Srinivasan, J.:— The petitioner was working as Principal District Munsiff, Kulithalai. Oh certain complaints received against him, departmental enquiry was initiated in ROC 69/88 con. B. 2 dated 18-8-1988. The enquiry was conducted and ultimately, the Enquiry Officer found that charges 1 to 3 and 5 were proved against the petitioner. When the report came to this Court, a committee of two learned Judges considered the report and found that the findings of the Enquiry Officer on charges 1, 4 and 5 could be accepted, with the result, charges 1 and 5 were alone found against the petitioner. Then the enquiry report was sent to the petitioner and his representation were called for, he made his representations which were again considered by a committee of learned Judges. The committee accepted the representation made by the petitioner on charge No. 5 and exonerated him. Ultimately, as per the findings of the Committee, charge No. 1 was alone proved against the petitioner. The matter was placed before the Full Court which accepted the finding and recommended dismissal of the petitioner from service. The papers were forwarded to the Government and ultimately, an order was passed by the Government, in G.O Ms. No. 1101 dated 7-7-1992 dismissing the petitioner from service. It is the said order which is challenged in the present writ petition.
2. Though the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition canvasses the evidence and the materials on record relating to the findings of fact, learned counsel for the petitioner confined his arguments on three points.
3. The first contention urged by him is that the order of the Government passed on 7-7-1992 proceeds on the footing that two charges were found against the peritioner viz., charges 1 and 5. It is submitted that there is an error apparent on the face of the record when the Government has been under the impression that two charges were found against the petitioner, the order of dismissal passed by the Government against the petitioner is unsustainable. We are unable to accept this contention. The records clearly show that the Full Court considered the findings against the petitioner on charge No. 1 and recommended the dismissal of the petitioner from service. The Government could not have come to any other conclusion once the recommendation of the Full Court was made. Hence, the mistake committed by the Government in its order while referring to the findings that two charges were found against the petitioner will not vitiate the order as such. In fact, the cause for such a mistake originated from the communication sent by this Court in D.O Letter No. 69/88 con-B-2 dated 11-6-1991 by the Registrar of this Court to the Secretary to Government, Home Department, In that communication, while reference was made to the findings given by the High Court earlier on charges 1 and 5, it was omitted to mention that on a later representation the finding on charge No. 5 was vacated and the petitioner was found guilty of only one charge viz., charge No. 1 In our opinion, the mistake does not vitiate the proceedings and the order of dismissal.
4. The second contention is that the enquiry was initiated by the Vigilance Department as evident from the statement found in the counter-affidavit filed by the second respondent. In the counter-affidavit, in paragraph 3, it is stataed as follows:
“It is true that on the directions of the Honourable the Acting Chief Justice, the Vigilance Cell (Judl.) High Court, Madras gone into certain alleged acts of corrupt practices levelled against the petitioner, who was then working as Principal District Munsif, Kulithalai, and gathered certain materials to substantiate the following allegations made against him. On the basis of the materials, so collected by the Vigilance Cell (Judl.) High Court, Madras, initiated departmental enquiry against the petitioner in ROC. No. 69/88 con. B-2 dated 18-8-1988.”
5. Obviously, the last sentence on which reliance is placed by learned counsel is not, properly worded. There is clearly an omission in the sentence to the reference to the authority who initiated the departmental enquiry. The files have been produced before us. We have gone through the files. We find that the enquiry was initiated only as per the direction of the Court and the charges were also framed only by the Court.
6. Reliance is placed upon a judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in T.S Sankaranarayanan. v. The High Court of Judicature at Madras reported by the Registrar, High Court, Madras, (1994 Writ LR 484). The Division Bench has taken the view in that case that if the proceedings are initiated not by the Full Court, but at the instance of the Chief Justice of this Court, the entire proceedings will be vitiated and invalid. With respect, we must point out that the proposition is too widely stated in the said ruling. In fact, we have rendered a judgment yesterday (4-3-1996) in W.P No. 1606 of 1996 that the law stated by the Division Bench on that aspect of the matter is not in accord with the judgments of the Supreme Court. We have referred to the judgments of the Supreme Court in State of M.P v. Shardul Singh, 1990 (1) SCJ 442; P.V Srinivasa Sastri v. Comptroller and Auditor General, AIR 1993 SC 1321 : [1993 (1) SLR 25 (SC)]; Registrar, Co-operative Societies v. F.X Fernando, 1994 (2) SCC 746 : [1994 (1) SLR 820 (SC)]; and Transport Commissioner, Madras-5 v. A. Radha Krishna Moorthy., (1995) 1 SCC 332 : [1995 (1) SLR 239 (SC)], and pointed out that even in the initiation of the enquiry and framing of charges is done by a subordinate authority, the enquiry will not be vitiated and if the final order is passed by the disciplinary authority, that would be valid. Hence, this contention also fails.
7. The third contention is that this is a case in which there is no legal evidence before the authorities for accepting charge No. 1 and giving a finding against the petitioner herein. Learned counsel draws our attention to the statements given by P.Ws 4 and 5 before the Vigilance Officer. P.W 5 the Advocate who appeared in O.S No. 76 of 1984 gave a statement on 21-6-1988. He mentioned that his client informed him that the petitioner herein demanded a sum of Rs. 1,000/- for deciding the case in her favour and that she replied that she had no money to pay to him. P.W 4 is a party in that suit. She gave a statement on 21-6-1988 before the Vigilance Officer in which she has stated that she was called by the District Munsif to his chamber and he demanded a sum of Rs. 1,000/- for deciding the case in her favour. She replied that she had not even a pie to be paid to him. She added that the case was decided against her. In the course of deposition as P.W 4 the party in the suit has stated that she informed her counsel about the demand made by the District Munsif only on the next day after such demand. P.W 5, the Advocate, in his deposition has stated that his client had come for trial on 1-11-1985 and that she did not tell him on that date about the demand said to have been made by the petitioner. He also says that he did not send any complaint to any higher authority about the demand made by the petitioner. But, he adds in the deposition that he had given a report to the Advocates' Association at Kulithalai and they had also held a meeting in that regard. It is contended by learned counsel that a perusal of the two statements given by the two witnesses before the Vigilance Officers and the depositions given by them before the Enquiry Officer could itself show that her evidence is wholly unacceptable and it is a case of no evidence on which the finding has been rendered.
8. We are unable to accept this contention Learned counsel is really inviting us to appreciate the evidence adduced before the Enquiry Officer. We have gone through the report of the Enquiry Officer. We find that the entire evidence in this regard has been discussed by the Enquiry Officer fully and he has come to the conclusion that charge No. 1 has been proved. The same has been considered by a Committee of learned Judges later and accepted by the Full Court thereafter. In such circumstances, there is no warrant for interferring with the finding of fact on the alleged ground that there is no legal ground. We do not find any justification to accept the said contention. In our opinion, the evidence is sufficient to warrant the finding of the charge.
9. Learned Additional Government Pleader invites our attention to a judgment of the Supreme Court in Jiwan Mal Kochar v. Union of India, AIR 1983 SC 1102 : [1983 (2) SLR 456 (SC)] in which it has been held that the Court cannot interfere with the finding based on circumstantial evidence. In this case, there is direct evidence given by the party herself which has been accepted by the Enquiry Officer and the learned Judges of this Court.
10. In such circumstances, there is no merit in the contention urged by learned counsel for the petitioner that it is a case of no evidence.
11. No other contention has been raised before us. We find that all the three contentions urged by learned, counsel for the petitioner are without substance. Hence, the writ petitions dismissed. There will be order as to costs.
12. Petition dismissed.