-5-1987 and the application under Order IX Rule 13 of C.P.C was not maintainable for non-compliance of proviso to Section 17 of the Act.

    5. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order, the defendants preferred a revision. The revisional court in its judgment dated 29-4-89, held that the defendants have proved that no summons of the suit were served on them and the defendants came to know of the ex parte decree on 5-5-1987 and moved application for setting aside ex parte decree next day i.e on 6-5-1987. The defendants' application for setting aside the ex parte decree was within time.

    6. However, the revisional court upheld the view of the Judge, Small Causes Court that the defendants have failed to comply with the requirement of proviso to Section 17 of the Act.

    7. The defendants have challenged the aforesaid judgments of the Judge, Small Causes Court as well as of the revisional court and have also challenged the ex parte decree, passed against them, by means of the present writ petition, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

    8. The defendant's counsel has made following submissions. Firstly, that the defendants have sent money-order of Rs. 975/- towards rent, which was admitted to the plaintiffs. The ex parte decree was passed by the court, ignoring the aforesaid admission. As such, the said amount should have been adjusted before judging the compliance of the requirement of the proviso to Section 17 of the Act. If the said amount would have been adjusted in the decretal amount, the defendants duly complied with the requirement of the proviso to Section 17 of the Act within the time allowed by the court.

    9. Secondly, the court having itself permitted the defendants to comply with the requirement of the proviso to Section 17 of the Act and the defendants having complied with the said requirement within time allowed by the court, the courts below were not justified in taking a view that the court had no jurisdiction to grant time for compliance of proviso to Section 17 of the Act. It is a settled proposition of law that no party should suffer for the mistake of the court.

    10. Thirdly, in any case the decree was corrected by the court as late as on 22-8-1988. As such, the court should have examined that the short fall, if any, could have been condoned on the defendants' application for condonation of delay given in the month of May, 1988.

    11. The plaintiffs' counsel has mainly contended that an application, under Order 9, Rule-13 of C.P.C, shall be deemed to be filed only on the date, the judgment debtor complies with the requirement of Section 17 of the Act. There is no power with the court for extending time for complying with the requirement of proviso to Section 17 of the Act. The counsel contended that the application for condonation of delay was given as late as on 13-5-1988 and there was no justification for this inordinate delay. The court below rightly rejected the said application and rightly held that there was no proper application moved on the part of defendants under Order 9 Rule 13 of C.P.C, read with proviso to Section 17 of the Act within time.

    12. The revisional court, while dismissing the defendants' revision, held that even though the trial court had no jurisdiction to extend time for complying with the requirement of proviso to Section 17 of the Act, still the defendants should not be penalised for the mistake of the court and it may be held that the defendants were entitled to comply with the requirement of proviso to Section 17 of the Act latest by 10-7-1987, but the defendants failed to comply with the said requirement even on 10-7-1987. There was no justification for the defendants to have sought further time on 10-7-1987 for complying with the requirement of proviso to Section 17 of the Act The defendants cannot be given any advantage of the court's order dated 23-7-1987 and 30-7-1987, whereby time was further extended for complying with the court's order dated 14-5-1987. The reviaional court also held that there was no justification for the defendants to have not complied with the court's order dated 14-5-1987 by 10-7-1987, as it was open to the defendants to have ascertained the exact decretal amount by 10-7-1987 and should have complied with the requirement of the proviso to Section 17 of the Act latest by 10-7-1987.

    13. The revisional court also held that the amount deposited and the security furnished by the defendants to the extent of Rs. 1180-50 Paise was not the full decretal amount, as the amount of mesne profits was not calculated in depositing the said amount. The said amount was short of the amount, required to be deposited under the proviso to Section 17 of the Act. While deciding the aforesaid point, against the defendants, the revisional court observed that it is true that the decree was amended in the month of July 1988, according to which, some amount was added in the decree on the basis of water-tax and some amount was reduced from the decree on the basis of the rent, received by the plaintiffs during the course of the suit. However, the defendants did not claim any benefit for adjusting the aforesaid amount in the month of July 1987, while seeking compliance of proviso to Section 17 of the Act.

    14. At the outset, it may be stated that the first finding, recorded by the revisional court, that the defendants cannot be given any advantage of the court's order dated 23-7-1987 and 30-7-1987 is patently contrary to its own finding, recorded earlier that no party should be punished for the fault of the court. The revisional court having itself held that even though the court had no jurisdiction to extend time for compliance of the requirement of proviso to Section 17 of the Act the defendant, should not suffer for the mistake of the court, in the same breath, the revisional court held contrary, taking a view that even though, the court granted time to the defendants for compliance of the requirement of the proviso to Section 17 of the Act, the defendants cannot be given advantage of the same. The two findings are patently contradictory to each other.

    15. The revisional court was also not correct in taking a view that the defendants did not claim any advantage of the amount of rent, sent by the defendants during the course of suit and received by the plaintiffs, during the course of the suit in April, 1986, whereas the record clearly shows that the defendants categorically stated in their application dated 14-5-1987 that they have already sent the rent to the plaintiffs and the said rent has been received by the plaintiffs during the course of the suit. As such only personal bond should be taken from the defendants. The fact of sending the rent of Rs. 975/- by the defendants and receipt of the aforesaid amount by the plaintiffs, was clearly plated by the defendants in their application dated 14-5-1987. The courts below failed to take notice of the said fact. In any case, the decree of the suit was amended in the month of July, 1988 under Section 152 of C.P.C and the court should have taken the said fact into account, while deciding the question, as to whether the defendants duly complied with the proviso to Section 17 of the Act by depositing half of the decretal amount of Rs. 590-25 paise and furnishing security for remaining 593-25 paise. The revisional court has failed to take the said fact into consideration.

    16. In Hukum Khan v. Ist Addl. District Judge, Nainital,1 the judgment debtor deposited the decretal amount and furnished security as per directions of the court within the extended time and the trial court accepted the security bond as sufficient and issued notice to the decree-holder. The decree-holder objected that the security was short by certain amount. Thereafter the court permitted the tenant to furnish the security of the said amount. The direction of the court was complied with by the judgment-debtor. A division Bench of this Court held in the aforesaid case that as the court had approved deposit of cash and security offered by the judgment-debtor, the court had jurisdiction to extend the time for furnishing any security. The Division Bench further held in this case.

    “If the court delayed in giving its direction or approving expressly or impliedly the security already tendered, so long that the period of limitation had expired before the applicant had fair opportunity of complying with the direction, then in a suitable case it would be open to the Court itself to consider and exercise the inherent powers reserved to it by Section 151.

    17. In Smt. Mohommadi v. Smt. Abna Begum,2 a single Jugde of this Court following the aforesaid Division Bench decision 1 eld:—

    “Once an application under Section 17 of the Small Causes Courts Act was preferred in time, there is sufficient compliance, party is not to suffer due to any error of the Court. While accepting the bond the court should have examined whether there is any deficiency or shortage in cash deposit or in the amount of security and whether it would prefer to have another bond or seek registration of the bond already furnished.”

    18. In Smt. Ram Piyari v. Budh Sen,3 this Court held:—

    “In view of this changed legal position, the view that the two necessary conditions required by Section 17, namely, a direction of the Court for the furnishing of security and the actual furnishing of the security should be complied within the prescribed period of limitation otherwise the application will not be a proper application, does not represent an accurate position in law. It is well settled that if the two conditions are not fulfilled at the time when application is actually presented, there would be substantial compliance with the proviso if the conditions are satisfied before the expiry of the period of limitation, because—

    “The applicant cannot be in a worse position in such a case than if his application had been rejected or returned to him, and he had filed a fresh application. To require of him to file a fresh application after he had fulfilled the two conditions would be a futile act. The application already kept pending by the court can be treated as having been presented after the conditions have been fulfilled. In this view of the matter, the application in the present case although presented on 4-2-1949, would be deemed to have been duly presented on 9-2-1949 when the security bond was filed and since this was done within the period of limitation, it substantially complied with the provisions of Section 17”. vide Mt. Bipti v. Kali Din.4

    The same principle would be applicable even if the condition is fulfilled after the expiry of the period of limitation. The result would be that the application can be deemed to have been presented on that day even though by that time the period of limitation may have expired. In that event the question for determination would be whether there was sufficient cause within meaning of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, because under the 1963 Act Section 5 does become applicable previously in this State Section 5 was not applicable at all.”

    19. Sri S.K Verma, learned counsel for the respondents, however placed reliance on the following decisions:—

    1. Ibrahim v. The Dy. Director of Consolidation.5

    2. Zahir Hasan v. Ist Additional District Judge, Gorakhpur.6

    3. Swami Pratap Singh v. State of U.P.7

    4. Shanti Prasad Gupta v. Dy. Director of Consolidation.8

    20. The gist of the aforesaid decisions is that the court has no jurisdiction to give time for compliance of requirement of Section 17 of the Act and that an application under Order IX Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not maintainable unless the provisions of proviso to Section 17 of the Act is complied with. On the basis of the aforesaid decisions, it has been contended before me by the learned counsel for the respondent that at best the application for recalling the ex parte decree moved by the petitioner can be treated to have been moved on the date petitioner complied with the requirement of Section 17 of the Act. It was open to the petitioners to move an application for condonation of delay on the date the petitioners deposited the security and cash amount i.e, on 4-8-1987. The petitioners did not move any such application. The court itself had no authority to extend time permitting the petitioners to comply with Section 17 of the Act. The petitioners for the first time have moved an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act on 13-5-1988 i.e, after lapse of nine months of the date of deposit made by the petitioners. There is no explanation worth the name for explaining the delay of nine months, as such the courts below were justified in rejecting the said application. The counsel for the respondent also contended that both the courts below have recorded a concurrent finding that the deposit made by the defendants on 4-8-1987 was not in accordance with proviso to Section 17 of the Act, as such this court should not interfere with the aforesaid findings. It was also contended that the defendants did not comply with the requirement of Section 17 of the Act, as the said deposit was not for the full amount due against the defendants under the decree of the court at the time of presenting their application. As such, even on 4-8-1987, Section 17 of the Act was not complied with and the court below committed no error in rejecting the petitioners' application under Order IX, Rule 13 of C.P.C on the aforesaid ground.

    21. On the basis of the law laid down by this court, it is made out that no party should be penalised for the mistake of the court. In the present case, admittedly the court granted time to the defendants to comply with the requirement of proviso to Section 17 of the Act and the requirement was so complied with by the defendants within the time allowed by the court and on being satisfied that the requirement of proviso to Section 17 of the Act has been complied with, the court issued notice to the plaintiffs. The defendants cannot be non-suited on the basis that the court had no authority to give time. Even assuming that the court had no authority to extend time for complying with the requirement of the proviso to Section 17 of the Act, at best it can be taken that under the orders of the court, the defendants complied with the requirement of the proviso to Section 17 of the Act on 4-8-1987, as such the court impliedly exercised its powers of condonation of delay, in moving application under Order IX, Rule 13 of C.P.C In case the Court would not have extended time, the defendants could have managed to comply with the orders of the court within the stipulated period. The court having itself granted time, the defendants cannot be told later on that you are not entitled to comply with the requirement of the proviso to Section 17 of the Act, even though, the court has permitted you to comply with the said requirement. In any case, the revisional court has also noticed that the defendants did move an application for condonation of delay. The said application should not have been rejected on the ground that there is no valid explanation for moving application as late as on 13-5-1988. The defendants gave explanation that a sum of Rs. 975/-. which the plaintiffs received during the pendency of the suit, which the plaintiffs admitted in their statement, should have been adjusted in the decree and the decree should have been prepared after adjusting the aforesaid amount. Due to delay in the correction of the decree, the defendants failed to comply with the requirement of proviso to Section 17 of the Act. The defendants were claiming adjustment of the aforesaid amount right from the very beginning. The revisional court was not right in saying that the defendants did not claim the benefit of the adjustment of the said amount in July, 1987. This observation of the revisional court is patently contrary to record.

    22. From the above discussion, it is clear that the revisional court has not approached the problem from the correct angle. The revisional court has not taken into account the fact that there was no fault on the part of the defendants in complying with the requirement of proviso to Section 17 of the Act within the time allowed by the court. The revisional court having itself held that the defendants should not be penalised for the mistake of the court, there was no jurisdiction for the revisional court to have taken a view that after 10-7-87 the defendants could not have taken advantage of the courts' order.

    23. The revisional court also failed to take into consideration that the defendants were claiming adjustment of Rs. 975/- towards compliance of the requirement of proviso to Section 17 of the Act right from the very beginning. The said amount should have been adjusted in the decree, is clear from the fact that the said decree has teen amended by the court itself in exercise of powers under Section 152 of C.P.C It has been held by the trial court itself that it was due to mistake of the court that a wrong decree was prepared. If the correct decree would have been prepared, the said amount would have been adjusted in the decree and if the said amount would have adjusted in the said decree, still can it be held that the defendants failed to deposit the requisite amount and failed to furnish security of the requisite amount, as per directions of the court even on 4-8-1987. All these matters require re-consideration of the revisional court. The judgment of the revisional court apparently suffers from the error pointed out in this judgment. As such, the order of the revisional court is liable to be set aside. The matter may be remanded back to be decided afresh in the light of the observations made in this judgment. I accordingly set aside the Order XIII of Additional District Judge, Bareilly dated 29-4-1989, passed in Smt. Masih Das v. Ramesh Chandra Saxena, and remand back the matter to the revisional court for deciding the defendants revision afresh in the light of the observations made in this judgment.

    24. The parties will bear their own costs.

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    Masih Das v. Court Of Addl. District Judge
    (Feb 13, 1992)