Relx India Private L... v. D.B Modak And Spectr...

(2017) 1 SCC 9 (1)

Order dated 23-11-2016

(Before Ranjan Gogoi and N.V Ramana, JJ.)

Civil Appeal No. 10245 of 2014

1. After hearing the learned counsels for the parties the appeal is disposed of with the following directions:

The appellants will be at liberty to publish, sell and distribute the raw judgments of the Supreme Court of India and other courts obtained from whichever source along with their own headnotes, editorial notes, paraphrasing, explanatory notes, etc. as laid down in Eastern Book Company v. D.B Modak (2008) 1 SCC 1.

We further direct the learned Trial Court to expedite the trial and conclude the same as expeditiously as possible.

2. The appeal is disposed of in the above terms. Interim order, if any, shall stand vacated.

(2017) 1 SCC 9 (2)

Order dated 25-10-2016

[Record of Proceedings]

(Before Ranjan Gogoi and Abhay Manohar Sapre, JJ.)

IAs Nos. 5-7 of 2015 in Civil Appeal No. 10245 of 2014

IA No. 4

3. Application for intervention is allowed.

IA No. 7

4. Application for taking on record the amended memo of parties is allowed. Cause-title be amended accordingly.

IAs Nos. 5 and 6

5. The prayers made in IAs Nos. 5 and 6, in our considered view, ought not to be allowed at this stage inasmuch as the grounds in support of Prayer ‘c’ of IA No. 5 on which notice has been issued have been urged before the learned Trial Court and the Appellate Court. Therefore, consideration of the said grounds and any finding thereon to sustain the relief so as to Prayer ‘c’ of IA No. 5 is concerned, would amount to prejudging the appeal.

6. However, to avoid any prejudice and in view of the assurance given by the learned counsel for both the sides that the matter can be disposed of within a short time-frame, we order hearing of civil appeal on 23-11-2016.

7. The Trial Court and the High Court of Allahabad will take into account the present order of this Court before deciding whether it should proceed with the contempt case(s) pending before it.

Court Masters

(2017) 1 SCC 10

Order dated 25-4-2016

[Record of Proceedings]

(Before Ranjan Gogoi and Prafulla C. Pant, JJ.)

IA No. 5 of 2015 in Civil Appeal No. 10245 of 2014

8. Issue notice on Prayer ‘c’ of IA No. 5 of 2015, returnable in four weeks.

9. IA filed by Mr Awanish Sinha, learned counsel, be listed along with IA No. 5 on the next date of hearing for consideration.

Court Masters

Impugned Judgment of the High Court dated 1-4-2014

FAFO No. 134 of 2014

(Before Shri Narayan Shukla and Vishnu Chandra Gupta, JJ.)

The Judgment of the High Court was delivered by

Shri Narayan Shukla, J.— Heard Mr Prashant Chandra, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Mr Akshat Srivastava and Ms Purnima Singh, learned counsel for the appellants as well as Mr Sudeep Seth, learned counsel for the respondents.

11. The instant appeal is directed against the order dated 1-1-2014, passed by the District Judge, Lucknow on the application for temporary injunction filed in Regular Suit No. 134 of 2012. By means of the order impugned, the learned District Judge has allowed the respondent-plaintiffs' application for temporary injunctions.

12. The facts which are essential to be exposited are that the respondent-plaintiffs instituted a suit being Regular Suit No. 1234 of 2012 before the District Judge, Lucknow for permanent injunction restraining the appellant-defendants from infringement of the Copyright Act, 1957 (hereinafter referred to as “the Copyright Act”), rendition of accounts, delivery of infringing copies, etc. in which they also sought an interim relief of the same nature till disposal of the suit. Respondent-plaintiff 1 claims itself owner and publisher of law report “Supreme Court Cases” and further owns all the copyrights subsisting therein. The respondent-plaintiffs also claim to be publishers and distributors of SCC Online Case Finder on CD-ROM and its web edition and the websites www.ebc-india.com and www.scconline.com.

13. The respondent-plaintiffs submitted that edition of SCC is based on the Editors' reading of the whole judgment and understanding of the question of law and facts involved. They determine whether to label it as “concurring”, “partly concurring”, “dissenting” or “partly dissenting” or “supplementing”, etc. They also make uniform the paragraphs of the judgment by separating it in seriatum of multiple opinions and in case any opinion refers to its own para number(s) internal referencing is done. In these tasks the Editor uses sound judgment, creativity and legal skill. A very significant role done by the Editor is to input the references, clarification and explanation to the raw text of the judgments, either in the text or as a footnote and most importantly he puts the editorial notes and his comments. For easy and quick understanding of the case the Editor culls out various rulings laid down in each case, which makes available to the readers the law laid down under different statutes.

14. In order to save their copyright they also refer to one judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court rendered in Eastern Book Company v. D.B Modak (2008) 1 SCC 1. In this case the Hon'ble Supreme Court allowed the test of minimum creativity for recognising the copyright in any of the inputs made by the respondent-plaintiffs in their copy-edited text.

15. The respondents further submitted that the Hon'ble Apex Court acknowledged that five copyrights vest in the plaintiffs' law reports “Supreme Court Cases” which are extracted below:

(a) Creation of paragraphs in their copy-edited version by segregating existing paragraphs in the original text by breaking them into separate paragraphs and/or by clubbing separate paragraphs, and in the paragraph numbering.

(b) Internal referencing, after providing uniform paragraph numbering to multiple judgments.

(c) Inputs in respect of Editor's judgment regarding the opinions expressed by the Judges by using phrases like “concurring”, “partly concurring”, “dissenting”, “partly dissenting”, “supplementing”, etc.

(d) Editorial notes.

(e) Headnotes

On the basis of the above settled law the present plaint/suit is being filed against the copyright infringement by the defendants herein.

16. The respondents claim that the appellant-defendants are engaging in competing with the business of the respondent-plaintiffs and also publish, sell and distribute on and through their websites i.e www.lexisnexis.com and on CD-ROM/DVD, etc., judgments pronounced by the various courts of India including by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India. In doing so they have openly infringed and are continuously infringing the copyrights of the respondent-plaintiffs vesting in Supreme Court Cases without any licence granted to any of them by the plaintiffs. They have produced and are also reproducing the said work and making adaptations thereof in a material form including storing it by electronic means on CD-ROMS, DVDs, floppy drives, etc. as well as in their databases available on their websites through online and internet services and by making and issuing infringing copies/adaptations of the work to the public for sale and/or hire by way of trade of the said infringing copies/adaptations of the work, the exclusive right to do which vests in the plaintiffs alone under Section 14 of the Copyright Act, 1957. In this manner the respondent-plaintiffs submitted before the Trial Court that the appellant-defendants have infringed and are continuously infringing the copyright of the plaintiffs in the work within the meaning of Section 51 of the Copyright Act, 1957.

17. The appellant-defendants filed counter-affidavit to the application moved under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC and submitted therein that the suit itself is not maintainable on various grounds. The appellant-defendants' submissions are quoted hereunder:

“2. That before giving a para wise reply to the application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 read with Section 55 of the Copyright Act, 1957 (the Copyright Act), it is submitted that the aforesaid suit is not maintainable and is also bad for misjoinder of parties. Save for Defendant 1, no other person or body, much less than Defendant 2 is a necessary party. Moreover, besides Defendant 1, no allegation has been made against Defendant 2, which needless to say is a division of Defendant 1 and has no independent legal entity. Defendant 2 has been arrayed with sole objective of indulging in adverse publicity to malign and cause harm to the defendants. It has already been brought on record that the plaintiffs have indulged in deliberate misreporting of the ex parte ad interim injunction order dated 22-9-2012, on account of which, the answering defendant has suffered colossal business losses and also loss of reputation. Appropriate proceedings shall be instituted by the answering defendant against the plaintiffs as may be advised for prosecution for determination and damages.

3. That the suit is not maintainable; and as the main relief cannot be granted, the application under reply is to be dismissed outright. The plaint does not disclose any cause of action and the reliefs as prayed are grossly undervalued. Above all the suit is barred by time and also under the provisions of the Copyright Act. No case has been made out for grant of any relief and the allegation of infringement of copyright is wrong. The basis for filing the suit has been indicated as the rendering of judgment by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Eastern Book Company v. D.B Modak (2008) 1 SCC 1. The said judgment was rendered on 12-12-2007 whereas nothing has been indicated as to how the answering defendant has violated the mandate contained in the said judgment.

4. That from a meaningful reading of the plaint it would be noticed that not a single instance has been pointed out by the plaintiffs as to how and in what manner the direction contained in Modak case (2008) 1 SCC 1 has been violated by the answering defendant. It is reiterated that no cause of action has accrued for filing the suit which has been instituted with ulterior motives and vexatious intentions. This stands substantiated by the fact that the plaintiffs started a tirade against the defendants with the mala fide intention of maligning them by way of adverse publicity in the media and continue to do so despite the orders dated 3-10-2012 having being passed by this Hon'ble Court restraining the plaintiffs from making any publicity in electronic and print media.

5. That it is apparent that the plaintiffs are facing difficulty in competing with established publishers and reporters of legal judgments (such as the answering defendants) and have consequently taken recourse to filing of the aforesaid frivolous suit; and then to making unwarranted and adverse publicity; and to achieve indirectly what cannot be directly achieved. As submitted above, the plaintiffs have pre-empted the relief which is yet to be granted by this Hon'ble Court. Even without any determination having been made regarding any infringement of the plaintiffs' copyright, it has been projected in the electronic and print media by and on behalf of the plaintiffs that the defendants have been found guilty of infringing the plaintiffs' copyright.

6. That the plaintiffs have not approached this Hon'ble Court with clean hands. The real purpose of the present suit is to give vent to business rivalry and to show down the answering defendants and to create impediments in the defendants' business activities. Fraud and justice do not dwell together and consequently in view of all what has come to the fore, it is apparent that the plaintiffs have taken recourse to unethical practice and played fraud upon this Hon'ble Court and are consequently not entitled to maintain the aforesaid suit.”

18. On merit they made their submission in the manner that Court order are available through various sources. While most of the judgments are procured from the Registry of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the remaining are sourced from other websites and journals including the website of the Judicial Information System more popularly known as “judis” having the web address; www.judis.nic.in. The said website has been launched by the National Information Centre of the Department of Electronics and Information Technology, falling under the Ministry of Information and Technology of the Government of India. The website is easily accessible to all and the information available falls within the public domain. Consequently, no question of infringement of the Copyright Act arises.

19. The appellant-defendants also submitted that the respondent-plaintiffs have failed to cite even a single instance where the defendants can even remotely be held as having violated the law laid down in Modak case (2008) 1 SCC 1; rather the defendants complained that the plaintiffs themselves have copied the judgments from judis. The appellant-defendants further submitted that there can be no copyright in the words “concurring”, “partly concurring”, “dissenting”, “supplementing”, etc. Since these are generic words commonly used in legal parlance, such inserted characterisation of Judges' opinion is merely factual, typical and incidental to the reporting of the judgments. Such insertions are garden-variety and absolutely devoid of any modicum of creativity and as such it clearly does not qualify the test of minimum creativity. Therefore, they submitted that no copyright subsists in the use of such generic words by the plaintiffs.

20. The appellant-defendants further submitted that judgments published by the plaintiffs are nothing but a verbatim reproduction of the judgments as are reported by the judis. Thus, the appellant-defendants themselves questioned the authority of the respondent-plaintiffs claiming copyright over the judgments. The appellants further submitted that besides the official website judis, there are other websites and law reporters such as Manupatra, Judgments Today, etc. which regularly reproduce and publish the judgments of the Supreme Court and various High Courts. These websites and journals provide a source for procuring the judgments which after their publication come within the public domain.

21. In this backdrop the appellant-defendants submitted that the plaintiffs' reliance on the test of minimum creativity as laid down in D.B Modak case (2008) 1 SCC 1 as well as their claim of copyright in respect of paragraphing, para numbering and inserted characterisation of Judges' opinion as concurring, dissenting are wholly misplaced as they are merely factual consisting of garden variety and absolutely devoid of any modicum of creativity, hence no copyright can subsist in the same.

22. After considering the submissions of the respondent-plaintiffs as well as the appellant-defendants the learned Trial Court concluded its opinion on the application for temporary injunction as under:

“I have carefully considered the arguments of the learned counsel for both the parties in this regard. I have already observed in preceding paragraphs that the Hon'ble Supreme Court has been pleased to hold that in cases of infringement either of trade mark or of copyright, normally an injunction must follow and permitting the defendants to carry on business by copyright infringement would in fact be putting a seal of approval of the Court on dishonest, illegal and clandestine conduct of the defendants. While granting ad interim injunction, I have carefully considered the existence of prima facie case, balance of convenience and danger of irreparable injury.”

23. The order, passed by the Trial Court is under challenge in the instant appeal before this Court.

24. Mr Prashant Chandra, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the appellant stated that the appellants' act in copying the Supreme Court decisions from the website judis or other websites are the acts which are saved under the Copyright Act (sic cannot) be said to be infringement of copyright. He drew the attention of this Court towards Section 52 of the Act, the relevant part of which is extracted below:

“52. Certain acts not to be infringement of copyright.—(1) The following acts shall not constitute an infringement of copyright, namely—

(a)-(p)***

(q) the reproduction of publication of—

(i)-(iii)***

(iv) any judgment or order of a court, tribunal or other judicial authority, unless the reproduction or publication of such judgment or order is prohibited by the court, the tribunal or other judicial authority, as the case may be;”

25. Mr Chandra submitted that the appellants have copied the decisions from the websites other than the respondents' which is not prohibited by the court, tribunal or any judicial authority. Therefore, its act is saved to be covered under the term “infringement” of copyright under Section 52 of the Act. He emphasised his argument over sub-section (1)(q)(iv) of Section 52 which speaks that the following acts shall not constitute an infringement of copyright, namely, any judgment or order of a court, tribunal or other judicial authority, unless the reproduction or publication of such judgment or order is prohibited by the court, the tribunal or other judicial authority, as the case may be. Since the judgments copied by the appellants have already been in circulation, published by judis, MLJ, CDJ and other journals, the respondents cannot claim their copyright over it rather it can be termed their acquiescence in such publication.

26. So far as the observations of the learned Trial Court regarding indirect infringement of the copyright is concerned, it is stated that the respondents had not alleged so in the plaint. He further stated that the respondents have claimed production (sic protection) of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in D.B Modak (2008) 1 SCC 1, claiming it a judgment in rem whereas it is not so rather it is a judgment in personam and its application is confined only to the parties of the respective judgment. Moreover, the question whether the judgment is in rem or in personam is open for consideration of the Trial Court at the stage of conclusion of the trial, therefore, at this stage we refrain ourselves to enter into this question to decide it.

27. On the matter of grant of temporary injunction he further submitted that for grant of temporary injunction the plaintiff was under duty to establish the availability of the following ingredients in the matter to consider the application for temporary injunction:

(I) Prima facie case;

(II) Balance of convenience;

(III) Irreparable loss.

Whereas in the instant case none of the ingredients is available with the respondents to claim the temporary injunction as they have not been able to establish so.

28. Per contra, Mr Sudeep Seth, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Modak case (2008) 1 SCC 1 has recognised the respondent-plaintiffs' copyright in six inputs put in by the plaintiffs in SCC, namely,

(I) Paragraphing/para numbering;

(II) Internal referencing;

(III) “Concurring”, “dissenting”, “partly concurring”, “partly dissenting”, “supplementing”, etc.

(IV) Editorial notes;

(V) Footnotes; and

(VI) Headnotes.

29. Mr Seth stated that the appellant-defendants are neither engaged in publishing the Supreme Court judgments in print media nor are they empanelled with the Supreme Court to receive raw text of Supreme Court judgments. He further stated that the appellant-defendants have infringed all the aforesaid copyrights except headnotes by copying through scanning the entire set of SCC volumes and have created a database on their website which they are selling by the name of Lexis Nexis India. He further stated that the judgment of D.B Modak case (2008) 1 SCC 1 is a judgment in rem as the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held in para 62 of the judgment. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in D.B Modak (2008) 1 SCC 1 has adopted and enunciated the Indian-Canadian test of “skill and judgment with flavour of creativity”. Thus, he submits that the Trial Court has followed correctly the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court. Therefore, there is no infirmity in the order passed by him on the application for temporary injunction.

30. The learned counsel for the respective parties also cited certain case laws on the scope of Section 52 of the Copyright Act as also the cases discussing what is the judgment in rem and judgment in personam as well as on the scope of Article 141 of the Constitution of India. However, since we are at the interim stage, we feel it appropriate to examine the facts of the present case in the context of the law propounded by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in D.B Modak (2008) 1 SCC 1 only to examine the correctness of the order impugned as the respondent-plaintiffs claim that the appellant-defendants have no right to claim protection in publication of the judgments under Section 52 of the Copyright Act.

31. In Modak case (2008) 1 SCC 1 The Hon'ble Supreme Court determined the following two questions:

(i) What shall be the standard of originality in the copy-edited judgments of the Supreme Court which is a derivative work and what would be required in a derivative work to treat it as the original work of an author and thereby giving a protected right under the Copyright Act, 1957 to the author of the derivative work?

(ii) Whether the entire version of the copy-edited text of judgments published in the appellants' law report SCC would be entitled for a copyright as an original literary work, the copy-edited judgments having been claimed as a result of inextricable and inseparable admixture of the copy-editing inputs and the raw text, taken together, as a result of insertion of all SCC copy-editing inputs into the raw text, or whether the appellants would be entitled to the copyright in some of the inputs which have been put in the raw text?

32. In this case the copyrights of the respondents in publication of their journals “SCC” have been considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. In the said case to claim a copyright, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has discussed the minimum requirement of creativity and held that to claim a copyright some amount of creativity in the work is required. It does require a minimal degree of creativity. It further held that to support the copyright there must be some substantive variation and not merely a trivial variation, not the variation of the type where limited/unique ways of expression are available and an author selects one of them which can be said to be a garden variety.

33. Paras 60, 61 and 62 of the aforesaid case (Eastern Book Company v. D.B Modak (2008) 1 SCC 1) are extracted below:

60. Although for establishing a copyright, the creativity standard applies is not that something must be novel or non-obvious, but some amount of creativity in the work to claim a copyright is required. It does require a minimal degree of creativity. Arrangement of the facts or data or the case law is already included in the judgment of the Court. Therefore, creativity of SCC would only be addition of certain facts or material already published, case law published in another law report and its own arrangement and presentation of the judgment of the Court in its own style to make it more user-friendly. The selection and arrangement can be viewed as typical and at best result of the labour, skill and investment of capital lacking even minimal creativity. It does not as a whole display sufficient originality so as to amount to an original work of the author. To support copyright, there must be some substantive variation and not merely a trivial variation, not the variation of the type where limited unique/ways of expression are available and an author selects one of them which can be said to be a garden variety. Novelty or invention or innovative idea is not the requirement for protection of copyright but it does require minimal degree of creativity. In our view, the aforesaid inputs put by the appellants in the copy-edited judgments do not touch the standard of creativity required for the copyright.

61. However, the inputs put in the original text by the appellants in (i) segregating the existing paragraphs in the original text by breaking them into separate paragraphs; (ii) adding internal paragraph numbering within a judgment after providing uniform paragraph numbering to the multiple judgments; and (iii) indicating in the judgment the Judges who have dissented or concurred by introducing then phrases like “concurring”, “partly concurring”, “partly dissenting”, “dissenting”, “supplementing”, “majority expressing no opinion”, etc.; have to be viewed in a different light. The task of paragraph numbering and internal referencing requires skill and judgment in great measure. The Editor who inserts para numbering must know how legal argumentation and legal discourse is conducted and how a judgment of a court of law must be read. Often legal arguments or conclusions are either clubbed into one paragraph in the original judgment or parts of the same argument are given in separate paragraphs. It requires judgment and the capacity for discernment for determining whether to carve out a separate paragraph from an existing paragraph in the original judgment or to club together separate paragraphs in the original judgment of the Court. Setting of paragraphs by the appellants of their own in the judgment entailed the exercise of the brainwork, reading and understanding of subject of disputes, different issues involved, statutory provisions applicable and interpretation of the same and then dividing them in different paragraphs so that chain of thoughts and process of statement of facts and the application of law relevant to the topic discussed is not disturbed, would require full understanding of the entire subject of the judgment. Making paragraphs in a judgment could not be called a mechanical process. It requires careful consideration, discernment and choice and thus it can be called as a work of an author. Creation of paragraphs would obviously require extensive reading, careful study of subject and the exercise of judgment to make paragraph which has dealt with particular aspect of the case, and separating intermixing of a different subject. Creation of paragraphs by separating them from the passage would require knowledge, sound judgment and legal skill. In our opinion, this exercise and creation thereof has a flavour of minimum amount of creativity.

62. The said principle would also apply when the Editor has put an input whereby different Judges' opinion has been shown to have been dissenting or partly dissenting or concurring, etc. It also requires reading of the whole judgment and understanding the questions involved and thereafter finding out whether the Judges have disagreed or have the dissenting opinion or they are partially disagreeing and partially agreeing to the view on a particular law point or even on facts. In these inputs put in by the appellant in the judgments reported in SCC, the appellants have a copyright and nobody is permitted to utilise the same.”

34. In the light of the aforesaid judgment, we arrive at the conclusion that the exercise and creation of minimum amount of creativity has to be viewed in the context of journals to journals published by the parties and in order to examine it several facts have to be considered by the Trial Court in the light of the evidence adduced by the parties during the course of the trial. Therefore, keeping in view the ingredients which are necessary to examine the case for the purpose of temporary injunction, we are of the view that at this stage the respondent-plaintiffs had prima facie case in their favour to issue temporary injunction against the appellant-defendants so that skill applied by their Editor in editing the journals should not be misused by the appellant-defendants. Thus, we are of the definite opinion that the learned Trial Court has correctly appreciated the application for temporary injunction filed by the respondent-plaintiffs and allowed it which does not require interference by this Court.

35. However, the appellants are permitted to publish, sell and distribute through their websites and CD-ROM/DVD the judgments pronounced by the Hon'ble Supreme Court and other courts but along with their headnotes and editorial notes with all precautions as has been cautioned by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Modak case (2008) 1 SCC 1.

36. With the aforesaid view, the appeal is dismissed.

Order of Trial Court dated 1-1-2014

R.S No. 134 of 2012

(Before Kamal Kishore Sharma, District Judge)

The Order of the District Court was delivered by

Kamal Kishore Sharma, District Judge.— Facts in short leading to this application for temporary injunction are such that the plaintiffs have alleged in their plaint that the defendants have infringed the copyrights vesting in SCC by making adaptations in a material form including storing it by electronic means. Further the plaintiffs have annexed certain charts which set out alleged instances of infringement. The plaintiffs have claimed that they “came to know about the infringement of their alleged copyrights by the defendants through their website www.lexixnexis.com on 6-9-2012”. Thus, the cause of action in this case is based on this alleged infringing material. Further, the plaintiffs claim that the infringing product of the defendants has been subscribed worldwide.

38. The relevant para of the plaint is reproduced hereunder:

“That the cause of action arose on 6-9-2012 when the plaintiffs learnt of the infringement of their copyrights by the defendants. The cause of action is a continuing and subsisting one and shall continue to subsist till such time as the defendants are not restrained from infringing the plaintiffs' copyrights in “Supreme Court Cases” (SCC)”.

39. The defendants filed their replies dated 9-11-2012 and 31-12-2012 stating that the defendants entered into a prospective licence agreement with Cyber Law Journal Pvt. Ltd. (CDJ) on 19-5-2011 to source database of judgments. CDJ has been in business from the year 2001. CDJ was publishing reportable judgments of the Supreme Court and various High Courts through its website www.cyberlawjournal.com. As per the Licence Agreement, CDJ permitted the defendants to use its data of court cases and judgments obtained by it, for a period of two years from the date of commencement of the agreement.

40. CDJ was carrying on its business openly, in competition with SCC from the year 2001. There was no objection to the judgments published by CDJ on its website by any publisher of law reporters including SCC. The defendants therefore had no notice of any alleged claim of infringement when they licensed the database from CDJ for a period of two years.

41. Since the 2 years' licence was to expire in May 2013, the defendants developed its own database by sourcing judgments from judis and other journals like MLJ, LLJ, etc. The defendants replaced its database with newly sourced contents on 19-4-2013. The contents for new database were sourced from judis and other proprietary law journals like MLJ, LLJ, etc.

42. The plaintiff alleged that judis had copied several judgments from SCC. However, as regards MLJ, the plaintiffs expressly admitted that Plaintiff 2 is an old subscriber of MLJ. The plaintiffs acknowledged that MLJ is engaged in the business of trading as Lexis India — MLJ online. It is pertinent to note that the plaintiffs did not dispute authenticity of contents, did not allege infringement of copyright qua any judgments published by MLJ. Plaintiff 2 has admitted in his affidavit dated 23-5-2013 he is an old subscriber of MLJ. Plaintiff 2 has further acknowledged expertise of MLJ in his interview in the Mint (2008) wherein he had stated that in order to start the case law reporting business he had studied many other journals including AIR and MLJ.

43. The plaintiffs filed a supplementary affidavit dated 26-7-2013 alleging that the defendant's new version also commits infringement of copyright. The plaintiffs cited 3 instances viz. judgments of (1) Indra Sawhney v. Union of India 1992 Supp (3) SCC 217 (Indra Sawhney), (2) Triveniben v. State of Gujarat (1989) 1 SCC 678 (Triveniben), and (3) Kehar Singh v. State (Delhi Admn.) (1988) 3 SCC 609 (Kehar Singh) and claimed that the judgments have been copied from SCC. According to the defendants, by this method at this belated stage the plaintiffs sought to enlarge the scope of inquiry in relation to the new/substituted content moreover the same is clearly beyond the pleadings in the suit.

44. The defendants filed their reply thereto how the said 3 judgments were sourced independently by the defendants (and not from SCC) as under:

(i) As regards, case of Indra Sawhney 1992 Supp (3) SCC 217, the defendants demonstrated that this judgment was at the relevant time in fact available on judis and that the defendants have accessed the same on 13-4-2013. It is submitted that while this judgment may not be available on judis any more, it was in fact available in April 2013. It is respectfully submitted that the contention of the plaintiff that Indra Sawhney 1992 Supp (3) SCC 217 decision was never available on judis is incorrect.

(ii) As regards the cases of Triveniben (1989) 1 SCC 678 and that of Kehar Singh (1988) 3 SCC 609, the defendants have pointed out that the content for both these cases has been sourced by the defendants from MLJ. The defendants submit that the dates on which these two judgments have been decided are very relevant. With regard to Triveniben case (1989) 1 SCC 678, the judgment was decided in 1989 while in Kehar Singh case (1988) 3 SCC 609 the judgment was decided on 1988. It is pertinent to note that the plaintiffs have taken no action in this regard when MLJ had published these two judgments in those years, namely, in the years 1989 and 1988. It is submitted that these are not recently reported judgments which have only now come to the notice of the plaintiffs; these are old judgments reported by MLJ over 20 years ago and which the defendant has now used on its online database.

45. The plaintiffs filed their counter reply dated 3-9-2013 alleging for the first time that MLJ has copied judgments from SCC. The plaintiffs have further cited 12 cases which it claims MLJ has copied from SCC.

46. The defendants filed their reply dated 7-10-2013 explaining that the 12 cases are of the year 1988 to 1990. MLJ had published these judgments in the said respective years. The publication of the said judgment was to the knowledge of the plaintiffs. No objection was even raised as to these publications over the last more than 2 decades.

47. I have heard the learned counsel for both the parties at greater lengths and I have meticulously studied the facts and circumstances of the case in hand and I have very carefully and minutely studied the facts and circumstances and the ratio laid down by the Hon'ble the Supreme Court and the Hon'ble High Courts in many case laws those have been referred by the learned counsel for the parties in support of their rival arguments.

48. First of all, it is submitted by the learned counsel for the plaintiff that vide order dated 22-9-2012, this Court granted ex parte temporary injunction to the plaintiffs against the defendants, mainly on infringement of copyright in editorial notes, besides infringement of other copyrights. Reliance has been placed upon the authority of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Eastern Book Company v. D.B Modak (2008) 1 SCC 1; T.V Venugopal v. Ushodaya Enterprises Ltd. (2011) 4 SCC 85 and Midas Hygiene Industries (P) Ltd. v. Sudhir Bhatia (2004) 3 SCC 90. All the three essential ingredients of prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable loss, have been recorded in the said order. There is no infirmity in the order of ad interim injunction dated 22-9-2012 and the same is liable to be confirmed by this Hon'ble Court.

49. While referring to the case law of Midas Hygiene Industries (P) Ltd. v. Sudhir Bhatia (2004) 3 SCC 90, it is submitted that the Hon'ble Supreme Court has been pleased to hold that in cases of infringement either of trade mark or of copyright, normally an injunction must follow. Mere delay in bringing action is not sufficient to defeat grant of injunction in such cases. The grant of injunction also becomes necessary if it prima facie appears that the adoption of the mark was itself dishonest.

(This landmark decision on grant of injunction has been followed in more than 110 cases of different High Courts including cases relating to copyright infringement.)

50. In case law of T.V Venugopal v. Ushodaya Enterprises Ltd. (2011) 4 SCC 85 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has been pleased to hold that permitting the appellant to carry on business by copyright infringement would in fact be putting a seal of approval of the court on the dishonest, illegal and clandestine conduct of the appellant; would create confusion in the mind of the consumers hence bounden duty and obligation of the court is not only to protect the goodwill and reputation of respondent company but also to protect the interest of the consumers; would amount to encourage the appellant to practice fraud on the consumers; would lead to eroding extraordinary reputation and goodwill acquired by the respondent company over a passage of time; hence entitled for injunctive relief.

51. Till date the instances of infringement cited in the tables in the plaint continue to exist in the database of the defendants and many fresh instances of infringement of plaintiffs' copyright by the defendants, have been found. The infringements continuing in the defendants' database, with the case laws downloaded recently in July 2013. In fact, it is not feasible for the defendants to remove the value additions/inputs made by the plaintiffs in the raw text so published in SCC, since the defendants have no access to the raw text so as to determine the value additions/inputs made by plaintiffs to enable the defendants to delete them. The only way of removing the infringing material is by complete replacement of SCC text by the defendants in their database.

52. In the counter-affidavit dated 9-11-2012 to the application of the plaintiffs for temporary injunction (C-40/41), it has been stated by the defendants that the judgments are sourced from judis, other websites and journals. It is also stated by the defendants that the plaintiffs' SCC has copied the Supreme Court judgments from judis.

53. In the written statement dated 18-12-2012 (A-42), the defendants have stated that they had entered into a prospective licence agreement dated 19-5-2011 with CDJ Cyber Law Journal Pvt. Ltd., Chennai (CDJ) and the entire content of Supreme Court Cases has been licensed by the defendants from CDJ, for which CDJ claims all copyright and proprietary rights. It has been further stated by the defendants that CDJ is a necessary party to the suit.

54. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the plaintiff that, it is apparent from the submissions made in the written statement by the defendants that SCR is the Official Law Reporter of the Supreme Court while judis is not an Official Law Reporter of Supreme Court. Moreover, judis is supposed to publish only SCR judgments. For the first time, it has been stated by the defendants that they had entered into a prospective licence agreement dated 19-5-2011 with CDJ and the entire Supreme Court judgments on its website have been licensed from CDJ.

55. Further it is argued by the learned counsel for the plaintiff that the prospective licence agreement with CDJ and the licensed material from CDJ being sold by the defendants under their own name does not absolve the defendants from the liability of infringing the copyright of the plaintiffs in their law report SCC. The Copyright Act, 1957, does not provide the same as a defence under Chapter XII on Civil Remedies. The defendants have never advertised or notified on their website about the alleged prospective licence agreement dated 19-5-2011 nor have they mentioned CDJ as either their partner or an associate on their web products. Through their web product of cases on Supreme Court and other High Courts, it has been shown by the defendants to the world at large that the said product is their original product and the aspect of product being licensed from CDJ is not reflected.

56. The plaintiffs having filed rejoinder affidavit dated 22-4-2013 (C-47/48), stated that the defendants have been consistently and blatantly infringing the copyright of the plaintiffs in their law report SCC.

57. On the other hand the learned counsel appearing for the defendants has contended that the plaintiffs having realised that the cause of action in the plaint based upon alleged infringing data as on 6-9-2012 is no more subsisting, have attempted to come up with a new case each time by its affidavits dated 23-5-2013, 26-7-2013 and 3-9-2013. Lastly at the hearing on 19-10-2013, the plaintiffs came up with yet another case of infringement by referring to R.C Poudyal case 1994 Supp (1) SCC 324.

58. After the uploading of the said newly sourced contents in April 2013, the alleged cause of action of the plaintiffs that the database of the defendants allegedly infringed the plaintiffs' alleged copyright became non est. With substitution of the alleged infringing material as alleged in the plaint, the cause of action pleaded in the suit does not survive. Moreover, in the plaint, the plaintiffs have not claimed damages for the alleged infringement.

59. It is settled practice as stated in the commentary by Iyenger's on The Copyright Act (Eighth Edn.) that the plaintiffs are required to give particulars of infringement at the time of filing of the plaint, inter alia, setting out the details of the infringement complained of; if the infringed work is a book, a copy of it should be filed as also a copy of the infringing book; in the case of infringement by copying various parts of a work, these should be extracted and annexed to the plaint.

60. The allegations of infringement in relation to the new database and moreover the alleged infringement by judis and MLJ, from which the defendants sourced the data, is not part of the plaint. These allegations are beyond the pleadings in the plaint. These allegations, if at all, give rise to a fresh cause of action for which the plaintiffs are required to institute a new action.

61. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has held in Bengal Waterproof Ltd. v. Bombay Waterproof Mfg. Co. (1997) 1 SCC 99, AIR 1997 SC 1398:

“10. … The aforesaid averments in the plaint clearly show that the present suit is not based on the same cause of action on which the earlier suit was based. … It is obvious that thus the alleged infringement of plaintiff's trade mark … has continued all throughout uninterrupted and in a recurring manner. It is obvious that such infringement … would give a recurring cause of action to the holder of the trade mark.… Wherever and whenever fresh deceitful act is committed the person deceived would naturally have a fresh cause of action in his favour. Thus every time when a person passes off his goods as those of another he commits the act of such deceit. … Therefore, whether the earlier infringement has continued or a new infringement has taken place cause of action for filing a fresh suit would obviously arise in favour of the plaintiff who is aggrieved by such fresh infringements of trade mark or fresh passing off actions alleged against the defendant.”

62. This judgment has, in fact, been cited by the plaintiffs. This judgment leaves no manner of doubt as to the position that the further allegations made by the plaintiff, if at all result in a fresh cause of action entitling them to file a fresh suit. However, these allegations based on the content which was not even on the defendant's website/database cannot and do not form a subject-matter of the present suit.

63. In this regard, it is clarified by the plaintiff by advancing the argument that the story of sourcing the judgments from judis and MLJ has been taken by the defendant during the progress of the hearing of temporary injunction application hence there was no occasion for the plaintiff to meet out the contention of the defendant that they had sourced the judgments alleged to have been copied from the SCC by the assistance of judis and MLJ.

64. It is argued by the learned counsel for the plaintiff in this regard that the copyright infringement is a continuing cause of action and being a continuing tort, under Section 22 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the period of limitation begins at every moment of time during which the tort continues. Suit for copyright infringement relates to tort, apparent from Part VII Article 88 of the Limitation Act, 1963.

65. It is wrong to say by the defendant that the judgments of the Supreme Court have been procured from other websites and journals including the website of judis whereas, in the supplementary affidavit dated 31-12-2012 it has been stated that the defendants have entered into prospective licence agreement dated 19-5-2011 with CDJ and the licensed material procured from CDJ is being displayed, distributed and offered for sale on its website.

66. The plaintiffs are empanelled for receiving raw text of the judgments from the Hon'ble Supreme Court but the defendants are not empanelled for receiving raw text of the judgments from the Hon'ble Supreme Court.

67. judis came into existence in the year 1997 while web based applications were implemented by judis only from 2001. judis has copied several judgments from SCC. judis reported judgments indicate the citation of SCC and while copying, judis has also copied the page number and footnotes of SCC. The judgments copied by judis from SCC do not fall in public domain. Only raw text of Supreme Court judgments comes in public domain, as specified in Section 52(1)(q)(iv) of the Copyright Act, 1957.

68. The defendants' plea of procuring/obtaining the infringing work of the plaintiffs from judis or CDJ is not a defence available to the defendants under the provisions of the Copyright Act, 1957. This sort of copyright infringement is termed as Indirect Infringement of copyright of plaintiffs in their work titled SCC. The defendants ought to have exercised due diligence before procuring infringing copy of the plaintiffs' work either from judis or CDJ. The defendants cannot escape the liability of selling, displaying for trade and business stolen cases from other entities or source.

69. It is wrong to say again by the learned counsel for the defendant that the judgments of the Supreme Court were sourced from judis and on 10-5-2013, at the time of filing of the affidavit, all judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court sourced from CDJ have been replaced by the judgments sourced directly from judis and is (sic) the defendants have not denied the infringement of plaintiffs' copyright in SCC. SCR is Official Law Reporter of Supreme Court, not judis, as admitted by the defendants in paras 13 and 15 of the written statement.

70. It is argued by the learned counsel for the plaintiffs that only a raw text of judgment of the court fall in public domain under Section 52(1)(q) of the Copyright Act, 1957. Section 52 or any other provision of the Copyright Act, 1957 does not absolve the defendants from copyright infringement of plaintiffs' work, by copying from judis the Supreme Court judgments copied by judis from SCC. The defendants have indirectly infringed copyright of the plaintiffs by copying the copyedited/value added SCC judgments from judis. The defendants have been changing their stand every moment and that the defendants have been continuing with infringement of the copyright of the plaintiffs even on 22-7-2013. Three decisions were cited and demonstrated by the plaintiffs in the following fashion:

(i) Nine-Judge Bench decision dated 16-11-1992 of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India 1992 Supp (3) SCC 217 not reported/published by judis reported in SCC as 1992 Supp (3) SCC 217 with various inputs/i.e editorial notes, multiple judgments, internal referencing, concurring, dissenting, paragraph numbering, etc. and; defendants copied from SCC including the value addition.

(ii) Judgment dated 7-2-1989 of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Triveniben v. State of Gujarat (1989) 1 SCC 678 reported in SCR; judis copied it from SCR; but the defendants copied the said judgment from SCC.

(iii) Judgment dated 3-8-1988 of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kehar Singh v. State (Delhi Admn.) (1988) 3 SCC 609 reported in Scale, copied by judis from Scale; Defendants did not copy from judis but copied the value-added judgment from SCC.

71. The defendants filed an affidavit dated 24-8-2013 coming up with another new story of copying the judgments from its proprietary law journals MLJ and LLJ.

72. While drawing my attention to supplementary affidavit dated 3-9-2013 of the plaintiff whereby it has been demonstrated that even the judgments published in the proprietary journal MLJ are verbatim copy of the copy-edited text of the judgments published in SCC by the plaintiffs. All the copy editing inputs inserted in the certified copies of the Supreme Court judgments by the plaintiffs are sequentially found in the text of MLJ in Kehar Singh v. State (Delhi Admn.) (1988) 3 SCC 609.

73. Copy-edited text in Triveniben v. State of Gujarat (1989) 1 SCC 678 published in SCC has been copied in MLJ subsequently and the same has been reported by the defendants on their website without indicating the equivalent citation of MLJ. Table of comparison of total paras, editorial notes, inputs of concurring, dissenting, etc. in Kehar Singh (1988) 3 SCC 609 and Triveniben (1989) 1 SCC 678 indicate that SCC has been copied by MLJ of the defendants while such copying is not found in other journals.

74. It is pertinent to mention here that the MLJ copied the copy-edited texts of SCC and published the same in the next year. In para 9, the plaintiffs have stated that the defendants have started marketing of the infringing database of the plaintiffs' by loading it on a samsung tablet computer and selling those tablets with infringing data as one combined item. The entire infringing data having been uploaded on the tablet and being sold is incapable of being retrieved and removed. The tablet with infringing data can be further sold and resold and the infringing copies would be untraceable and beyond any remedy causing irreparable and permanent injury to the plaintiffs.

75. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties at greater details and having gone through the facts of the counter-affidavit and supplementary affidavits filed by both the parties I find strength in the submission of the learned counsel for the plaintiff and it is correctly argued by the learned counsel for the plaintiff that the infringement of the copyright is continuing cause of action and being continuing tort, under Section 22 of the Limitation Act, 1963 the period of limitation begins at every moment of the time during which the tort continued and suit for copyright infringement relates to tort as is apparent from Article 88 of the Limitation Act, 1963. I also found that the defendants from time to time have changed the stance when at one time the defendants have taken the case that they have sourced the judgment through CDJ and later on they have claimed that they had purchased the journal popularly known as MLJ and they have sourced the judgments value added from MLJ.

76. The plaintiff has been prompted to indicate further instances of infringement by filing the affidavit within three decisions of Indra Sawhney 1992 Supp (3) SCC 217, Triveniben (1989) 1 SCC 678 and Kehar Singh (1988) 3 SCC 609, which demonstration of encouragement has been deliberately dealt with. At this stage I found that the aforementioned three instances do not tantamount to setting up a new case by the plaintiff but they are illustrations of continuing infringement which have been brought to the notice of this Court. Moreover the case law of Bengal Waterproof Ltd. v. Bengal Waterproof Mfg. Co. (1997) 1 SCC 99, AIR 1997 SC 1398 is not of any help to the case of the defendants because in this very case law Hon'ble the Supreme Court has been pleased to hold that where the alleged infringement of the plaintiff's trade mark has continued all throughout uninterrupted and in a recurring manner then it is obvious that such infringement would give a recurring cause of action to the holder of the trade mark wherever and whenever fresh deceitful act is committed the person deceived would naturally have a fresh cause of action in his favour. Further it is held that every time when a person passes off his goods as those of another he commits the act of such deceit and therefore whether the earlier infringement has continued or a new infringement has taken place, cause of action for filing a fresh suit would obviously arise in favour of the plaintiff who is aggrieved by such a fresh infringement of the trade mark or fresh passing off action is alleged against the defendant. Nowhere it is held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that for every fresh cause of action the plaintiff should file a fresh suit.

77. It is therefore wrong to say by the defendant that every new version of the defendant is giving fresh cause of action to the plaintiff and so the plaintiff is required to give particulars of every infringement at the time of filing of the plaint and setting out the details of the infringement complained of. The allegations of the infringement in relation to the new database and moreover the alleged infringement by judis and MLJ are not the part of the plaint hence the suit of the plaintiff is liable to be dismissed and accordingly the application for the temporary injunction is also liable to be dismissed. This argument of the defendant is also liable to be turned down and accordingly it is turned down.

78. It is next contended by the defendant that pronouncement of Hon'ble the Supreme Court in D.B Modak case (2008) 1 SCC 1 are in public domain and the judgments are published by judis from contents provided by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. Therefore, once a judgment is uploaded on judis, it becomes part of public domain.

79. The plaintiffs have relied upon article published in www.geop.uiuc.edu to distinguish between public domain from publically available. The article categorically states as under:

“Warning! Once a piece of intellectual property moves into the public domain, that status can never be revoked.”

80. Assuming without admitting that as alleged judis had uploaded SCC copy of judgment of Indra Sawhney 1992 Supp (3) SCC 217, it is submitted that the contents thereof became part of public domain. The defendants have used copy of the judgment available in public domain, therefore they cannot allege to have infringed any copyright. Therefore, the judgment relied upon by the plaintiffs in Shyam Lal 1970 SCC OnLine All 260, AIR 1971 All 192 is not applicable.

81. My attention is drawn to some circular noted as under and it is contended by the defendant that while using contents from judis, a user is bound by Circular F. No. E.B/J.18/2001 dated 17-10-2001 wherein it has been directed:

“It is, therefore, impressed upon all the LAW journals that they should publish the judgments verbatim repeat, verbatim without any change. Further if the citation is given in the body of the judgment, it should not be disturbed and shifted to the footnote.”

82. Therefore, no change could have been made in reporting judgment available on judis.

83. In Academy of General Education v. B. Malini Mallya (2009) 4 SCC 256:

“37. Yet again in Eastern Book Company v. D.B Modak (2008) 1 SCC 1, this Court held:

‘57. The Copyright Act is not concerned with the original idea but with the expression of thought. Copyright has nothing to do with originality or literary merit. … The trivial variation or inputs put in the judgment would not satisfy the test of copyright of an author.’

38. The High Court 2007 SCC OnLine Kar 585, (2008) 2 AIR Kant R 517, in our opinion, should have clarified that the appellants can also take the statutory benefit of the provisions contained in clauses (a), (i) and (l) of sub-section (1) of Section 52 of the Act.”

84. It is submitted that value additions (if any) to the judgment as published on judis are not distinguishable by those accessing the judgments from judis. A user cannot be expected, to much less compelled to, identify what aspect of the judgment from judis falls under Section 52 and it would be too onerous on the user if they are required to compare the judgments as reported by various case reporters to identify what truly is the raw text and what are the value additions so as to determine what is in public domain. Once judis makes it available, as far as the public is concerned, the entire text available on judis is material which the public is free to use.

85. It is next contended by the learned counsel for the defendants that new database has been sourced from judis and MLJ. The plaintiffs in its reply have stated judis and MLJ have copied the judgment from SCC and therefore sourcing of judgment by the defendants from judis and MLJ amounts to alleged indirect infringement. It is submitted that the allegation is squarely against judis and MLJ of having infringed the plaintiffs alleged copyright.

86. Regarding judis and MLJ, it is contended that judis is a database which came into existence in 1997 and which is operated by National Informatics Centre, under the Department of Electronics and Information Technology which is under the Ministry of Communication and Information Technology. The judgments provided on the database of judis are the official raw text of the judgments as passed and as made available by the Union of India.

87. The inauguration of judis was reported in Informatics, a quarterly newsletter from NIC in April 1997. The article stated that the inauguration of judis was by Justice Ahmadi and that the introduction of judis was with a view to support young advocates and Judges and enable easy access to case reports.

88. It would be pertinent to mention that the website where the database of judis is made available to the public, namely: in its legend at the bottom of the screen states,

“Content on this website is published and managed by Supreme Court of India”.

Additionally, in the “Disclaimer” it states,

“… Government of India, Ministry of Information Technology, National Informatics Centre hereby excludes any warranty, express or implied, as to the quality, accuracy, timeliness, completeness, performance, fitness for a particular purpose of the site or any of its contents, including (but not limited) to any financial tools contained within the site. Government of India, Ministry of Information Technology, National Informatics Centre will not be liable for any damages (including, without limitation, damages for loss of business projects, or loss of profits) arising in contract, tort or otherwise from the use of or inability to use the site, or any of its contents, or from any action taken (or refrained from being taken) as a result of using the site or any such contents. Government of India, Ministry of Information Technology, makes no warranty that the contents of the site are free from infection by viruses or anything else which has contaminating or destructive properties.”

89. The availability of the case reports by the Supreme Court through judis is considered by the public at large as the judgments of the courts and therefore content from the same can be freely used under the provisions of Section 52(1)(q)(iv). Therefore the judgments in Beal, ex p (1868) LR 3 QB 387, Cate v. Devon and Exeter Constitutional Newspaper Co. (1889) LR 40 Ch D 500, King Features Syndicate Inc. v. O. & M. Kleeman Ltd. 1940 Ch 523 and Dorling v. Honnor Marine Ltd. 1965 Ch 1, (1964) 2 WLR 195 (CA) are not applicable in the facts of this case.

90. The defendant therefore submits that the reproduction or publication or use of the data available on judis does not infringe any copyright. These judgments are made available to, and can thus be used by the public at large.

91. Regarding Madras Law Journal, it is submitted by the defendant that defendants have acquired MLJ on 30-5-2008 which is the oldest legal journal and founded in the year 1891. MLJ started reporting Supreme Court judgments in its report named Supreme Court Journal in the year 1951 which is much before the plaintiffs' publication from the year 1969. MLJ has evolved its own method of editing the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court. It involves right from applying for certified copies of the judgment, to copy-editing the text of the same and enhancing it with various copyrightable elements such as paragraphing, para numbering, editorial notes, headnotes and use of the phraseology, “concurring” and “dissenting”.

92. Use of word “concurring” by MLJ was specifically submitted before this Hon'ble Court by citing judgment of MLJ reported in the year 1953 and 1956. Thus, it is clear that SCC has been using “concurring” in editing judgments by lifting the same from MLJ. There is not a single reference to this aspect in the written arguments submitted on behalf of the plaintiffs.

93. Plaintiff 2 has admitted in his affidavit dated 23-5-2013 that he is an old subscriber of MLJ. Plaintiff 2 has further acknowledged expertise of MLJ in his interview in the Mint (2008) wherein he had stated that in order to start the case law reporting business he had studied many other journals including AIR and MLJ. Much before SCC, MLJ coined the word “concurring” in editing judgments which is evident from copies of MLJ case reports from 1953 and 1956 case reports wherein the word concurring appeared in brackets. Also the EBC Webstore sells copies of MLJ journal and its various publications.

94. In view of the above, it is submitted by the learned counsel for the defendants that the plaintiffs have alleged that MLJ and judis have copied the judgments from SCC and sourcing of the judgment from them by the defendants amount to alleged indirect infringement. It is submitted that without joining judis and MLJ no finding can be rendered by this Hon'ble Court as to the alleged copying of judgments by judis and MLJ. Even to prove the case of indirect infringement, the plaintiffs must join judis and MLJ. This claim/contention clearly suffers from non-joinder of necessary parties.

95. It is submitted that without joining judis and MLJ in the suit the plaintiffs cannot get a relief against them alleging indirect infringement by the defendants. Any vigilant litigant would have immediately taken action against judis and MLJ. However, for obvious reasons, the plaintiffs without proceeding against judis and MLJ, have resorted to make unsubstantiated allegations against MLJ and judis. This is undoubtedly only a calculated and tactical move lacking merit.

96. The defendant has in its affidavit of 7-10-2013 at Annexure A included indicative copies of various publications of the plaintiffs listing cases with inclusions of MLJ's alternate citations. It is pertinent to note that MLJ has started its Supreme Court publication in 1951, while the plaintiff was established only in 1969. This casts doubt about intentions of the plaintiffs as to why the plaintiffs are objecting to the defendants' online publication at this stage when it has not objected to MLJ publishing the same content for the past many decades.

97. The only plausible explanation seems to be to keep away a new entrant into the India market and to keep competition at bay. It is humbly submitted that competition of this nature is good because consumers in India, namely, in the Indian legal fraternity, will benefit from such competition which will result in greater choice of quality products.

98. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties on this stage, I found that the defendants never advertised or notified on their website about the alleged prospective licence agreement dated 19-5-2011 nor have they mentioned CDJ as either their partner or as associate on their web products. There is every likelihood that it would be indicated by the defendants that such products are their original products and the aspect of product being licensed from CDJ is not reflected.

99. From the submissions and arguments of the learned counsel for the plaintiff, I am prima facie satisfied that judis came into existence in the year 1997 and judis also copied some value added judgments from text citation of SCC. Moreover, it is also demonstrated that judis has also copied the page number and footnotes of SCC, and as such, I found force in the submission of the learned counsel for the plaintiff that the judgments copied by judis from SCC do not fall in public domain.

100. To my mind, because the defendants have not exercised due diligence before procuring infringing copy of the plaintiff's work, either from judis or CDJ, so the defendants cannot escape the liability of selling, displaying, for trade and business, stolen cases from other entities or source. Hence the act of the defendants certainly can be said to be termed as indirect infringement of the copyright of the plaintiff in their work title of SCC. Moreover, prima facie, it is found that the CDJ and MLJ also copied some of the value added judgments of the plaintiff.

101. Moreover, the defendants cannot take benefit of the fact that the suit of the plaintiff seeking relief against alleged infringement of the copyrights is not maintainable because of CDJ and MLJ having not been made party to the suit. In this regard, I am to say it is total discretion of the plaintiff that against whom he intends to take action and against whom he does not.

102. The learned counsel for the defendant next argued that it is a well-established principle in the intellectual property law such as trademarks, copyrights, etc., that the defense of acquiescence is available to a defendant when the plaintiff has not just been sleeping over his rights, but has by its positive actions stood by and watched the defendant invest in its business under the belief that it is not violating any rights of the plaintiff. In such an event, the plaintiff is estopped from attacking the defendant. Admittedly the plaintiffs have not raised any question of infringement of copyright in relation to any of the judgment published by MLJ. MLJ has been publishing the judgment of the Supreme Court right since 1951. Even in relation to the 12 instances alleged, the judgments have for the last more than 2 decades been published without any objection. MLJ has obviously built reputation in the market over the last 5 decades in relation to its business of publication of judgment including that of the Supreme Court. The plaintiff by not having raised any objection has obviously stood by quietly and allowed MLJ to build its reputation and goodwill in the market.

103. The reliance is placed on the Supreme Court decision in Sumeet Machines (1994) 2 SCC 448, 1995 PTC 165 where the ingredients of acquiescence have been recognised. The Supreme Court has in its decision held as under:

“24. In dealing with this case we would like to keep this in the back of our mind that we are concerned with an interim application for injunction in relation to the violation of copyright, trade mark and the design.”

104. Thus, the Hon'ble Supreme Court was considering the case relating to copyright infringement, therefore the contentions of the plaintiffs that doctrine of acquiescence does not apply to copyright is untenable. The Hon'ble Apex Court has further held: (Sumeet Machines case (1994) 2 SCC 448, 1995 PTC 165 & 459, paras 26 & 28)

“26. … Therefore, acquiescence is one facet of delay. If the plaintiff stood by knowingly and let the defendants build up an important trade until it had become necessary to crush it, then the plaintiffs would be stopped by their acquiescence. If the acquiescence in the infringement amounts to consent, it will be a complete defence.…

***

28. … ‘… The position might be altogether altered had the use of the factor or element in question been of a secretive or surreptitious nature; but when a man is openly using, as part of his business, names, and phrases or other elements; which persons in the same trade would be entitled, if they took steps, to stop him from using, he gets in time a right to sue them which prevents those who could have stopped him at one time from asserting at a later stage their right to an injunction.’”

105. In Sumeet Machines case (1994) 2 SCC 448, 1995 PTC 165, the Supreme Court further examined the principle in relation to the grant of interim injunction and held:

“33. … ‘… It was necessary that an application for interlocutory injunction should be made immediately after the plaintiff becomes aware of the infringement of the mark. Improper and unexplained delay is fatal to an application for interlocutory injunction. The interim injunction will not be granted if the plaintiff has delayed interfering until the defendant has built up a large trade in which he has notoriously used the mark.’”

106. This has also been settled English law as held in Saunders v. Smith (1838) 3 My & Cr 711, 40 ER 1100: (ER pp. 1105 & 1107)

“… the plaintiffs have, by neglecting to take steps to restrain the publication and sale of the first volume, induced the defendants to persevere in their undertaking and to publish the second;

***

… I find the publication complained of to be of a character which, whether it be or be not an infringement of the copyright of the plaintiffs, is a course of proceeding which has been pretty largely admitted, and pretty generally adopted. Several cases occurred to me, and several were mentioned to me at the Bar; in which a gentlemen at the Bar, desirous of publishing a work upon a particular subject, has collected the cases upon that subject, and has taken those cases, generally speaking, verbatim, from reports which are covered by copyright. No instance has been represented to me in which those entitled to the copyright have interfered; no judgment, therefore, has been pronounced upon that subject. I am not stating whether the owner of the copyright is entitled to interfere in such a case, or whether that use of published reports is or is not to be permitted. That is a question of legal right, upon which I find, at present, no reason for coming to an adjudication. But, in considering whether I am to exercise an equitable jurisdiction in such a case, before the legal right has been established, it is very important to observe that, for many years, such a course as I have stated has been pretty generally adopted; more particularly when I find that these plaintiffs have themselves acquiesced in a similar course of proceeding.”

107. Thus, even in English law the doctrine of acquiescence is held applicable to copyright. In fact, the doctrine of acquiescence is well settled in respect of copyright law and has been discussed in the authority of Copinger and Skone James on Copyright.

108. The defendants submit that it is more than clear that the plaintiffs were aware of MLJ's reported judgments as a subscriber. The plaintiffs have taken positive actions by:

(i) Plaintiff 2 has admitted that he studied reporting of judgments by MLJ before starting SCC.

(ii) Including MLJ as alternate citations in its reported judgments.

(iii) Referring to MLJ citations in its commentaries.

(iv) Plaintiff 2 also admits that he is an old subscriber of MLJ.

(v) SCC had only objected to MLJ using words like “True Print” in its online version without objecting to its contents.

109. The plaintiffs have thus confirmed that the judgments reported by MLJ were not infringing alleged copyright of SCC.

110. Had action been taken against MLJ by the plaintiffs, the defendant/MLJ could have exercised its choice whether or not to continue building their business in the manner adopted. Now at this stage the plaintiffs have no locus to move against MLJ or the defendant. The defendant has commercially invested substantial amount of efforts to enter into commercial arrangements to obtain the rights to publish content from MLJ. It is to the grave detriment of the defendant if it cannot continue to exercise its lawfully obtained rights, merely because the plaintiffs have for over an unreasonably extended period of time failed to take action against MLJ for violations they allege. In fact, it will be pertinent to mention that the defendants acquired MLJ relatively recently. Had the plaintiffs successfully taken action against the erstwhile owners of MLJ, on the basis of the alleged infringement the defendants would have had the opportunity to consider whether or not to invest in and make the acquisition of MLJ at all. Having stood by without taking any action for several decades the plaintiffs cannot now seek to move against MLJ.

111. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the plaintiff submits that the Apex Court decision relied by the defendants rendered in Power Control Appliances v. Sumeet Machines (P) Ltd. (1994) 2 SCC 448, 1995 PTC 165 on the issue of acquiescence in using trade mark under the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958, to contend that the plaintiffs have acquiesced to the infringement of copyright by MLJ. The said case law is distinguishable and not applicable to the present case since acquiescence is one of the defences available under Section 30(1)(b) of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958, but the same is not a defence available under Section 52 of the Copyright Act, 1957. The defences available for infringement of trade mark under the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958, and those available under the Copyright Act, 1957, are different. It may also be noted that in Sumeet Machines case (1994) 2 SCC 448, 1995 PTC 165, eventually, the Hon'ble Supreme Court had granted injunction as stated in para 42 of the said judgment.

112. Similarly, Ramdev Food Products (P) Ltd. v. Arvindbhai Rambhai Patel (2006) 8 SCC 726 cited by the counsel for the defendants is also distinguishable as the said case relates to infringement of trade mark under the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958, and does not relate to infringement of copyright under the Copyright Act, 1957. Since defence of acquiescence is not available under the provisions of the Copyright Act, 1957, hence, the case laws cited by the counsel for the defendants are distinguishable and are not applicable to the present case.

113. On this score I do not find any voice in the submission of the learned counsel for the defendants and the case laws referred to by them are distinguishable from the facts and circumstances of the case in hand. The case laws referred to by the defendant relate to the infringement of the trade mark under the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958 and not relating to infringement of the copyrights under the Copyright Act, 1957, hence this argument of the defendants is turned down.

114. It is next contended by the learned counsel for the defendants that the plaintiffs while relying upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in D.B Modak (2008) 1 SCC 1 have claimed that the said judgment is in rem and law under Article 141 of the Constitution. In State of M.P v. Narmada Bachao Andolan (2011) 7 SCC 639, AIR 2011 SC 1989, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held:

“64. The Court should not place reliance upon a judgment without discussing how the factual situation fits in with a fact situation of the decision on which reliance is placed, as it has to be ascertained by analysing all the material facts and the issues involved in the case and argued on both sides. A judgment may not be followed in a given case if it has some distinguishing features. A little difference in facts or additional facts may make a lot of difference to the precedential value of a decision. A judgment of the court is not to be read as a statute, as it is to be remembered that judicial utterances have been made in setting of the facts of a particular case. One additional or different fact may make a world of difference between the conclusions in two cases. Disposal of cases by blindly placing reliance upon a decision is not proper.”

(emphasis in original)

Therefore, the judgment in D.B Modak (2008) 1 SCC 1 has to be considered in keeping with facts of that case.

115. The argument of the plaintiffs that the judgment of D.B Modak (2008) 1 SCC 1 is in rem is misconceived in law. Section 41 of the Evidence Act provides which are the judgments which are in rem:

“41. Relevancy of certain judgments in probate, etc., jurisdiction.— A final judgment, order or decree of a competent court, in the exercise of probate, matrimonial, admiralty or insolvency jurisdiction, which confers upon or takes away from any person any legal character, or which declares any person to be entitled to any such character, or to be entitled to any specific thing, not as against any specified person but absolutely, is relevant when the existence of any such legal character, or the title of any such person to any such thing, is relevant.

Such judgment, order or decree is conclusive proof—

that any legal character which it confers accrued at the time when such judgment, order or decree came into operation;

that any legal character, to which it declares any such person to be entitled, accrued to that person at the time when such judgment, order or decree declares it to have accrued to that person;

that any legal character which it takes away from any such person ceased at the time from which such judgment, order or decree declared that it had ceased or should cease;

and that anything to which it declares any person to be so entitled was the property of that person at the time from which such judgment, order or decree declares that it had been or should be his property.”

The judgment in D.B Modak (2008) 1 SCC 1 does not fall in any of those categories.

116. The plaintiffs have referred to the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Syndicate of Press of University of Cambridge 2011 SCC OnLine Del 3215, (2011) 185 DLT 346 and of Academy of General Education (2009) 4 SCC 256 while contending that law laid down in D.B Modak case (2008) 1 SCC 1 has been consistently followed. It is submitted that it is clear from both judgments that in the said cases, the Hon'ble Court has considered the law laid down therein but have not treated that judgment as a judgment in rem.

117. To my mind argument of the learned counsel for the defendants has no force because this very judgment of D.B Modak case (2008) 1 SCC 1 has been referred in Academy of General Education v. B. Malini Mallya (2009) 4 SCC 256, SCC at p. 37. So, I am of the view that judgment rendered in D.B Modak case (2008) 1 SCC 1 can be said to be the judgment in rem. The ratio, laid down in this case cannot be ignored for the reasons that the trial giving rise to this case, still has been pending before the Hon'ble Delhi High Court.

118. Next contention of the learned counsel for the defendants is that the decision in ‘D.B Modak case (2008) 1 SCC 1’ is merely a direction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India and it does not set aside the orders passed by the Hon'ble Single Judge and the Division Bench 2002 SCC OnLine Del 1131, (2002) 101 DLT 205 of the Delhi High Court. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has only modified the order granted by the Hon'ble Delhi High Court; and the order is based on facts admitted by the parties; and on the undisputed fact that the sole source of procurement of judgments was SCC.

119. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the plaintiff cited various judgments to argue that D.B Modak case (2008) 1 SCC 1 will come within the purview of Article 141 of the Constitution of India and, therefore, is binding on all the High Courts in India and subordinate courts.

120. I am afraid that if this question is travelled upon by me full and finally it would amount to deciding the suit finally whereas, at present, I am deciding only temporary injunction application and question, whether the judgment delivered by the Hon'ble the Supreme Court in D.B Modak case (2008) 1 SCC 1 is binding or not, is not material so far as decision on the application for temporary injunction is concerned.

121. It is lastly argued by the learned counsel for the defendants that it is well established, that while passing an interim order of injunction under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC, the Court is required to consider three basic principles, namely,

(i) prima facie case;

(ii) balance of convenience and inconvenience; and

(iii) irreparable loss and injury.

122. It is submitted that the plaintiffs have not made out any prima facie case as:

(i) The plaintiffs' case that the defendants' database allegedly infringed the plaintiffs' alleged copyright on the date of institution of the suit does not survive any more. The defendants as stated in detail in para 42 above replaced the alleged infringing database with newly sourced contents on 19-4-2013.

(ii) The plaintiffs' allegations in its affidavits dated 26-7-2013 and 3-9-2013 about indirect infringement by using database of judis and MLJ is not cause of action of the present suit, and therefore no relief can be claimed thereon finally or at interim stage.

(iii) Alleged instances of infringement pointed out by the plaintiffs in its affidavit dated 23-5-2013, 26-7-2013 and 3-9-2013 are not part of the cause of action in the plaint.

(iv) The defendants have disclosed source of its database. Therefore allegation that the judgments have been copied from SCC is not substantiated.

(v) Allegation of indirect infringement cannot be looked into as judis and MLJ have not been made parties and there is no pleading in that regard in the plaint.

123. The balance of convenience is also against the plaintiffs and in favour of the defendants as:

(i) the defendants are a leading global provider of content enabled work flow solutions. Defendant 2 is an authoritative legal publishing brand having presence in various countries. The defendants have invested money and labour in building its business in India. The defendants are reporting more than 50,000 judgments. Therefore it would not be in the interest of justice that on the alleged instances of infringement (which have been replaced on without prejudice basis), a blanket injunction is granted against the defendant.

(ii) The plaintiffs' studied inaction and/or failure to take action against MLJ since 1988 or against judis since 2001 for allegedly copying judgments when the alleged copied database was to the knowledge of Plaintiff 2 (an old subscriber of MLJ).

(iii) As the plaintiffs merely objected to use of word “True Prints” by MLJ without objecting to alleged copied judgments, thereby leading third parties to believe that SCC had no other objections in respect of actions or content of MLJ.

(iv) Falsity in the case of the plaintiffs about use of word “concurring” in editing judgments. The plaintiffs claim to have coined the word “concurring” whereas the same word has been in use by MLJ from at least 1951.

124. In view of the settled legal position that:

(i) under Section 52(1)(q)(iv) the judicial pronouncement of the Apex Court is in public domain and its reproduction of publication does not infringe the copyright;

(ii) that the plaintiff is obliged to specifically point out the infringing copy or the infringing portion of a published document;

(iii) that the injunction, if any, can only be in relation to the specific infringing copy or infringing portion (and nor sic);

(iv) that even while granting injunction the Court is required to clarify that the defendant can take the statutory benefit of the provisions contained in Section 52(i) of the Act. It is evident that the plaintiffs' application seeking injunction against the defendants is an attempt to abuse the process of this Hon'ble Court as the application seeks injunction in relation to the entire database of the defendants. This clearly shows the mala fide intent to eliminate a competitor database completely under the (disguise) of 3/12/1 solitary instance of breach of copyright; none of which as explained above is really an infringing copy in any case.

125. Assuming without admitting, the plaintiffs have made out prima facie case, the settled principle of law is that even where prima facie case is in favour of the plaintiffs, the Court will refuse temporary injunction if the injury suffered by the plaintiffs on account of refusal of temporary injunction was not irreparable. In Dalpat Kumar v. Prahlad Singh (1992) 1 SCC 719, AIR 1993 SC 276 the Hon'ble Supreme Court held:

“5. … Satisfaction that there is a prima facie case by itself is not sufficient to grant injunction. The Court further has to satisfy that non-interference by the Court would result in “irreparable injury” to the party seeking relief and that there is no other remedy available to the party except one to grant injunction and he needs protection from the consequences of apprehended injury or dispossession. Irreparable injury, however, does not mean that there must be no physical possibility of repairing the injury, but means only that the injury must be a material one, namely, one that cannot be adequately compensated by way of damages.”

The plaintiffs, in prayer (c) of the plaint, have sought rendition of profit and decree for the profit earned. Thus, if the plaintiffs succeed in their case of alleged copyright infringement they may be compensated as prayed.

126. In view thereof, the defendants humbly submit that ex parte ad interim relief granted by this Hon'ble Court by its order dated 22-9-2012 deserves not to be confirmed.

127. On the other hand the learned counsel for the plaintiffs has disputed this contention of the defendants by saying that the trio ingredients i.e prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable loss and injury lies in favour of the plaintiffs.

128. I have carefully considered the arguments of the learned counsel for both the parties in this regard. I have already observed in the preceding paragraphs that the Hon'ble Supreme Court has been pleased to hold that in cases of infringement either of trade mark or of copyright, normally an injunction must follow and permitting the defendants to carry on business by copyright infringement would in fact be putting a seal of approval of the Court on dishonest, illegal and clandestine conduct of the defendants. While granting ad interim injunction, I have carefully considered the existence of prima facie case, balance of convenience and danger of irreparable injury.

129. I do not find any force in contention of the defendants for vacation of the ex parte injunction order and so ex parte injunction granted earlier is liable to be confirmed in the following manner and the application for temporary injunction is liable to be allowed in the following manner.

130. The application for temporary injunction moved by the plaintiffs is allowed and during the pendency of the suit, the defendants, their assigns and business franchisees, licensees, distributors, agents, etc. are restrained from infringing the copyrights in the literary work of the plaintiffs in their law report “Supreme Court Cases” (SCC) and from selling, distributing or otherwise making available to the public, either as CD-ROMS or through their websites on the internet or through any tablet or by any other means, copies of its law report and databases which infringe the copyrights of the plaintiffs in and to the law reports titled Supreme Court Cases (SCC).

131. As now the temporary injunction application of the plaintiffs is allowed, so there is no question of continuing the order dated 3-10-2012 to the effect that the plaintiffs shall not publish ex parte order of temporary injunction in newspapers, print media and electronic media, which has continuously been extended, hence the order dated 3-10-2012 to this effect is hereby vacated.

132. Fix 30-1-2014 for hearing.

Ex Parte Injunction Order of Trial Court dated 22-9-2012

RS No. 134 of 2012

(Before Kamal Kishore Sharma, District Judge)

The Order of the Trial Court was delivered by

Kamal Kishore Sharma, District Judge.— I have heard the learned counsel for the plaintiffs and perused the report of the Munsarim, as also provisions, contained in Sections 55 and 62 of the Copyright Act, 1957, in order to be satisfied as to jurisdiction of this Court.

134. According to Section 62 of the Copyright Act, 1957, the District Court having jurisdiction shall try and decide the suit relating to the Copyright Act.

135. The plaintiffs have filed the instant suit against the defendants for permanent injunction restraining them from infringement of copyright in the literary work of the plaintiffs in their Law Reports and from selling, distributing or otherwise making available to public such Law Reports, etc. etc.

136. Register it as a regular suit, issue summons to the defendants fixing 22-10-2012 for written statement and framing issues.

137. Also heard the learned counsel for the plaintiffs on application moved under Section 55 of the Copyright Act, 1957, read with Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

138. Through the aforesaid application, the plaintiffs prayed that the defendants, their assigns and business franchisees, licensees, distributors, agents, etc. be restrained from infringing the copyrights in the literary work of the plaintiffs in their law report “Supreme Court Cases” (SCC) and from selling, distributing or otherwise making available to the public, either as CD-ROMS or through their websites on the internet or by any other means, copies of its law report and databases which infringe the copyrights of the plaintiff in and to the law reports titled Supreme Court Cases (SCC) during the pendency of the above suit.

139. While praying for ad interim injunction, the learned counsel for the plaintiff drew my attention to comparative charts giving illustration running from pp. 14 to 35 of the application/affidavit. It is submitted that editorial notes of the law books, journals and online journals of the plaintiffs, publishing SCC, exactly tallied with the editorial notes of the defendants' online journals.

140. I have gone through the entire illustration and found, at this stage, prima facie, that editorial notes of the plaintiffs of law journals are exactly tallying with those of the defendants' online journals.

141. It is further submitted that the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Eastern Book Company v. D.B Modak (2008) 1 SCC 1 has acknowledged the copyright of plaintiffs' journals and the Hon'ble Apex Court has been pleased to lay down the test of minimum creativity for recognising copyright in any of the inputs made by the plaintiffs in their copy-edited text.

142. In support of the prayer for issuance of ex parte ad interim injunction, reliance is placed by the plaintiff on T.V Venugopal v. Ushodaya Enterprises Ltd. (2011) 4 SCC 85, wherein it is held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that permitting the appellant to carry on his business with trade name “Eenadu” would amount to putting seal of approval on clandestine conduct of the appellant. It is further held that the appellant deliberately misrepresented having potentiality of creating confusion and deception in public at large.

143. Next, reliance is placed on Midas Hygiene Industries (P) Ltd. v. Sudhir Bhatia (2004) 3 SCC 90, wherein it is held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that the law on the subject is well settled. In cases of infringement either of trade mark or of copyright normally, an injunction must follow. Mere delay in bringing action is not sufficient to defeat grant of injunction in such cases. The grant of injunction also becomes necessary, if it prima facie appears that the adoption of the mark was itself dishonest.

144. After having heard the learned counsel for the plaintiffs and perusal of the record I think that issuance of notice of the application of temporary injunction is essential to be issued to the defendants/opposite parties. But, at the same time, I am also of the view that passing of an interim injunction order is justifiable at this stage because prima facie case lies in favour of the plaintiffs and factors of balance of convenience and irreparable loss also exist in their favour.

145. In view of this, issue notice of the application under Section 55 of the Copyright Act, 1957, read with Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 to the opposite parties, for the date fixed, for objection, if any, and disposal.

146. Meanwhile, the defendants, their assigns and business franchisees, licensees, distributors, agents, etc. are restrained from infringing the copyrights in the literary work of the plaintiffs in their law report “Supreme Court Cases” (SCC) and from selling, distributing or otherwise making/available to the public, either as CD-ROMS or through their websites on the internet or by any other means, copies of its law report and databases which infringe the copyrights of the plaintiffs in and to the law reports titled Supreme Court Cases (SCC).