Sarwar Ali, J.:— These writ applications have been heard one after the other and are being disposed of by a common judgment. In all these writ applications the petitioners pray for quashing of the orders of suspension which are Annexure 1 in all the three applications. All these orders have been passed on 18.8.1977
2. The department of the Agriculture of the State maintains farms at different places for seed production. Two of such farms are at piprakothi and Musahari. The farms are under the management and supervision of Junior Assistant Agronomist. The Regional Director of Agriculture Research Institute, Dholl, (Muzaffarpur) had over all control over the farms and the officers concerned. In the year 1969-1970 the total production of potatoes in the two farms aforesaid was 1177.40 quintals and 769.60 quintals respectively. For safe storage of these potatoes tenders were invited from different Cold Storages. Himalaya Ice and Cold Storage, Muzaffarpur, was one of the tenders. Its tender having been accepted, potatoes were stored in the said cold storage. It may be stated that Sri Jugal Kishore Banka was the proprletor of the said firm. For reasons which need not be discussed here the potatoes which were stored in the said cold storage deteriorated. On 3.11.1970 Junior Assistant Agronomist received a letter dated 24.10.1970 from Sri Banka wherein he Intimated that he had thrown away the deteriorated potatoes and partly sold the damaged potatoes and he had kept the sale proceed with himself for adjusting towards the rental of the cold storage. In the said letter it was storage that deterioration took place due to the breakdown of machineries. The entire matter having been brought to the notice of the Director of Agriculture, Bihar, explanations were called for from different persons including the petitioners. Subsequently it was decided to file criminal and civil cases against Sri Banka. The petitioners in C.W.J.C Nos. 2146 and 2149/77 filed complaint petitions against Sri Banka for misappropriation of seed potatoes which were entrusted to Himalaya Ice and Cold Storage. In the criminal cases the trial court has passed an order on 8.3.1975 committing Sri Banka to the court of Sessions. A Criminal Miscellaneous application being Criminal Miscellaneous No. 4313 of 1975 challenging the order aforesaid is pending in this Court. A civil suit has also been filed bearing money suit No. 28 of 1973 in respect of the damage sustained by the State in relation to part of the potatoes entrusted to the Cold Storage. It has been decided to file another suit for damages but the suit has not been filed as yet (for reasons which need not be discussed here).
3. It is in the context of the damage and loss sustained by the State of Bihar in relation to the storage of the potatoes aforesaid that the impugned orders of suspension have been passed.
4. In the view that we are taking in this case it is not necessary to give further facts in detail but it would be proper to notice some of the main contention that have been urged in this case. We, may, however, Indicate that it would be necessary to adjudicate in relation to some of the contentions only.
5. On behalf of the petitioners in C.W.J.C Nos. 2146 and 2149/77 it has been contended that:—
(a) The suspension of the petitioners is for having misappropriated foundation potatoes seeds stored in the Cold Storage. There was no material on the basis of which even a prima facie conclusion to this effect could have been arrived at. Indeed the State has throughout asserted that it was Sri Banka who had misappropriated. The order of suspension has thus been passed without application of the mind to the materials that were available to the State. Such an order is not sustainable in law.
(b) The impugned order is penal in nature. It can only be passed after complying with the requirements of natural justice. This not having been done the order is fit to be set aside.
(c) The petitioners were asked to give explanation as early as in the year 1970. Thereafter the petitioners were promoted. There was also decision to file criminal and civil cases against Sri Banka. All these lead to the irresistible conclusion that the explanation of the petitioners had been accepted and there were no allegations against the petitioners which could form a basis of any action against them.
(d) Taking the totality of the facts and circumstances into consideration the start of departmental proceedings after seven years of the incident amounts to arbitrary exercise of power and is; therefore, mala-fide in law.
(e) The impugned orders were passed before framing of charges against the petitioners. The orders of suspension were thus illegal.
(f) The State has decided to suspend the petitioners and not to hold departmental proceedings till the disposal of the criminal case against Sri Banka. This kind of suspension is not envisaged in law and amounts to arbitrary exercise of power.
6. On behalf of the petitioner in C.W.J.C 1493/77 it was further contended that the Government records themselves show that the petitioner was never found to be at fault till 14-7-1977. A sudden decision to suspend the petitioner could not but be said to be arbitrary in the facts and circumstances of the case.
7. In my view these writ applications can be disposed of on consideration of the contentions mentioned in paragraph 5(a) and (f). It is, therefore, first necessary to see as to what Annexure-1 purports to do. That it suspends the petitioners is not in dispute. It is the ground or reason for which action is taken which is subject matter of controversy. Learned counsels for the petitioners says that the order of suspension has been passed because, according to Annexure-1, the petitioners have been prima facie found guilty of misappropriation of foundation seed potatoes. Learned counsel for the State on the other hand says that Annexure-1 means that the petitioners have been found prima facie guilty in connection with the misappropriation of seed potatoes. We have, therefore, to examine the wording of the ianguage employed in Annexure-1. It is well settled that where the words used in a document are clear, there is be scope for putting gloss over the language used See (1) Somar Puri v. Shyam Narain Gir AIR 1954 Patna 586. Here also the language is clear and explicit. What has been stated is that the petitioners have been found guilty of misappropriation, and not that they have been found guilty of playing some part in connection with the misappropriation of potato seeds. The words used are “Gaban Ke Arop Ke Lie”. Had the Intention been as suggested by the learned counsel for the State, words like “Gaban Ke Arop Ke Sambandh Men’ or similar words would have been used. I am, therefore, clearly of the view that the language employed in Annexure-1, is clear and as such it has to be held that, as disclosed in Annexure-1, the petitioners have been suspended on the ground that they were prima facie found guilty of misappropriation of potato seeds. If that be the correct Interpretation of Annexure-1, I have no doubt that the aforesaid Annexure is unsustainable in law. A perusal of the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the State makes it clear that there was no material on the basis of which an inference could be drawn that the petitioners had actually or factually misappropriated seed potatoes. Thus there was no material on the basis of which a prima facie conclusion could be arrived at that the petitioners were guilty of actual misappropriation of seed potatoes. On this ground alone the order contained in Annexure-1 in all the three applications is fit to be quashed.
8. Learned counsel for the State contended that the order of suspension is passed on subjective satisfaction of the State Government. Such an order was not justiciable. We do not think that this argument can be accepted, contrary as it is to the decision of the Supreme Court see (2) Barium Chemicals Ltd. v. Company Law Board. A.I.R 1967 S.C 295 at 383. Had there been factual foundation on the basis of which reasonable conclusion could be arrived at that the petitioners were guilty of actual misappropriation it would have been a different matter. Here it appears that the authority passing the Impugned order did not ask itself the right question and take reasonable step to acquaint itself with the relevant information to enable it to answer it correctly. This amounts to misdirection in Law sec. (3) Secretary of State v. Tameside 1976-3-All England Report 665, 696 per Lord Diplock. I am therefore, of the view that Annexure-1 is fit to be quashed for the reasons already discussed.
9. Paragraph-14 of the supplementary affidavit which has not been denied, clearly disclosed that the decision of the Government is to suspend the petitioners and not to hold departmental enquiry till the disposal of the criminal cases against Sri Banka. Learned counsel for the petitioners contended and. In my view, rightly that the Bihar Service Codek does not envisage suspension of this nature. The relevant rules in relation to suspension are Rules 99 and 100. These rules do not envisage that because of pendency of a criminal proceedings in a connected matter against some other persons a public servant should be suspended and the suspension should continue indefinitely till the disposal of the criminal case against such person. True it is that under the general law of master and servant a master may forbid the servant from working. In such a situation the servant is entitled to full pay. The present order, however, is not of that nature. It is an order of suspension in the purported exercise of powers under the Bihar Service Code where the Government Servant is only entitled to the subsistence allowance and not fully pay. In the circumstances indefinite suspension of the petitioners cannot be sustained.
10. I am therefore, of the view that Annexure-1 to all the three writ applications has to be quashed and I would order accordingly.
11. After the order of suspension was passed each of the petitioners have been served with a charge-sheet. I am not expressing any opinion about the validity of the same or about the continuance of the departmental proceeding which is proposed, it appears, to be taken against the petitioners.
12. S.K Choudhary, J.:— I agree.
Application allowed.