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  • Section 17. Section 17 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act provides:17. Application of the Code of Civil Procedure.(1)
  • Order IX, rule 9 or 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 5 of the 1908 Act provided5. Extension
  • Rules of Court made Section 5 applicable to Order IX, rule 15, C.P.C
  • provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908,
  • SECTION 17 PROVINCIAL SMALL CAUSE COURTS ACT
  • Section 145 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.4.
  • Section 5 of the 1963 Act provides5. Extension
  • Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
  • SECTION 5 LIMITATION ACT 1908
  • Order IX, rule 13, C.P.C10.
  • LIMITATION ACT 1963
  • 1963 Act Section 5
  • Order IX, rule 9
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
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Acts
  • Section 17. Section 17 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act provides:17. Application of the Code of Civil Procedure.(1)
  • Order IX, rule 9 or 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 5 of the 1908 Act provided5. Extension
  • Rules of Court made Section 5 applicable to Order IX, rule 15, C.P.C
  • provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908,
  • SECTION 17 PROVINCIAL SMALL CAUSE COURTS ACT
  • Section 145 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.4.
  • Section 5 of the 1963 Act provides5. Extension
  • Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
  • SECTION 5 LIMITATION ACT 1908
  • Order IX, rule 13, C.P.C10.
  • LIMITATION ACT 1963
  • 1963 Act Section 5
  • Order IX, rule 9
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Satish Chandra, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

Budh Sen filed a suit for ejectment against Lala Amichand. During the pendency of that suit Amichand died and his widow, Smt. Ram Piari (the present applicant), together with his sons and daughters (opposite parties 2 to 7), were substituted. The sons actively participated in the further hearing. The suit was ultimately decreed on December 6, 1975. The decree was ex parte as regards the applicant, Smt. Ram Piari.

The applicant moved to set aside the ex parte decree on January 19, 1976 and at the same time filed a tender for the decretal amount of Rs. 208.80. The court "passed the tender" on the same day and the money was deposited in the bank on February 18, 1976. The trial court dismissed the application to set aside the ex parte decree, finding that the applicant had knowledge of the suit and willfully did not appear; it disbelieved her assertion that she first learned of the decree on January 13, 1976. The trial court held that the application was consequently barred by the prescribed period of limitation because the decree was dated December 6, 1975.

Aggrieved, the applicant filed a revision. In the revision proceedings it was argued that because the proviso to Section 17 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act had not been complied with (in particular that the decretal amount was not deposited within time), the application to set aside the ex parte decree was not maintainable. The District Judge upheld that contention and dismissed the revision. The applicant then approached this Court by a petition under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. While the matter was before the District Judge, the applicant had moved an application supported by affidavit asking that the delay in depositing the money be condoned; no specific order on that condonation application appears to have been made by the District Judge.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether non-compliance with the proviso to Section 17 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act (i.e., failure to deposit the decretal amount within time or furnish security as directed) renders an application to set aside an ex parte decree non-maintainable.
  2. Whether Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 applies to an application under Order IX, rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure (i.e., an application to set aside an ex parte decree), and, if so, whether it permits condonation of delay by showing sufficient cause.
  3. Whether the District Judge erred in failing to pass any specific order on the applicant's application for condonation of delay in depositing the decretal amount.

Arguments of the Parties

Arguments advanced (as recorded in the opinion)

  • It was argued in the revision that, because the proviso to Section 17 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act had not been complied with (specifically the decretal amount was not deposited within time), the application for setting aside the ex parte decree was not maintainable; the District Judge accepted this contention and dismissed the revision.
  • Learned counsel for the applicant argued that the learned District Judge erred in not passing an order on the application for condonation of the delay in depositing the money and further that he misconstrued the proviso to Section 17. The applicant had also moved, in the District Judge's court, an application supported by affidavit praying that the delay in depositing the money be condoned.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Sher Ahmad Khan v. Ali Bux, A.I.R. 1931 All. 103 Held that Section 17 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act is mandatory. The court observed that Section 17 had been regarded as mandatory in this decision, establishing the mandatory character of the proviso's requirements.
Ram Bharose v. Ganga Singh, A.I.R. 1931 All. 727 (Full Bench) Explained various methods of complying with Section 17 and gave a reasonable and practical interpretation of the proviso. The court relied on the Full Bench's explanation to show that there are varied modes of compliance with Section 17 and that it admits of practical construction.
Bipti (Defendant-Applicant) v. Kali Din (Plaintiff-Opposite Party), A.I.R. 1951 All. 420 Held that where the Court's direction as to security is taken and security is furnished within the period of limitation, the application can be treated as made when the security is filed or cash deposited; if direction or security come only after expiry of limitation the application is not proper. The court cited this decision for the principle of "substantial compliance" — that an application may be treated as made when the security is eventually furnished if that occurs within the limitation period, and for the related treatment of timing.
K.A. Desai & Co. v. Vijaysinhji Bhimshinhji, A.I.R. 1954 Saurashtra 84 Illustrates that some High Courts (Bombay, Madras, Nagpur and Saurashtra) made Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908, applicable to certain Order IX provisions by Rules of Court. The court used this precedent to show earlier regional practices whereby Section 5 (old Act) had been extended by Rules of Court to applications under Order IX in some High Courts.
Marimuthu Coundar v. Ponnammal, A.I.R. 1956 Mad. 422 Another decision illustrating regional rule-making to make Section 5 (old Act) applicable to Order IX applications. Referred to as further authority for the historical position that some High Courts extended the 1908 Section 5 by Rules to Order IX matters.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analyzed the matter in the light of changes introduced by the Limitation Act, 1963, and earlier case-law dealing with compliance with the proviso to Section 17 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act.

  1. Textual starting-point: The proviso to Section 17 requires that an applicant to set aside an ex parte decree must, at the time of presenting the application, either deposit the decretal amount in court or comply with a prior direction of the court as to furnishing security.
  2. Pre-1963 position: Under the Limitation Act, 1908, Section 5 extended the limitation period for some classes of applications only if specifically made applicable; consequently, the earlier judicial approach (as in Bipti) was that the two conditions in Section 17 (court's direction and furnishing security) should be fulfilled within the prescribed period of limitation; otherwise the application would not be proper.
  3. Change by Limitation Act, 1963: The 1963 Act's Section 5 (quoted in the opinion) broadly provides for extension of prescribed periods to "any appeal or any application" except certain Order XXI applications. The court reasoned that the new Section 5 applies of its own force to applications the period for which is prescribed in the Limitation Act schedule. Article 123 of the 1963 Act provides a limitation period for an application to set aside an ex parte decree; therefore Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, is of its own force applicable to an application under Order IX, rule 13, C.P.C.
  4. Effect on the interpretation of Section 17: Because Section 5 now applies, the prior strict view is modified. If the two conditions required by the proviso to Section 17 are not fulfilled at the time the application is presented, there can still be "substantial compliance" if the conditions are satisfied before the expiry of the prescribed limitation period — treating the initial application as having been presented when the conditions are fulfilled. Even if the conditions are fulfilled after the expiry of the limitation period, the application can be deemed presented on the day the conditions are satisfied, and in that case Section 5 will require the applicant to show sufficient cause for delay.
  5. Application to the present facts: The applicant had moved an application for condonation of delay, though not expressly and precisely drafted as an application under Section 5; the substance of the filing was that the court had jurisdiction to entertain an application under Section 5 and the defects were curable. However, the trial court had made a factual finding that the applicant's claim that she first learned of the decree on January 13, 1976 was not believable. That finding of fact is binding on revision and was not shown to be contrary to law or to suffer from jurisdictional error. Because that factual finding meant the application was time-barred, and because the explanation for the delay was found untrue, there was no basis for condonation under Section 5. The District Judge, being of the view that Section 5 was not applicable, did not consider the merits of the applicant's condonation application; but remanding the case for such consideration would be futile in view of the adverse finding of fact at trial.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The revision fails and is accordingly DISMISSED with costs.

Implications (as stated or necessarily arising from the opinion):

  • The court held that the Limitation Act, 1963 (Section 5), applies to applications under Order IX, rule 13 (application to set aside ex parte decrees), so that condonation of delay may be available where sufficient cause is shown.
  • The earlier strict requirement that the two conditions in the proviso to Section 17 (court's direction and actual furnishing of security/deposit) must be satisfied at the moment of presenting the application is not an accurate statement of the law after the 1963 Act. There can be substantial compliance if the conditions are fulfilled before the expiry of the prescribed period, and, if satisfied after expiry, the question turns on whether sufficient cause is shown under Section 5.
  • In the present case, however, because of a binding finding of fact by the trial court that the applicant's explanation for delay (date of knowledge of the decree) was not credible, the application was time-barred and no condonation under Section 5 was available; remand would have been futile. The direct consequence for the parties is the dismissal of the revision and the maintenance of the ex parte decree as against the applicant.

This summary is drawn exclusively from the text of the provided opinion and does not add facts or inferences beyond those expressly contained in the opinion.

    Smt. Ram Piyari v. Budh Sen And Others

    Satish Chandra, J.:— Budh Sen, opposite party No. 1, filed a suit for ejectment against Lala Amichand. During the pendency of the suit, Amichand died. His widow Smt. Ram Piari, the present applicant as well as his sons and daughters, who are opposite parties 2 to 7, were substituted in his place. The sons actively participated in the further hearing of the suit and the same was ultimately decreed on December 6, 1975. The decree was ex parte against the applicant, namely, the widow of Amichand. The applicant moved for the setting aside of the ex parte decree on January 19, 1976. She filed a tender for Rs. 208.80, the decretal amount, along with the aforesaid application. The court passed the tender the same day, that the money was deposited in the bank on February 18, 1976. The trial court dismissed the application on the finding that the applicant Smt. Ram Piari had knowledge of the suit and wilfully did not appear and allowed it to proceed ex parte against her. The court disbelieved her case that she came to know of the decree on January 13, 1976. The necessary consequence of this finding was that since the decree was dated December 6, 1975, the application filed on January 19, 1976 was beyond the Prescribed period of limitation.

    2. Aggrieved, the lady went up in revision. At the hearing of the revision, it was argued that since the proviso to Section 17 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act was not complied with in as much as the decretal amount was not deposited within time, the application for setting aside the ex parte decree was not maintainable. The learned District Judge upheld this contention and dismissed the revision. The lady has come to this Court under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. When this point was taken in the court of the District Judge, the applicant moved an application supported by an affidavit praying that the delay in depositing the money be condoned. No specific order appears to have been passed by the learned District Judge on this application.

    3. Learned counsel for the applicant has argued that the learned District Judge was in error in not passing any order on the application for condonation of delay in depositing the money and further that he misconstrued the proviso to Section 17. Section 17 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act provides:—

    “17. Application of the Code of Civil Procedure.—(1) The procedure prescribed in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, shall save in so far as is otherwise provided by that Code or by this Act, be the procedure followed in a Court of Small Causes in all suits cognizable by it, and in all proceedings arising out of such suits:

    Provided that an applicant for an order to set aside a decree passed ex parte or for a review of judgment shall, at the time of presenting his application either deposit in the court the amount due from him under the decree or in pursuance of the judgment or the decree of compliance with the judgment as the Court may, on a previous application made by him in this behalf, have directed.

    (2) Where a person has become liable as surety under the Proviso to sub-section (1), the security may be realised in manner provided by Section 145 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908”.

    4. In (Sher) Ahmad Khan v. Ali Bux . A.I.R 1931 All. 103. Section 17 was held to be mandatory. In Ram Bharose v. Ganga Singh . A.I.R 1931 All. 727. a Full Bench explained the various methods of complying with Section 17. The Full Bench gave a reasonable and practical interpretation of the Proviso.

    5. In Bipti…Defendant-Applicant; v. Kali Din…Plaintiff-Opposite Party. . A.I.R 1951 All. 420. a Division Bench held:—

    “….Where the direction of the Court as to the security is to be furnished is taken and the security is furnished within the period of limitation and the application for the setting aside of an ex parte decree is also made within time, the application for the setting aside of an ex parte decree, though made before the direction of the Court is obtained or the security is actually furnished, can be treated as having been made when the security bond is filed or the cash is deposited; and in such cases the provisions of Section 17 shall be deemed to have been substantially complied with where any of the two necessary conditions require by Section 17, namely, the direction of the Court for the furnishing of security and the actual furnishing of security are done after the expiry of the period of limitation the application for the setting aside of an ex parte decree cannot be considered to be a proper application.”

    6. This situation arose because Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908 was not applicable to an application under Order IX, rule 9 or 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 5 of the 1908 Act provided—

    “5. Extension of period in certain cases.—Any appeal or application for a review of judgment or for leave to appeal or any other application to which this section may be made applicable by or under any enactment for the time being in force may be admitted after period of limitation prescribed therefor, when the appellant or applicant satisfies the Court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period.”

    7. The section was applicable on its own force to the two categories of applications, namely, review of judgment or leave to appeal. It was applicable to any other application only if it was made applicable by any other enactment. The Bombay, Madras, Nagpur and Saurashtra High Courts alone have by Rules of Court made Section 5 applicable to Order IX, rule 15, C.P.C see K.A Desai and Co. v. Vijaysinhji Bhimshinhji . A.I.R 1954 Saurashtra, 84. and Marimuthu Coundar v. Ponnammal . A.I.R 1956 Mad. 422.. It was made applicable to an application under Order IX, rule 9 only by the Bombay High Court. But the Limitation Act of 1963 has changed the position. Section 5 of the 1963 Act provides—

    “5. Extension of prescribed period in certain cases.—Any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, may be admitted after the prescribed period if the appellant or the applicant satisfied the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period.”

    8. Unlike the old section which covered only applications for review of judgment or for leave to appeal and applications to which the section was made expressly applicable by some enactment, the present section of its own force applies to all applications except those under Order XXI, C.P.C It is no longer necessary to extend Section 5 to any category of applications by any enactment before its provisions are attracted.

    9. The section uses the words ‘after the prescribed period’. Section 2(j) of the Act defines ‘prescribed period’ to mean the period of limitation computed in accordance with the provisions of this Act. It implies that the period of limitation must be provided for in the Schedule to the Act. Section 5 would hence of its own force apply to such applications for which the period of limitation is prescribed by the Schedule to the Limitation Act, Art. 123 of the Act of 1963 provides a period of limitation for an application to set aside a decree passed ex parte. It is thus evident that Section 5, Limitation Act, is of its own force applicable to an application under Order IX, rule 13, C.P.C

    10. In view of this changed legal position, the view that the two necessary conditions required by Section 17, namely, a direction of the Court for the furnishing of security and the actual furnishing of the security should be complied within the prescribed period of limitation, otherwise the application will not be a proper application, does not represent an accurate position in law. It is well settled that if the two conditions are not fulfilled at the time when the application is actually presented, there would be substantial compliance with the proviso if the conditions are satisfied before the expiry of the period of limitation, because—

    “The applicant cannot be in a worse position in such a case then if his application had been rejected or returned to him, and he had filed a fresh application. To require of him to file a fresh application after he had fulfilled the two conditions would be a futile act. The application already kept pending by the court can be treated as having been presented after the conditions have been fulfilled. In this view of the matter the application in the present case although presented on February 4, 1949, would be deemed to have been duly presented on February 9, 1949 when the security bond was filed and since this was done within the period of limitation, it substantially complied with the provisions of Section 17”. (vide Bipti…Defendant-Applicant; v. Kali Din…Plaintiff-Opposite Party. (supra).

    11. The same principle would be applicable even if the condition is fulfilled after the expiry of the period of limitation. The result will be that the application can be deemed to have been presented on that day even though by that time the period of limitation may have expired. In that event the question for determination would be whether there was sufficient cause within meaning of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, because under the 1963 Act Section 5 does become applicable. Previously in this State Section 5 was not applicable at all.

    12. The applicant had moved an application for condonation of delay. It is true that it was not specifically headed to be under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. It is further true that the prayer was not quite accurate inasmuch as it did not specifically ask for condonation of delay in filing the application but only for depositing the money. But the substance of the matter was that the court had jurisdiction to entertain an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The defects in it could easily be cured. Evidently, the District Judge being of the view that Section 5 was not applicable at all did not consider the merits of the application. In this view the case would have meant a remand to the lower appellate court. But I find that the trial court had dismissed the application on the finding that the applicant's case that she derived knowledge of the decree on January 13, 1976 was not believable. This was a finding of fact which is binding in a revision. I am not satisfied that the finding was contrary to law, much less that it suffered from any jurisdictional error. In view of this finding the application was barred by time. Since the explanation for the delay was not held to be true, there was no question of condoning the delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. In this view the remand of the case would be a futile order.

    13. In the result the revision fails and is accordingly dismissed with costs.

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    Smt. Ram Piyari v. Budh Sen And Others
    (May 19, 1977)