Kingsford, J.:— This appeal arises out of a will executed by one Ram Bhanjan in the year 1893. The contest lies between one Ram Ratan, the respondent, who propounds the will, and three daughters of Ram Bhanjan, who are the appellants before us. Ram Ratan appears to have been an adopted son of Ram Bhanjan, and he propounds the will in question as legatee and devisee thereunder. The will was executed on 6th September, 1893, and it was registered at the village of the executant three days later in the presence of the Sub-Registrar, whose endorsement is upon the document. It appears that on 14th September, 1893, Umrao Kumar, the wife of the testator, filed an application for registration of her name in the Collectorate. Ram Bhanjan died a, month later. On 3rd February, 1894 Umrao's name was registered in respect of the properties. On 23rd June, 1897 she applied for Letters of Administration, which were granted to her accordingly six months later. Umrao appears to have died in the year 1912, and after her death the appellants filed an application for revocation of those letters. That application was granted in March 1913. Shortly afterwards the respondent Ram Ratan applied for probate. The appellants entered a caveat, but probate was granted on 18th September, 1913. The present appeal is from that order.
2. The first contention raised before us by the learned vakil for the appellants is, that the document is not a will. The document states that Ram Ratan is the adopted son of the testator, and provides that after the testators's death Ram Ratan is to have possession of the properties, and that he is to manage them in consultation with the testator's wife, Umrao, during her lifetime, and that nothing done by Ram Ratan without Umrao's permission is to be valid. After the death of Umrao it is provided that the will shall operate solely in favour of Ram Ratan. We were referred to p. 24 of Mozumdar's Hindu Wills, and our attention was called to three tests applicable to a will. I do not think it was seriously contended that the will in question was not a revocable document and certainly it cannot be said that it does not contain a disposition of property. It was however contended that there was no existence of any intention in the testator's mind, that the will should take effect after his death. As I have already indicated, an application was made for the registration of Umrao's name before Ram Bhanjan's death, and in the application filed by Umrao it is stated that a petition was also filed by Ram Bhanjan assenting to her application. I am not prepared to hold that these circumstances are any indication that Ram Bhanjan intended that the will, so far as the respondent was concerned, should take effect before his death. We were referred to the ruling in a Reference by the Collector and Superintendent of Stamps, Bombay(1). The circumstances of that case are clearly distinguishable; for the document there considered was not a will at all; it was merely a trust-deed which was contemplated to operate during and beyond the lifetime of the executant. It cannot be said that description is applicable to the document in the present case.
3. A further contention was, that as the respondent had been adopted in Dattaka form by Ram Bhanjan, he became a coparcener in the joint family property, and as such was entitled to that property upon the testator's death, and therefore there was no power in the testator to bequeath to Ram Ratan property to which the latter was already entitled to succeed. Now this argument raises the question as to the title of Ram Bhanjan to the property which the will purports to devise. There is a long series of rulings, to which reference is made at p. 762 of Mozumdar's work, the effect of which clearly is that it is not within the province of a probate Court to inquire into; the title of the testator in the properties covered by the will. That being so, I am of opinion that the learned District Judge was perfectly right in ruling that the question, whether or not Ram Ratan was adopted by Ram Bhanjan, was not a matter which he could decide in the present suit. It is, in fact, not open to us to consider the matter at all. The next contention was that the will was not properly proved. It appears that the document was attested by two witnesses named Mangal Prasad and Sheoraj Misser, both of whom are since dead. It was also attested by a third man, Mathura Rai, whose signature was attached to it by the above Mangal Prasad. Mathura Rai has given evidence in the present case. It seems that he was illiterate at the time of the execution of the will, but he has since learnt to write. He states that the will was duly executed by Ram Bhanjan, and-that it was duly attested by Mangal Prasad and Sheoraj Misser. He has no doubt that the document shown to him in Court is the actual will which he saw so executed and attested. I am unable to find any reasons for discrediting the evidence of this witness, or for finding that it does not amount to sufficient proof of attestation.
4. The third contention was that the signature of Ram Bhanjan upon the will was a forgery. It is said that there are some documents which contain his genuine signature, and that if these documents, which are not actually before us, were compared with the signature on the will, they would show that the latter is not genuine. I do not think it is necessary for us to give the appellants any further opportunity of producing those documents before us, because, in my opinion, the question whether or not the signature is genuine is set at rest by the endorsement of the Sub-Registrar upon the deed. That endorsement is to the effect, that execution was admitted by Ram Bhanjan in the presence of the Sub-Registrar, and this, as I have already said, took place three days after the actual execution. In my opinion therefore there are no circumstances which would entitle us to interfere with the grant of probate.
5. This was a valid will executed by a competent testator, and I would therefore dismiss the appeal with costs measuring the hearing-fee at 8 gold mohurs.
6. Atkinson, J.:— I entirely concur with the judgment of my learned colleague.
V.S/R.K
7. Appeal dismissed.