Narayan, J.:— These two appeals arise out of a suit in which a declaration was sought by the plaintiffs that they were entitled to the money due under the insurance policies and the shares, stocks and securities and to the profits, benefits and interests covered by them as specified in Schedule A of the plaint. The plaintiffs who are the brokers of one Rai Bahadur Ram Ran Vijaya Sinha deceased are claiming these amounts as surviving coparceners of an alleged joint family consisting of themselves and the said Rai Bahadur. The Rai Bahadur died on 27th October 1936 leaving surviving two step-brothers who are the plaintiffs in this litigation, a widow, who is the defendant no. 1 and three daughters who are the defendants nos. 2, 3 and 4. The defendant no. 2 Srimati Sharad Sinha is his daughter born of a deceased wife of his and the defendants nos. 3 and 4 are his daughters born of Srimati Parvati Kuer, the defendant no. 1. Ths case put forward by the plaintiffs is that when the Rai Bahadur died the joint family was possessed of flourishing printing and publishing business known as the Khadga Vilas Press and also other moveable and immoveable properties in the districts of Patna and Ballia and that out of the income of the joint family business and properties, properties had been acquired in the names of he different members of the joint family, most of them being in the name of the Rai Bahadur. The allegation is that among other investments the join family invested moneys in purchasing shares and stocks, in Government securities and in various companies and also in Life Insurance Companies by effecting insurance on the life of the Rai Bahadur and on the lives of the plaintiffs. All these are characterised as provisions for the joint family consisting of the Rai Bahadur and the two plaintiffs, his step-brothers. After the death of the Rai Bahadur the defendant no. 1 applied for a Succession Certificate in respect of the insurance money arising out of three policies which had been taken in the name of the Rai Bahadur. These three policies are insurance policies nos. 36483, 36484 and 36485 of the Great Eastern Life Assurance Co., Ltd., who have been impleaded as defendant no. 5 in this suit. Each of the policies is for a sum of Rs. 17,000. In spite of the objection raised by the present plaintiffs the District Judge of Patna by his order, dated 13th December 1940, directed succession certificate to be issued to the defendant no. 1 on her furnishing securities, but up till now no certificate has been issued as no security has been furnished. The plaintiffs have instituted the suit on the allegation that on account of the wrongful claim made by the defendant no. 1 and on account of the order passed by the District Judge, a cloud has been cast on their title with regard to the insurance moneys and the stocks, shares and Government securities held by the family. They, therefore, seek a declaration that they are entitled to the amounts payable under the policies and on account of the shares, stocks and securities.
The contesting defendant was only the defendant no. 1, and her contentions substantially were that the Rai Bahadur had separated from the plaintiffs in the year 1906 and that the properties described in Schedule A of the plaint consisting of the insurance moneys, stocks, shares and securities were his personal properties which had been acquired by him out of his separate money and for the benefit of his own wife and children. Regarding the Khadga Vilas Press the allegation of the defendant is that it had been started by Babu Saheb Prasad Singh, the first father-in-law of the Rai Bahadur, and that it had been gifted by him to the Rai Bahadur shortly after the Rai Bahadur's first marriage.
The learned Subordinate Judge has decreed the plaintiffs' claim with regard to the money payable under the shares, stocks and securities and to the profits arising out of them, but he has dismissed the plaintiffs' claim with regard to the amounts payable under the three insurance policies mentioned above.
First Appeal no. 69 of 1947 has been filed by the two plaintiffs, and it is directed against the order of the learned Subordinate Judge dismissing the claim of the plaintiffs with regard to the three insurance policies. First Appeal no. 91 of 1947 has been filed by the defendant no. 1 Srimati Parvati Kuer, and it is directed against the decree that has been passed by the learned Subordinate Judge with regard to the shares, stocks and securities.
The learned Subordinate Judge has negatived the case of the defendant no. 1 that the press, was the property of Babu Saheb Prasad Singh, and according to the findings arrived at by the learned Subordinate Judge the press was a family property having been started by Babu Raimdin Sinha, the father of the plaintiffs and the Rai Bahadur. The story of the defendant no. 1 that the press had been gifted by Babu Saheb Prasad Singh, the first father-in-law of the Rai Bahadur, to him had to be rejected because of the finding that the press was the property of Babu Ramdin Sinha. It has further been found by the learned Subordinate Judge that the Rai Bahadur was joint with the plaintiffs and that he died in the year 1936 in a state of jointness with them. These findings have not been challenged before us by the defendant no. 1 Srimati Parvati Kuer, and her Counsel Mr. Lalnarain Sinha has argued on the assumption that these findings are absolutely correct.
On the evidence which is forthcoming in this case there cannot be the least doubt that the press business was the most important business of this joint family, and the statement of the plaintiff Sri Sarangdhar Sinha to the effect that the surplus income from the press was invested in acquiring life insurance policies and in buying shares and stocks must be accepted as correct. The learned Subordinate Judge has rightly found that the money invested in stocks and shares was the money saved out of the income of the press and that there is no substance in the contention of the defendant no. 1 that the stocks and shares were purchased by the Rai Banadur out of a separate fund belonging to him. The lady Srimati Parvati Kuer though she had stated in her examination-in-chief that she had come to know from her husband that the shares and the stocks had been acquired by him out of his personal fund, had to admit in her cross-examination that all these properties were acquired by her husband out of the income of the press. The press was as is admitted now, a joint family business, and if the shares and the stocks had been acquired out of the income of the press then they must be regarded as joint family properties. The lady further admits that account-books were maintained regarding the purchase of the shares and other properties in the life-time of her husband and that the accounts used to remain in the iron-safe of her husband. She has made another important statement in her deposition, and it is this that accounts of income and expenditure of the press were maintained during the life-time of her husband and that the income from all the properties were noted in the account-books. Her statement that the accounts of the press have not been produced in this case and that her pairvikars had told her that forged bahis had been filed by the plaintiffs deserves no serious consideration. Obviously, she is not able to swear that the account-books that had been filed are fabricated books, and she never insisted on the production of the real account-books if she and her pairvikars had taken these account-books as fabricated documents. I am afraid the lady is depending a bit too much on her pairvikars, and the unfortunate result of this dependence is that her Counsel in this Court had to give up the main defences on which she had sought to rest her case. Because there was no division of the press and because it is out of the income of the press that all these acquisitions had been made, the lady had to say that the press was not divided because it was the separate property of her husband a statement to which she is not able to stick now. Because the account-books show that the plaintiffs were paid monies for their personal expenses out of the income of the press, the lady says in her deposition that the plaintiffs used to get something from her husband by way of help. But, she had to admit in her deposition in the Succession Certificate case that the press belonged to all the three brothers as their joint property and that the income was divided among them. Her clear statement in the previous deposition was that “each brother used to divide the income of the press amongst themselves and they used to spend on their household affairs from their separate shares”. These statements must now be regarded as absolutely incorrect statements, and the irresistible conclusion is that the press was the only business of the family out of the income of which the properties which are in dispute in this case were acquired. The lady herself says that the Rai Bahadur had no business besides the press business, and we have got before us the evidence of certain very respectable witnesses from which it appears that the Rai Bahadur had no separate fund or business or any separate property and that the income from the press was practically the only income out of which the shares, and stocks were purchased. Those respectable witnesses are Sri Ramdayalu Singh, Speaker of the Bihar Legislative Assembly; Sri Chandreshwar Prasad Narayan Singh, a big zamindar, a Member of the Legislative Assembly and Leader of the Opposition in the Legislative Assembly, and Sri Shyama Prasad Singh, another big zamindar and Deputy President of the Bihar Legislative Council. Of course, the depositions of Dr. Rajendra Prasad (now the President of the Indian Republic) and Sri Srikrishna Sinha (now the Chief Minister of Bihar) have been wrongly admitted by the learned Subordinate Judge under section 33 of the Evidence Act. The provisions of section 33 of the Evidence Act having not been strictly complied with these two depositions must be rejected as inadmissible in evidence. Mr. Lalnarain Sinha did not advance before us any serious argument so far as the finding of the learned Subordinate Judge With, regard to the stocks, shares and securities is concerned, and his submission was that if the Insurance policies standing in the name of the Rai Bahadur are taken to be policies which had been acquired by the Rai Bahadur for his own personal benefit and for the benefit of his wife and children, the stocks and shares standing in the name of the Rai Bahadur should also be taken to be properties which had been acquired by the Rai Bahadur for his own benefit and the benefit of his wife and children. The learned Counsel could not fail to appreciate that the presumption of the Hindu Law in a joint undivided family is that the whole property of the family is a joint estate and that the onus lies upon a party claiming any part of such property as a separate estate to establish that fact. It is true that there can be no presumption that a joint family possesses joint family property, but here on the findings and also on the admissions it must be taken to be an established fact that whatever acquisition was made was made from the income of the press which was a joint family business. Here, there is no evidence given that the Rai Bahadur had any separate property or any separate income and that out of his personal funds the purchase money with regard to the stocks and the shares was paid. As has been laid a down in several cases, the criterion is to consider from what source the money comes from which the purchase money is paid. It has been established as well as admitted that the purchase money came from the fund which had accumulated out of the savings of the income of the press. The learned Subordinate Judge was, therefore, justified in passing a decree with regard to the stocks and the shares, and the learned Counsel who, appeared on behalf of the lady before us rightly, I say with respect, did not advance any argument in support of his client's appeal, no. 91 of 1947, independent of what he submitted in the other appeal which has been preferred by the two brothers. We have, therefore, to address ourselves seriously only to the question as to how far the Insurance policies can be regarded as the personal properties of the Rai Bahadur.
Mr. Lalnarain Sinha formulated the following three points so far as the plaintiff's appeal is concerned:— (1) Life Insurance policy is by its very nature not capable of being a part of a joint family asset. (2) Premia paid towards Life Insurance policies, even when paid out of joint family funds, are monies appropriated by the insured, and the policies, as such, must be presumed to be his separate property. (3) SO far as the burden of proof is concerned a policy must be proved to be joint family property. While elaborating his arguments on these points the learned Counsel submitted that the source out of which the premium was paid will not be the determining factor and that when a joint family fund is utilized by a particular member for paying premium that should be regarded as appropriated by him personally. In the opinion of the learned Counsel a Life Insurance policy is for personal protection and that from its very nature such a property is a property of a peculiar kind, the primary intention being to provide for a risk and not to make investments. But, before I discuss the question of law raised by the learned Counsel it is necessary to point out that there cannot be the least doubt in this case that the premia were paid out of the joint family fund and that whenever the family got the amount of a matured policy the amount so received was treated as an acquisition by the joint family and not only by the individual member, the policy in whose name had matured. I do not think it is necessary for us to refer to the entire evidence in this case for he purpose of establishing that the premia were being paid out of the joint family funds and that the amounts of the matured policies received were treated as acquisitions of the joint family. Mr. Lalnarain Sinha again conceded that the premia were being paid out of the joint family funds, but he submitted that in absence of the ledger it could not be held with certainty whether the amount spent over insurance was ultimately treated as amount spent for the joint family or for the individual member in whose name the policies stood. If the defendant, thought that the ledger would be the only document which could throw light on the question as to whether the amount spent over premia was treated as amount spent for the joint family or for the individual member, she should have insisted on the production of the ledger, and no point can be made out of the non-production of the ledger, if its production was not insisted on by the defendant. My own opinion is that the production of the ledger would, not have in any way advanced the case of the defendant. Sri Sarangdhar Sinha is perfectly correct when he says that ledgers corresponding to cash-books are maintained and that they contain nothing else except the total of the separate khatas. If the entries in the account-books and the correspondence filed by the plaintiffs cannot throw any light on the question raised, certainly the ledgers would be of no assistance to us on the point. A Bench of this Court held in Chandra Narayan Deo v. Ramchandra, following a Privy Council decision (37 All. 557), that it is open to a litigant to refrain from producing any document which he considers irrelevant, and that, if the opposing litigant is dissatisfied, it is for him to apply for an affidavit of documents, and he can so obtain inspection and production of all that appear to him in such affidavit to be relevant and proper. Their Lordships of the Privy Council had said that if he fails to do so, neither he nor the Court at his suggestion is entitled to draw any inference as to the consents of any such documents. Though in view of the facts conceded it is not necessary to refer to the entire documentary evidence which goes to show that the premia were paid out of the joint family funds, I should like to refer to some of the items. Though the bank account was in the name of the Rai Bahadur, the amounts received from the bank were treated as amounts belonging to the joint family, and that must be so because the deposits in the bank were made out of the income of the press which had never been divided. For some years there was the system of Haveli Khata, meaning, thereby that a consolidated sum used to be taken and entered in the Haveli Khata. The expenses of the entire family, including the two plaintiffs and the Rai Bahadur, were met but of this consolidated amount. But, only after a few years this system was given up, and the family reverted to the old system of taking as much money as was needed by them, and each item was entered in the account-books. This is sufficiently borne out by the papers, but the papers do not show that the premium was ever paid out of the Haveli Khata or the Amanat Khata (suspense account). The amounts received from the banks were entered on the credit side and the amounts paid to the Insurance Companies were entered on the debit side, e.g, there is one item of Rs. 250 received from the Bihar Bank on 6th August 1927, and out of that amount Rs. 102-6-6 was paid to the Bharat Insurance Company. Similarly, a sum of Rs. 274-9-0 was paid on 9th July 1927 to the Bharat Insurance Company through Hajuri Singh out of the cash in hand. To the Great Eastern Life Insurance Company a sum of Rs. 755 was paid on 22nd September 1927. The entries on the credit side show that on or about that date amounts were received from the Bihar Bank and from one Ram Saran Sao. On Friday, the 3rd of February 1928, insurance premia were paid to the Great Eastern Company on account of the policies standing in the name of Sri Sarahgdhar Sinha and Sri Ramji Sinha. On 10th March 1928, Rs. 380-6-0 was received from the Bihar Bank, and on that very date the Great Eastern Company was paid this amount. When the same figure which is shown on the debit side is not shown on the credit side that means that the payment was made from cash in hand. On 11th November 1928, premia on account of the policies standing in the names of the three brothers were paid, and the payment appears to have been made out of the cash in hand. It appears that on that date Rs. 1,407 and odd was the cash in hand, and out of that only Rs. 946 had to be paid as premia. It is not necessary to quote other items when it is conceded that the premia were paid on of the joint family fund. There is one letter, dated 9th January 1934, exhibit 9(d), written by the Rai Bahadur to the Great Eastern Life Assurance Company, Ltd., which appears to be very important, inasmuch as it shows that the Rai Bahadur had sent a cheque for Rs. 1,706-12-0 for payment of the premia, on account of the policies standing in the names of the three brothers. I would not refer to the letters of the Managers of the Assurance Companies to the Rai Bahadur, because those Managers had not been called as witnesses, and it is not known whether they are alive or dead. There are also various items which go to show that the amounts received from the Assurance Companies were treated as money belonging to the joint family. The Bharat Life Insurance policy matured in 1934, and a payment of Rs. 18,874-1-0 was made by cheque. The amount was credited in the Amanat Khata. Rs. 5,196-12-0 was received from the Empire of India Life Assurance Company, and on the credit side it is shown in the Haveli Khata. This amount was spent in commemoratiug the memory of Ramdin Sinha, the father of the plaintiffs. Norwich Union Life Insurance policy in the name of the Rai Bahadur matured in 1927, and it is credited in the account under the head Life Insurance Khata. Thus, the plaintiffs have rightly submitted that money received out of matured policies, even in the name of the Rai Bahadur, was blended with the joint family fund and treated as joint family money. On these facts the question arises as to whether simply because a policy was taken in the name of an individual member and in that policy the words ‘family provision’ were entered against the column “For whose” benefit the Assurance to be effected the insurance amount can be treated as the separate and the personal property of the individual member in whose name the policy stood. It is true that the framers of the Hindu Law had no idea of what is called an ‘Insurance’ in the present age. This is entirely a modern concept, but the question arises as to whether the Hindu Law as it has descended to us (unamended by any statute up till now) can be applied, in an abridged or in an extended form to what is called in the present age as an Insurance policy. There is no warrant for the proposition that there should be another standard for judging income and expenditure on account of the insurance policies than what has been laid down in the Hindu Law as it is administered by the Courts of India at present. The Hindu Law has no doubt been modified or supplemented in certain respects by certain Acts, but there is no special Act with regard to insurance policies as it applies to the Hindus up till now. The criterion still is to consider from what source the money came with which the premia were paid. The Judicial Committee in Bilas Kunwar v. Desraj Ranjit Singh pointed out that the exception in the English Law by way of advancement in favour of wife or child did not apply in India and that the general rule in India in the absence of all other relevant circumstances had been thus stated by Lord Campbell in Dhurm Das Pandey v. Shama Soondri Dibiah:— “The criterion in these cases in India is to consider from what source the money comes with which the purchase money is paid.” The essence of a coparcenary under the Mitakshara Law is unity of ownership and the ownership is in the whole body of coparceners. No individual member of the family, whilst it remains undivided, can predicate, of the joint and undivided property, that he, that particular member, has a definite share in it. As has been pointed out by the Privy Council in several cases, the rights of each coparcener until a partition takes place consist in a common possession and common enjoyment of a coparcenary property. There can be no exception with regard to money received out of Insurance policies, the sole criterion being how and from what source the premia of the policies had been paid. A Life Insurance policy is certainly a contract between a person who is called the “Assured” and the Insurance Company, but it cannot be said that an Insurance policy cannot be taken for the benefit of the joint family and out of the joint family funds. The onus, if any, on the plaintiffs for showing that the policies were taken as an investment and that the premia were paid out of the joint family funds, has been sufficiently discharged in this case. And the learned Counsel for the lady could not support his proposition that the source of premium will not be the determining factor and that by its very nature a Life Insurance policy is not capable of being a part of the joint family asset by any authority. It is absolutely clear from the facts that even when the monies of matured policies were received they were treated as monies belonging to the entire joint family Individual members of a coparcenary can no doubt have separate properties, and though, loosely speaking, an insurance is not an investment, where the facts are absolutely clear for the purpose of showing that premia were paid out of the joint family funds and monies received from the Insurance Companies were treated as the income of the joint family and were blended with the joint family fund, the conclusion will be irresistible that the intention was not to treat the Insurance money as the separate money of the person in whose name the policy stood. A reference was made to a litigation which the plaintiffs and the lady had with the Bihar Bank on account of the overdraft account. The Bihar Bank's Money Suit was dismissed against the plaintiffs but decreed against the lady, and the written-statement filed by the plaintiffs is an exhibit in this case. It has not been contended that there is any such admission in this written-statement which can be prejudicial to their case in this litigation. Certainly, the plaintiffs anyhow wanted to escape liability, and as pointed out by Sir John Beaumont in Ramabai Shriniwas Nadgir v. Government Of Bombay, a party is not bound by an admission in his pleading except for the purposes of the suit in which the pleading is delivered and that it frequently happens that if a party is prepared in a particular suit to deal with the case on a particular ground and to make an admission, such an admission is not binding in any other suit, and certainly not for all time. The learned Subordinate Judge appears to have made some inconsistent observations while dealing with the questions relating to the Insurance policies. At one place he says that the account-books cannot show separate khata for all the brothers because the press is a joint family business, and at another place he says that
“if the premia were paid by the deceased by taking money from joint family funds, it became his personal money”.
He further observes that as the premia were, paid out of the income of the joint family press, there must be one common khata for payment of Insurance premia. And he thinks that because of this the contention of the plaintiffs that there were no separate insurance khatas for the three brothers in the press account-books, has no substance. The finding of the learned Subordinate Judge that the premia were paid out of the separate money of the Rai Bahadur, although they were paid out of the income of the press, is inconsistent and unsound, nor is his view about the Amanat and Haveli Khatas correct. For some reason or other there is a mention of Amanat and Haveli Khatas in the account-books, but an examination of the account-books unmistakably goes to show that all items entered under such khatas were treated as monies belonging to the joint family. The learned Subordinate Judge says that money paid to a coparcener for his personal use and policy acquired by such money becomes his self-acquired property. The account-books do not show that the amounts of the Insurance premia were treated as monies paid to a coparcener for his personal use. On the other hand, I have already referred to a letter of the Rai Banadur himself from which it appears that it is he who sent a cheque for the amounts payable as premia on account of the policies standing in the names of the three brothers. The cheque was issued on the Bihar Bank where no other money except the joint family money was kept. I must, therefore, hold, in disagreement with the learned Subordinate Judge, that not only the stocks, shares and securities are the property of the joint family, but even the Insurance policies which had been acquired out of the joint family fund are property belnoging to the joint family. As already pointed out, the lady has admitted so far as the stocks and shares are concerned that they were acquired out of the income of the press. I need not repeat that this admission reflects a good deal on the defence which has been set up by the lady in this case. Her whole, attempt was to show that the press was the personal property of her husband, and if she has failed to show that, as undoubtedly she has, then her entire defence in this suit is bound, to be rejected as untenable. All acquisitions were made out of the income of the press, and the press has always been a joint family business. This finding, in my opinion, is conclusive of the case and conclusive of it as against the lady.
Lastly, the learned Counsel for the lady raised some objection as to the admissibility of the account-books. I must confess that the several relevant entries in the account-books have not been separately marked as exhibits. The entire books are exhibits in the case, and therefore the contention has been raised that particular entries cannot be relied on. There are several answers to this contention in this case. The lady in her evidence admits that account-books were maintained with regard to the stocks and the shares, and when these account-books were marked no objection whatsoever was raised on her behalf. Because of her statement in her deposition and also because no objection was raised as to the admissibility of these papers at the time when they were admitted, these documents can be treated as admitted documents in the case. As a matter of fact the judgment of the learned Subordinate Judge shows that even the lady had placed reliance on the entries in these account-books. The learned Subordinate Judge says that there are several entries in the Haveli Khata of the press account-books which go to show that each of the three brothers withdrew from time to time certain amount of money which they deposited in the Amanat Khata in their own names. The position in this case, therefore, appears to be that the account-books were treated as admitted documents in the case. No objection was raised as to the admissibility of these papers, rather each party attempted to interpret and construe the entries in their own way. Sri Sarangdhar Sinha has proved that the accounts were written in regular, course of business, and, the formal proof of a document can be waived by the, party against whom it is sought to be used. The entry of “no objection” in the exhibit list and the manner in which the entries have been used by both sides undoubtedly go to show that the formal proof of the entries was waived. The document cannot, therefore, be rejected on the ground that the items have not been separately proved. It will not be correct to say that these documents are being used in this case to charge anybody with liability in the sense in which those words are used in section 34 of the Evidence Act. The present section is in effect a reproduction, with some alteration, of section 43 of Act II of 1855. The old section ran thus:
“Books proved to have been regularly kept in the course of business, shall be admissible as corroborative but not as independent proof of the facts stated therein”.
The section as it stands now runs thus:
“Entries in books of account, regularly kept in the course of business, are relevant whenever they refer to a matter into which the Court has to inquire, but such, statements shall not alone be sufficient evidence to charge any person with liability”.
Undoubtedly, the section as it stands now means that when any person has to be charged with liability the statement in the books of account will not be sufficient for the same. But the section lays down that entries in books of account, regularly kept in the course of business, are relevant whenever they refer to a matter into which the Court has to enquire. Here, both parties relied on the entries not for the purpose of charging any person with liability, but for the purpose of showing as to how the items relating to the Insurance policies were entered in the books. In this case, if any person can be charged with liability it is the Great Eastern Life Assurance Company, but this Company; as they have said in their written-statement, are neither interested in the title of the plaintiffs nor in the title of defendants. Obviously, they will pay the money to the person found entitled and have little interest in this litigation. In a very recent case decided by a Division Bench of this Court, Ramgobind Prasad v. Gulab Chand Sahu, the following observation was made:
“What would amount to independent evidence sufficient to corroborate the entries in the account-books depends upon the facts of each case and particularly on the issues between the parties. What is necessary to be seen in each case is whether besides the entries in the account-books, there is any evidence to prove that the transactions referred to in those entries actually took place. Where the transactions sued upon are numerous and extend over some length of time, it is hardly reasonable to expect independent evidence to be given to prove each and every particular transaction. In such case the genuineness of the account-books, if they are regularly kept in the course of business, will be the determining factor. But mere proof of the correctness of the entries in the account-books will not be enough. There must be some evidence to corroborate those entries. Such corroboration will be best afforded by the evidence of the person who wrote the account-books and in whose presence the transactions took place. He cannot possibly have independent recollection of the various transactions and he may, as provided in section 159, Evidence Act, refresh his memory by referring to the account books. But it is not necessary for him to prove that ‘such and such articles valued at’ such and such amount were supplied on such and such dates. If he proves the entries written by him and states that the transactions referred to in those entries actually took place in his presence or to his knowledge, the effect will substantially be the same. Where however the dispute between the parties is confined to some particular items only, specific evidence may be available and should be insisted upon to prove those particular transactions.”
Of course, the suit which came to be decided by their Lordships was a suit for the recovery of money on the basis of bahi khatas, and hence that was a suit in which a certain person was sought to be charged with liability. This is not the position here, and I need not repeat that in this case the documents should be treated as practically admitted documents.
It appears that the daughters of the Rai Bahadur have now attained majority, but they have still been shown as minors. This defect, however, will not prove fatal to the suit, and in support of this view I may refer to the decisions of this Court in Ratan Prasad Marwari v. Bridhi Chand Shroff, Gulab Chand v. Mt. Kishori Kuer and Bibi Asghari v. Muhammad Kasim. Mr. Lalnarain Sinha did not in fact make any point out of the omission of the plaintiffs to discharge the guardian of the minors.
In the result, therefore, I would allow First Appeal no. 69 of 1947, filed by the plaintiffs, with costs. The decree passed by the learned Subordinate Judge will be varied and the entire suit of the plaintiffs will stand decreed with costs. First Appeal no. 91 of 1947 which is the appeal filed by the defendant no. 1 will stand dismissed with costs. The Insurance Company will not be liable for costs in any of the appeals.
Ahmad, J.:— I agree.
K.D
Order accordingly.