1. The writ petition in which a temporary relief by way of injunction is sought for arises out of prayer for the issue of a writ of mandamus restraining the respondent not to close down the limestone mines in Sowdapuram or lay off the workmen in the limestone mines, without obtaining permission from the Prescribed authority under Ss. 25-N, 25-O and 25-M of the Industrial Disputes Act. The prayer in the miscellaneous petition is for an injunction restraining the respondent from retrenching or terminating the services of 76 workers including staff members pending disposal of the writ petition. The writ petition was admitted on 19 January 1993 and an interim injunction was granted for 10 days on the same day. The respondent has filed Writ Miscellaneous Petition No. 2908 of 1993 to vacate the order of injunction, dated 19 January 1993. Though elaborate arguments were advanced on both sides, the learned counsel appearing for the writ petitioner is not willing to have the writ petition itself disposed of finally. I am, therefore, constrained to limit my findings only for the purpose of the miscellaneous petitions. In other words, I am only concerned with the question whether the petition has made out a prima facie case for the grant of injunction.
2. A few facts leading to the writ petition are necessary before dealing with the miscellaneous petition. The respondent-company has three factories at Mettur called Plants I, II and III. They have also limestone mines at Sowdapuram, besides other industries; Plants I and III at Mettur are engaged in the manufacture of caustic soda and cholorine while Plant II is engaged in the manufacture of PVC materials. Plant I was also manufacturing bleaching powder and limestone is an important raw material for the manufacture of bleaching powder. It is only for the purpose of uninterrupted supply of quality limestone that the respondent took the mines at Sowdapuram on lease from the Government. Admittedly, the production of bleaching powder was stopped in October 1992 and the workers in the bleaching section were absorbed in other divisions. The cause of action for the present writ petition seems to be a notice put up by the management on 1 October 1992 stating that in view of the stoppage of the production of bleaching powder there was no purpose in running the Sowdapuram Mines, the respondent proposed to close down the mines under S. 25-FFF of the Industrial Disputes Act. One of the preliminary contentions of the petitioner is that the Sowdapuram Mines cannot be treated as a separate establishment as to deprive the workers therein of the protection available under Part V-B of the Industrial Disputes Act. It is the case of the petitioner that there is a functional integrality between Plants I and III and the Sowdapuram Mines, the reason for this stand is that there are only 76 workmen in the Sowdapuram Mines and as such it will not attract Part V-B of the Industrial Disputes Act. But, if the Sowdapuram Mines and Plants 1 and III are taken as one industrial establishment, Part V-B of the Act will stand attracted. Though the closure notice, dated 1 October 1992, was not given effect to, the apprehension of the petitioner is that the respondent will resort to retrenchment without taking permission from appropriate authorities under S. 25-N of the Act. It is to prevent such an alleged illegal action that the present writ petition and miscellaneous petition have been filed.
3. In the application to vacate the injunction, the respondent says that the workmen of Sowdapuram Mines are employed only for the mines and they are not subject to transfer to any other establishments. The wages, allowances and other service conditions for the workmen of the Sowdapuram Mines are governed by separate settlement. However, for the purpose of bonus, the mines is taken along with Plants I and III. The contention is that the Sowdapuram Mines is a separate industrial establishment. There is a preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of the writ petition, because the respondent is a company, the shares of which are held by the public. It is neither a State nor a public authority and, therefore, not amenable to the writ jurisdiction of this Court. There is a categorical averment that the notice, dated 1 October 1992, regarding closure will not be given effect to. The stand of the respondent regarding retrenchment is carefully worded in the sense that the respondent says, that they will always act in accordance with law and it cannot be presume that the respondent will disregard the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act. But the respondent is careful enough to plead and argue that the Sowdapuram Mines has to be treated as a separate establishment for the purpose of application of Part V-B of the Industrial Disputes Act.
There is a categorical averment as follows:
“It is further submitted that the provisions of Ss. 25-N and 25-M of the Industrial Disputes Act, would not apply to the Sowdapuram Mines.”
4. On the above pleadings and the arguments of the respective counsel, the following points arise for consideration:
(i) Prima facie, is the writ petition maintainable:
(ii) Is the apprehension of the petitioner that the respondent is likely to violate S. 25-N of the Act, justified?
(iii) Is the petitioner entitled for the grant of temporary injunction and have they made out the necessary requirements?
5. At the risk of repetition, I make it clear that I am deciding only the miscellaneous petitions and, therefore, I am not referring to all the decisions cited at the Bar, but only those decisions which appear to be binding and which are sufficient to render a decision on a prima facie consideration. It would be proper first to dispose of the objection regarding maintainability of this writ petition. A judgment of’ the Andhra Pradesh High Court in P. Gattaiah v. Commissioner of Labour [1981 - I L.L.N 623], is identical to the facts of the present case. In that case, 87 workmen had been retrenched. It was contended that the retrenchment was contrary to Chap. V-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and, therefore, a mandamus was sought for to reinstate the workmen in service holding that the retrenchment was illegal. Sri G. Subramaniam, learned counsel appearing for the respondent, suggests that this decision cannot be relied upon at this stage, because a Division Bench of our High Court in Workmen of Buckingham and Carnatic Mills v. State of Tamil Nadu [1982 - I L.L.N 455], has expressed a dissent to certain extent, while applying Gattaiah case (vide supra).
6. In Scindia Steam Navigation Company, Ltd. v. Scindia Employees' Unions [1983 - II L.L.N 63], a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court, while holding that the settlement under S. 18(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act does not have the effect of creating statutory duty or a public duty and would not, therefore, give rise to a cause of action to be enforced under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India. However, proceeded to approve Gattaiah case [1981 - I L.L.N 623] (vide supra), by stating in Para. 31, at page 375 of 1983 - II L.L.N:
….this decision does not lay down any new principle, but only gives effect to the established principle that if there is any statutory duty cast upon an individual that will be enforced under Art. 226.”
7. But, I can steer clear of all these decisions by adverting to the judgment of the Apex Court, which in my opinion, are sufficient to hold that the writ petition is maintainable atleast on prima facie consideration. The first is Andi Mukta Sadguru Shree Muktajee Vandas Swami Suvarna Jayanthi Mahotsav Smarak Trust v. V.R Rudani [1989 - II L.L.N 281]. In this judgment, the Apex Court has laid down the principles as to when Art. 226 can be invoked with particular reference to the person or authority. The form of the body concerned against whom a writ is sought for is not very much relevant, according to the Apex Court. After referring to Praga Tools Corporation v. C.A Imanual [1969 S.C.R 773], the Supreme Court observed as follows, in Para. 22, at pages 287 and 288:
“Here again we may point out that mandamus cannot be denied on ground that the duty to be enforced is not imposed by the statute. Commenting on the development of this law, Professor Smith states:
‘To be enforceable by mandamus a public duty does not necessarily have to be one imposed by character, common law, custom or even contract.’
We share this view. The judicial control over the fast expending maze of bodies affecting the rights of the people should not be put into watertight compartment. It should remain flexible to meet the requirements of variable circumstances. Mandamus is a very wide remedy which must be easily available ‘to reach injustice wherever it is found’ Technicalities should not come in the way of granting that relief under Art. 226.”
8. In Miss Raj Soni v. Air Officer-in-Charge Administration [A.I.R 1990 S.C 1303], the Apex Court was concerned with a writ petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India against a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1960. Two passages in the judgment answer the two objections raised by the respondent herein. The first passage is as follows:
“the petitioner's claim is just. It will, therefore, be a travesty of justice to send her to any other forum at this stage. In any case the petitioner seeks to enforce her statutory right under S. 8 of the Act read with Rule 110 of the rules with a further contention that she has been discriminated in the matter of superannuation so much so that other teachers similarly situated were retired at the age of 60 years whereas the petitioner has been singled out and retired at the age of 58 years.”
The second passage is as follows:
“The recognised private schools in Delhi whether aided or otherwise are governed by the provisions of the Act and the rules. The respondent-management is under a statutory obligation to uniformly apply the provisions of the Act and the rules to the teachers employed in the school. When any authority is required to act in a particular manner or under a statute it has no option but to follow the statute. The authority cannot deny the statute on the pretext that it is neither State nor an “authority” under Art. 12 of the Constitution of India.”
On a due consideration of all the above decision, I, therefore, reject the preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the writ petition.
9. As a rider to the objection regarding maintainability, Sri G. Subramaniam, learned counsel appearing for the respondent, also argues that a stage has now come when the Court can presume that the respondents will violate S. 5-N of the Industrial Disputes Act. In other words, the writ-petitioners apprehend violation of S. 25-N and on that basis seek a writ of mandamus. He also relies on the fact that though a notice was issued on 1 October 1992 proposing to close down the Sowdapuram Mines, they have given up that idea and the same has been made clear in the counter-affidavit. But, what is important is that the counter-affidavit does not give any guarantee regarding retrenchment and whether they will follow the provisions of S. 25-N of the Act. On the other hand, the contention of the respondent in the counter-affidavit is that Ss. 25-M and 25-N will not apply to the Sowdapuram Mines, because less than 100 workmen are employed in the mines. Therefore, I have no difficulty in holding that there is a perceptible apprehension that the workmen are likely to be retrenched without following the provisions of S. 25-N of the Act.
10. The third major controversy between the parties is whether Chap. V-B of the Act will apply at all, to the Sowdapuram Mines. The contention of the petitioner is that Plants I and II and the Sowdapuram Mines together constitute one establishment under S. 25-2 of the Act. On the other hand, the contention of the respondents is that the workers of the Sowdapuram Mines are not subject to transfer to any other establishment, that the wages, allowances and other service conditions of the workmen of Sowdapuram Mines are governed by separate settlements and not linked with the factory at Plants I and III. The contention, therefore, is that Sowdapuram Mines is a separate industrial establishment. On this crucial question on which demands (sic) the applicability of Ss. 25-N and 25-M of the Industrial Disputes Act, there are two judgments of the Supreme Court which save me of the trouble of going through the arguments of the respective counsel. Inasmuch as I am deciding only the miscellaneous petition I do not propose to set out elaborately the arguments of Sri G. Subramaniam. Suffice it to say that the argument is based upon the definition contained in 25-L of the Industrial Disputes Act, which is in pari materia with the explanation to S. 25-A of the Act. The argument is that, one industrial establishment cannot comprise of a mine as well as a factory. For the purpose of getting permission under S. 25-N of the Act, the appropriate Government is different in respect of a factory and in respect of a mine. These very arguments were considered in Associated Cement Companies, Ltd., Associated Cement Companies Limited, Chaibassa Cement Works, Jhinkpani v. Workmen. [1960 (1) S.C.R 700]. The Apex Court held that the factory and the limestone quarry are parts of establishment and the fact that in the matter of reference the Act gives jurisdiction to two distinct authorities would not affect the decision. This judgment has been confirmed in S.G Chemicals and Dyes Trading Employees' Union v. S.G Chemicals and Dyes Trading, Ltd. [1986 — I L.L.N 986]. I am quoting two passages from the said judgment both for the maintainability of the writ petition and for rejecting the contention that Sowdapuram Mines is a separate entity and a separate industrial establishment for the purpose of S. 25-N of the Act. The first passage is as follows, in Para. 6, at page 993:
“When we consider that there are eighty-four workmen who have been thrown out of employment and can ill afford the luxury of fighting from Court to Court and that some of the questions arising in the case are of considerable importance both to the employers and the employees, the reason given for directly coming to this Court must be held to be valid and this must be considered to be a fit case for this Court to exercise its discretion and grant special leave to appeal.”
The second passage is as follows, in Para. 13, at page 997:
“In the modern industrial world, it is often not possible for all processes which ultimately result in the finished product to be carried out at one place and by reason of the complexity and number of such processes and the acute shortage of accommodation in many cities, several of these processes are often carried but in different buildings situate at different places. Further, in many cases these functions are distributed amongst different departments and divisions of a factory and such departments and divisions are housed in different buildings….”
In this case, one significant admission on the part of the respondent is that the Sowdapuram Mines was exclusively used for the respondent's manufacturing operations, particularly in the manufacture of bleaching power. The argument of Sri G. Subramaniam, learned counsel for the respondent that the decision of, the Apex Court turned on the factual findings and evidence recorded in that case does not appeal to me, because the ratio has been held and truly laid down in this case.
11. Having come to the above conclusions, the only question which remains to be considered is whether the balance of convenience is in favour of the grant of injunction. I have no doubt in my mind that when a large body of workmen are involved and they are threatened with imminent danger of being retrenched without following the statutory prescription, the Court cannot??? idle. I am satisfied that if an injunction is not granted the workmen at Sowdapuram Mines will be seriously prejudiced and put to unbearable loss and hardship which will affect their very livelihood. Consequently, Writ Miscellaneous Petition No. 1659 of 1993 is allowed by granting an injunction restraining the respondent from retrenching or laying off the workmen without following the procedure prescribed under Ss. 25-M and 25-N of the Industrial Disputes Act, pending disposal of the writ petition. Writ Miscellaneous Petition No. 2908 of 1993 is, therefore, dismissed.