1. Industrial dispute relating to the non-employment of one M. Sankaranarayanan, a workman was referred for adjudication to Labour Court by the Government of Tamil Nadu in G.O.Ms No. 1423, Labour and Employment Department, dated 3 September, 1979, under S. 10(1)(c) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short the Act). The said dispute was taken on file as Industrial Dispute No. 268 of 1979 on the file of the First Additional Labour Court, Madras.

2. The workman filed a statement of claim that the management of Vijaya and Suresh Combines, Motion Pictures Producers, terminated his services from October 1978 onwards without notice and that the said termination is illegal. On the other hand, the management would contend that there was no termination as alleged, and that the petitioner left the services on his own in September 1977 itself to better his prospects.

3. The workman also made a claim petition in C.P No. 468 of 1984 under S. 33-C(2) of the Act claiming wages from November 1977 to October 1978 at Rs. 300 per mensem and daily batta for the same period at the rate of Rs. 15 per day on the ground that his wages and batta for the said period were not paid. To such a claim, the management contended that the workman left the services from October 1977; that his last drawn wage was only Rs. 250, that the claim of batta is not sustainable, as it is paid only when he went on tour; that he did not go on tour from June 1977 onwards and that the present petition is only an offshoot of the proceedings of the industrial dispute.

4. By consent of parties, evidence was recorded in common in both the proceedings.

5. Learned Labour Judge, apart from taking into consideration the conduct of workman and other relevant circumstances also relied upon the admission stated to have been made by the workman expressing his unequivocal intention to abandon the services. The admission so made by him in a letter sent to the management is to the following effect:

“During my service with you for four years I have received no intimation orally or in writing of termination … I have had no intention of leaving my services from your firm but was forced to take this decision on the strength of your manager's call at my house to find out my reaction on your decisions to dispense with my services, Also to sustain myself and family I have to look out for another job.”

6. The other reasoning resorted to be given is couched in the following terms:

“If really the petitioner was in the employment of the respondent and his services were terminated only in October 1978, one would normally expect the petitioner to have received his salary from the respondent till then. But curiously, the petitioner has come forward with a claim petition claiming salary and balla from November 1977 onwards. It is highly unbelievable that the petitioner was working for a period of one year without getting the wages. It is significant to note that at no earlier point of lime before sending Exhibit WI, the petitioner has made a claim in writing for his wages from November 1977 onwards. The very fact that he had not been paid any salary from November 1977 onwards, even according to him, will clearly show that he should not have been in the employment of the respondent during the relevant period and if that were so, his case that his services were terminated in October 1978, cannot be true.”

It was on those reasonings, he was inclined lo hold that it was not a case of termination of the services of the workman in October 1978 as alleged and that the workman has left his services on his own even in September 1977, as alleged by the management. So, the workman was held to be not entitled to the relief asked for.

7. He would further hold that in view of his finding that the workman should have left his services on his own in September 1977, his claim for wages from November 1977 to October 1978 cannot be sustained at all and that when admittedly the workman was not sent lo outstations from the middle of 1977, his claim for batta for one year from November 1977 has no basis at all and that, therefore, he was not entitled lo any relief in the claim petition also.

8. After recording such findings, the operative portion of the order reads as follows:

“In the result, in the industrial dispute there will be an award holding that there was no termination of the petitioner by the respondent as alleged and so the reference itself is bad in law. The claim petition fails and the same is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.”

9. Aggrieved by the said order, the workman resorted to the present action under Art. 226 of the Constitution praying for issue of a writ of certiorarified mandamus lo quash the award in the aforesaid industrial dispute and claim petition by the First Additional Labour Court, Madras, and consequently, to direct his reinstatement with all arrears of salary, continuity of service and all other service benefits and perquisites.

10. Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the award of the Labour Court is unsustainable on the simple ground that it is based on cither no evidence or at least grossly inadequacy of evidence for recording the finding that the workman had voluntarily abandoned the services for better prospects in September 1977 and consequently, his claim for wages from November 1977 to October 1978 cannot at all be sustained and even assuming for argument's sake that there is some evidence as lo his abandonment of his services, such evidence, in the eye of law, can, by no stretch of imagination, be stated to constitute “abandonment of service” and in that view of the matter, he would say that this Court, exercising jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution is perfectly justified in selling at naught the award so passed, in the sense of giving the workman reinstatement and other attendant benefits, such as back-wages, etc.

11. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent would, however, repel such submission.

12. To the said submission of learned counsel for the petitioner, I am unable to affix my seal of approval, in the facts and circumstances of the case. It is not as if the finding recorded by the Labour Court, on the question of “abandonment of service” is not based on any evidence or otherwise, the evidence on record is so grossly inadequate as is not legitimately permissible in the appreciation of such evidence lo record a finding as had been done by it. The rationale adopted by the Labour Court in recording such a finding, as extracted in the summation of facts of this case, would make it appear, in a clinching fashion that due application of mind was there in sifting and scanning the evidence and other circumstances available on record in recording a finding as to the question of voluntary abandonment of the services by the petitioner' and in such a process, the admission of the petitioner in his own letter and other conected circumstances, especially of his not drawing the salary for about a year, notwithstanding the fact that he was virtually working in the office had been duly taken into account. Such being the case, il cannot at all be staled that there is no evidence at all or otherwise, the evidence available is grossly inadequate lo record such a finding. It is thus clear that the finding of the Labour Court was arrived at on the basis of some evidence.

13. It may be that better particulars and clear evidence should have been placed before the Labour Court. Quantum of evidence or appreciation thereof for recording the findings of fact would not come within the purview of the extraordinary jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution. The finding of fact arrived at by the Labour Court, that the petitioner had voluntarily abandoned the services and consequently he was not entitled to wages for the period as claimed for by him cannot at all be disturbed by this Court, inasmuch as such a finding is traceable to sufficient and adequate evidence, in the shape of admission of the petitioner as well as tangible circumstance of himself admitting about his not drawing the salary, although he was slated to have been working virtually in the office of the management of the respondent for more than one year.

14. Useful reference may, however, be made at this juncture to the case of G.T Lad v. Chemicals and Fibres of India, Ltd. [1979 — I L.L.N 331], for understanding the terminology “abandonment of service.” Their Lordships of the Supreme Court dealing with such a question expressed thus, in Para. 50, at page 334:

“In the Act, we do not find any definition of the expression ‘abandonment of service.’ In the absence of any clue as to the meaning of the said expression, we have to depend on meaning assigned to it in the dictionary of English language. In the unabridged edition of Random House Dictionary, the word ‘abandon’ has been explained as meaning ‘to leave completely and finally; forsake utterly; to relinquish; renounce; to give up all concern in something. According to the Dictionary of English Law by Earl Jowitt (1956 Edn.) abandonment’ when used in relation to an office means relinquishment of an interest or claim. According to Black's Law Dictionary abandonment when used in relation to an office means, voluntary relinquishment. It must be total and under such circumstances as clearly to indicate an absolute relinquishment. The failure to perform the duties pertaining to the office must be with actual or imputed intention, on the part of the officer to abandon and relinquish the office. The intention may be inferred from the acts and conduct of the party and is a question of fact. Temporary absence is not ordinarily sufficient to constitute an abandonment of office.

From the connotations reproduced above, it clearly follows that to constitute abandonment, there must be total or complete giving up of duties so as to indicate an intention not to resume the same. In Buckingham and Carnatic Company Ltd. v. Venkatiah, [A.I.R 1964 S.C 1272], it was observed by this Court that under common law an inference that an employee has abandoned or relinquished service is not easily drawn unless from the length of absence and from other surrounding circumstances an inference to that effect can be legitimately drawn and it can be assumed that the employee intended to abandon service abandonment or relinquishment of service is always a question of intention, and normally, such an intention cannot be attributed to an employee without adequate evidence in that behalf. Thus, whether there has been a voluntary abandonment of service or not is a question of fact which has to be determined in the light of the surrounding circumstances of each case.”

The parameter, as devised in constituting “abandonment of service” in the decision, as cited supra, in on all fours applicable to the facts circumstances of the case on hand.

15. For the reason as above, it goes without saying that the writ petition deserves to be dismissed and the same is accordingly dismissed. Rule nisi issued is discharged. There will be no order, however, as to costs in the circumstances.