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AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
  • Mr. Pramod Ahuja with Ms. Amita Sachdeva, Advs.
  • None.
Judges
  • Rajiv Sahai Endlaw, J.
Acts
  • Order II Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC)
  • Section 25B(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958
  • 4030. Order II Rule 2 of the CPC
  • Section 27 of the Rent Act
  • Order II Rule 2 of the CPC
  • Section 14(1)(a) and 14(1)(b)
  • Section 14(1)(e).28.
  • Section 14(1)(e)
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
  • Mr. Pramod Ahuja with Ms. Amita Sachdeva, Advs.
  • None.
Judges
  • Rajiv Sahai Endlaw, J.
Acts
  • Order II Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC)
  • Section 25B(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958
  • 4030. Order II Rule 2 of the CPC
  • Section 27 of the Rent Act
  • Order II Rule 2 of the CPC
  • Section 14(1)(a) and 14(1)(b)
  • Section 14(1)(e).28.
  • Section 14(1)(e)
See more information ...
Smart Summary

Judgment Summary — Rajiv Sahai Endlaw, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

This is a Rent Control Revision Petition under Section 25B(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958. The petitioner/tenant challenges an order dated 26 April 2017 (E. No. 189/17 (New No. 199/17)) of the Pilot Court (Central), Tis Hazari Courts, which dismissed the tenant's application for leave to defend a petition for eviction under Section 14(1)(e) of the Act and resulted in an order of eviction of the petitioner from Shop No. 2262, Shankar Gali, Bazar Sita Ram, Delhi.

The respondent/landlady's eviction petition alleged bona fide personal requirement of the premises for her business (M/s. Sant Enterprises) and relied on the fact that she owned adjoining shops nos. 2263 and 2264 which were used by her husband and mother‑in‑law respectively. The tenant sought leave to defend on multiple grounds including non‑attornment, alleged vacancy or joint possession of adjoining shops, alternative accommodation being available to the landlord, and a contention that the present petition was barred by Order II Rule 2 CPC due to an earlier eviction petition under Section 14(1)(a) and (b).

The High Court heard the tenant's counsel, perused trial court records, and considered the Additional Rent Controller's findings as well as the parties' contentions and documentary material placed on record.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Trial Court (learned Additional Rent Controller) correctly dismissed the tenant's application for leave to defend an eviction petition brought under Section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, in proceedings under Section 25B (summary procedure).
  2. Whether Order II Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 bars the filing of a second eviction petition on a different ground (i.e., whether filing of an earlier petition under Section 14(1)(a) and (b) prevents filing of a subsequent petition under Section 14(1)(e)).
  3. Whether attornment by the tenant to the new registered owner (respondent/landlady) was necessary once a registered sale deed in favour of the respondent was placed on record.
  4. Whether the respondent/landlady's carrying on business (or family members carrying on business) from other premises disentitles her from an eviction order on the ground of bona fide personal requirement.
  5. Whether the tenant's averments and documentary basis in the application for leave to defend were sufficiently particular, factual and credible to entitle the tenant to leave to defend under Section 25B(5) and (8).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner/Tenant's Arguments

  • The earlier landlord (Girwar Singh) never asked the tenant to pay rent to the respondent nor informed the tenant of the sale; the tenant continued to pay rent under Section 27 but did not admit the respondent as landlord.
  • The respondent had not produced documents with respect to shops nos. 2263 and 2264, and had not disclosed the age or supporting documents for her mother‑in‑law who allegedly occupied shop no. 2264.
  • Shop no. 2264 was said to be lying vacant and no evidence of business therefrom was produced; shop no. 2263 was allegedly in joint possession of the respondent and her husband.
  • The respondent had a factory at Ghaziabad and could use other premises (including a property identified only by number “2243”) as alternative accommodation; thus the requirement was not bona fide or necessary.
  • The eviction petition under Section 14(1)(e) was barred by Order II Rule 2 CPC because an earlier petition under Section 14(1)(a) and (b) had been filed in respect of the same tenancy.
  • The respondent's registration suggested she was only a “dealer” and not a manufacturer, challenging the respondent's asserted manufacturing/trading requirement.

Respondent/Landlady's Arguments and Pleadings

  • The respondent produced a registered Sale Deed dated 16 June 2008 showing purchase from Girwar Singh, and thus established ownership and the landlord‑tenant relationship.
  • The respondent pleaded her own bona fide requirement of Shop No. 2262 to run her trading/business activities (M/s. Sant Enterprises), given her factory at Ghaziabad and lack of suitable office accommodation in Delhi.
  • The respondent placed on record documentary evidence showing: (a) Pushpa Trading Company to be the husband's business carried on from shop no. 2263 (Income Tax assessment orders, Sales Tax documents); (b) DVAT registration, TIN and bank certificate linking M/s. Earthing Material to the mother‑in‑law and shop no. 2264; and (c) documents showing Sant Enterprises to be the respondent's business at Ghaziabad.
  • The respondent denied the tenant's assertions that shop no. 2264 was vacant or that shop no. 2263 was in joint possession; she maintained that the documentary record established the asserted uses of the adjoining shops.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
S. Rajdev Singh v. Royal Studios, AIR 1972 Del 150 Each ground of eviction under the Rent Act constitutes a separate cause of action; Order II Rule 2 CPC does not bar filing of petition on other grounds. Cited to support the conclusion that Order II Rule 2 CPC did not bar the respondent from filing a petition under Section 14(1)(e) after earlier proceedings on other grounds.
Jai Kishan Balkishan v. Dr. M.B. Kagal (1972) 8 DLT 422 Same principle as above regarding separability of causes of action under different grounds of eviction. Relied upon to hold that the landlord could bring a separate petition under a different head of Section 14.
Abnash Kaur v. Dr. Avinash Nayyar, ILR (1974) II Del 133 (FB) Same principle: different grounds of eviction = separate causes of action; Order II Rule 2 not a bar. Applied to reject the tenant's objection based on Order II Rule 2 CPC.
Vijay Kumar Sharma v. Manoj Kumar Garg (cited) Affirmation that Order II Rule 2 CPC does not bar filing of a petition for eviction on other grounds after an earlier petition. Used with earlier decisions to show filing under Section 14(1)(e) was not barred by prior proceedings.
Sanjay Singh v. M/s Corporate Warranties Pvt. Ltd., (2013) 204 DLT 12 Where a sale deed is registered in favour of the assignee / purchaser, attornment by the tenant is not required to establish the new landlord's status. Cited to hold that attornment by the petitioner was not necessary once registered sale deed in respondent's favour was on record.
Harvinder Singh v. Paradise Tower Pvt. Ltd. (2013) 199 DLT (CN) 25 Reiterates that registered sale deed establishes new ownership and attornment is unnecessary. Relied upon to confirm that the relationship of landlord and tenant stood established despite tenant's denial of attornment.
Ambica Prasad v. Mohd. Alam (2015) 13 SCC 13 Same principle from higher court: attornment not required once a sale deed is registered. Applied to support the view that the tenant's non‑attornment argument was legally unnecessary.
Faruk Ilahi Tamboli v. B.S. Shankarrao Kokate (2016) 15 SCC 431 Plea that the landlord/business is carried on along with other family members from other premises is not a ground to grant leave to defend; landlord may carry on separate business from multiple premises. Relied upon to reject tenant's contention that family members' businesses from adjoining premises defeated landlord's bona fide requirement.
Dina Nath v. Subhash Chand Saini (2014) 11 SCC 20 Supports a liberal approach to landlord's prayer for eviction on bona fide personal requirement; harmonized construction of Rent Control provisions. Used to justify a liberal approach to landlord's case and to uphold the presumption of bona fides where a prima facie case is shown.
Bhupinder Singh Bawa v. Asha Devi (2016) 10 SCC 209 Holds that a landlord's carrying on business from other premises with family members is not a ground for granting leave to defend. Cited in support of the proposition that tenant has no locus to dispute landlord's separate use of other premises.
Anil Bajaj v. Vinod Ahuja (2014) 15 SCC 610 It is not impermissible for a landlord to carry on business from several premises; tenant cannot dictate how landlord uses his property. Applied to reject tenant's argument that the landlord's multiple business locations defeated the bona fide requirement.
Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. (1998) 8 SCC 119 Rent Controller should not proceed on a presumption that the landlord's requirement is not bona fide; a prima facie case by the landlord warrants presumption of bona fides. Relied upon to draw the presumption that the respondent's requirement was bona fide once she established a prima facie case.
Rahabhar Productions Pvt. Ltd. v. Rajendra K. Tandon (1998) 4 SCC 49 Rent Control law must be construed harmoniously, balancing rights of tenant and landlord; a liberalized approach to bona fide requirement of landlord was endorsed. Cited (and read with Dina Nath) to support the modern, less restrictive approach to evaluating landlord's bona fide requirement.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court undertook a multi‑step analysis, grounded on the record and legal authorities cited in the impugned order and before the High Court:

  1. Record review and trial court findings: The Additional Rent Controller had recorded (and the High Court summarized) that the respondent had produced a registered Sale Deed (16 June 2008) establishing ownership; documentary evidence (Income Tax, Sales Tax, DVAT, TIN, bank certificate) demonstrated that shop no. 2263 was used by the husband (Pushpa Trading Company) and shop no. 2264 by the mother‑in‑law (M/s. Earthing Material); documents also linked Sant Enterprises to the respondent at Ghaziabad. The Controller found the tenant's contrary claims bald and unsubstantiated.
  2. On the question of attornment: The Court relied upon cited authorities and the fact of registration of the Sale Deed to hold that attornment by the tenant was not legally required. The tenant's prior deposit of rent in the respondent's name under Section 27 further supported recognition of the landlord‑tenant relationship.
  3. On Order II Rule 2 CPC: The Court analyzed the tenant's objection that the present petition was barred because an earlier petition had been filed on other heads (14(1)(a) and (b)). The Court held that each ground of eviction constitutes a separate cause of action (citing multiple precedents), so Order II Rule 2 did not bar filing a fresh petition on a different ground. The Court also noted that Section 14(1)(e) proceedings are governed by a special summary procedure under Section 25B and therefore the respondent could pursue that ground separately.
  4. On the tenant's factual challenges to the respondent's claimed requirement: The Court criticized the tenant's reliance on unsupported assertions (for example, alleging vacancy of shop no. 2264, joint possession of 2263, or availability of an unspecified property "2243") and described the leave to defend application as vague and largely a denial rather than the disclosure of facts required under Section 25B(5). The Court emphasized that Section 25B requires the tenant to disclose facts which, if proved, would disentitle the landlord to eviction; mere denials or bald averments are insufficient.
  5. On the argument about the respondent being a mere “dealer” rather than a manufacturer: The Court rebuked the tenant's counsel for relying on a Wikipedia definition rather than the statutory definition under the Uttar Pradesh Value Added Tax, 2007, and rejected the contention. The Court noted that the tenant had admitted the respondent ran a manufacturing business at Ghaziabad in the leave application.
  6. On precedential support: The Court applied the cited Supreme Court decisions (including Dina Nath, Faruk Ilahi Tamboli, Anil Bajaj, Bhupinder Singh Bawa and others) to hold that the landlord's carrying on business (or family members carrying on business) from other premises is not a ground for granting leave to defend and that a landlord may legitimately operate from multiple premises; thus the tenant lacked locus to challenge the asserted use of neighbouring shops.
  7. Credibility and bona fides: Relying on Sarla Ahuja and related authorities, the Court observed that where the landlord has made out a prima facie case, a presumption of bona fides arises and the Rent Controller should not begin from the presumption that the requirement is mala fide.
  8. Conclusion of analysis: Given documentary proof adduced by the respondent and the insufficiency and vagueness of the tenant's application for leave to defend, the Court found no legal error in the Additional Rent Controller's dismissal of leave to defend under Section 25B(8) and upheld the eviction order.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The petition is DISMISSED. The High Court found no merit in the tenant's challenge to the dismissal of his application for leave to defend and upheld the eviction order. The court also ordered No costs.

Implications:

  • The direct effect is that the Trial Court's order dismissing the tenant's application for leave to defend (and the consequent eviction order) stands affirmed by the High Court in this revision proceeding.
  • The Court reaffirmed that: (a) separate grounds of eviction under the Rent Act give rise to separate causes of action so that Order II Rule 2 CPC does not bar a subsequent petition on a different ground; (b) attornment is not necessary once a registered sale deed is on record; and (c) the landlord's carrying on business from multiple premises (including family members operating from adjoining shops) does not, by itself, defeat a bona fide personal requirement or entitle a tenant to leave to defend under Section 25B.
  • The opinion does not purport to lay down a novel legal principle; it applies existing precedents and affirms the special summary procedure and evidentiary expectations under Section 25B of the Act. No broader new precedent was announced beyond the Court's application of established authorities to the facts.

End of summary. This summary is based exclusively on the content of the provided opinion and does not add or infer facts beyond that text.

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    Vijay Sharma Petitioner v. Namita Aggarawal

    Rajiv Sahai Endlaw, J.:— This Rent Control Revision Petition under Section 25B(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 impugns the order (dated 26th April, 2017 in E. No. 189/17 (New No. 199/17) of the Pilot Court (Central), Tis Hazari Courts) of dismissal of the application filed by the petitioner/tenant for leave to defend the petition for eviction under Section 14(1)(e) of the Act filed by the respondent/landlady and the consequent order of eviction of the petitioner/tenant from Shop No. 2262, Shankar Gali, Bazar Sita Ram, Delhi - 110 006.

    2. The counsel for the petitioner/tenant has been heard and the copies of the Trial Court record filed along with the paper book perused.

    3. The respondent/landlady sought eviction of the petitioner/tenant from Shop No. 2262 aforesaid on the ground of her own self requirement of the same pleading (i) that the respondent/landlady had purchased the subject shop vide Sale Deed dated 16 June, 2008; (ii) that the petitioner/tenant is an old tenant in the shop at a rent of Rs. 150/- per month; (iii) that besides the subject shop, the respondent/landlady also owns adjoining shops no. 2263 and 2264; (iv) that shop no. 2264 is in occupation and possession of the mother-in-law of the respondent/landlady who is running her business therefrom in the name and style of M/s. Earthing Material; (v) that the mother-in-law of the respondent/landlady has no source of income other than from the said business as the father-in-law of the respondent/landlady is paralysed and not able to move from the bed - therefore the respondent/landlady has allowed her mother-in-law to carry on business from the said shop no. 2264; (vi) that the shop no. 2263 is being used by the husband of the respondent/landlady from where he is running his business under the name and style of M/s. Pushpa Trading Company; (vii) the respondent/landlady is herself carrying on business in the name and style of M/s. Sant Enterprises having factory at Ghaziabad but no office at Delhi from which she can trade in the goods manufactured or run her office; (viii) that the shop no. 2262 in the tenancy of the petitioner/tenant is most suitable and reasonable for the respondent/landlady to have her office of trading of goods manufactured in the factory at Ghaziabad as in the adjoining two shops the mother-in-law and husband of the respondent/landlady are carrying on their business; (ix) that even otherwise, the aforesaid shops are situated in a commercial area most suitable for the business of the respondent/landlady in the name and style of M/s. Sant Enterprises and easily accessible for the customers of the said business; and, (x) that the respondent/landlady does not have any other reasonable/suitable accommodation.

    4. The petitioner/tenant sought leave to defend pleading (i) that the “earlier landlord Girwar Singh” never asked the petitioner/tenant to pay rent to the respondent/landlady nor informed the petitioner/tenant of the sale in favour of the respondent/landlady; (ii) that though the petitioner/tenant had been depositing rent under Section 27 of the Rent Act in the name of the respondent/landlady but without admitting the respondent/landlady to be the landlady; (iii) that the “earlier landlord Girwar Singh” has been accepting rent from the petitioner/tenant; (iv) that the respondent/landlady along with the petition for eviction has filed documents with regard to her factory at Ghaziabad but has not filed any documents with regard to the two shops no. 2263 and 2264; (v) that the respondent/landlady has also not mentioned the age of her mother-in-law and has not filed any documents on record; (vi) that the shop no. 2264 alleged to be in possession of the mother-in-law of the respondent/landlady is lying vacant and no document of carrying on of any business therefrom have been filed; (vii) that shop no. 2263 is in joint possession of the respondent/landlady and her husband Sanjay Agarwal who has therein been doing business of goods manufactured at Ghaziabad by the respondent/landlady; the name of the said business is Pushpa Trading Company and which is being run by Sanjay Agarwal; (viii) that one can do business from one place only and not from four places as the respondent/landlady is wanting to do; (ix) that the respondent/landlady has got a factory at Ghaziabad and second shop no. 2264 which is lying locked and is surplus; (x) that the respondent/landlady has been carrying on manufacturing business since 2012 i.e for five years prior to the filing of the petition for eviction and had not thought it fit to carry on trading business and in fact trading business has been carried on in the name of Pushpa Trading Company; (xi) that no documents of Pushpa Trading Company had been filed; and, (xii) that the petition for eviction was barred by Order II Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) owing to the respondent/landlady having earlier filed a petition for eviction of the petitioner/tenant under section 14(1)(a) and (b) of the Act.

    5. The respondent/landlady filed reply to the aforesaid leave to defend application in which she denied that in shop no. 2264 her mother-in-law was not carrying on any business or that shop no. 2263 was in joint possession of the respondent/landlady and her husband. It was further stated that the respondent/landlady had placed on record documents to show that Pushpa Trading Company was of the husband of the respondent/landlady.

    6. The learned Additional Rent Controller has in the impugned order recorded (i) that the respondent/landlady had placed on record the registered Sale Deed dated 16 June, 2008 of purchase of the property from Girwar Singh who had been admitted by the petitioner/tenant also to be the erstwhile owner and landlord of the premises; (ii) that it is immaterial whether the petitioner/tenant attorns to the respondent/landlady as landlady or not as law does not require any act of attornment; (iii) that the relationship of landlord and tenant between the respondent/landlady and the petitioner also stood established in the earlier proceedings between the parties; (iv) that the respondent/landlady had placed on record the Income Tax Assessment orders from which it was evident that the husband of the respondent/landlady was the sole proprietor of Pushpa Trading Company and carrying on business from shop no. 2263; (v) the respondent/landlady has also placed on record the documents issued by the Sales Tax Department showing the husband of the respondent/landlady to be the proprietor of Pushpa Trading Company and carrying on business from shop no. 2263; (vi) from the aforesaid documents it was evident that the business of Pushpa Trading Company was not of the respondent/landlady; (vii) the respondent/landlady had also placed on record DVAT registration certificate issued in the name of M/s. Earthing Material at shop no. 2264 proving that the business of Earthing Material was carried on from shop no. 2264; (viii) the respondent/landlady had also placed on record TIN certificate and the certificate issued by the Punjab National Bank, Asaf Ali Road Branch, New Delhi to prove that the business in the name and style of M/s. Earthing Material at shop no. 2264 was of Pushpa Devi, mother-in-law of the respondent/landlady; (ix) all the said documents proved that shop no. 2264 was not lying vacant; (x) it mattered not that the mother-in-law of the respondent/landlady was a senior citizen, as long as the business being carried on from shop no. 2264 was of the mother-in-law of the respondent/landlady; (xi) that the respondent/landlady had also placed on record documents to show that the business of Sant Enterprises at Ghaziabad was of the respondent/landlady; and, (xii) the pleas of the petitioner/tenant that the respondent/landlady was carrying on business from shop no. 2243 and/or that shop no. 2264 was lying vacant were bald averment on which leave to defend could not be granted.

    7. The counsel for the petitioner/tenant before this Court has contended (i) that prior to filing the petition for eviction from which this petition arises, a petition under Section 14(1)(a) and 14(1)(b) was filed and which was dismissed qua 14(1)(b) and allowed qua 14(1)(a), giving benefit of 14(2) to the petitioner/tenant; (ii) that the petitioner/tenant has filed appeal against the said order which is still pending consideration; (iii) that the respondent/landlady at the time of filing the earlier petition did not take the ground of her own requirement - even in the notice preceding the petition for eviction under section 14(1)(a) of the Act it was not pleaded that the respondent/landlady required the premises in the tenancy of the petitioner/tenant for her own use; (iv) that the petitioner/tenant has in the grounds of challenge pleaded in this petition, pleaded another premises available to the respondent/landlady - at the time when this order is being dictated it is stated that it was so pleaded in the application for leave to defend also in para 31 of the leave to defend application i.e that the respondent/landlady was also having property no.“2243;” and, (v) that the registration of the respondent/landlady showed that the respondent/landlady was merely a ‘dealer’ and was not manufacturing the goods at Ghaziabad.

    8. I will take up last of the aforesaid contentions first. At the time of hearing, it was enquired from the counsel for the petitioner/tenant what is the definition of ‘dealer’ in the law under which the certificate of registration and allotment of TIN is issued.

    9. Though the counsel for the petitioner/tenant at that stage stated that he had not checked the definition of ‘dealer’ but after checking the same on his iPad states that it does not include a manufacturer. However what the counsel for the petitioner/tenant is seeing on his iPad is definition of ‘dealer’ in Wikipedia, contents whereof, as is well-known, any user can change at any time. The argument is to be noted to be rejected. The certificate is issued under the provisions of the Uttar Pradesh Value Added Tax, 2007 and instead of checking up the definition of ‘dealer’ thereunder, definition in Wikipedia is being used. There should be some seriousness while making arguments in the Court of Law, at least in the High Court, and arguments of this kind without the counsel himself satisfying with respect thereto and/or giving any thought to the same, should not be made.

    10. I may in this regard mention that the petitioner/tenant, in the application for leave to defend has admitted that the respondent/landlady is running her manufacturing business at Ghaziabad. The argument made today shows the fickleness of the grounds on which leave to defend is being sought and argued and the length to which the tenants are willing to go to somehow secure leave to defend to defer their eviction from the premises.

    11. In the same vein is the argument that the petition for eviction under Section 14(1)(e) is barred by Order II Rule 2 of the CPC for the reason of earlier petition for eviction under section 14(1)(a) and (b) of the Act having been filed. It is settled law that each ground of eviction under the Rent Act constitutes a separate cause of action Reference can be made to (i) S. Rajdev Singh v. Royal Studios AIR 1972 Del 150; (ii) Jai Kishan Balkishan v. Dr. M.B Kagal (1972) 8 DLT 422; (iii) Abnash Kaur v. Dr. Avinash Nayyar ILR (1974) II Del 133 (FB); and, (iv) Vijay Kumar Sharma v. Manoj Kumar Garg 4030. Order II Rule 2 of the CPC does not bar the filing of a petition for eviction on other grounds after the filing of the petition on one of the grounds stipulated in proviso to sub Section (1) of Section 14 of the Act. Moreover, the procedure prescribed for dealing with the petition for eviction under Section 14(1)(e) is special, under Section 25B and not applicable to other grounds of eviction and if the petition for eviction under Section 14(1)(e) of the Act is clubbed with any other ground, the summary procedure under Section 25B would not be available. Thus no adverse inference can be drawn against the respondent for not invoking ground under Section 14(1)(e) while filing the earlier petition for eviction under section 14(1)(a) and (b) of the Act.

    12. Though the counsel for the petitioner/tenant before this Court has not controverted the ownership of the respondent of premises in tenancy of the petitioner or the existence of relationship of landlord and tenant with respondent, but since in the application for leave to defend such ground was taken, I may record that as per (i) Sanjay Singh v. M/S. Corporate Warranties Pvt. Ltd…. Respodent (2013) 204 DLT 12; (ii) Harvinder Singh v. Paradise Tower Pvt. Ltd. (2013) 199 DLT (CN) 25; and, (iii) Ambica Prasad v. Mohd. Alam (2015) 13 SCC 13 once Sale Deed is registered by earlier owner in favour of respondent, attornment by the petitioner, admittedly tenant under earlier owner, to the respondent as landlord is not required. Moreover, the petitioner/tenant himself has been depositing rent under Section 27 of the Act in the name of the respondent/landlady only and without impleading Girwar Singh as party even thereto.

    13. Taking of such grounds by a tenant in the application for leave to defend and during the hearing shows that the tenant does not hesitate from indulging in falsehood and making incorrect submissions in law for the sake of securing leave to defend.

    14. With respect to the argument of “another property” being available to the respondent/landlady, the plea, as contained in para 31 is as under:—

    “The petitioner's another property near by this property no. 2243 and in that property also surplus space is there.”

    15. As would be obvious from the above, save for giving the number, no address even of the locality where the said property is situated is given. The counsel for the petitioner/tenant during the hearing has not drawn attention to any document filed by the petitioner/tenant to show any right of the respondent/landlady to any such property. On enquiry also it is stated that no such document was filed along with the application for leave to defend or has been filed before this Court. The affidavit containing the aforesaid averments has been verified as true to knowledge but the counsel is unable to state the basis of the knowledge with respect to “property no. 2243”.

    16. As far as the shop no. 2264, which the respondent/landlady claims to be in possession of her mother-in-law from where the mother-in-law is carrying on business in the name and style of M/s. Earthing Material is concerned, the impugned order has already noticed that the documents had been placed by the respondent/landlady to show the business of M/s. Earthing Material to be of the mother-in-law and at the address of the subject shop. The petitioner/tenant has been in occupation of and claims to be carrying on business from shop no. 2262 for several decades and ought to have known, to what use shop no. 2264 was being put and since when it is lying vacant. Significantly, leave to defend application is abysmally vague in this regard. It is not stated, what business was being carried on from the said shop earlier and till when and since when it is lying closed.

    17. The summary procedure prescribed by Section 25B cannot be permitted to be so abused by the tenants, by taking whatsoever pleas, without any basis and to indulge in falsehood and to claim leave to defend and to protract the eviction. The language of Section 25B(5) requires the tenant to, in the application for leave to defend, disclose facts as would disentitle the landlord from an order of eviction under Section 14(1)(e) of the Act. What is however found in the present case is that the application for leave to defend, instead of disclosing any facts, is of mere denial and which though may be permissible in a written statement, is not permitted in the application for leave to defend.

    18. Similarly, it cannot be said that the reasoning given by the learned Additional Rent Controller with respect to shop no. 2263 is not in accordance with law within the meaning of Section 25B(8) of the Act.

    19. Reference can be made to the recent judgments of the Supreme Court in (i) Faruk Ilahi Tamboli v. B.S Shankarrao Kokate (2016) 15 SCC 431; (ii) Dina Nath v. Subhash Chand Saini (2014) 11 SCC 20; and, (iii) Bhupinder Singh Bawa v. Asha Devi (2016) 10 SCC 209 where it has been held that the plea that the landlord has been carrying on business along with the other family members from other premises and earning salary/profits therefrom is no ground to grant leave to defend to the tenant as the landlord is fully entitled to carry on separate business from the premises which were let out long back and the tenant has no locus to dispute the same.

    20. Similarly, recently in Anil Bajaj v. Vinod Ahuja (2014) 15 SCC 610 it has been held that it is not impermissible for the landlord to carry on business from several premises and that it is not for the tenant to dictate to the landlord how the property belonging to landlord should be utilized by him for purpose of his business and cannot be a reason for grant of leave to defend.

    21. In the aforesaid state of law, the facts disclosed by the petitioner/tenant cannot disentitle respondent/landlady from order of eviction. Supreme Court in Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance Company Ltd.. (1998) 8 SCC 119 held that Rent Controller shall not proceed on the presumption that the requirement of the landlord is not bona fide and that when the landlord shows prima facie case, a presumption that the requirement is bona fide is to be drawn.

    22. Supreme Court in Rahabhar Productions Pvt. Ltd. v. Rajendra K. Tandon (1998) 4 SCC 49, reiterated in Dina Nath supra, held that provisions of Rent Control law must be construed harmoniously so as to balance the rights and obligations of tenants and landlord. In Dina Nath it was further held that a liberalized approach has to be adopted qua the landlord's prayer for eviction when sought on the ground of bona fide personal requirement of landlord; it was also noticed that though earlier decisions interpreted Rent Control legislations narrowly, placing rather heavy burden on the landlord in cases where eviction was sought on the ground of bona fide requirement but recent decisions have made a significant departure from that approach. It was held that the landlord's requirement need not be only one of dire necessity.

    23. I am satisfied that the requirement of respondent/landlady whose family members are admittedly carrying on business from adjoining two shops, for the shop in tenancy of the petitioner is bona fide.

    24. There is thus no merit in the petition.

    25. Dismissed.

    26. No costs.

    27. At this stage, the counsel for the petitioner/tenant states that the affidavit accompanying the petition for eviction describes the petition for eviction as under section 14(1)(a) and (b) and not under Section 14(1)(e).

    28. Such computer errors more on the part of paralegal staff are also merely inconsequential and cannot entitle the tenant to leave to defend.

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