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Citation Codes
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citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 and/or the Indian Electricity Act, 1910 and Indian Electricity Rules.14.
  • provisions of the Indian Electricity Act and in particular s. 24(1)
  • SICK TEXTILE UNDERTAKINGS NATIONALISATION ACT
  • Kedia.10. Section 22 of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910
  • provision of Rule 59 of the Indian Electricity Rules
  • provisions of the Indian Electricity Act, the rules
  • s. 24 of the Indian Electricity Act and Clause VI
  • ARTICLE 226 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
  • provision to s. 22 of the Electricity Act
  • provision of the Indian Electricity Act
  • s. 24 of the Indian Electricity Act.32.
  • s. 24 of the Indian Electricity Act
  • Indian Electricity Act or Rules
  • s. 24 of Indian Electricity Act
  • s. 24 of the Electricity Act
  • Indian Electricity Act,
  • Indian Companies Act
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 and/or the Indian Electricity Act, 1910 and Indian Electricity Rules.14.
  • provisions of the Indian Electricity Act and in particular s. 24(1)
  • SICK TEXTILE UNDERTAKINGS NATIONALISATION ACT
  • Kedia.10. Section 22 of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910
  • provision of Rule 59 of the Indian Electricity Rules
  • provisions of the Indian Electricity Act, the rules
  • s. 24 of the Indian Electricity Act and Clause VI
  • ARTICLE 226 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
  • provision to s. 22 of the Electricity Act
  • provision of the Indian Electricity Act
  • s. 24 of the Indian Electricity Act.32.
  • s. 24 of the Indian Electricity Act
  • Indian Electricity Act or Rules
  • s. 24 of Indian Electricity Act
  • s. 24 of the Electricity Act
  • Indian Electricity Act,
  • Indian Companies Act
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The petition was filed by a company (petitioner no.1) which entered into an agreement on 11.12.1992 with the owners (Respondent nos. 7–11) to develop the property and which obtained sanction for construction from the Howrah Municipal Corporation. The petitioner applied for and obtained a temporary electrical supply for construction. The respondent-licensee (Calcutta Electric Supply Corporation or the respondent-company) informed the petitioner that dues of the erstwhile consumer (Kiran Ice and Cold Storage, a proprietorship of Bajranglal Kedia) were outstanding and threatened refusal of supply unless those dues were paid. An inspection occurred, security was (allegedly) deposited and a meter was installed; subsequently the respondent-company issued notice (21.7.1994) claiming a larger outstanding sum against the erstwhile occupier. The petitioner made a representation denying knowledge of the erstwhile consumer.

The respondent-company's affidavit stated that the erstwhile consumer's connection had been disconnected in July 1992 and that proceedings to recover dues were pending; it also alleged that the petitioner had paid Rs. 15,000 and had promised to pay the balance, and contended that the petitioner was estopped or hiding the erstwhile consumer behind its corporate veil. The petitioner filed this writ application (the court refers to jurisdiction under Article 226) challenging an impugned notice dated 17th June 1994 directing the petitioner to settle the erstwhile consumer's dues or face disconnection.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the petitioner's electrical connection could be disconnected or supply withheld by the licensee on account of unpaid dues of a pre-occupier/erstwhile consumer of the premises.
  2. Whether the petitioner (as a new applicant/occupier) could be made liable for the outstanding dues of the previous consumer, either by operation of law (including s.24 of the Indian Electricity Act) or by estoppel or by lifting the corporate veil.
  3. Whether the licensee had any statutory power or rule permitting refusal of fresh supply in the circumstances described, and how ss.22 and 24 of the Indian Electricity Act apply to an application for a new connection.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The respondents are under a statutory duty to supply electricity to the petitioner on application (invoking s.22 of the Indian Electricity Act and related authorities).
  • The petitioner denied knowledge of the erstwhile consumer and denied having accepted liability for his dues; the petitioner contested that any payment of Rs. 15,000 had been made.
  • Reliance was placed on several precedents (including John Earnest Edward v. Rai Jogendra Chandra Ghosh Bahadur; Souriyar Luka; N.T.C. Ltd. v. M.P. Electricity Board; C.E.S.C. v. Arun Kumar Dhar) to show that supply cannot be refused by reason of another person's arrears.

Respondents' Arguments

  • The respondent-licensee contended that the petitioner had accepted liability (by payment of Rs. 15,000) and was therefore estopped from denying liability for the arrears of Shri Kedia.
  • It was suggested that the petitioner might be concealing Shri Kedia behind the corporate veil and that the petitioner should therefore bear the liability.
  • The respondents relied on the fact of large outstanding dues of the erstwhile consumer and on their claim that they had been prevented earlier from disconnecting the erstwhile consumer by injunctions in other suits.
  • Respondent nos.7–11 (owners) alleged that meters and accessories remained on the vacant property and had sought removal, causing development difficulties.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
John Earnest Edward v. Rai Jogendra Chandra Ghosh Bahadur, AIR 1935 Cal 298 Authority relied on to support that supply obligations cannot be used to enforce arrears of another and that one connection should not be disconnected for arrears relating to a different connection. The Court relied on this authority among others to support the proposition that power under s.24 can be exercised only in relation to the specific consumer/connection and not to force payment of another person's arrears.
Souriyar Luka v. Kerala State Electricity Board, AIR 1959 Ker 199 Principle that amount due from a consumer is not a charge on the premises and a purchaser is not liable to pay the dues of a defaulting consumer simply by acquiring the premises. The Court cited this decision to hold that the purchaser/new occupant cannot be compelled to pay the erstwhile consumer's arrears as a condition for fresh supply.
National Textile Corporation (N.T.C.) Ltd. v. M.P. Electricity Board / National Textile Corporation (M.P.) Ltd., AIR 1980 MP Authority that the Electricity Board is not entitled to demand pre-existing dues of former owners from a successor (in that context, National Textile Corporation) when supplying new connections. Used to support the conclusion that past dues of former owners/occupiers cannot be forced upon a new applicant for supply.
C.E.S.C. v. Arun Kumar Dhar, 1978 CHN 159 Holding that s.22 does not require payment of arrears of electricity charges for others. The Court invoked this decision to reinforce that the statutory right to supply under s.22 cannot be made conditional upon payment of another person's arrears.
Ferro Alloys Corporation Ltd. v. A.P. State Electricity Board, JT 1993 (2) SC 85 Observation that normally about two and a half months is needed for recovery efforts before disconnection is appropriate. The Court noted this to emphasise that disconnection is a remedy of last resort and that licensees should pursue recovery before disconnecting supply.
Najeeb Zaman v. Bihar State Electricity Board & Others, 1994 (2) PLJR 657 (and Sugam Packaging Pvt. Ltd. unreported C.W.J.C.) Principle that s.24 must be strictly construed and is a last-resort remedy; one connection cannot be disconnected to realize arrears of another connection. The Court relied on these holdings (and related Patna High Court decisions) to conclude that s.24 cannot be used to deny fresh supply to a purchaser or transferee for arrears of a previous consumer.
Chotanagpur Engg. Works v. Union of India, 1987 BLT 299 Analogy from telephone law: a director's telephone connection cannot be disconnected for non-payment of a company's dues. Referred to as analogous support for the proposition that individual/new-connection rights are distinct from another entity's liabilities.
T. Chanchiah v. A.P.S Board, AIR 1980 AP 12 Holdings that partners' individual connections cannot be disconnected for defaults of the firm. Used as precedent showing that disconnection power under s.24 is limited to the consumer/connection in question.
Andhra Cement Co. Ltd. v. A.P. State Electricity Board, AIR 1983 AP 263 Cited as an authority in the line of decisions restricting s.24 and holding that liability for arrears cannot be imposed on unrelated connections. Referred to in support of the general principle that s.24 cannot be used to deny fresh supply to a different consumer/connection.
North East Fertilizer (P) Ltd. v. Bihar State Electricity Board, 1994 (2) BLJR 954; AIR 1995 Pat 33 Division Bench decision following Sugam Packaging and similar precedents restricting the scope of s.24. Noted as following the line of authority which this Court adopts to hold that past dues of another consumer cannot be enforced against a new applicant for supply.
Isha Marbles v. Bihar State Electricity Board, JT 1995 (2) SC 626 (Supreme Court) Supreme Court holding that s.24 does not permit thrusting the liability of the consumer upon a third party; purchaser seeking supply cannot be called upon to clear past arrears as a condition precedent. The Court relied on this recent Supreme Court pronouncement as authoritative and dispositive, concluding that the licensee could not withhold supply from the petitioner on account of the erstwhile consumer's arrears.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded from statutory text and principle to the specific facts. It began with s.22 of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910, which imposes a statutory obligation on a licensee to supply energy to any person within its area of supply on the same terms as others in similar circumstances. The court emphasized that electricity undertakings are public utilities with a duty to serve the public and that statutory obligations of licensees cannot be evaded by taking pleas not grounded in the Act, the Rules or the licence conditions.

The court observed that a licensee's right to discontinue supply is circumscribed by statutory power under s.24 and Clause VI of the Schedule; those provisions create a personal liability of the consumer and do not create a charge on the premises. The court noted that the respondent-licensee had not placed before it any provision of the Act, the rules, or licence conditions that would justify refusing to grant a new connection to a person who had fulfilled or was ready to fulfil the requisite conditions for supply.

Applying those principles to the facts, the court found: (a) the petitioner was not the successor in interest of the erstwhile consumer and was not alleged to have any statutory liability for the erstwhile consumer's dues; (b) s.24 applies to the specific consumer/connection and cannot be used to transfer liability to a third party or a new occupier; (c) there was no material proving that the petitioner had accepted liability by paying Rs. 15,000 — the petitioner denied such payment and respondents furnished no supporting document; (d) estoppel could not be established on the material before the court; and (e) the licensee had not availed itself of the primary remedies (suit for recovery or strict recourse to s.24) in a timely fashion, and could not benefit from its own inaction or wrong.

The court followed and relied on a line of decisions (including decisions of higher courts culminating in the Supreme Court's Isha Marbles) establishing that there is no charge on premises for electricity dues, that s.24 must be strictly construed and is a remedy of last resort, and that a purchaser or transferee seeking a fresh supply cannot be compelled to clear arrears of a prior consumer as a condition for supply. The Court therefore concluded that the impugned notice, which sought to make fresh supply conditional on settlement of the erstwhile consumer's dues, was not legally sustainable.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The application was allowed and the impugned notice dated 17th June, 1994 (Annexure 'I' to the writ application) was quashed. The respondents were directed to continue supply of electrical energy to the petitioner in accordance with law. Application allowed; impugned notice quashed; supply to continue.

Implications:

  • Direct effect: The petitioner is to continue to receive electricity supply; the respondent-licensee cannot condition granting or continuation of a fresh connection to the petitioner on payment of arrears attributable to a prior consumer of the premises.
  • Legal consequence for parties: The ruling reinforces that liability for electricity dues is personal to the consumer and that ss.22 and 24 of the Indian Electricity Act, read with relevant rules and decisions, prevent imposition of a prior consumer's arrears on a new applicant or purchaser.
  • Broader implication: The court applied and followed existing precedent (including a recent Supreme Court pronouncement) to affirm the established principle; the opinion addresses the direct dispute between the parties and treats the matter as an application of settled law rather than announcing a novel legal proposition.
  • Costs: In the facts and circumstances of the case there was no order as to costs.
Application allowed.
SP

    Shree Balasaria Construction (P) Ltd. v. Cesc Ltd. And Ors.

    Satya Brata Sinha, J.:—The question which arises for consideration in this application is as to whether the petitioner's electrical connection is liable to be disconnected for non-payment of dues on the part of pre-occupier of the premises.

    The fact of the matter lies in a short compass.

    2. The petitioner no. 1 which is a company incorporated under the Indian Companies Act entered into an agreement on 11.12.1992 with the owners of the property in question (Respondent nos. 7-11) for developing the same on certain terms and conditions. For the aforementioned purpose an application for sanction of the plan was applied for and granted by the Howrah Municipal Corporation, and pursuant thereto the construction of the building started. An application was filed by the petitioner before the respondent-company for grant of temporary supply of electrical energy.

    3. On 21.12.1993 the respondent-company ‘intimated that a sum of Rs. 1,50,085.95 p. is due from the erstwhile consumer. The petitioner was requested to pay the said dues failing which it was threatened that the electrical energy shall not be supplied at the said premises. However an inspection was held. The petitioner also deposited the security amount and the meter was installed. On 21.7.94 the petitioner received a notice that the outstanding dues of the erstwhile occupier is Rs. 49,50,481.61 p., besides the delayed payment surcharge to be levied thereupon.

    3A. On 22.7.1994 the petitioner made a representation alleging therein that they have no knowledge about the erstwhile consumer.

    4. The contention of the petitioner is that as it has applied for a new connection, the respondent-company having a statutory duty to supply the electricity to the petitioner cannot refuse to do so on the ground that there allegedly existed an outstanding dues of one Bajranglal Kedia.

    5. In its affidavit-in-opposition, the respondents stated that one Kiran Ice and Cold Storage, which was a proprietory concern of Bajranglal Kedia, took electrical connection. Its outstanding bills accumulated to the tune of Rs. 49,50,481.61 p. The respondent-company however was prevented from disconnecting the electrical energy in view of orders of injunction passed in several suits. The said electrical connection was eventually disconnected in July, 1992.

    6. The petitioner allegedly applied for a temporary connection which was granted. It, however, demanded the aforementioned sum from the petitioners by a letter dated 21st December, 1993 whereupon the petitioner paid a sum of Rs. 15,000/- and promised to pay the balance amount in instalments after they had obtained a new supply of electricity at the said premises. It is contended that by such payment the petitioners accepted that they were liable for the arrears and relying on the said promise, the respondent had acted to its disadvantage. It is stated that in the suit Bajranglal Kedia appeared through the same advocate on record who is also representing the petitioners. It has been contended that Shri Kedia is concealing himself behind the corporate veil of the petitioner and thus this writ application should be dismissed.

    7. Mr. P.K Roy, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, inter alia, submitted that the respondents in law are bound to supply electrical energy to the petitioner and in support of the aforementioned contention reliance has been placed on John Earnest Edward v. Rai Jogendra Chandra Ghosh Bahadur reported in AIR 1935 Cal 298; Souriyar Luka v. Kerala State Electricity Board reported in AIR 1959 Ker 199; N.T.C Ltd. v. M.P Electricity Board, reported in AIR 1980 MP 32 and The C.E.S.C v. Arun Kumar Dhar reported in 1978 CHN 159.

    8. The learned Counsel has further drawn my attention to the Affidavit-in-Opposition filed by the respondent nos. 7 to 11 wherein it has been alleged:

    “Since the property was vacant but an electrical meter and accessories thereof were lying in a piece of land of the said property, I, represented before the competent officer of CESC Ltd. at their Regional Office, Howrah, for removal of the said meter board and allied accessories.

    Till date CESC respondent did not respond to any of the representation inasmuch as the CESC respondents did not care to remove the said electrical meter and accessories thereof, for which the developer is to face trouble for development of the property also.”

    9. Mr. Sinha appealing on behalf of the contesting respondents, however, submitted that the petitioner is bound by the promise, it is estopped and precluded from contending that it is not bound to pay all the outstanding dues of the aforementioned Shri Kedia. It has been submitted that keeping the fact that the petitioner has already paid a sum of Rs. 15,000/-, clearly goes to show that it had undertaken to pay the liabilities of the said Shri Kedia.

    10. Section 22 of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910 imposes a statutory obligation on the licensee to supply the electrical energy in the following manner:

    “Where energy is supplied by a licensee, every person within the area of supply shall, except in so far as is otherwise provided by the terms and conditions of the licence be entitled, on application, to a supply on the same terms as those on which any other person in the same area is entitled in similar circumstances to a corresponding supply.”

    11. Electricity undertakings acquire the character of public utilities by reason of their virtually monopolistic position and their profession to serve the public. The State in exercise of its legislative power had a right to compel them to render service efficiently, promptly and impartially to the members of the public, as has been done by enacting s. 22 of the said Act. Even in common law such public utilities having obtained a licence under a statute are under an automatic obligation by reason of the fact that the property of a public utility is dedicated to public service and impressed with public interest to serve the public and any such statutory obligation is in effect and substance a declaration of the common law.

    12. Upon the dedication of public utility to public use and in return for the grant to it of a public franchise, the public utility is under a legal obligation to render adequate and reasonably efficient service, without unjust discrimination and at reasonably rates to all the members of the public to whom its use and scope of operation extend and who apply for such service and comply with reasonable rules and regulations of the public utility.

    13. In India in view of the aforementioned provision any member of the public may compel a licensee to connect his premises with his supply-lines by filing an application to the Court. There cannot however, be any gainsaying that the right of the prospective consumer is meticulously and minutely regulated under the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 and/or the Indian Electricity Act, 1910 and Indian Electricity Rules.

    14. The grounds upon which a licensee can refuse to supply electrical energy is also governed by the statute. The licensee, thus, in refusing to supply electrical energy cannot take recourse to the plea which is not covered by the Indian Electricity Act or Rules framed thereunder or the conditions of licence or other law for the time being in force.

    15. The Statutory obligations under s. 22 would have no meaning if it were not buttressed with liability on the licensee to suffer the penalty prescribed, apart from its civil liability to pay damages for failure to supply energy. Section 42 of the Act provides for penalty for illegal or detective supply of energy where without reasonable excuse, the burden of proving which is on the licensee, the licensee discontinues the supply or fails to supply. Section 48 provides that the penalties imposed by Ss. 39 to 47 are in addition to, and not in derogation of any liability for compensation or the liability of the licensee to have his license revoked.

    16. The licensee thus has a statutory liability to supply electrical energy to any prospective consumer on the same terms as those on which any other person in the same area is entitled in similar circumstances to a corresponding supply. Such a statutory obligation on the part of the licensee is also reinforced in terms of Clause VI of the Schedule appended to the Act. It is interesting to note that s. 22 of the said Act employs the words ‘every person’ which thus not only bring within its purview natural person but also includes any company or association or body of individuals whether incorporated or not. The statutory duty imposed under s. 22 with regard to adequacy of supply is also reinforced by the provision of Rule 59 of the Indian Electricity Rules which costs a further obligation on the licensee to take certain precautions.

    17. The right of a licensee to discontinue supply is circumscribed by its statutory power which is contained in s. 24 of the Indian Electricity Act and Clause VI of the Schedule appended thereto.

    18. The respondent-company has not placed before me any provisions of the Indian Electricity Act, the rules framed thereunder or any conditions of licence in terms whereof it can refuse to grant electrical connection to a person who makes requisition therefor and who has either fulfilled all the requisite terms and conditions or is ready and willing to do so.

    19. It stands admitted that the electrical connection of the said Kiron Ice and Cold Storage Ltd. was disconnected in July, 1992. It is also not disputed that the respondent-company has filed a suit against the said concern for recovery of its dues which is pending consideration. The petitioner, is not alleged to be the successor in interest of the said concern nor is it alleged that it has any statutory liability to pay his outstanding dues. In fact it is also disputed that the owner of the premises in question are Respondent nos. 7-11 with whom the petitioner had entered into an agreement.

    20. In terms of the provision of the Indian Electricity Act all the rules framed thereunder no charge is created on the premises in relation to payment of electrical dues. The provisions of the Indian Electricity Act and in particular s. 24(1) thereof in no uncertain terms states that the obligation to pay all the dues for consumption of electrical energy is personal. The remedy of a licensee thus is against the consumer itself unless a contract is entered into by the concerned parties to the contrary.

    21. When a licensee applies for grant of new connection and fulfils the terms and conditions therefor and an agreement is entered into, the rights and obligations of the parties to the said contract are personal in nature.

    22. Section 24 of the said Act can be taken recourse to only in a case where a person neglects to pay any charge for energy or any sum, other than a charge for energy, due from him to a licensee in respect of the supply of energy to him.

    (Emphasis supplied)

    23. In terms of s. 24 of the said Act, therefore, no charge is created in the premises where electricity is supplied. Supply of energy is made to a consumer occupying a premises but non-payment of bills despite supply of electrical energy is the personal liability of live consumer and the same thus is not statutory dues.

    24. Primary remedy of a licensee to recover the dues from a consumer is to file a suit but s. 24 of the Act provides for an additional right to recover the same by disconnecting the electrical energy. The said provision, therefore, cannot apply in the case of a transfer of the premises and no liability can be fastened on the transferee who has purchased the property in question bona fide and in good faith.

    25. Mr. Sinha, when questioned, conceded that apart from s. 24 there is no other provision which entitles the Respondent to withhold supply of electrical energy. No circular has also been issued by the Calcutta Electric Supply Corporation whereby it has a right not to give supply of electrical energy despite its statutory obligation under s. 22 of the said Act.

    26. In the instant case, the old consumer was not the owner of the property. The petitioner company was not supposed to make an enquiry with regard to the personal liabilities of the occupier before purchasing the properties, thus even then a doctrine of ‘caveat emptor’ would have no application in the instant case.

    27. It is not the case of the respondents nor this court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can lift the corporate veil for the purpose of finding out as to whether Sri Kedia has any direct or indirect connection with the company.

    28. So far as the question of estoppel raised by the learned Counsel for the respondent is ‘concerned, the same also cannot be accepted. The petitioner has categorically denied that it had made any payment of Rs. 15,000/- as alleged by respondents in their affidavit-in-opposition. The learned Counsel could not point out any document in support of, the plea that such a payment was made by the petitioner. He merely submits that the statement made in the affidavit-in-opposition should not be rejected. It is now well known that a person who raises a plea of estoppel must prove the same.

    29. It is also unlikely that a temporary connection may be granted to the petitioner on the receipt of a sum of Rs. 15,000/- although a sum of about Rs. 50,00,000/- was due from Sri Kedia. Apart from the said sum, delayed payment surcharge also accrued on the said sum.

    30. My reason of the impugned order dated 17th June, 1994 the Manager Mains (Distribution) directed the petitioner to call on the Deputy General (CCM-MT) at Victoria House for settlement of the dues of the erstwhile consumer failing which the temporary supply installed for construction purposes was to be disconnected on the expiry of 7 days from the date of the receipt of the said letter.

    31. The right of the licensee is to sue the consumer for recovery of its dues or to take recourse s. 24 of the Indian Electricity Act.

    32. It may also be noticed that under Clause VI of the schedule appended to the Indian Electricity Act, the consumer is required to furnish adequate security. Even additional security can be asked for.

    33. In Ferro Alloys Corporation Ltd. v. A.P State Electricity Board, reported in JT 1993 (2) SC 85, the Supreme Court noticed that normally a period of 2 and 1/2 months is needed for recovery of the amount before an action for disconnection of electrical energy can be taken.

    34. The licensee, thus, could take recourse of the provisions of s. 24 at the earliest opportunity as against Sri Kedia. It did not do so. It, therefore, cannot take benefit of its own wrong even if the company was prohibited in view of the court's order to disconnect the electrical energy of Sri Kedia it could have moved the higher courts or could have asked the court for a direction upon the licensee to furnish adequate securities therefor.

    35. In Souriyar Luka v. Kerala State Electricity Board, reported in AIR 1959 Ker 199 it was held:—

    “The purchaser of the premises in revenue sale held for the purpose of recovering dues from a defaulting consumer is not a person from whom any amount is or can be deemed to be due and he is not in the position of one on whom premises have devolved by succession or voluntary transfer. The amount due from a consumer to the licensee is not a charge on the premises used by such consumer and the purchaser of the premises in revenue sale gets a clear title, subject to such encumbrances as may have existed on the date of the attachment under the Revenue Recovery Act.”

    36. In National Textile Corporation (M.P) Ltd., Bhopal v. M.P Electricity Board, Jabalpur reported in AIR 1980 MP a Division Bench interpreting the provision of Sick Textile Undertakings (Nationalisation) Act, inter alia, held that the Electricity Board is not entitled to demand from the National Textile Corporation pre-appointed day dues of the former owners of the National Textile undertakings owned by the owners to the Board on account of supply of electricity to such undertaking.

    37. In the The Electric Supply Corporation & Ors. v. Arun Kumar Dhar reported in 1978 CHN 159, Monoj Kumar Mukherjee, J. (as His Lordship then was) observed that the provision to s. 22 of the Electricity Act does not require that payment to be made for arrear of electricity charges for others.

    38. This aspect of the matter has also considered by me in Najeeb Zaman… v. Bihar State Electricity Board & Others… reported in 1994 (2) PLJR 657, wherein the Patna High Court took into consideration an unreported decision in Sugam Packaging Pvt. Ltd. v. Bihar State Electricity Board C.W.J.C No. 5358 disposed of on 22.7.92 holding that:—

    “The law was further laid down in the following terms: It is thus, not correct to contend that the electrical energy is supplied to an industry and not to the Company. The Industry as such is not a juristic person. The Industry has its owner and although there is no electrical energy supplied to an unit but the unit is not a contracting party inasmuch as a unit is not a juristic person and thus capable of enterting into a contract.

    Further it is now also well settled that s. 24 of the Indian Electricity Act has to be construed strictly. Such an action can only be taken as a last resort. It has also been held by various Courts including this Court that even if a person has two connections in the same premises, one connection cannot be disconnected for realisation of arrears of dues relating to the other connection.

    Reference in this connection may be made to John Earnest v. Jogendra Chandra AIR 1935 Cal 298.

    Following the aforementioned decisions in relation to a telephone matter, I have held in Chotanagpur Engg. Works v. Union of India, reported in 1987 BLT 299 that the telephone connection of a Director cannot be disconnected for non-payment of dues by a company.

    In T. Chanchiah v. A.P.S Board reported in AIR 1980 AP 12 it has clearly been held that for default to pay electrical dues of a firm, the electrical connection of the partners thereof cannot also be disconnected.

    Reference in this connection may be made to Andhra Cement Co. Ltd. v. A.P State Electricity Board reported in AIR 1983 AP 263.

    These decisions therefor indicate that power under s. 24 can be exercised only in relation to a consumer and that too in respect of electrical connection in question.

    Section 24 of the Indian Electricity Act, so construed, cannot be held to confer any power upon the Board not to give fresh electrical connection.”

    39. Sugam Packaging (P) Ltd.'s case (supra) has followed by a Division Bench of Patna High Court in North East Fertilizer (P) Ltd. v. Bihar State Electricity Board reported in 1994 (2) BLJR 954; AIR 1995 Pat 33.

    40. It is necessary to consider the matter any further, in view of the latest pronouncement of the Supreme Court upholding the aforesaid decisions of the Patna High Court in Isha Marbles v. Bihar State Electricity Board reported in JT 1995 (2) SC 626 wherein the Supreme Court categorically has held that in terms of s. 24 of Indian Electricity Act that the liability of the consumer cannot be thrust upon a third party.

    The law was stated thus:—

    “From the above it is clear, the High Court has chosen to construe s. 24 of the Electricity Act correctly. There is no charge over the property. Where that premises comes to be owned or occupied by the auction purchaser, when such purchaser seeks supply of electric energy he cannot be called upon to clear the past arrears as a condition precedent to supply. What matters is the contract entered into by the erstwhile consumer with the Board. The Board cannot seek the enforcement of contractual liability against the third party. Of course, the bona fides of the sale may not be relevant.”

    41. The Apex Court observed:—

    “No doubt, dishonest consumers cannot be allowed to play tyrant with the public property but inadequacy of the law can hardly be a substitute for overzelousness.”

    42. For the foregoing reasons this applications allowed and impugned notice dated 17th June, 1994 as contained in Annexure ‘I’ to the writ application is quashed and the respondents are directed to continue to supply of electrical energy in accordance with law. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case there shall be no order as to costs.

    Application allowed.
    SP

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    Shree Balasaria Construction (P) Ltd. v. Cesc Ltd. And Ors.
    (Apr 20, 1995)