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  • SECTION 24 A CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT
  • Section 2(r) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986
  • Section 11 (1), 17 (1) (a) (i) and 21 (a) (i) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (in short, "the Act")
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Citation Codes
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citation codes
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  • SECTION 24 A CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT
  • Section 2(r) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986
  • Section 11 (1), 17 (1) (a) (i) and 21 (a) (i) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (in short, "the Act")
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

These connected consumer complaints (Consumer Cases Nos. 1130 to 1140 of 2016) were filed against Unitech Ltd. by several allottees (and in one instance subsequent purchasers) who had applied for and were allotted apartments in the Unitech Habitat residential project at Plot No.9, Sector Pi-II, Alistonia Estate, Greater Noida. The allotments and builder-buyer agreements arose between 2006 and 2008. Under the terms of allotment, the developer was required to deliver possession within 26-36 months of signing the buyer-seller agreements. The complainants paid instalments as per agreements but allege the developer failed to complete construction and deliver possession within the agreed period (possession dates were generally in 2009-2010). As a result, complainants approached the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission seeking relief.

The Commission heard affidavit evidence, and counsel for both sides. The Commission treated the complaints together because they involved similar questions of law and fact. The record shows detailed particulars of units, consideration amounts, agreement dates and claimed possession dates for the several complainants. The Commission received written statements from the opposite party and rejoinders from complainants.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the National Commission has pecuniary jurisdiction to entertain these complaints under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (i.e., whether the value of relief sought exceeds Rs.1.00 crore).
  2. Whether the opposite party's plea of Force Majeure (including recession, farmer agitation, shortages and delay in environmental clearances) excuses or justifies the delay in delivering possession.
  3. Whether the complaints are barred by limitation (i.e., whether the claims filed more than seven years after the contractual possession dates are time-barred), or whether a continuing cause of action exists.
  4. What relief/amount of compensation is payable to the complainants (including whether contractual clauses limiting compensation are applicable or whether refund with interest should be ordered).

Arguments of the Parties

Complainants' Arguments

  • The complainants alleged they were allotted specific apartments and made payments in instalments pursuant to the allotments, but the opposite party failed to construct and deliver possession within the contractual period (26-36 months).
  • They claimed deficiency in service due to the opposite party's failure to deliver possession and sought refund of amounts paid along with interest (learned counsel contended for interest @ 18% from dates of payment).
  • Complainants denied the facts and defenses raised in the written statements (as per rejoinders).

Opposite Party's Arguments (Unitech Ltd.)

  • The opposite party attributed the delay to external factors: a recession in the economy affecting availability of labour and raw materials, massive agitation and strikes by farmers whose lands were acquired by NOIDA, acute shortage of labour, underground water and raw material, and delayed approvals from the Greater Noida Authority (including environmental clearance procedures following a Government of India notification dated 14-09-2006).
  • It relied upon clause 4(e) of the allotment/builder-buyer agreement, which (it contended) entitled the developer, where unable to offer the allotted apartment, to either offer an alternative property or refund the amount paid with simple interest at the rate of 10% per annum "without damages or other compensation."
  • The opposite party raised a limitation defence, contending complaints filed more than seven years after the agreed possession dates were time-barred under Section 24-A of the Consumer Protection Act.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Ghaziabad Development Authority Vs. Balbir Singh (2004) (cited as State Commission 65) The decision recognizes that interest awarded to an allottee can be in the nature of compensation and that compensation must be correlated with the loss or injury suffered (no uniform rate for all cases; compensation depends on facts). The Commission relied on this authority to conclude that the interest claimed by apartment buyers is in the nature of compensation and therefore can be added to the value of relief for assessing pecuniary jurisdiction. This supported the view that the value of relief sought exceeded Rs.1.00 crore.
Meerut Development Authority Vs. M K Gupta IV (2012) CPJ 12 (Hon'ble Supreme Court) Holds that in cases of non-delivery of possession, the buyer has a recurrent cause of action for filing a complaint (i.e., continuing cause of action doctrine). The Commission relied on this authority to reject the opposite party's limitation plea, treating the complaints as arising from a continuing cause of action and thus within the period for filing.
Satish Kumar Pandey (referred to as "Supra" in reproduced reasoning) Contains reasoning that economic slowdown, general recession, or market shortages do not by themselves constitute Force Majeure unless labour lock-out/strike or specific evidence is shown; courts require evidence of inability to procure labour/materials despite attempts. The Commission reproduced and adopted reasoning from this authority to reject generalized Force Majeure pleas by the developer (finding no material/evidence that the developer could not procure labour or materials, or that the alleged events legally excused performance).
Consumer Complaint No. 347 of 2014 (Swarn Talwar & Ors. Vs. Unitech Ltd.) and connected complaints — Coordinate Bench order dated 14.08.2015 The Coordinate Bench declined to accept the Force Majeure pleas raised by the opposite party in similar fact situations, and provided detailed reasons rejecting recession, agitation and shortage contentions as adequate to excuse delay. The present Commission followed and relied on the Coordinate Bench's reasoning in holding that the Force Majeure plea lacks merit and in finding the opposite party guilty of deficiency in service for failure to deliver possession despite expiry of agreed dates.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Commission set out a stepwise analysis addressing jurisdiction, merits (force majeure/deficiency), limitation and relief:

  1. Pecuniary jurisdiction: The Commission examined Sections 11(1), 17(1)(a)(i) and 21(a)(i) of the Consumer Protection Act (National Commission's pecuniary threshold Rs.1.00 crore). It considered the opposite party's contention that interest should not be added to the value of services for jurisdictional purposes. Relying on the Ghaziabad authority, the Commission held that interest claimed by apartment buyers constitutes compensation (as it recompenses the loss of use of funds) and thus can be included when determining the value of relief. Aggregating amounts paid plus claimed interest in each case showed the relief sought exceeded Rs.1.00 crore, so the National Commission has pecuniary jurisdiction.
  2. Force Majeure and merits: The Commission addressed and rejected the developer's Force Majeure defence. It relied on prior Coordinate Bench reasoning (including the Swarn Talwar matter and the Satish Kumar Pandey analysis reproduced in the record) which found that general economic slowdown, agitation by farmers (not directly relating to the project), alleged shortages of labour/materials and delays in environmental clearances were not established with sufficient evidence to constitute Force Majeure. The Commission noted the opposite party produced no material showing inability to procure labour, materials or necessary approvals despite attempts, and therefore did not accept the plea. Given the lapse of about seven years beyond agreed possession dates, the Commission concluded there was deficiency in service.
  3. Limitation: The Commission considered the opposite party's limitation plea under Section 24-A of the Act. It rejected the plea, holding that where the developer has neither offered possession nor unequivocally refused to deliver possession, the cause of action is continuing (recurrent) and thus the complaints are within limitation. The Commission relied on the Supreme Court's holding in Meerut Development Authority Vs. M K Gupta IV to support the continuing cause of action approach.
  4. Contractual clauses and relief assessment: The Commission examined contractual provisions relied upon by the developer, specifically clause 4(c)(ii) (which provides for compensation at Rs.5/- per sq. ft. per month for delay, save for Force Majeure) and clause 4(e) (the "Default" clause providing that if the developer cannot offer the apartment, it shall offer an alternative property or refund the amount in full with simple interest @ 10% per annum "without any further liability to pay damages or any other compensation"). Given the factual finding that construction remained incomplete more than seven years after the stipulated possession dates, the Commission concluded the developer was unable to offer possession and that clause 4(e) was therefore applicable. Applying the agreement's clause 4(e), the Commission held the developer liable to refund the amounts received with simple interest at 10% per annum from the dates of payment until realisation.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

The Commission issued the following dispositive orders:

  • All the above consumer complaints were allowed.
  • The opposite party (Unitech Ltd.) was directed to refund to each complainant the respective amounts paid by them, within six weeks from the date of the order, together with simple interest at the rate of 10% per annum from the date of each payment until realization of the amount.
  • The opposite party was directed to pay Rs.10,000/- to each complainant as litigation costs.

Implications:

The immediate effect is that Unitech Ltd. is required to refund the payments made by these complainants with simple interest @ 10% p.a. and to pay specified litigation costs to each complainant. The Commission found deficiency in service and rejected the developer's Force Majeure and limitation defenses on the facts before it. The opinion does not articulate any broader legal principle beyond applying existing authorities and Coordinate Bench reasoning to the facts; accordingly, the decision effects relief between these parties rather than announcing a new legal doctrine.

    Niru Kaushal v. Unitech Ltd.

    NATIONAL CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION

    NEW DELHI

    CONSUMER CASE NO. 1130 OF 2016

    1. NIRU KAUSHAL & ANR. w/o Sh. Arun Kaushal R/o 4, Birbal Marg, Jangpura Extension Delhi - 110014 ...........Complainant(s)

    Versus

    1. UNITECH LTD.

    6, Community Center Saket New Delhi 110017 ...........Opp.Party(s)

    CONSUMER CASE NO. 1131 OF 2016

    1. VISHAL RANJAN & ANR. Sh. Manoranjan Prasad Sinha, R/o H. No. D-235, Swarn Jayanti, Rail Nagar, Sector - 50

    Noida, U.P. ...........Complainant(s) Versus

    1. UNITECH LTD.

    6, Community Center Saket New Delhi - 110017 ...........Opp.Party(s)

    CONSUMER CASE NO. 1132 OF 2016

    1. SUSHANT KISHORE DAS & ANR. S/O. LATE. SH. GOUR KISHORE DAS, R/O. FLAT NO.- 401, TOWER-8, PARSAVNATH SHRISHTI, SECTOR-93,

    NOIDA, U.P.

    SECTOR-93, NOIDA, U.P.

    2. SMT. GEETANJALI DAS

    W/O. SH. SUSHANT KISHORE DAS. FLAT NO.-401, TOWER-8, PARSAVNATH SHRISTI, SECTOR-93, NOIDA,

    U.P.

    SECTOR-93, NOIDA, U.P. ...........Complainant(s) Versus

    1. UNITECH LTD.

    THROUGH ITS MANAGING DIRECTOR REGD. OFFICE:6,

    COMMUNITY CENTRE , SAKET, NEW DELHI-110017. SAKET, NEW DELHI-110017. ...........Opp.Party(s)

    CONSUMER CASE NO. 1133 OF 2016

    1. SUSHMA JAIN

    THROUGH POWER OF ATTORNEY HOLDER: SH. J.L.

    JAIN, S/O. LATE. SH. N.R. JAIN. W/O. SH. ASHISH JAIN. R/O a-1/604, GLAXO APARTMENT MAYUR VIHAR-1 EXTENSION, DELHI-110092

    MAYUR VIHAR-1 EXTENSION, DELHI-110092 ...........Complainant(s)

    1

    Versus

    1. UNITECH LTD.

    (THROUGH ITS MANAGING DIRECTOR) REGD. OFFICE.

    6, COMMUNITY CENTRE SAKET, NEW DELHI-110017 SAKET, NEW DELHI-110017 ...........Opp.Party(s)

    CONSUMER CASE NO. 1134 OF 2016

    1. AVINASH CHANDER KHANDPUR & ANR. S/O, SH. J.N. KHANDPUR, R/O, E-83, DDA FLATS, SAKET, DELHI-110017

    2. PARAKRAM KHANDPUR

    S/O, AVINASH CHANDER KHANDPUR, R/O, E-83, DDA

    FLATS,

    SAKET, DELHI-110017. ...........Complainant(s) Versus

    1. UNITECH LTD.

    (THROUGH ITS MD) 6, COMMUNITY CENTRE,

    SAKET, NEW DELHI-110017 ...........Opp.Party(s)

    CONSUMER CASE NO. 1135 OF 2016

    1. DEV SINGH SAHAI

    S/o. Col. B.J. Singh, Presently R/o. 20, Goodge Place, First Floor Flat,

    London,

    UK, W1T 4SH

    2. Dev Singh Sahai Through Power of Attorney Holder: Smt. Gunwant Kaur Shai, W/o. Col. B.J. Singh, R/o. B-37, Sector-51, Noida

    U.P. ...........Complainant(s)

    Versus

    1. UNITECH LTD.

    (Through Its Managing Director) Regd. Office: 6, Community Center, Saket,

    New Delhi - 110 017. ...........Opp.Party(s)

    CONSUMER CASE NO. 1136 OF 2016

    1. ASHIM SARAF

    S/O, SHRI RAM KISHAN SARAF, MANAGING DIRECTOR, HI LIFE EXPORTS PVT. LTD. R/O., 191-A,

    EKTA MARG, WESTERN AVENUE, SAINIK FARMS,

    NEW DELHI-110062 ...........Complainant(s) Versus

    1. UNITECH LTD.

    (THROUGHI ITS MD) 6, COMMUNITY CENTRE,

    SAKET, NEW DELHI-110017. ...........Opp.Party(s)

    CONSUMER CASE NO. 1137 OF 2016

    2

    1. RAVI NIRULA

    DR. R.C. NIRULA, R/O, 52, GOLF LINKS, NEW DELHI-110003. ...........Complainant(s) Versus

    1. UNITECH LTD.

    (THROGH ITS MD) 6, COMMUNITY CENTRE,

    SAKET, NEW DELHI-110017 ...........Opp.Party(s)

    CONSUMER CASE NO. 1138 OF 2016

    1. DR. RAM CHANDRA NIRULA & SONS. Thru. Dr. RC Nirula (Karta) A-2, Anand Niketan New Delhi ...........Complainant(s) Versus

    1. UNITECH LTD.

    (Through Its Managing Director), Regd. Office: 6, Community Center Saket,

    New Delhi - 110 017 ...........Opp.Party(s)

    CONSUMER CASE NO. 1139 OF 2016

    1. AMAAN GHANI KHAN & ANR. S/O. IDREES MOHAMMAD GHANI KHAN, C/O RECKITT BENCHKLISER INDIA LTD. PLOT NO.-48, SECTOR-32, INSTITUTIONAL AREA, GURGAON, HARYANA-122001. GURGAON, HARYANA-122001.

    2. YASMEEN KHAN

    W/O. AMAAJN ABDUL GHANI KHAN PLOT NO.48, SECTOR-32 INSTITUTIONAL AREA, GURGAON,

    HARYANA 122001

    GURGAON, HARYANA 122001 ...........Complainant(s) Versus

    1. UNITECH LTD.

    THROUGH ITS MANAGING DIRECTOR REGD. OFFICE:

    6, COMMUNITY CENTER, SAKET, NEW DELHI-110017. SAKET, NEW DELHI-110017. ...........Opp.Party(s)

    CONSUMER CASE NO. 1140 OF 2016

    1. DR. PAYAL NAYAR

    D/O. SH. A.S. NAYAR, R/O 145, SHIVALIK APARTMENTS

    ALAKNANDA

    DELHI 110019 ...........Complainant(s) Versus

    1. UNITECH LTD.

    6, COMMUNITY CENTER SAKET

    NEW DELHI 110017 ...........Opp.Party(s)

    BEFORE:

    3

    HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE AJIT BHARIHOKE,PRESIDING MEMBER HON'BLE MR. ANUP K THAKUR,MEMBER

    For the Complainant : MR. SAURABH JAIN For the Opp.Party : MR. R.K. PANDEY Dated : 31 Jul 2017

    ORDER

    By this order, we propose to decide the above noted consumer complaints involving similar question of law and facts.

    2. Briefly stated, the facts relevant for the disposal of the above noted complaints are that opposite party developer undertook the development of a residential complex Unitech Habitat at Plot No.9, Sector Pi-II, Alistonia Estate, Greater Noida, Uttar Pradesh.

    3. The above noted complainants applied for allotment to the apartments in the above noted project in the year 2006 to 2008. It is the case of the complainants that they were allotted specific apartments in the above noted project and pursuant to the allotment, they made payments in instalments to the opposite party against the respectively agreed consideration amount. As per the terms and conditions of allotment, opposite party was required to deliver possession of the respective apartments to the respective complainants within 26-36 months of the signing of builder-buyer agreement. It is the case of the complainants that respective date of possession have long expired but the opposite party has failed to construct apartment and deliver possession of the respective apartments to the complainants. Claiming failure of the opposite party to deliver possession of the apartments within the requisite period, complainants approached this Commission by filing consumer complaints.

    4. The details of apartments booked, agreed consideration amount, dates of respective builder buyer agreements between the parties, tentative dates of delivery of possession as per the agreement and the amount paid against the consideration amount by the respective complainants are provided in the chart below:

    UNIT TOTAL BBA POSSESSION TOTAL

    CC No. COMPLAINANTS

    DETAILSCONSIDERATIONDATE DATE PAID

    Block

    HBTN, ₹

    Niru Kaushal & Tower-1, ₹ 75,07,516/-

    03.01.2010

    1130/2015 03.01.2007 68,08,015/- Arun Kaushal Flat

    No.202,

    2ndFloor

    Block

    Vishal Ranjan & ₹ 76,43,284/-- ₹ 1131/2016 HBTN, 10.09.2007 10.09.2010 Rachna Kumari Tower 02, (switch over) 70,34,119/-

    4

    Flat No 0304, 3rd Floor
    1132/2016 Sushan Kishore Das and Geetanjali Das Block HBTN, Tower 04, Flat No. 0303, 3rd Floor ₹ 71,43,744/-   02.02.2008 2.04.2010

    1333/2016 Sushma Jain Block HBTN, Tower 06, Flat No.203, 2nd Floor ₹ 73,26,102/-   19.08.2006 9.08.2009
    1134/2016 Avinash Chander Khandpur & Parakram Khandpur Block HBTN, Tower- 02, Flat No.203, 2nd Floor ₹ 57,42,025/-   20.06.2006 0.06.2009

    Block

    1137/2016 Ravi Nirula HBTN, ₹71,16,302

    14.03.2007 14.03.2010

    ₹64,31,479/ Tower 17,

    5

    Flat No. 1102, 11th Floor
    1138/2016 Dr. Ram Chandra Nirula and Sons Block HBTN, Tower 17, Flat No.1002, 10th Floor ₹71,16,302/- 14.03.2007 4.03.2010

    5. The complaints have been resisted by the opposite party mainly on following grounds :

    (i) The delay is attributable to a recession in the economy, affecting the availability of the resources such as labour and raw materials;

    (ii) There was major disruption in the construction activity of the opposite party due to massive agitation and strikes by farmers whose lands were acquired by NOIDA, which resulted in slackening and availability of supply of raw material;

    (iii)) There was acute shortage of labour, underground water and raw material besides delayed approval from Greater Noida Authority;

    (iv) In terms of clause 4(e) of the allotment letter the opposite party is entitled either to offer an alternative property or refund the amount paid by the complainant with simple interest at the rate of 10% per annum without damages or other compensation.

    (v) It is also alleged that notification dated 14-09-2006 issued by Government of India imposed restrictions and prohibitions on new projects or activities or on the extension or modernization of the

    6

    existing projects without prior environmental clearances and the procedure for obtaining such clearances led to delay in construction schedule. It is also claimed that the Dharna by farmers who were agitated on account of acquisition of their land, in front of the projects of various builders also halted the construction work and there was default in payment of instalments by several flat buyers, dues against whom amounted to nearly Rs.57,00,00,000/-.

    6. In the rejoinder, respective complainants have denied averments in the written statement.

    7. Parties have filed affidavit evidence in support of their respective submissions. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.

    8. It is pertinent to mention that so far as complainants Amaan Abdul Ghani Khan and Yasmeen Khan of complaint no. 1139 of 2016 are concerned, they are subsequent purchasers who purchased the rights of original allottee on 29.08.2008 which transaction was recognized by the opposite party. As regards complainants Vishal Ranjan and Rachna Kumar in complaint no. 1131 of 2016 and complainants Avinash Chander Khandpur and Parakram Khandpur in complaint no. 1134/2016, they were originally allotted different apartments but later on pursuant to the agreement with the opposite party, the allotment was switched to apartment no.304, 3rdFloor in Tower HBTN-3 and apartment no.103, Ist Floor in Tower 19 respectively.

    9. The first question which needs determination is as to whether this Commission has pecuniary jurisdiction to entertain the above noted complaints?

    10. Section 11 (1), 17 (1) (a) (i) and 21 (a) (i) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (in short, "the Act") provides for the pecuniary jurisdiction of the respective Foras and hierarchy to deal with the original consumer complaints. Section 21 (a) (i) of the Act provides that National Commission shall have jurisdiction to entertain the complaints where the value of goods or services and compensation, if any, exceeds Rs.1.00 crore.

    11. Contention of learned counsel for the opposite party is that for the purpose of pecuniary jurisdiction, only the value of services plus compensation is to be taken into account and the interest claimed not being the compensation cannot be added to the consideration amount for the respective apartments to inflate the pecuniary value of the relief.

    12. We do not find merit in the above contention. In our considered view, the interest claimed by the apartment buyers is in the nature of compensation because had the complainants kept the amount paid to the opposite party in their bank, they obviously would have earned interest. Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Ghaziabad Development Authority Vs. Balbir Singh (2004) 5 State Commission 65 has interalia observed and held as under:

    "However, the power to and duty to award compensation does not mean that irrespective of facts of the case compensation can be awarded in all matters at a uniform rate of 18% per annum. As seen above what is being awarded is compensation i.e. a recompense for the loss or injury. It therefore necessarily has to be based on a finding of loss or injury and has to correlate with the amount of loss or injury. Thus the Forum or the Commission must determine that there has been deficiency in service and/or misfeasance in public office which has resulted in loss or injury. No hard and fast rule can be laid down, however a few examples would be where an allotment is made, price is received/paid but possession is not

    7

    given within the period set out in the brochure... …Along with recompensing the loss the Commission/Forum may also compensate for harassment/injury both mental and physical. Similarly, compensation can be given if after allotment is made there has been cancellation of scheme without any justifiable cause. That compensation cannot be uniform and can best of illustrated by considering cases where possession is being directed to be delivered and cases where only monies are directed to be returned. In cases where possession is being directed to be delivered the compensation for harassment will necessarily have to be less because in a way that party is being compensated by increase in the value of the property he is getting. But in cases where monies are being simply returned then the party is suffering a loss inasmuch as he had deposited the money in the hope of getting a flat/plot. He is being deprived of that flat/plot. He has been deprived of the benefit of escalation of the price of that flat/plot. Therefore the compensation in such cases would necessarily have to be higher."

    13. From the above, it would be seen that Hon'ble Supreme Court has also recognized that the interest on the consideration amount or the part thereof paid by the apartment buyer is in the nature of compensation. If we add the amount paid by the respective complainants against the consideration of the booked apartment and the interest claimed thereon in each and every case, the value of the relief sought is more than a crore. Therefore, we hold that the complaints are within the pecuniary jurisdiction of this Commission.

    14. Coming to the plea of Force Majeure taken by the opposite party. It may be noted that issue raised by the opposite party is no more resintegra. Similar pleas to explain the delay in construction were taken by the opposite party in Consumer Complaint No.347 of 2914 Swarn Talwar and 2 Ors. Vs. Unitech Ltd. and other connected consumer complaints which pertain to the alleged deficiency i.e. failure of the opposite party to deliver possession of the booked apartments in the same project. In the aforesaid matters, Coordinate Bench of this Commission vide order dated 14.08.2015 declined to accept the plea of Force Majeure taken by the opposite party. The relevant reasoning of the Coordinate Bench rejecting the plea of Force Majeure is reproduced as under :

    "Coming to the pleas that there was recession in the economy and a disruption due to agitation by farmers and acute shortage of labour, etc., the following view taken by us In Satish Kumar Pandey (Supra) is relevant.

    "Neither any new legislation was enacted nor an existing rule, regulation or order was amended stopping suspending or delaying the construction of the complex in which apartments were agreed to be sold to the complainants. There is no allegation of any lock- out or strike by the labour at the site of the project. There is no allegation of any slow- down having been resorted to by the labourers of the opposite party or the contractors engaged by it at the site of the project. There was no civil commotion, war, enemy action, terrorist action, earthquake or any act of God which could have delayed the completion of the project within the time stipulated in the Buyers Agreement. It was contended by the counsel for the OP that the expression 'slow down' would include economic slow-down or recession in the Real Estate sector. I, however, find no merit in this contention. The word 'slow down' having been used alongwith the words lock-out and strike, I has to be read ejusdem generis with the words lock-out and strike and therefore, can mean only a slow

    8

    down if resorted by the labourers engaged in construction of the project. As regards, alleged shortage of labour, I find that no material has been placed on record by the OP that despite trying, it could not be get labourers to complete the construction of the project within the time stipulated in the Buyers Agreement. It was submitted by the learned counsel for the complainants that ordinarily big builders such as the OP in these cases, are contracting/sub-contracting the construction work to the contractors engaged by them, instead of employing their own labourers on a regular basis, the purpose being to ensure that they are not saddled with the wage bill of those regular labourers, in case the opposite party does not have adequate work for them. There is no evidence of the OP having been invited tenders for appointment of contractors / sub- contractors for executing the work at the site of those projects and no contractor/ sub- contractor having come forward to execute the project on the ground that adequate labour was not available in the market. Therefore, it cannot be accepted that the opposite party could not have arranged adequate labour, either directly or through contractors/sub- contractors, for timely completion of the project. As regards the alleged shortage of water, bricks and sand in the market, I find that there is no evidence filed by the OP, to prove that it was unable to procure water, sand and brick in adequate quantity. This is also their case that the notification of the Government, being relied upon by the opposite party, is an old notification, which was in force even at the time the opposite party promised possession in 36 months. There is no evidence of the opposite party having invited tenders for supply of bricks and water and there being no response to such tenders. In fact, if the work is to be executed through contractors/sub-contractors, the material such as bricks, sand and even water will be arranged by the contractor/sub-contractor and not by the opposite party. As noted earlier, there is no evidence of the opposite party having invited tenders after awarding the work of project in question to the contractors/sub-contractors and there being no response to such tenders. Therefore, I find no merit in the plea that the completion of the project was delayed due to non-availability of water, sand and bricks in adequate quantity.

    It is an undisputed proposition of law that ordinarily the parties are bound by the terms and conditions of the contract voluntarily agreed by them and it is not for a Consumer Forum or even a Court to revise the said terms.

    However, a term of a contract, in my view will not be final and binding if it is shown that the consent to the said term was not really voluntary but was given under a sort of compulsion on account of the person giving consent being left with no other choice or if the said term amounts to an unfair trade practice. It was submitted by the learned counsel for the complainants that the term providing for payment of a nominal compensation such as Rs.5/- per square foot of the super area having become the order of the day in the contracts designed by big builders, a person seeking to buy an apartment is left with no option but to sign on the dotted lines since the rejection of such term by him would mean cancellation of the allotment. He further submitted that a person seeking to acquire a built up flat instead of purchasing a plot and then raising construction on it, therefore, is not in a position to protest resist the inclusion of such a term in the Buyer's Agreement, and has to rely upon the reputation of the builder, particularly if he is a big builder such as Unitech Ltd. He also submitted that the format of the Buyer's Agreement is never shown to the purchasers at the time of booking the apartment and if he refuses to sign the Buyer's

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    Agreement on the format provided by the builder, not only will he lose the booking, even the booking amount/earnest money paid by him will be forfeited by the builder. I find merit in the above referred submissions of the learned counsel. A person who, for one reason or the other, either cannot or does not want to buy a plot and raise construction of his own, has to necessarily go in for purchase of the built up flat. It is only natural and logical for him to look for an apartment in a project being developed by a big builder such as the opposite party in these complaints. Since the contracts of all the big builders contain a term for payment of a specified sum as compensation in the event of default on the part of the builder in handing over possession of the flat to the buyer and the flat compensation offered by all big builders is almost a nominal compensation being less than .25% of the estimated cost of construction per month, the flat buyer is left with no option but to sign the Buyer's Agreement in the format provided by the builder. No sensible person will volunteer to accept compensation constituting about 2-3% of his investment in case of delay on the part of the contractor, when he is made to pay 18% compound interest if there is delay on his part in making payment.

    It can hardly be disputed that a term of this nature is wholly one sided, unfair and unreasonable. The builder charges compound interest @ 18% per annum in the event of the delay on the part of the buyer in making payment to him but seeks to pay less than 3% per annum of the capital investment, in case he does not honour his part of the contract by defaulting in giving timely possession of the flat to the buyer. Such a term in the Buyer's Agreement also encourages the builder to divert the funds collected by him for one project, to another project being undertaken by him. He thus, is able to finance a new project at the cost of the buyers of the existing project and that too at a very low cost of finance. If the builder is to take loan from Banks or Financial Institutions, it will have to pay the interest which the Banks and Financial Institutions charge on term loan or cash credit facilities etc. The interest being charged by the Banks and Financial Institutions for financing projects of the builders is many times more than the nominal compensation which the builder would pay to the flat buyers in the form of flat compensation. In fact, the opposite party has not even claimed that the entire amount recovered by it from the flat buyers was spent on this very project. This gives credence to the allegation of the complainants that their money has been used elsewhere. Such a practice, in my view, constitutes unfair trade practice within the meaning of Section 2(r) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 since it adopts unfair methods or practice for the purpose of selling the product of the builder. Though, such a practice does not specifically fall under any of the Clauses of Section 2(r) (1) of the Act that would be immaterial considering that the unfair trades, methods and practices enumerated in Section 2(r) (1) of the Act are inclusive and not exhaustive, as would be evident from the use of word "including" before the words

    "any of the following practices". It would also be pertinent to note here that as pointed out by the complainants the agitation of the farmers was on account of acquisition of land in Noida Extension and not on account of acquisition of land on which the project in which the flats were to be constructed for the complainants. As regards the alleged delay in obtaining environmental clearances there is no material on record to show when the opposite party applied for such clearances, where they submitted all the requisite documents etc. while applying for such clearances and how much was the time taken by the concerned authorities in granting the

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    said clearances. In the absence of such particulars, it would be difficult for us to accept that development of the project was delayed on account of any notification imposing restrictions on new projects. In any case, the opposite party has failed to produce before us any notification imposing restriction or prohibition on development of the project in which the flats were to be constructed for the complainants."

    15. We do not find any reason to disagree with the aforesaid reasoning of the Coordinate Bench. Accordingly, taking note that the facts of the complaints under consideration are similar to the facts of the above noted cases decided by the Coordinate Bench, we do not find force in the plea of Force Majeure taken by the opposite party. As the opposite party has failed to complete the construction and deliver the possession of the respective apartments to the complainants despite of expiry of agreed date of delivery of possession by almost seven years, we find the opposite party guilty of deficiency in service.

    16. Counsel for the opposite party has raised a half-hearted plea of limitation. It is contended that it is admitted case of the complainants that possession of subject apartments were to be delivered somewhere in the year 2009-2010. As the complainants have filed the above noted consumer complaints more than seven years after the date on which the possession was agreed to be delivered, in view of Section 24-A of the Consumer Protection Act, the complaints are time barred and liable to be dismissed.

    17. We do not find merit in the above noted plea. As per the builder buyer agreement the opposite party had promised to construct and deliver possession of the subject apartments to the respective complainants in consideration of their paying the agreed consideration amount. The opposite party till date has not offered possession of the subject apartments to the complainants and as also not refused to deliver possession. Thus, this is a clear case of continuing cause of action. We therefore are of the view that the complaints filed by the respective complainants are within limitation. Reliance in this regard may be placed upon the decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Meerut Development Authority Vs. M K Gupta IV (2012) CPJ 12, wherein Hon'ble Supreme Court held that in such a case buyer has a recurrent cause for filing a complaint for non delivery of possession of the plot.

    18. Now the question is, what should be the amount of compensation to be paid to the complainants?

    19. Learned counsel for the complainants has contended that as the opposite party has utilized the money paid by the complainants as part payment against the consideration amount, the interest of justice demands that opposite party should refund the said amount with interest @ 18% from the date of respective dates of deposits.

    20. Learned counsel for the opposite party on the contrary has contended that admittedly the parties had entered into a Builder Buyer Agreement and, therefore, they are bound by the terms and conditions of their respective agreements. Learned counsel has argued that clause 4 c (ii) deals with the compensation payable by the developer in the event of delay in offering possession and as per said clause, the developer is liable to pay compensation @ Rs.5/- per sq. ft. per month of the super area for the period of delay in offering the delivery of the apartment beyond the period indicated in clause 4.a (i).

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    21. Clause 4 c (ii) of the Builder-Buyer Agreement is reproduced as under:

    "That the Developer would pay charges @ Rs.5/- per s q. ft. per month of Super Area for the period of delay in offering the delivery of the said apartment beyond the period indicated in clause 4 (a) (i), save and except as for reasons beyond the reasonable control of the Developer and Force Majeure events. These charges would be adjusted at the time of Final Notice for possession."

    22 On reading of the above, it is clear that this clause provides for payment of compensation if the developer delays the offer of possession beyond the period indicated in clause 4 a. (i).

    23. Clause 4(e) is the another clause in the agreement deals with the compensation to be paid by the developer when he is not in a position to offer the allotted apartment. Clause 4 (e) is reproduced as under:

    "Default:

    If for any reason the Developer is not in a position to offer the Apartment altogether, the Developer shall offer the allottee (s) an alternative property or refund the amount in full with Simple Interest @ 10% per annum without any further liability to pay damages or any other compensation on this account."

    24. On reading of the above, it is clear that if for any reason the developer is not in a position to offer the allotted apartment, developer would offer an alternative property or to refund the amount paid by the allottee in full with 10% interest per annum.

    25. In the instant case, the opposite party was supposed to deliver possession of respective apartments to the complainants during the period 2009-2010. More than seven years from the respective stipulated dates of delivery of possession have gone by but admittedly the construction of apartments is not complete. Thus, in our view, this is a case of inability of opposite party to offer possession of booked apartments to the respective complainants. Thus, in our view, clause 4.(e) is applicable to assess the liability of opposite party. Thus, applying the aforesaid clause of the agreement, we are of the view that as per the agreements, developer is liable to refund the respective payments received from the respective complainants with 10% interest thereon from the date on which the payments were received.

    26. In view of the discussion above, we allow the above noted complaints with following directions:

    1. The opposite party shall refund to each of the complainants the respective amounts paid to it by the complainants within six weeks from today alongwith compensation of simple interest @ 10% p.a. from the date of each payment till the realisation of the amount.

    2. The opposite party shall pay a sum of Rs.10,000/- each as litigation cost to the respective complainants.

    ......................J

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    AJIT BHARIHOKE

    PRESIDING MEMBER

    ......................

    ANUP K THAKUR

    MEMBER

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