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  • Article 14 of the Constitution
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
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Cites
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Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
2017 INSC 771
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Article 14 of the Constitution
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant-State, in order to encourage investment by small-scale industrial (SSI) units, had issued a series of executive orders granting refund of Central Sales Tax (CST) paid on raw materials purchased from outside the State:

  • G.O. 391-Ind of 21-6-1972: refund for three years from the order and five years from the date of production.
  • G.O. 54-Ind of 26-2-1983: refund for five years from the date of production.
  • G.O. 318-GR of 30-11-1990: full refund up to 31-3-1995, followed by a sliding-scale refund until 31-3-2000, with an option to continue under earlier packages.
  • G.O. 253-Ind/DIC of 1-10-1993: superseded the 1990 order and capped the refund at purchases of ₹50 lakh per annum (maximum monetary refund of ₹2 lakh per unit per year).

SSI units challenged the 1993 notification before the High Court, invoking promissory estoppel. The Division Bench rejected estoppel but struck down the cap as lacking nexus with the stated objective, and directed that refunds continue for a full five-year period from the date of production. The State appealed; leave was granted, leading to the present Supreme Court judgment.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether SSI units possessed an indefeasible or legally enforceable right to full refund of CST for five years despite the subsequent policy change.
  2. Whether the State’s decision in G.O. 253-Ind/DIC of 1-10-1993, imposing a monetary cap on refunds, was arbitrary, unreasonable, or violative of Article 14 so as to warrant judicial interference.
  3. To what extent principles of promissory estoppel constrain the State from modifying or curtailing an incentivising fiscal policy.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant-State’s Arguments

  • Refund of CST is a concession, not a vested right; it can be withdrawn or modified for just and valid reasons in the public interest.
  • Investigations revealed fraudulent claims—dealers outside the State had not deposited CST; some suppliers were non-existent; FIRs and vigilance enquiries were initiated.
  • Judicial review of an economic policy must be limited to examining arbitrariness; adequacy of material or policy wisdom is outside the court’s purview.
  • Capping the refund balanced the need to curb misuse while still offering incentives, and therefore was not arbitrary.

Respondents’ Arguments

  • No concrete material was produced to substantiate alleged fraud; administrative lapses of the State cannot justify depriving legitimate claimants.
  • If other-State dealers failed to pay CST, purchasers within the State should not suffer denial of refund.
  • An across-the-board cap lacks nexus with the stated objective of preventing bogus claims; selective enforcement against fraudulent claimants would have sufficed.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Ugar Sugar Works Ltd. v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2001) 3 SCC 635 Courts should not interfere with executive policy unless it is mala fide, arbitrary, irrational, or unfair, especially in taxation and economic regulation. Used to emphasise judicial restraint and to justify limited scrutiny of the State’s fiscal policy decision.
CCT v. Dharmendra Trading Co. (1988) 3 SCC 570 Government may withdraw a concession if misuse or undue advantage is reasonably established. Supported the view that evidence of fraudulent refund claims provided a valid ground for modifying the incentive scheme.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court characterised the refund scheme as an executive economic policy. Citing precedent, it reiterated that judicial review in such spheres is confined to assessing arbitrariness under Article 14. The Court found:

  • SSI units had no indefeasible right to the concession; the policy could be reviewed or altered to protect the public exchequer.
  • The State’s decision rested on concerns over fraudulent refund claims and the erosion of non-plan resources—considerations that are germane and non-arbitrary.
  • The High Court erred in treating the issue as mere “administrative apathy” and in holding that the policy could have been fully withdrawn but not curtailed. The Court held that partial curtailment is a reasonable balancing measure.
  • Lapse of time and loss of some documentary evidence do not invalidate a policy that was reasonable when enacted.

Holding and Implications

Appeals Allowed; High Court judgment set aside.

The monetary cap on CST refund introduced by G.O. 253-Ind/DIC of 1-10-1993 is upheld. However, refunds already granted and financially availed shall remain undisturbed. No broader constitutional precedent is set beyond reaffirming judicial deference to economic policy formulated on rational grounds.

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    State Of Jammu And Kashmir (S) v. M/S. Trikuta Roller Flour Mills Pvt. Ltd. And Another (S)

    Navin Sinha, J.— Leave granted in Special Leave Petitions (Civil) Nos. 5803 and 5835 of 2006. The State Government issued a Notification bearing G.O No. 318-GR of 1990 dated 30-11-1990, granting hundred per cent refund of Central sales tax (CST), paid by small-scale industrial units (SSI units) in the State, on raw materials purchased from outside the State, for a period of five years. It was superseded by G.O No. 253-Ind/DIC of 1993 dated 1-10-1993, restricting the refund to the maximum annual purchase turnover of Rs 50 lakhs to a unit holder. In monetary terms, Rs 2 lakhs per annum per unit (taking the maximum rebate of CST at 4%).

    2. As part of an executive policy to encourage entrepreneur investment in the State by SSI units, the appellant by G.O No. 391-Ind of 1972 dated 21-6-1972, provided for refund of CST paid on purchase of raw materials from outside the State, for a period of 3 years from the date of the order, and 5 years from the date of production. It was superseded by G.O No. 54-Ind of 1983 dated 26-2-1983, providing for refund of CST for a period of 5 years from the date of production.

    3. A fresh G.O No. 318-GR of 1990, dated 30-11-1990, was issued in supersession, providing for such refund in full up to 31-3-1995, after which it was to be provided on a sliding scale of (a) 50 per cent of the tax paid up to the end of 31-3-1998, and (b) 25 per cent of the tax paid up to the end of 31-3-2000. Option was also given to those entitled to avail the earlier package of incentives, to continue availing the benefit for the remaining period of their entitlement. It was again superseded by G.O No. 253-Ind/DIC of 1993 dated 1-10-1993, leading to institution of writ petitions assailing it.

    4. The challenge to the Notification dated 1-10-1993, by the respondents was on principles of promissory estoppel, contending that having held forth a promise for grant of exemption from CST on raw materials purchased from outside the State for five years from the date of production, the appellant could not have withdrawn or modified the benefit before that time period.

    5. The Division Bench of the High Court rejected the plea of promissory estoppel. But, regarding the plea of the State change in policy on account of refunds availed fraudulently, it was held that administrative apathy, could not be a justification for putting a ceiling on the quantum of refund. The restriction sought to be introduced, had no nexus with the object sought to be achieved. If the Government bona fide deemed it against public interest, it could have withdrawn the policy. The appellant was held bound to provide refund for a period of 5 years from the date of production.

    6. Shri R. Venkataramani, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant, submitted that the respondents had no legal or indefeasible right to claim refund of CST paid, except in terms of the benefit as may have been granted under the executive policy decision, and as modified from time to time. The benefit being in the nature of a concession, could be withdrawn at any time, for just and valid reasons in the larger public interest. The detection of false claims for refund of CST, leading to institution of FIRs, enquiries and vigilance cases, affecting the State exchequer, led to a conscious policy decision to put a cap on the earlier policy. Judicial review of the policy decision dated 1-10-1993, will have to be circumscribed within limits of relevancy of materials considered only. If the policy decision was found to be completely arbitrary, based on no materials, or took into consideration irrelevant materials, then only the Court could have interfered. A reasonable conclusion based on satisfaction culled out from relevant materials regarding misuse of the concession, and protection of the State exchequer were sufficient justification for change in policy. The decision to put a cap on reimbursement was, therefore, not arbitrary.

    7. The learned counsel for the respondents, supporting the impugned order of the High Court, submitted that no material had been brought on record, in support of the contention regarding raising of false claims by SSI units in the State. If CST had not been paid by the dealers in the other State from whom the raw materials had been purchased, the respondents could not be visited with the consequences by denial of refund. The Division Bench had aptly observed that administrative apathy in detecting false claims could not be a justification for an across the board decision to curtail the benefit. Moreover, if false and bogus claims were an issue, and the intention was to curb it, capping the limit for exemption had no nexus with the object sought to be achieved.

    8. The respective submissions have received our thoughtful consideration. The grant of refund on CST paid, to boost entrepreneur investment was primarily an executive economic policy decision. The scope for judicial scrutiny and interference with the same, has to be restricted to arbitrariness and unreasonableness as observed in Ugar Sugar Works Ltd. v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2001) 3 SCC 635 as follows:

    “18. … It is well settled that the courts, in exercise of their power of judicial review, do not ordinarily interfere with the policy decisions of the executive unless the policy can be faulted on grounds of mala fide, unreasonableness, arbitrariness or unfairness, etc. Indeed, arbitrariness, irrationality, perversity and mala fide will render the policy unconstitutional. However, if the policy cannot be faulted on any of these grounds, the mere fact that it would hurt business interests of a party, does not justify invalidating the policy. In tax and economic regulation cases, there are good reasons for judicial restraint, if not judicial deference, to judgment of the executive. The courts are not expected to express their opinion as to whether at a particular point of time or in a particular situation any such policy should have been adopted or not. It is best left to the discretion of the State.”

    9. The respondents had no legal or indefeasible right to claim refund of CST paid by them. The policy rested on an executive decision to encourage entrepreneur investment. It naturally includes the power of the State to review the policy from time to time, including on considerations for the manner in which the policy was proving beneficial or detrimental to the larger public interest, and the State exchequer. The policy could therefore well be withdrawn or modified at any time for just, valid and cogent reasons. Judicial review of a policy decision, especially an economic policy decision, shall have to be restricted to the presence of just and valid reasons eschewing arbitrariness, so as not to fall foul of Article 14 of the Constitution. But, in the garb of judicial review, the Court will not examine the sufficiency or adequacy of the reasons or materials, in the manner of an appellate authority, to substitute its own wisdom for that of the Government. That would tantamount to taking over of the executive decision making process.

    10. The appellant had specifically contended before the High Court that based on verification of complaints regarding refunds having been obtained without any payment of CST, causing revenue loss to the State, the decision had been taken in larger public interest. The High Court unfortunately dealt with it very cursorily, as a simple issue of administrative apathy without further discussion. The reasonableness in action on part of the State, in not having withdrawn the benefit completely, balancing competing interests, was considered negatively holding that it could have been completely withdrawn but not curtailed. Misuse of exemption, fraudulent claims for refund, affecting the financial health and coffers of the State can certainly be valid and germane reasons in the larger public interest, to restrict or revoke the benefit as observed in CCT v. Dharmendra Trading Co. (1988) 3 SCC 570, as follows:

    “4. … It is well settled that if the Government wants to resile from a promise or an assurance given by it on the ground that undue advantage was being taken or misuse was being made of the concessions granted the court may permit the Government to do so but before allowing the Government to resile from the promise or go back on the assurance the court would have to be satisfied that allegations by the Government about misuse being made or undue advantage being taken of the concessions given by it were reasonably well established.”

    11. It is the contention of the appellants that in or about 1992, genuine doubts were entertained about the veracity of the refund claims of CST made by SSI units. A specific reference has been made by illustration to the case of the respondent in Civil Appeal No. 9844 of 2011. Enquiries were also made from the Excise and Taxation Officer II, Amritsar, as dealers at Amritsar were suspected of being in connivance with the dealers in the appellant State. It was observed on the basis of information furnished by the authorities at Amritsar that the original payee receipts produced by the SSI units in the appellant State, did not tally with that given by the sales tax authorities of Punjab, and who had also confirmed that the suppliers did not deposit any CST. Enquiries from the authorities at Punjab further revealed that M/s Sewak Traders, one of the dealers of Punjab, from whom purchase was said to have been made, was found to be a non-existent trader in Amritsar District, never registered with the authorities at Punjab, and had never filed any return or deposited any taxes. Consequently, FIRs had been lodged, as also vigilance inquiries set up, as it was causing great amount of revenue loss to the State exchequer. It was the further case of the appellants, that even otherwise, serious reservations were expressed time and again regarding the incentives, observing that they were regularly eroding the non-plan resources of the State and that curtailment was becoming unavoidable. These were all relevant considerations, the State being the guardian of State finances.

    12. There has been much passage of time since the issue originated and the litigation that followed. The mere fact that ample documentary evidence may not be available with the State today, for valid reasons as mentioned in the additional affidavit, it cannot be held that what was valid when done, must be pronounced as illegal today, merely because the evidence may have been lost with passage of time for unavoidable reasons. Undoubtedly, fraudulent refund claims obtained, would be contrary to the financial interests of the State, thereby affecting the larger public interest. The policy wisdom of the State that the grant of refund was eroding non-plan resources is a matter exclusively in the executive domain.

    13. The order of the High Court is, therefore, held to be unsustainable and is set aside. It is however clarified that only such claims which have already been granted and the financial benefit availed, shall not be reopened or withdrawn, and no refund shall be required to be made by any such unit to the State.

    14. The appeals are allowed with directions.

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    State Of Jammu And Kashmir (S) v. M/S. Trikuta Roller Flour Mills Pvt. Ltd. And Another (S)
    (Aug 18, 2017)