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Structured Summary of the Opinion (S.N. Bhargava, C.J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner was commissioned as a 2nd Lieutenant on 21-8-1971, served in the 1971 Indo-Pak War, and progressed through successive appointments and promotions (Captain in 1974, permanent commission in 1976, Major in 1982, selection for Selection Grade Lieutenant Colonel in 1990 and promotion to Lt. Col. on 2-3-1991). He was awarded the Vishisht Seva Medal (VSM) — announced 26-1-1990 and conferred 15-1-1991 — and held intelligence and command appointments including GSO I (Intelligence).

The petitioner was considered for promotion to Colonel along with officers of the 1972 batch by Selection Board No. 3 in August 1992 and was not approved. Communications of non-selection were dated 31-3-1993 and subsequently by letter dated 1-11-1994 after further consideration. The petitioner’s candidature was considered multiple times (August 1992; May 1993; November 1993 – withdrawn; July 1994) and ultimately not approved; respondents asserted three opportunities to be considered are the rule and non-approval on three occasions renders an officer ineligible for further consideration under existing rules.

The petitioner filed a statutory complaint against his supersession on 28-3-1995; this complaint was pending when he filed the writ petition on 1-6-1995. The statutory complaint was later rejected by the Central Government (order dated 26-6-1995), the rejection being a brief/schematic order. Respondents filed a counter and later an additional affidavit (12-9-1995) contesting jurisdiction (asserting Delhi High Court's exclusive jurisdiction) and urging dismissal on laches.

The petitioner sought writs of mandamus/certiorari directing the respondents to include his name in the Select Category, to consider him at par with the 1972 batch officers, to promote him to Colonel, and to expunge any adverse entries. The High Court considered the record, parties’ submissions, DSR provisions and related material and delivered the judgment summarized herein.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, for consideration for promotion to the rank of Colonel, the Selection Board was entitled to consider ACRs and adverse entries prior to the petitioner's promotion to Lt. Colonel (i.e., whether adverse entries prior to promotion are "washed away" by subsequent promotion and award of VSM).
  2. Whether the Selection Board proceedings vis-à-vis the petitioner were vitiated because the Board considered ACRs beyond the period after his promotion to Lt. Colonel and/or relied on adverse entries without mandatory performance counselling being given.
  3. Whether this High Court had jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition (respondents contended that Selection Boards met in Delhi and statutory complaint decision originates in Delhi, so Delhi High Court has jurisdiction).
  4. Whether the writ petition was barred by delay or laches, given the dates of the Selection Board decisions and the date of filing.
  5. Whether the statutory complaint rejection (a brief/non-speaking order) precluded judicial review or otherwise disposed of the grievance finally and adequately.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The petitioner argued that any adverse entry or remark prior to his promotion to Lt. Colonel (2-3-1991) stood “washed away” by that promotion and by the award of the VSM; therefore only ACRs after 2-3-1991 should have been considered when assessing him for promotion to Colonel.
  • He relied on a set of judicial authorities to support the proposition that pre-promotion adverse entries cannot be used after a promotion has been granted.
  • Paragraph 150 of the Instructions for Rendition of Confidential Reports was invoked: before any adverse remark is recorded performance counselling is mandatory. Respondents admitted no performance counselling was given, so any alleged adverse remark could not be validly relied upon.
  • He contended that the Selection Board either did not consider his VSM or did so improperly (respondents’ description of the VSM as awarded for rescuing passengers suggested to him an incorrect appreciation of the medal’s significance and of his overall service record).
  • He disputed respondents’ jurisdictional and laches objections, noting the statutory complaint was pending when the writ petition was filed and that he received communications while posted in Sikkim; on this basis he contended the petition was neither barred by delay nor outside the court’s territorial jurisdiction.
  • He further challenged Annexure R-1 (administrative instructions) as not being part of DSR or the Army Rules, and argued that administrative circulars without wide publicity cannot override legal principles recognized by courts.

Respondents' Arguments

  • Respondents accepted the petitioner's factual service history but contended that promotions from Lt. Col. to Colonel are made by Selection Boards and approved by the Central Government; each officer is considered on his profile and batch merit and is entitled to only three considerations (initial, first review, final review).
  • They relied on Annexure R-1 and other internal instructions to explain that Selection Boards consider overall profile including multiple years of ACRs (alleging ACRs for the last ten years were considered as a matter of practice) and maintained anonymity of officers to preserve objectivity.
  • Respondents denied any procedural unfairness or mala fides: the proceedings of the three Selection Boards were shown to be fair, impartial and manned by different senior officers; they asserted that VSM and ACRs were considered.
  • On jurisdiction they argued that the Selection Boards met in Delhi and the statutory complaint rejection proceeded from Delhi, therefore the High Court, Delhi had exclusive or predominant jurisdiction and this Court had no territorial jurisdiction to entertain the challenge.
  • They also urged dismissal on the ground of laches (delay in challenging the Selection Board decision).
  • Respondents pointed out that administrative instructions (e.g., R-1) and internal circulars must be given effect to in the peculiar context of defence services where different considerations apply compared to other government services; they cited authority in support of that proposition.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Raj Kumar Gupta v. State of J. & K. (1987) 5 SLR 365 (J&K) Cited by petitioner to support the principle that adverse entries prior to promotion are not to be relied upon after promotion (i.e., such entries stand "washed away"). The court treated this and similar authorities collectively as supporting the principle that pre-promotion adverse entries lose their effect after a valid promotion; this formed part of the legal basis for limiting the ACRs to those after promotion to Lt. Col.
L.S. Rane v. Union of India (1983) 1 SLJ 321 (Bom) : [1982 (3) SLR 378 (SC)] Cited by petitioner in support of the same principle about the effect of subsequent promotion on earlier adverse entries. Used by the court as one among several authorities to accept the legal proposition that earlier adverse entries are not to be used against an officer after he has been validly promoted.
Girish Bihari v. State of U.P., 1982 Lab IC 1500 (All) Cited by petitioner for the proposition that prior adverse entries are neutralised by later promotion. Considered by the court along with other authorities to support limiting the ACRs to the post-promotion period for review of promotion to Colonel.
Brij Mohan Singh Chopra v. State Of Punjab, (1987) 2 SCC 188 : AIR 1987 SC 948 Cited by petitioner for the adverse-entry-washed-away principle. The court referenced these authorities collectively and applied the principle to hold that only post-promotion ACRs should be considered for the petitioner’s promotion review.
Baldev Raj v. Union of India, (1980) 4 SCC 321 : AIR 1981 SC 70 Cited by petitioner for the same general principle concerning effect of promotion on earlier adverse remarks. Included among the authorities supporting the court's conclusion that ACRs prior to promotion should not be considered for the petitioner’s promotion to Colonel.
Regional Manager v. Pawan Kr. Dubey, (1976) 3 SCC 334 Cited by petitioner in support of the aforesaid principle (effect of promotion on earlier records or entries). Taken with other precedents in reaching the conclusion that the Selection Board's use of earlier ACRs vitiated the proceedings as they applied to the petitioner.
State of Punjab v. Dewan Chuni Lal, (1970) 1 SCC 479 : AIR 1970 SC 2086 Cited by petitioner as authority for the proposition relied upon regarding effect of prior adverse matters. Court treated it as part of the body of authorities that support the petitioner's main legal contention about the non-persistence of earlier adverse entries after promotion.
Baikunth Nath Das v. Chief Dist. Medical Officer, Baripada, (1992) 2 SCC 299 : AIR 1992 SC 1020 Cited by petitioner in support of his contentions regarding the treatment of earlier adverse entries and promotion consequences. Included by the court among authorities that endorse the principle that earlier adverse entries are not to be carried forward after promotion.
Damomal v. Union of India, AIR 1967 Bom 355 Cited by petitioner for the territorial/jurisdictional proposition that aided his argument on forum conveniens or cause of action aspects. The court relied on petitioner's authorities (including this) to conclude that part of the cause of action arose within its territorial jurisdiction (Sikkim) and therefore the Court had jurisdiction to entertain the petition.
Serajuddin & Co. v. State of Orissa, AIR 1971 Cal 414 Cited by petitioner concerning jurisdictional principles. Considered by the court in the determination that it had jurisdiction because part of the cause of action arose within its territory.
Orient Paper Mills v. Union of India, AIR 1979 Cal 114 Cited by petitioner on jurisdictional/thematic points concerning forum and cause of action. Used to support the court's conclusion that a portion of the cause of action arose within the court’s territorial jurisdiction.
K.D. Gupta v. Union of India, 1989 Supp (1) SCC 416 : AIR 1989 SC 1393 Relied on by respondents to underscore that defence services have peculiarities and that considerations applicable to other government servants may not apply wholesale to military promotions. The court observed that K.D. Gupta was in a different context and did not displace the general principles relied upon by the petitioner; it did not accept K.D. Gupta as decisive to defeat the petitioner's principle about effect of promotion on earlier entries.
State Bank of India v. Mohd. Myunuddin, (1987) 4 SCC 486 Relied on by respondents for the proposition that different considerations may apply in certain institutional contexts (cited in support of special considerations in defence services). Not treated as overriding the petitioner's authorities; the court recognised defence peculiarities but held they did not show that general legal principles on effect of promotion were inapplicable to this petitioner.
Mir Ghulam v. Union of India, (1973) 4 SCC 135 Relied on by respondents to support special features of defence service administration. The court noted these authorities but concluded they did not negate the petitioner's entitlement to have only post-promotion ACRs considered in his case.
(1985) 3 SCC 217 (cited by respondents in argument) Relied upon by respondents to contend lack of jurisdiction of this Court (specific case name not recorded in the opinion extract). The court considered the jurisdictional arguments overall and held that because part of the cause of action arose within its territorial jurisdiction, it could entertain the petition despite respondents' reliance on this authority.
R.C. Tewari v. Union of India (High Court judgment dated 19-8-95, C.W. No. 2/95) Referred to by the court in the context of judicial review of non-speaking orders and the need for reasons to enable effective review. The court noted that because the statutory complaint rejection was non-speaking, it could not be meaningfully reviewed; R.C. Tewari was invoked as illustrative of the need for speaking reasons to permit judicial review.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded by addressing jurisdiction and delay first, then moved to substantive issues about promotion procedure and admissibility of ACRs/adverse remarks.

  1. Jurisdiction and delay: The Court found the petition was not barred by delay. The Selection Board results (August 1992) were communicated later (31-3-1993 and 1-11-1994) and the writ petition was filed on 1-6-1995 while a statutory complaint (filed 28-3-1995) was still pending. The Court noted that the petitioner had received communications while posted in Sikkim and that part of the cause of action therefore arose within the territorial jurisdiction of the Court; on that basis it held that the Court had jurisdiction to entertain the petition despite respondents’ contention that Delhi alone was competent.
  2. Legal framework for promotion: The Court reviewed the statutory and administrative framework: Army Act, 1950 (Sections 191–193), Army Rules, and Defence Services Regulations (DSR). It observed there are no promotion procedures in the Army Act or Army Rules, and that the DSR contains provisions on promotion (quoted para 70). The Court noted that Annexure R-1 (a circular) is not part of the DSR nor shown to have been given wide publicity; likewise certain Regulations had not been gazetted as required by Section 193.
  3. Effect of promotion and award of VSM: The Court accepted the petitioner’s central legal proposition (supported by several High Court and Supreme Court authorities) that adverse entries or remarks prior to a valid promotion stand neutralised ("washed away") and consequently should not be relied upon for later promotion considerations. The Court emphasized that the petitioner's promotion to Lt. Colonel on 2-3-1991 and his VSM (announced 26-1-1990, conferred 15-1-1991) meant that only ACRs earned after his promotion to Lt. Col. should have been material to the August 1992 Selection Board’s consideration for Colonel.
  4. Requirement of performance counselling: The respondents admitted there was no performance counselling communicated to the petitioner. The Court noted para 150 of the Instructions for Rendition of Confidential Reports requires performance counselling before any adverse remark is recorded, and observed the lone advisory remark recorded ("He is trustworthy in accomplishing desired actions, though rigid in his attitude") had itself been treated by respondents as non-adverse and hence could not be retrospectively treated as adverse given the absence of counselling.
  5. Procedural fairness and record: The Court examined the proceedings of the three Selection Boards and found them manned by senior officers without proven mala fides; however, it observed the respondents could not produce any instruction making it imperative that ACRs for the last ten years must be considered in every case. A letter (Annexure R-3) urging consideration of all ACRs in the overall profile was not shown to have been widely publicised nor to have the status of DSR; it had been filed late and was not relied upon in the respondents’ pleadings.
  6. Non-speaking rejection of statutory complaint: The statutory complaint rejection by the Central Government was brief and non-speaking. The Court held that because the statutory complaint order did not address or reason through the petitioner's detailed submissions, the Court could not meaningfully assess or defer to that order in a way that would preclude judicial review.
  7. Conclusion of analysis: Drawing these strands together, the Court concluded that the Selection Board proceedings, insofar as they relied on ACRs predating the petitioner’s promotion to Lt. Col. and VSM, were not legally sustainable with respect to the petitioner. Therefore the Selection Board proceedings were vitiated as regards this petitioner’s case.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Writ Petition is allowed. The Court directed the respondents to review the petitioner’s case afresh within three months, considering only the ACRs earned in the rank of Lieutenant Colonel up to the time he was first considered by the Selection Board in August 1992. If found fit, the petitioner should be promoted to Colonel along with those batch mates considered in August 1992 and be given retrospective seniority. The stay previously granted (26-6-1995) ends automatically. The petitioner may commence study leave six weeks after announcement of the result. Costs awarded to the petitioner.

Direct Consequences for the Parties

  • The respondents must re-evaluate the petitioner’s promotion case within three months limiting consideration to ACRs after his promotion to Lt. Colonel (i.e., the period from date of promotion to the date of the Selection Board’s consideration in August 1992).
  • If approved on review, the petitioner is to be promoted to Colonel with retrospective seniority and associated consequential benefits as appropriate.
  • The stay previously in force is terminated automatically; the petitioner may take study leave as ordered.
  • Costs of the writ petition were awarded against the respondents.

Broader implications: The Court applied established judicial principles (as cited by the petitioner) about the effect of subsequent promotion on earlier adverse entries and emphasised procedural requirements (such as performance counselling) in ACR regimes. The opinion did not purport to create a new general rule beyond applying existing authorities to the petitioner’s factual matrix; the order’s effect is primarily prospective and specific to the petitioner’s case.

    Lt. Col. Mahavir Singh v. Union Of India And Others

    S.N Bhargava, C.J:— This is a petition for issuance of a writ of mandamus/certiorari and for a direction to the respondents to include the petitioner's name in the Select Category of officers. The petitioner also seeks a direction to the respondents to consider him at par with the officers of 1972 batch and to promote him to the rank of Col. and also to expunge all the adverse entries, if any, from the record of the petitioner.

    2. The petitioner was commissioned in the rank of 2nd Lt. on 21-8-71 and took part in the Indo-Pak War of 1971. He was promoted to the rank of Captain in 1974 and was granted permanent commission in 1976. In 1977 he was appointed Staff Officer Grade III in a Brigade level, Headquarter, deployed for Counter Insurgency Operations in Mizoram. In 1979, he was appointed as Camp Commandant of HQ. 11 Infantry Division. He was promoted to the rank of Major in 1982 and was later appointed as GSO II (Intelligence) at HQ 2 Corps, the highest field formation in the Army. He was awarded Vishisth Seva Medal in 1990. He was approved for promotion to the rank of Selection Grade Lt. Col. in 1990 and was actually promoted to the rank of Lt. Col. in 1991. He was appointed as GSO I (Intelligence) at HQ 2 Corps, and was involved in Counter Terrorism Operation “RAKSHAK” in Punjab. He was then appointed as ‘GSO I (Intelligence) at HQ 17 Mtn. Division and was posted at Gangtok in the year 1993, and is now qualified to be promoted to the rank of Colonel.

    3. Petitioner's candidature for promotion to the rank of Col. was rejected when he was considered along with Infantry Officers of 1972 batch by the Selection Board No. 3 in August 1992, and this order was communicated to the petitioner vide Ext. P-II dated 31st March, 1993. Petitioner's name appears at serial number 178 in the list of officers who were considered for promotion to the rank of Col. in August 1992. Petitioner's case was to be considered and reviewed again by the Selection Board in November, 1993 but it had to be withdrawn as CR 12/92-5/93 were not on record. His case was again considered and reviewed by another Selection Board in July 1994, but he was not approved for promotion to the rank of Acting Colonel. This was communicated to the petitioner vide Ext. P-4 dated 1st November, 1994. He was further informed vide Ext. P-4 that since he had not been approved for promotion on three occasions he was not eligible for further consideration for promotion under the existing rules which means that the petitioner is bound to retire in his present status of a Lt. Colonel. The petitioner has submitted in his petition that during his entire service career, no performance counselling was ever communicated to him, without which no adverse remark/entry can be placed on his record and thus the petitioner believes that his record is above average and there is nothing adverse on the basis of which promotion can be denied to him. He has further submitted that even if he had any adverse entry earlier, it stood washed away when he was promoted to the rank of Lt. Col. on 2nd March, 1991 and, therefore, such adverse entry prior to 2nd March, could not have been considered while giving promotion to the rank of Col. More so, when the petitioner was awarded VSM on 15th January, 1991.

    4. Petitioner submitted a statutory complaint against his supersession on 28th March, 1995 which was pending at the time when he filed this writ petition on 1-6-95. However, the same was rejected by an order Exhibit R-2 without giving any reasons.

    5. Counter has been filed by the respondents wherein, they have not disputed the facts regarding the petitioner's status as mentioned in the petition. They have submitted that promotion in the army from the rank of Major to Lt. Col. and above are made by the Selection Boards. Each officer is considered on the basis of his own profile and batch merit. The competent authority to approve the recommendations of the Selection Boards for promotion from Lt. Col. to Colonel and above is the Central Government. They have also enclosed the policy in this regard which has been marked as Annexure R-1. They have further submitted that in order to maintain objectivity, the identity of the officer under consideration in not disclosed to the Board members. Each officer is entitled to consideration only 3 times i.e, fresh, first review and final review. The army being a pyramidical organisation, selection norms and parameters for each higher select ranks are from strict to very strict and thus supersession is an incidence of service. They have further alleged that the petitioner was considered by the Selection Board in August 1992 and May 1993 but was found unfit. His consideration in the final review held in November, 1993 was withdrawn. His case was again reviewed, finally in July 1994 and was found unfit. They have further submitted that the petitioner was awarded VSM for leading a rescue of passengers of a civil passenger bus which had fallen into a water ditch. It has also been submitted that Article 33 of the Constitution of India provides that Parliament may by law determine to what extent any of the rights conferred in Part III of the Constitution shall in their application to the members of the Armed Forces be restricted or abrogated so as to ensure the proper discharge of their duties and maintenance of discipline among them.

    6. They have further submitted that selection is not vacancy based. Approved officers are empanelled and thereafter physically promoted in order of seniority as and when vacancies occur. The seniority in itself is no criterion for promotion and an officer has first to be approved for promotion on the basis of his own merit, profile and batch merit. Officers are entitled only three considerations i.e first, first review and final review and if they are not approved during these three considerations, they are finally superseded and are not entitled for any further consideration and future promotion. The Selection Board did not approve the selection of the petitioner on the basis of his overall profile and batch merit. The case of the petitioner was considered duly and properly as per the policy and procedure applicable to all officers. It has also been admitted that there is no record to indicate that he was given performance conselling by any Reporting Officer. The contention of the petitioner that he has always earned above average reports throughout his career is not correct. Advisory and adverse remarks have been given to the petitioner by various Reporting Officers. These remarks have always been communicated to the petitioner. He has earned average to above average CRs during his career. In any case, absence of adverse remarks is no indication of the quality and calibre of an officer. The statutory complaint dated 28th March, 1995 submitted by the petitioner was duly considered by the Central Government and has been rejected vide its order dated 26th June, 1995 which has been duly communicated to the petitioner. The order of rejection reads as under:

    “The Central Government has considered the statutory complaint dated 28th March, 1995 submitted by Lt. Col. Mahavir Singh Sandhu (IC 32764) Inf. against his supersession. After considering the grievances of the officers and relevant records, the Government is satisfied that no injustice has been done to the officer in this regard. The officer has been assessed on the basis of his overall performance. The officer has an inconsistent profile and has not been placed in an acceptable grade for promotion on three occasions based on his overall profile and its evaluation by the respective Selection Board. The complaint is, therefore, rejected.”

    7. A rejoinder has also been filed by the petitioner wherein it has been submitted that the fact that the petitioner was awarded VSM was not considered by the Selection Board and even if it was considered, it was not done so in the right prospective and this is obvious from the assertion made in the counter that the VSM was awarded for rescuing passengers of a civil bus which had fallen into a water ditch. There are no statutory rules framed under the Army Act, only administrative instructions have been issued and selection is based on vacancies (Annexure P-8). It has also been asserted that no adverse remarks were communicated to the petitioner except one advisory remark which is as under:

    “He is trustworthy in accomplishing desired actions, though rigid in his attitude.”

    8. This remark cannot be treated as adverse. Further, it is stated that he was not given any performance counselling before such a remark was recorded. Therefore, this remark cannot be looked into as it has been made contrary to the instructions for Rendition of CRs which has been reproduced in the rejoinder. He has further submitted that the order dated 26-6-1995 rejecting his statutory complaint is a non-speaking order and various submissions made in his statutory complaint have not been considered.

    9. The respondent on 12-9-95, filed an additional affidavit alleging that this Court had no jurisdiction and prayed for the dismissal of the writ petition. It is stated that since the petitioner seeks to challenge the decision of the Selection Boards which were held in Delhi and the order rejecting his statutory complaint was also passed in Delhi and the High Court at Delhi alone has jurisdiction to entertain such a petition. They have further asserted that the petition should be dismissed on the ground of laches as the petitioner has challenged the order of the Selection Board held in August, 1992. Petitioner has not filed his written reply but during the course of argument has vehemently contested both these propositions.

    10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the petitioner was promoted to the rank of Lt. Col. on 2-3-91 after considering his overall profile and batch merit. Therefore, any adverse entry in the ACR or adverse remark earlier to 2-3-91 stood washed away and so at the time of consideration of his candidature for promotion to the rank of Colonel, only the ACRs after 2-3-91 should have been considered. In this connection, he has placed reliance on Raj Kumar Gupta v. State of J. & K., (1987) 5 SLR 365 (J & K); L.S Rane v. Union of India, (1983) 1 SLJ 321 (Bom) : [1982 (3) SLR 378 (SC)]; Girish Bihari v. State of U.P, 1982 Lab IC 1500 (All); Brij Mohan Singh Chopra v. State Of Punjab., (1987) 2 SCC 188 : AIR 1987 SC 948 : [1987 (2) SLR 54 (SC)]; Baldev Raj v. Union of India, (1980) 4 SCC 321 : AIR 1981 SC 70; Regional Manager v. Pawan Kr. Dubey, (1976) 3 SCC 334 : [1976 (2) SLR 44 (SC)]; State of Punjab v. Dewan Chuni Lal, (1970) 1 SCC 479 : AIR 1970 SC 2086 : [1970 SLR 375 (SC)]; Baikunth Nath Das v. Chief Dist. Medical Officer, Baripada, (1992) 2 SCC 299 : AIR 1992 SC 1020 : [1992 (2) SLR 2 (SC)]. He has further submitted that as per paragraph 150 of the instructions for Rendition of Confidential Reports, before any adverse remark is made, performance counselling is mandatory to enable the concerned officer to improve his performance. Since the respondents have admitted in their counter that the petitioner was not given any performance counselling it means that there was no adverse remarks against the petitioner. Even if the remark quoted in the earlier part of this judgment is taken to be adverse, the same cannot be looked into or relied upon as no performance counselling was given to the petitioner.

    11. Honour of VSM was announced by the President of India on 26-1-90 and the medal was conferred on him on 15-1-91. Thereafter, he was promoted to the rank of Lt. Col. on 2-3-1991. D.S.R 696 provides as to how, why and when VSM series are awarded. They are awarded for distinguished service of a high order. This award is not given on any particular incident or act of gallantry but on the basis of the overall performance in the service which is evident from Annexure P-7 also. He has further submitted that either the Selection Board did not consider the fact that VSM has been awarded to the petitioner or if it was considered then it was not done so in the right perspective. This is evident from the respondents statement that the petitioner was awarded VSM because he had rescued some civilians from a bus fallen in a ditch. Petitioner has further submitted that the Selection Board promoted 17 officers who were junior to the petitioner to the rank of Colonel. Promotion in the military is covered by DSR para 70 which provides that “Officers will normally be considered for promotion in the order of seniority in their batch. But officers whose advancement is in the interest of service may be selected for promotion to fill vacancies whatever his seniority in the rank at the time. The cases of officers who were superseded for promotion will be kept under review in accordance with the existing instructions”. This paragraph does not mention about the overall profile or batch merit. If an officer is specially selected for promotion then reasons should be given to justify that it was done so in the interest of service. No such reasons are alvailable in the present case. The respondents though they were given time, have not been able to produce any instructions which make it obligatory on the part of the Selection Board to consider the ACRs for the last ten years. He has further submitted that Annexure R-1 produced by the respondents is not a part of the DSR but are only administrative instructions which do not have the force of law. Even as per Exhibit R-1, seniority of an officer has to be given due importance as also the fact that anybody has been decorated.

    12. As regards the preliminary objection taken by the respondents, it has been submitted that the order of the Selection Board held in August 1992 was communicated to the petitioner only on 31-3-93 and the order of the Selection Board held in 1993–1994 was communicated to the petitioner by letter dated 1-1. 1-94 and the writ petition was filed on 1-6-95. Meanwhile the petitioner had also filed a statutory complaint against the order of rejection which was pending when the writ petition was filed. Therefore, it cannot be said that the petition has been filed belatedly. With regard to the objection on jurisdiction he has placed reliance on Damomal v. Union of India, AIR. 1967 Bom 355; Serajuddin and Co. v. State of Orissa, AIR 1971 Cal 414 and Orient Paper Mills v. Union of India, AIR 1979 Cal 114.

    13. On the other hand, the learned Counsel for the respondent has placed reliance on (1985) 3 SCC 217, and submitted that this Court has no jurisdiction. He has further submitted that the petition being belated should be dismissed on that account alone. On merit, his submission is that the instructions issued by the MS have the force of law and are mandatory because neither Army Act nor DSR provides for the procedure. There is no allegation of mala fide against any member of the Selection Board. The respondents have placed the proceedings of all the three Selection Boards before the Court and they have been found to be fair and impartial. All the Selection Boards consist of different personnel who have no bias’ or prejudice against the petitioner. The records show that they have also considered the fact that the petitioner was awarded VSM and the Selection Board has considered the ACRs for the last ten years in case of all the candidates. Each officer has been considered on the basis of his own profile and batch merit. Therefore, no prejudice has been caused to the petitioner. Identity of the officer was withheld from the members of the Board and no member was allowed to express his opinion or comment in order to ensure that the views expressed by one member do not influence the other. Great reliance was placed on Exhibit R-1. Guidelines provided by R-1 were strictly followed and the Selection Board submitted its recommendations to the Government of India for its final approval. It has further been submitted that the defence services have their own peculiarities and special requirements. The considerations which apply to other Government servants in the matter of promotion cannot as a matter of course be applied to defence personnel. In this connection he has placed reliance on K.D Gupta v. Union of India, 1989 Supp (1) SCC 416 : AIR 1989 SC 1393 : [1989 (2) SLR 424 (SC)]; State Bank of India v. Mohd. Myunuddin, (1987) 4 SCC 486 : AIR 1987 SC 1889 : [1987 (4) SLR 383 (SC)] and Mir Ghulam v. Union of India, (1973) 4 SCC 135 : AIR 1973 SC 1138 : [1973 (1) SLR 953 (SC)].

    14. I have given a thoughtful consideration to the whole matter and have perused the entire records as also the citations made at the bar. Result of the Selection Board held in August, 1992 was communicated to the petitioner only on 31-3-93 and the order of the Selection Board held in the year 1993–1994 was communicated to the petitioner by a letter dated 1-11-94 and the Writ Petition was filed on 1-6-95. Meanwhile, the petitioner had also filed a Statutory Complaint against the order of rejection which was pending when he filed the Writ Petition. Therefore, it cannot be said that the petition is belated. In fact, it was rather premature. The petitioner could have waited till his Statutory Complaint Was disposed of so as to exhaust his alternative remedy.

    15. Petitioner is posted in Sikkim since April, 1993 and it was here in Sikkim that he received the orders of the various Selection Boards. He had filed the Statutory Complaint while he was posted in Sikkim and the rejection of the Statutory Complaint was also communicated to him in Sikkim. Therefore, considering the authorities relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, I am of the view that as a part of the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of this Court, this Court has the jurisdiction to entertain the Writ Petition.

    16. Petitioner's services are controlled by the Army Act, 1950 which authorises the Central Government to make rules under Section 191 and regulations under Section 192. Section 193 provides that all rules and regulations made under the Act shall be published in the Official Gazette and, on such publication, shall have effect as if enacted in the Act. Section 193 provides that every rule and every regulation made by the Central Government shall be laid before each House of Parliament. The Central Government in exercise of its powers conferred by Section 191 of the Army Act promulgated the Army Rules, 1954 which was also published in the Gazette of India, Regulations of the Army have also been framed but not under Section 192 of the Army Act. They have also not been published in the Official Gazette as required under Section 193. However, Defence Services Regulations are in existence and have been revised from time to time. A revised edition of 1987 was made available to the Court by the parties. Paragraph 70 of the D.S.R which provides for promotion runs as under

    “70. Claims for Promotion ˜ Officers will normally be considered for promotion in the order of seniority in their Corps but an officer whose early advancement is in the interest of service may be specially selected for promotion to fill a vacancy whatever his seniority in the rank at the time. The cases of officers who are superseded for promotion will be kept under review in accordance with the existing instructions.”

    17. This provides that normally officers will be Considered for promotion in the order of seniority but an officer whose advancement is in the interest of service may be specially selected for promotion to fill a vacancy irrespective of his seniority. There are no provisions made in the Army Act or Army Rules for promotion. Procedure for promotion has been given only in the D.S.R Respondents have placed reliance on Exhibit R-1, a circular letter dated 6-5-87. This circular does not find place in the D.S.R It need not be emphasised that such a circular requires wide publicity. There is no evidence on record to show that wide publicity was given to Annexure R-1. Purpose of giving wide publicity is to enable the persons who are governed and affected by such circulars or regulations to know the procedure of selection. Even the Regulations have not been published in the Official Gazette. However, a printed publication is available as far as the D.S.R is concerned; Annexure R-1 also requires that the seniority of an officer has to be taken into consideration and citations of award or decorations awarded to an officer should also be taken into consideration. The proceedings of the three Selection Boards were shown to me in my chamber and they show that the fact that VSM was awarded to the petitioner was mentioned in the proceedings sheet. I did not see any reason to come to the conclusion that any of the officers who manned the Selection Boards were against the, petitioner or were biased or prejudiced. They were all high ranking officials and all the three Selection Boards were manned by different person. Even the petitioner has not alleged any mala fide against any of the members of the Selection Board. Therefore, it cannot be said that there was any defect in the constitution of the Board. The proceedings of the Selection Boards show that the ACRs for the last 10 years had been considered to judge the overall profile of an officer within his own batch. The respondent could not produce any order or instruction which made it imperative for the Selection Board to consider the ACRs for the last ten years. Petitioner's case from the very beginning is that the petitioner was found suitable for promotion to the rank of Lt. Col. in the year 1990 and was promoted to the rank of Lt. Col. on 2-3-91. The respondents admitted that at the time of the promotion of the petitioner to the rank of Lt. Col. his overall profile and batch merit were considered meaning thereby, that he Was found fit for promotion to the rank of Lt. Col. on the basis of his ACRs up to 1990. Thereafter, honour of VSM was announced on 26-1-90 and the medal was conferred on him on 15-1-91. VSM is awarded as per D.S.R paragraph 696(ii) which provides as under:—

    “(iii) Vishisht Seva Medal — Awardable for distinguished service of a high order.”

    18. Petitioner's candidature was again considered for; promotion to the rank of Colonel in August, 1992. As has been mentioned in the various authorities relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, the adverse entry or remark, if any, against the petitioner stood washed away by his promotion to the rank of Lt. Colonel and by award of the VSM for distinguished service of a high order. Thus, only the ACRs after 1990 should have been considered for his promotion to the post of Colonel. Respondents have not controverted this propostion of law, and have relied only upon K.D Gupta's case (1989 Lab IC 1364) which states that the consideration which’ apply to other Government servants in the matter of promotion cannot as a matter of course be applied to defence personnel. It does not say that the general principles laid down for public servants will not apply to the military personnel. Moreover, the observations made in K.D Gupta's case are in a different context., K.D Gupta had filed a contempt petition as the directions to the following effect were not complied with.

    “………the appellant's medical category shall be taken as being continued to be S-1 from 1977 and on that basis his promotional entitlement shall be finalised by the respondents……”

    19. Petitioner therein was informed by the respondent as under:—

    “………………………………………

    Therefore, upgradation of your medical category from Shape-2 to Shape-1 by the. Supreme Court vide their orders dated 20th April, 1988, does not warrant reconsideration of your case for promotion because your medical category had not affected your case for promotion to the rank of A/Colonel on any occasion. You failed to make the grade for promotion not on˜the basis of your medical category but on the basis of your overall performance and merit of your batch…”

    20. It was only while considering whether this reply of the respondents amounted to contempt or not that the observations relied only the respondents were made in the judgment. Moreover, respondents have also admitted in para 18 of their counter that no performance counselling was ever communicated to him. Para 150 of the Instructions for Rendition of Confidential Reports require that before any adverse remarks is made performance counselling is mandatory to enable the concerned officer to improve his performance. The respondents also thought that the so-called adverse remark passed against the petitioner “He is trustworthy in accomplishing desired actions, though rigid in his attitude” was not to be considered adverse and therefore, did not think it necessary to give any performance counselling before making the above remark in the ACR. As such, now it is not open to the respondents to treat this remark as an adverse remark. The respondents have not been able to show any adverse remark or adverse entry against the petitioner. Merely stating that advisory and adverse remarks have been given to the petitioner by various Reporting Officers is not enough. Petitioner had filed a statutory complaint against the order of his supersession which runs into 21 pages and had given detailed reasons running into nearly 13 pages. However, the said complaint has been dismissed by a routine order reproduced in the earlier part of the judgment. This order does not meet to discuss any of the points raised by the petitioner in his statutory complaint and is therefore a non-speaking order. If the authorities had considered the submissions made by the petitioner and had given reasons for rejecting the same, this Court would have been in a position to consider the reasons in its judicial review (Reference in this connection may be made to a recent judgment of this Court dated 19-8-95 in R.C Tewari v. Union of India, C.W No. 2/95).

    21. Respondents have heavily relied on Annexure R-3 which is a letter from Brig. J.L Malhotra, Dy. MS(B) for Military Secretary dated. 28-11-86 enclosing the comments on several points. One of the points raised was as under:—

    “It is suggested that in Review Boards for promotion, only those ACRs be considered which the officer has earned after his last promotion board and not the previous ACRs which have already been considered. Reconsideration of these ACRs along with the latest one nullifies the effect of good ACRs which the officer might have earned after his last Board.”

    and the comment given thereon is as under:—

    “1. The point raised has been examined. It is pointed out that the system of selection imbibes the theory to select the best man for the job. Accordingly, the factors which lead to the Selection have been identified. One of the most important factors in the selection system is the overall profile of the officer which includes among other things all ACRs earned in the rank of Major and Lt. Cols, for promotion up to A/Cols.”

    22. In the letter itself it has been stated that wide publicity should be given to the contents Of the letter. However, there is no evidence that any publicity was given to this letter. Moreover, even the respondents who had filed the counter were not aware of this letter otherwise, they would have made a mention of it in their counter. They only sought time to file some documents to show that it is necessary for the Selection Board to consider the ACRs for the last 10 years. The letter was not even referred to or mentioned at the stage of arguments and it was filed only on 23-9-95 after the arguments had concluded on 14-9-95. If this letter had the same force as the DSR then it should have found place in the revised DSR edition of 1987. So, in my opinion, such inter-communication between two officers without any publicity cannot negate the judicial pronouncement of the various High Courts and the Supreme Court relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner.

    23. In this view of the matter I am of the opinion that at the time of the consideration of the petitioner's candidature for promotion to the rank of Colonel only the ACRs after 1990 that is from the date he was promoted to the rank of Lt. Col. up to the date of consideration by the Selection Board should have been considered. Therefore, the proceedings of the Selection Board vis-a-vis the petitioner only, is not legal and stands vitiated as far as petitioner is concerned. The respondents are directed to review the case of the petitioner afresh within three months hereafter, considering only the ACRs earned in the rank of Lt. Colonel till he was considered by the first Selection Board in August, 1992. In case he is found fit he should be promoted to the rank of Colonel along with his batch mates who were considered initially in the August, 1992 and should also be given his due seniority in the rank of Colonel with retrospective effect. Stay granted on 26-6-95 automatically comes to an end. Petitioner may commence study leave after six week's of the announcement of the result of consideration for the post of Colonel.

    24. In the result, the Writ Petition is allowed with costs.

    25. Petition allowed.

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    Lt. Col. Mahavir Singh v. Union Of India And Others
    (Sep 29, 1995)