K.J Raman, Member (A):— The applicant in this case is an Indian Police Service Officer, who was working as Inspector General of Police till his retirement on 31.5.1983 He has filed this application under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, challenging a letter dated 25.5.1987 from the 2nd respondent (Secretary to Government, Home Department Government of Tamil Nadu), enclosing a statement of articles of charge together with a statement of imputation and other related annexures, addressed to the applicant for submitting a reply. The relief claimed is for setting aside or quashing the departmental proceedings initiated by the impugned letter referred to above together with the charge sheet, the appointment of Inquiry Officer (I.O) and other consequential orders in the course of such inquiry. The Union of India represented by the Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs, New Delhi, is the first respondent. The 3rd respondent is the Inquiry Officer appointed in the case against the applicant.

2. The facts of the case, succinctly, are as follows. The applicant entered the Tamil Nadu Police Subordinate Service in the year 1950 and he was appointed in the Indian Police Service in 1965. He was promoted as an Inspector General of Police in 1982 and continued as such till his retirement. He was lastly working as Director of Fire Services, Madras, before his retirement. He submitted an application for voluntary retirement with effect from 31.5.1983 On the last day before his retirement, however, he was suspended from the service by an order dated 31.3.1983 (Page 18 of the Paper Book). Thereafter, a charge memo was served on him on 13.7.1983 An inquiry was conducted in pursuance thereof, but no final orders have been issued even though the inquiry was over in April, 1985. By a letter dated 12.12.1983, the State Government declared that the applicant had given three months' notice for voluntary retirement on 1.3.1983 and that the three months' notice period was over by 31.5.1983(A.N). The letter further added that the applicant was placed under suspension pending inquiry of certain charges, but under certain rule of the All India Services (Death-cum-Retirement Benefit) Rules, 1958 (AIS/DCRB Rules), the applicant was rule 6(1)(b)(ii) 16(2) deemed to have retired voluntarily from IPS, on completion of the date of three months' notice, i.e 31.5.1983 (A.N) (Page 20 of the Paper Book). The said letter dated 12.12.1983 further directed payment of 50% of pension provisionally to the applicant. Thereafter, the 2nd respondent issued the impugned charge sheet dated 25.5.1987 (Pages 22 to 36 of the Paper Book) containing two charges, together with a statement of imputations, etc. In charge No. 1, it is alleged that the applicant during the period* January 1983 to 31st May, 1983 cancelled certain tenders already accepted, and issued supply orders to a particular; Firm at a higher price resulting in loss to the State Exchequor to the extent of about Rs. 1.4 lakhs. Under charge No. 2, it was alleged that, shortly before his due date of voluntary, retirement (31.5.1983), the applicant hurriedly passed orders on 24.5.1983, 25.5.1983 and 28.3.1983 favouring the same Firm and its sister concern, resulting in a pecuniary loss of about Rs. 4.9 lakhs, without citing any reasons for rejecting the accepted tenders. The applicant avers that the said charge sheet was served on the applicant only on 27.7.1987

3. The applicant states that he made a number of representations to the 2nd respondent stating that the events in respect of which the charge sheet was issued, took place somewhere between 4.1.1983 and 28.5.1983 and the impugned charge sheet was served on the applicant only on 27.7.1987, and that, as per provisions of rule 6(1)(b)(ii) of the AIS (DCRB) Rules, no charge sheet can be served on the delinquent officer after his retirement a period of four years from the dates of events specified in the charge, and that, therefore. the impugned charge sheet was totally without jurisdiction and clearly barred by limitation as per the provisions of the aforesaid rule. The applicant states that nonetheless the 2nd respondent appointed an I.O in respect of the aforesaid charge sheet by his proceedings dated 23.11.1988 and 15.12.1988 The applicant similarly submitted his objection before the I.O, who, however, did not agree, and fixed the next date of enquiry (Pages 54 and 55 of the Paper Book).

4. The I.O in his letter dated 26.8.1989, fixing the next date of hearing on 19.9.1989 (Page 55 of the Paper Book), enclosed a copy of a note dated 26.8.1989 submitted by the Presenting Officer (P.O) (Page 56). In this note the P.O states that the benefit of limitation contained in rule 6(1)(b)(ii), will not be available to the applicant and that departmental proceedings can be initiated against him after the date of his retirement for misconduct committed by him while in service, although such proceedings may be in respect of an event which took place more than 4 years before the institution of such proceedings. The P.O refers to the Explanation below the said rule. According to the P.O, the limitation does not apply because the applicant was placed under suspension on 31.5.1983, as stated above. The I.O stated in his letter dated 26.8.1989 (Page 55 of the paper book); to the applicant, that he agreed with the P.O's statement and had rejected the contention of the applicant that the proceedings were barred by limitation.

5. The applicant relies on the provisions of rule 6(1)(b)(ii) of the AIS (DCRB) Rules for his contention that the entire proceeding initiated by the impugned charge sheet is barred by limitation. This is because, according to the applicant, the events specified in the charge sheet took place more than 4 years before the institution of the proceedings i.e the serving of the charge sheet on the applicant on 27.7.1987 The applicant further contends that after the issue of the order dated 12.12.1983 referred to above, allowing the applicant to retire voluntarily from service with effect from 1.6.1983, he was under the bona fide impression that he would not be proceeded with departmentally any longer since the earlier inquiry was completed much earlier in April, 1985 and no order was passed against the applicant. The applicant also strongly opposed the contention of the P.O referred to above. According to the applicant, the Explanation under the rule relied on by the P.O is indeed in applicant's favour.

6. The 2nd respondent has filed a reply on behalf of the respondents 2 and 3. It is stated that, after the applicant gave notice of voluntary retirement by his letter dt. 24.2.1983, seeking such retirement from 31.5.1983(A.N), certain allegations of corruption and malpractices were received by the Government against the applicant. After some enquiry conducted in April, 1983, it was held that as many as 8 allegations were substantiated against the applicant. It is stated that these allegations related to impropriety, rectitude and moral turpitude against the applicant. To enable the Government to initiate departmental action against the applicant beyond the date of his voluntary retirement on 31.5.1983, it is stated in the reply, that the Government issued an order dated 31.5.1983 placing the applicant under suspension with immediate effect till further orders. It is further stated simultaneously (para 4 of the reply) that under Rule 16(2) of the AIS (DCRB) Rules, the applicant is deemed to have retired on 31.5.1983

7. It is further stated in the reply that a charge sheet dated 13.7.1983 was issued in pursuance of the complaint referred to above. An I.O was appointed and an inquiry held. The I.O submitted a report holding that some of the charges were proved and others not proved. The State Government considered and agreed with the report of the I.O The Government of India were moved for inflicting an appropriate penalty on the applicant by the State Government, as early as March, 1988. It is stated that the matter was still under consideration of the Government of India in consultation with the Union Public Service Commission.

8. It is then stated in the reply that, subsequently, a special audit was conducted into the accounts of the Directorate of Fire Services, which revealed grave irregularities committed by the applicant involving huge extra expenditure to the Government. The State Government ordered a detailed enquiry into the matter during October, 1983 and on receipt of a report thereof, with the approval of the Central Government, the impugned charge sheet dated 25.5.1987 was served on the applicant. It is averred that the applicant was not immediately available at his residence and was reported to be in Bargur and, therefore, the communication (Charge Sheet) had to be sent by registered post acknowledgement due by the Director-General of Police, Madras, and hence there was a delay in the service of the charge sheet on the applicant.

9. The respondents reply on Rule 16(2) of the AIR (DCRB) Rules and Government of India decision No. 5 under the said Rule. They also rely on the ‘Explanation’ under the rule 6(1) of the said Rules, referred to above. In other words, the contention is that, since the applicant was suspended on 31.5.1983, the departmental proceedings should be deemed to have been initiated on that date, and that a charge sheet could be issued against the applicant after his retirement without any limitation whatsoever with reference to the date of the events (Sub-paras (vi) & (vii) of Para 4 of the reply-pages 66 & 67 of the paper book).

10. In a significant averment in paras 7 and thereof, it is affirmed that the charges served on the applicant on 13.7.1983 and the enquiry completed thereon during April, 1985, have nothing to do with the present charges (charge sheet dated 25.5.1987) which relate to other irregularties committed by the applicant on the eve of his voluntary retirement.

11. There is also a vague averment in Para 10 of the reply that the suspension order issued by Government on 31.5.1983 is still in force. We do not understand the import of such an averment, as it does not seem to be the case of the respondents that the applicant had in fact not retired and is still in service. There seems to be something wrong with the submission of the 2nd respondent referred to above.

12. The case has been heard when the learned counsel for the applicant and the learned counsel for the respondents No. 2 and 3 submitted their arguments at length. We have very carefully considered the records of the case and the submission made during the hearing.

13. We find that, notwithstanding some vague averments made in the reply as briefly indicated above, the accepted position on all sides in that the applicant has retired from service from the afternoon of 31.5.1983, notwithstanding his suspension by an order of the same date. This is clear from the letter dated 12.12.1983 of the Deputy Secretary to the State Government addressed to the Accountant General, Madras (pages 20 to 21 of the paper book), that the applicant had not only retired, but also had been sanctioned a provisional pension. If the applicant had not retired, there was no question of sanctioning any pension at all. When this was pointed out to the learned counsel for the respondents 2 and 3 (hereinafter referred to as respondents), he did not want to persist with the argument that the applicant has not yet retired from service.

14. The next issue to be examined is with reference to the issue of the charge sheet dated 25.5.1987, after the retirement of the applicant. In this connection, it would be necessary to reproduce the relevant rules relied on by both the sides. Rule 6 of the AIS (DCRB) Rules is as follows:—

“6. Recovery from pension,-(1) The Central Government reserves to itself the right of withholding or withdrawing a pension or any part of it, whether permanently or for a specified period, and the right of ordering the recovery from pension of the whole or part of any pecuniary loss caused to the Central or a State Government, if the pensioner is found in a departmental or judicial proceedings to have been guilty of grave misconduct or to have caused pecuniary loss to the Central or a State Government by misconduct or negligence, during his service, including service rendered on re-employment after retirement:

Provided that no such order shall be passed without consulting the Union Public Service Commission:

Provided further that—

(a) such departmental proceeding, if instituted while the pensioner was in service, whether before his retirement or during the re-employment, shall after the final retirement of the pensioner, be deemed to be a proceeding under this sub-rule and shall be continued and concluded by the authority by which it was commenced in the same manner as if the pensioner had continued in service;

(b) such departmental proceeding, if not instituted, while the pensioner was in service, whether before his retirement or during his re-employment;

(i) shall not be instituted save with the sanction of the Central Government;

(ii) shall be in respect of an event which took place not more than four years before the institution of such proceedings; and

(iii) shall be conducted by such authority and in such place or places as the Central Government may direct and in accordance with the procedure applicable to proceeding on which an order of dismissal from service may be made;

(c) suchjudicial proceeding, if not instituted while the pensioner was in service, whether before his retirement or during his re-employment, shall not be in-stituted in respect of a cause of action which arose or an event which took, place more than four years before such institution.

Explanation-For the purpose of this rule:

(a) a departmental proceeding shall be deemed to be instituted when the charges framed against the pensioner are issued to him or, if he has been placed under suspension from an earlier date, on such date and

(b) a judicial proceeding shall be deemed to be instituted—

(i) in the case of criminal proceedings, on the date on which a complaint is made or a charge-sheet is submitted to the criminal court; and

(ii) in the case of civil proceedings, on the date on which the plaint is presented or, as the case may be, and application is made, to a civil court.”

15. The learned counsel for the applicant naturally relied on the provision of clause (b)(ii) of the second proviso to the above rule. According to the learned counsel, in this case, the departmental proceeding with reference to the impugned charge dated 25.5.1987 has been initiated after his retirement and not before his retirement. In so contending, he relies on Explanation (a) reproduced above. The contention of the learned counsel for the applicant is that the present departmental proceeding should be deemed to be instituted when the impugned charge sheet dated 25.5.1987 was served on him on 27.7.1987

16. Having thus brought the said proceeding within the Clause (b) as above, the learned counsel for the applicant proceeded to state that the sub-Clause, (ii) thereunder shall apply as the bar of limitation in this case. According to this provision, any departmental proceeding against the Government servant to be instituted after his retirement, shall have to be in respect of an event which took place not more than four years before the institution of such proceeding. Taking the date of institution of the proceeding as 27.7.1987, i.e the date on which the applicant received the charge sheet, the learned counsel for the applicant has argued that the events specified in charges Nos. 1 and 2 referred to above, all took place or happened more than 4 years before the date of the institution on 27.7.1987 is under Charge No. 1, January 1983 to 31.5.1983, and under Charge No. 2, 24.5.1983, 25.3.1983 and 28.5.1983 These are the dates on which the applicant is stated to have passed certain orders, constituting the alleged misconduct.

17. According to the respondents, vide their reply, the I.O, as briefly indicated above, the argument of the applicant as above is not correct. Their contention is mainly based on the fact that the applicant was placed under suspension 31.5.1983 which also happens to be the date of his voluntary retirement. Curisously, the respondents also rely on the same rule and the same Explanation referred to above. According to them, the departmental proceeding in the case of the applicant started from the date on which he was placed under suspension i.e 31.5.1983 If the disciplinary proceeding had already been initiated or instituted or deemed to be instituted with effect from 31.5.1983, then the present case would fall under Clause (a) of the second proviso to Sub-Rule (1) of Rule 6 reproduced above. This provision deals with a departmental proceeding instituted while the pensioner was in service. In that case, it is to be continued and concluded by the appropriate authority in the same manner as if the pensioner had continued in service. If this contention were accepted, the question of any limitation with reference to the event on which the charge is based, would not arise. That is what the reply contends, in substance.

18. The respondents also rely on the Government of India decision No. 5 under Rule 16 of the AIS (DCRB) Rules. The said decision is as follows:—

“(5) Under sub-rule (2) of Rule 16 ibid, retirement of a membet of the Service becomes effective on the expiry of three months' notice given by him unless he is under suspension. Once the notice period begins to run, it may not be open to the Government a unilateral act of suspension to prevent the running of the three month's period. In other words, a member of the Service, who has given notice for voluntary retirement under the aforesaid rule will retire from service on the expiry of the period of the prescribed three months even if he is placed under suspension after he gave notice. However, as provided in the explanation below rule 6(1) ibid a departmental proceedings in terms of the aforesaid rule shall also be deemed to have been instituted against the pensioner the date he was placed under suspension. In view of this, if a member of the Service is placed under suspension after he gives notice for retiring from service voluntarily, the benefit of the limitation contained in clause (b)(ii) of the proviso to rule 6(1) ibid will not be available to him, and departmental proceeding under this rule for reduction of his pensionary benefits can be initiated against him, even after the date of retirement, for a misconduct committed by him while in service, although such proceeding may be in respect of an event which took place more than four years before the institution of such proceedings. (DP & AR letter No. 25011/47/78-AIS (II) dated 16th October, 1978).”

19. The latter portion of the above decision no doubt appears to favour the stand taken by the respondents as above. On a deeper scrutiny of the above provisions and decision we find that the argument of the respondents relating to suspension in this case is rather fallacious, in as much as it tries to relate the suspension of the applicant with the impugned charge sheet dated 25.5.1987, as if the latter followed the former in the same proceeding. We have pointedly observed that, in the reply, the respondents have clearly asserted that the impugned charge sheet dated 25.5.1987 had nothing to do with the complaint, enquiry and proceeding in and during which the applicant was suspended on 31.5.1983 It is also admitted by the respondents unambiguously that a charge sheet had been served on the applicant on 13.7.1983 in connection with and in continuation of the said suspension, and that, in fact, the disciplinary proceeding has actually been completed save for the issue of final order in that case after the sanction of the Government of India.

20. It is obvious from a reading of rule 6(1) of the AIS (DCRB) Rules that it deals with a departmental proceeding against a Government servant instituted either before his retirement or after his retirement. The Explanation under the rule definnes when such a departmental proceeding should be deemed to be instituted, since the event of institution of the proceeding separates two classes of cases in Clauses (a) and (b) of the second proviso to the said sub-rule. It is obvious from the wording of the Explanation, that the reference to suspensiont herein can only be appropriately and correctly related to the suspennsion in that particular proceeding and not in a different or separate proceeding. All that the Explanation does is to regard the date of suspension as the date of institution of the proceeding, instead of the date of issue of the charge sheet, in a case where there is a suspension of a Government servant in that case. We are quite clear in our mind that the provisions of the rule and the decision referred to above do not either permit or sanction the clubbing of a suspension in a different proceeding with the issue of a charge sheet inn an entirely different and separate proceeding.

21. When we look at the object of providig such a limitation, the above interpretation would become clear. The object of the limitation provided is to provide a sense of repose or peace to a retired pensioer after his retirement, in the sense that, after the expiry of the four year period, he can be rest assured that he would not be dragged into any protracted departmental proceeding and made to suffer any loss or reduction in his pension, when a suspension is ordered before his retirement, and a charge sheet and inquiry follow in that proceeding, the Government servant would naturally and very legitimately consider that the proceeding starting with the suspension and going through the process of charge-sheeting and ending in the enquiry, is over, and that whatever order was felt necessary would be passed that case. After his retirement (sic), whatever may be his apprehension about the enquiry already held, he would be resting assured that there would be no other proceedinng instituted against him on the basis of the same order of suspension. He can legitimately expect that after his retirement, a fresh proceeding could be initiated against him only by the issue of a charge sheet within the four year period specified in the provision in the rule. An earlier suspension in an altogether different case cannot justly be a permanent manacle or fetter to tie him down even after his retirement.

22. In view of the reasoning above, we are unable to agree with the respondents, the P.O and the I.O, that the fact of suspension of the applicant in the earlier case debarred him from the benefit of the provision of limitation under rule 6(1)(b)(ii) reproduced above. The learned counsel for the respondents, realising this position during the hearing, fairly stated that he was not pressing this point.

23. What the learned counsel for the respondents then did was to argue that the impugned proceeding was indeed instituted under the rule, within the limitation period of four yeafs. This is an argument which is not to be found anywehre in the pleadings, but was submitted during the hearing. The reasoning of the learned counsel was that, in both the charges, there was only one event happening in various stages, starting from January, 1983 and ending on 31.5.1983, and all these stages should be takenn to constitute only one event. This should be deemed to have taken place on the last date i.e 31.5.1983 The learned counsel contended that if this were done, the proceeding could be regarded as having been instituted within the four years period, as the charge sheet was dated 25.5.1987

24. The learned counsel for the applicant contended that this was toot correct, and that these were separate events happening on different dates as given in the statement of charges, and, in ay case, he reiterated his contention already recorded above, that even then, since he received the charge sheet only on 27.7.1987, the proceeding was actually instituted only on that date, which was certainly beyond a period of four years from the end of May, 1983.

25. We have given due thought to the rival contentions as above. The substance of the charges is given in para 3 above, We have also perused the imputations on which die above charges are based. As indicated earlier in this order, both the charges refer to the passing of certain orders by the applicant on specified dates. The propriety of each such order is being questioned by the respondents. We do not see any common thread, so to say, running through the acceptance of tenders, or placing orders for supplies, on different dates, so as to constitute a single event, as contended by the learned counsel for the respondents. There is no allusion to a single event at all in the charges, of which the various dates given in the charges could be considered as contituting stages. We are, therefore, not in a position to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the respondents that there was only one single event which took place or happened on or about 31.3.1983

26. The next question which arises in this regard is, on what date the charges framed against the pensioner in this case were ‘issued to him’ as stipulated in clause (a) of the Explanation under rule 6(1) AIS (DCRB) Rules, reproduced earlier in this order. The learned counsel for the respondents urged vigorously that the impugned charge sheet ought to be taken as having been issued to the applicant on 25.5.1987, itself, since it is dated as 25.5.1987 (Page 22 of the paper book) and it was also signed by the appropriate authority on that date. The learned counsel of the applicant on the contrary submitted, as stated earlier, that the charge sheet was served on him on 27.7.1987

27. No specific rule explaining the meaning of the phrase ‘issued to him’, has been referred to or reproduced before us. The act of issuing any letter or notice to a person would comprise, in the ordinary parlance, the despatch of the communication addressed to that person either through a special messenger or by a process like the registered post. Such despatch must be for immediate service to the person addressed, and not mediately to any intermediate agency or point or person. We do not think that we should go so far as to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the applicant that the impugned charge sheet ought to be regarded as issued to him under the said rule only on the date on which he actually received the communication. There would be a number of reasons for delay in actual receipt, such as absence of the addressee at the normal address, etc.

28. In this regard, we may usefully Cite the provisions of Rule 27 of the All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1969 (Rule 30 of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 (CCS (CCA) Rules, is also identical). This rule provides for service of orders, notice, etc., including charge sheets also. The provision is as follows:—

“27 SERVICE OF ORDERS. NOTICES. ETC.

Every order, notice and other process made or issued under these rules shall be served in person on the member of the Service concerned or communicated to him by registered post.”.

29. It is seen that a charge sheet under this rule is treated as served, when it is handed over the addressee in person or communicated to him by registered post. It appears to us reasonable and apposite that the same meaning should be given to the words'issued to him' in the rule under examination.

30. We may refer in this connection to the following observation made by the Full Bench of this Tribunal in K. Ch. Venkata Reddy v. Union of India, 1987 (2) SLJ 117 (CAT):

“It is well established that the date of initiation of proceedings is the date-when the charge memo is served on the official”.

31. We have already indicated the definition of ??? ‘service’ as given in the CCS (CCA) Rules.

32. We may also refer in this connection to certain decisions of the Supreme Court relating to communication of order or notices in disciplinary matters. In the case of State Of Punjab v. Khemi Ram† , (1969) 3 SCC 28 : AIR 1970-SC-214, the Supreme Court held as follows:—

“In our view, once an order is issued and it is sent out to the concerned Government servant, it must be held to have been communicated to him no matter when he actually received it. We find it difficult to persuade ourselves to accept the view that it is only from the date of the actual receipt by him that the order becomes effective.”

33. In B.J Shelat v. State of Gujarat ((1978) 2 SCC 202 : AIR-1978-SC-1109), the Apex Court held:

“An order of suspension when once issued and sent out to the concerned Government servant must be held to have been communicated no matter when he actually received it.

………………

34. Though the above observations were made in connection with the service of suspension orders, we think that the same principle should apply in the present case also.

35. The original letter dated 25.5.1987, containing the charges, was produced by the learned counsel for the applicant, and was perused by us. It is seen from this letter that it is from the Special Commissioner and Secretary to Government, and addressed to the applicant by name. It is, however, not addressed to the applicant directly, but it is addressed through the Director General of Police, Madras as follows:

Thiru T.V Venkataraman, I.A.S,

Special Commissioner and Secretary to Government.

Thiru D. Krishnan, I.P.S (Retired) through the

Director General of Police, Madras (In duplicate)”

36. It is very clear from the above that the letter dated 25.5.1987, instead of being sent out to the applicant, has been deliberately sent to the Director General of Police (DGP), Madras, in duplicate, with an endorsement that the DGP should “arrange to serve the letter to Thiru D. Krishnan, I.P.S (Retired), under, acknowledgement”. Upto this stage, the communication is not directed to the applicant immediately. There is an endorsement below this letter in the office of the DGP, which is as follows:—

“Endt. Re. No. 113634.GBI(5)/87. dt: 1.7.1987 Forwarded to Thiru D. Krishnan, IPS (Retired)

1.7.87

For Director General of Police

Madras.”

37. From the above it is crystal clear that, though the impugned letter bears the date 25.5.1987, it was actually forwarded or despatched or sent out or issued to the applicant after more than a month, only by the endorsement dated 1.7.1987 by the DGP. Elsewhere from the reply it is seen that the DGP sent the charge sheet by registered, post A.D to the applicant, obviously on or after 1.7.1987 The applicant states that he received it on 27.7.1987 In our opinion, therefore, for the purpose of the rule in question, the charge sheet should be regarded as having been issued to the applicant only on the date on which the DGP sent the letter by registered post acknowledgement due. This date is not on record; it could only be after 1.7.1987 It automatically follows that the impugned charge sheet was issued to the applicant after the expiry of four years from the date of the last even alleged in the charge sheet, namely, 31.5.1983 Consequently, the charge sheet has been issued to the applicant and the departmental proceeding in question is tituted against him, after the expiry of four years from the date of the event mentioned in the charges. Therefore, being hit by the bar of limitation, the impugned charge sheet and the departmental proceeding and all the orders issued thereunder, including the appointment I.O, etc. are all legally invalid and of no effect. From a conspectus of the facts and circumstances of the case, discussed above, we find that this application has to be allowed. The impugned charge sheet and orders dated 25.5.1987 (Pages 22-36) 24.11.1988 (Page 48), 15.12.1988 (Pages 49-51) and 10.8.1989(Page 54) are all quashed together with the disciplinary proceeding in question. There will be no order as to costs.

38. Application allowed.