J.D Jain, Vice-Chairman:— It would thus appear that the respondent-administration took the decision to revert the applicant because certain complaints about his misbehaviour with the girl students had been received. It is equally manifest that the applicant did some canvassing in his favour through some School Teachers and Parents Teachers Association, Government High School, Sector 41, Chandigarh that he was a man of good character and he be not transferred. However, the concerned authorities were not impressed by the same and they considered the immoral conduct of the applicant towards his female pupils was most reprehensible. Reference in this context be also made to Annexure R-3 which is a copy of letter dated 9.1.1987 written by the Headmistress, Government High School, Sector 41-A, Chandigarh in which the applicant is working as a S.V Teacher, to the Director, Public Instructions (S). In the said letter, she had stated that Shri Hans Raj, submitted a complaint to her that the applicant had misbehaved with his daughter during the December test. She further remarked, “So keeping in view the record of Shri O.P Kaushal in previous schools, he is in the habit of misbehaving with the students. The detail has already been submitted to your goodself personally. So, now it is requested that to avoid any kind of problem, he may be transferred from school to any other school or he be sent to his parent State i.e Haryana. It is in this background, the question whether the impugned order is punitive and stigmatic in nature, looms large for determination.

2. It is now well settled that a deputation is just a transfer of a Government employee from one department to another or from one Government to another i.e from Central Government to State Government or State Government to State Government or State Government to Central Government. So, in its very nature, the tenure of a deputationist is precarious one.

3. Of course in some cases it may be for a fixed term, but even then it is implicit that a deputationist can always be repatriated to his parent State/department in public interest or in the exigencies of service. Further a deputationist continues to hold lien on his permanent post in his parent cadre till, of course, he is permanently absorbed in the borrowing department. Another wholesome principle is that if many persons are drafted to serve on deputation, their inter se seniority in the borrowing department should be respected and preserved during the period of such deputation to the new department. Reference in this context can be made with advantage to K. Madhavan v. Union of India, (1987) 4 SCC 566 and R.S Makashi v. I.M Menon, (1982) 1 SCC 379. In the former case, it was observed:

“There is not much difference between deputation and transfer. Indeed, when a deputationist is permanently absorbed in the C.B.I, he is under the rules appointed on transfer. In other words, deputation may be regarded as a transfer from one Government to another.

4. It is thus manifest that a deputationist has no right to the post held by him in the borrowing department and he can always be repatriated to his parent department in public interest or exigencies of service. This right of the borrowing department to repatriate the employee and for that matter, right of the lending department to recall their own- employee sent on deputation, is well recognised in service jurisprudence. It is in this background, therefore, that we have to see whether the impugned order of the respondents reverting the applicant to his parent State of Haryana can be said to be punitive, mala fide or tantamount to colourable exercise of power.

5. Admittedly, the impugned order dated 12.1.1987 (copy Annexure P-3) is absolutely innocuous in form. It does not cast any aspersion or stigma on the applicant at all, either in respect of his service career or the alleged misbehaviour with his girl students. Indeed, the respondents have not made any detailed inquiry about the alleged misconduct on his part and it was after preliminary inquiry that they thought it fit to revert the applicant to his parent State. Certainly, one cannot be oblivious to the fact that a school teacher must conduct himself in a manner especially towards girl students that no one can raise a little finger on his moral fibre. It must be absolutely meticulous and above suspicion in all respects. So having regard to the sensitive nature of relationship between a teacher and girl pupils to whom he is supposed to teach like a father, the steps taken by the respondents cannot be commended as being wise and in the public interest/exigencies of service. A teacher must not only be absolutely above board, but he must enjoy the reputation of being upright and a person of undoubted character. Hence, we do not think that repatriation of the applicant to his parent State can, by any stretch of reasoning, be called as punitive or mala fide or colourable exercise of power.

6. In Kamlesh Trivedi v. Indian Council of Agricultural Research, (1988) 7 ATC 253 : ATR (1988) 2 CAT 116, the question was whether the transfer of a Class IV employee, who had allegedly misbehaved with some girl student and was consequently transferred along with the post from the Office of the Indian Agricultural Research Institute, Pusa, New Delhi to Regional Station, IARI in Bihar, was by way of punishment or not. A Full Bench of this Tribunal held as under:

The. transfer must be ordered by a competent authority in bona fide exercise of power. It should not be a fixed transfer or for settling scores. However, merely because transfer is ordered on complaints or after an inquiry into the guilt of the employee, it cannot be said to be by way of punishment. The principle that ‘justice should not only be done but appear to be done’ is not contravened if transfer is made without any further inquiry after a penalty in a proper disciplinary proceedings. It does not amount to double jeopardy.

7. The Full Bench answered the question posed to it as under:

No inquiry need be made if no finding of guilt, misconduct or stigma is attached. Transfer may be on administrative grounds and one of the grounds could very well be the allegations themselves. If the transfer is ordered in the exigency of service without giving any finding on the allegations, it would not be vitiated. If a charge-sheet is issued and statement regarding imputation of misconduct is given or memo is issued on a complaint and the representation of the employee or statement with reference thereto is recorded or even where no charge-sheet or statement regarding imputation of misconduct or a memo has been issued, but the concerned official's statement with regard to the allegation has been recorded, that would more than satisfy the principles of natural justice. But we must add that question of observing the principles of natural justice in a case of transfer does not arise where it is not based upon a finding on the allegations of misconduct or the like made against the employee. But if a finding of misconduct is arrived at without observing the principles of natural justice and that is the “operative reason” for transfer, it is liable to be quashed.

8. As already observed, the applicant was fully aware of the nature of the complaint against him and he did try to persuade the authorities to cancel the impugned order of transfer by making representations personally as well as by canvassing through Parents Teachers Association, Government High School, Sector 41-A, Chandigarh. So, we do not think that a regular disciplinary proceeding was at all necessary for finding out the guilt. After all repatriation to one's department does not amount to reduction to a lower grade.

9. It may also be pertinent to notice here that Rule 21 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965, which contains provisions regarding officers borrowed from the State Governments etc., lays down that where an order of suspension is made or a disciplinary proceeding is conducted against a Government servant, whose services have been borrowed by the Central Government from a State Government, the latter has to be forthwith informed of the circumstances leading to the order of suspension of the Government servant or commencement of the disciplinary proceedings, as the case may be. Further, if consequent upon the disciplinary proceedings conducted against such Government servant, the disciplinary authority is of the opinion that any of the penalties specified in clauses (i) to (iv) of Rule 11 of the said Rules, should be imposed on him, it can pass such orders as it may deem necessary after consultation with the lending authority. So, instead of undergoing all this elaborate procedure, the respondents thought it fit to pass an order of repatriation simpliciter, which is wholly innocuous and non-stigmatic in nature. We think that the respondents have been rather charitable and generous to the applicant in this matter. Therefore, the question of any mala fides or colourable exercise of power on the part of the respondents does hot arise at all.

10. We may also advert at this stage to the decision of the Supreme Court in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ashok Deshmukh, (1988) 3 SCC 503 : 1988 SCC (L&S) 509 : (1988) 7 ATC 78 3. In that case, a deputationist was ordered to be repatriated to his substantive post in his parent department. The Court found that the allegations of bias and mala fides against the borrowing authorities were not substantiated. The order of repatriation did not attach any stigma to the concerned Government servant therein. Of course, it was noticed that a complaint had been made against them by an M.L.A which too later was found to be wrong. It was, therefore, held that the impugned order could not be termed as mala fide or punitive in nature on the alleged ground of being the outcome of displeasure of superiors incurred by reason of a complaint made by an M.L.A The Supreme Court further held that in the circumstances, the order cannot be said to be arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution either. The facts in the case on hand are somewhat similar, except to the extent that as a result of preliminary enquiry, the concerned authorities still entertained a doubt about the moral fibre of the applicant in dealing with his girl students and they did not absolve him totally of the same. We do not think that this circumstance alone would vitiate the impugned order as being arbitrary or mala fide or having been passed in colourable exercise of power. Hence, this application too is totally devoid of merit.

11. Application dismissed.