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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion — State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, U.T., Chandigarh

Factual and Procedural Background

The complainant, Mr. Pradeep John David, applied to purchase an apartment (unit IF-R1-E411-GF/(Car Parking)P-R1-E411-GF measuring 1881 sq ft) in the Hyde Park Estate II project (Mullanpur, Punjab) developed by opposite parties No.1 & 2 (DLF Universal Limited). He paid Rs.600,000 as earnest money and later raised a housing loan of Rs.64 lakhs from Proforma Opposite Party No.3 (ICICI Bank) to finance the purchase. The total sale price was fixed at Rs.80,19,010.04 and he elected a construction-linked payment plan. An Independent Floor Buyer's Agreement was executed on 29.01.2013; Clause 11(a) required delivery of possession within 30 months from the application dated 30.08.2012 (i.e., on or before 28.02.2015) subject to force majeure.

By 28.02.2015 the complainant had allegedly paid Rs.75,95,023.95 (over 95% of the sale consideration, though opposite parties claimed Rs.69,76,212) but possession was not delivered. The complainant alleges lack of development and basic amenities at site, receipt of an alleged "paper possession" offer dated 15.02.2016, and an additional demand for Rs.34,89,642.63 by the builder. He issued a final notice (email dated 04.03.2016) and filed this consumer complaint under Section 17 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, seeking refund of amounts deposited with interest, compensation and litigation expenses.

Opposite parties No.1 & 2 filed a joint reply raising objections including lack of territorial jurisdiction, existence of an arbitration clause, that the complainant (an NRI) did not fall within the Act's definition of consumer, and that only a Civil Court could adjudicate. They admitted the agreement and delay in delivery but asserted they offered possession on 15.02.2016 after obtaining partial completion certificate and occupation certificate, and alleged the complainant was a defaulter on payments. Service of Proforma Opposite Party No.3 was dispensed with as no relief was sought against it.

The parties filed affidavits and documents in support. The Commission heard submissions, considered documentary evidence (including ledger entries, certificates, photographs and the agreement) and delivered its decision on 27.05.2016.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the existence of an arbitration clause in the agreement bars the Consumer Forum from exercising jurisdiction over the complaint.
  2. Whether the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, U.T., Chandigarh has territorial jurisdiction to entertain the complaint.
  3. Whether the complainant (an NRI) falls within the definition of "consumer" under Section 2(1)(d) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986.
  4. Whether this consumer dispute is maintainable before the Consumer Forum (i.e., whether only a Civil Court can decide the dispute).
  5. Whether delay in handing over possession by the stipulated date amounted to deficiency in service and whether the complainant was obliged to accept possession offered after the delay.
  6. Whether the complainant is entitled to refund of amounts paid, interest thereon, compensation and litigation costs.

Arguments of the Parties

Complainant's Arguments

  • He applied and paid earnest money and subsequent instalments for allotment of the specified unit and relied on representations in the brochure and by the developer's representatives.
  • He paid amounts aggregating (as claimed) Rs.75,95,023.95 under the construction-linked plan and raised a housing loan to make payments.
  • Possession was not offered by the stipulated date (28.02.2015) despite payments exceeding 95% of sale consideration.
  • On-site inspections and photographs revealed lack of development and basic amenities; the 15.02.2016 offer was a paper possession while the project remained largely incomplete.
  • He sought refund of amounts deposited with interest and compensation for mental agony and harassment when refund was refused.

Opposite Parties' (DLF No.1 & 2) Arguments

  • The Commission lacked territorial jurisdiction to hear the complaint.
  • An arbitration clause in the Agreement required disputes to be referred to arbitration, rendering the consumer complaint not maintainable.
  • The complainant, being an NRI, purchased the unit as an investment and therefore did not fall within the Act's definition of consumer.
  • Consumer Fora proceedings are summary in nature; thus only a Civil Court could adjudicate the dispute.
  • They admitted delay but claimed possession was offered on 15.02.2016 after obtaining partial completion certificate and occupation certificate; they also alleged the complainant defaulted on some payments and disputed the exact quantum paid.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Abha Arora Vs. Puma Realtors Pvt. Ltd. and another (Consumer Complaint No.170 of 2015) That this Commission held jurisdiction even in presence of arbitration clause (authority cited by the court). Cited to reject opposite parties' contention that arbitration clause ousted the Commission's jurisdiction.
Praveen Kumar Arora & another Vs. Emaar MGF Land Limited (Consumer Complaint No.198 of 2015) Same proposition: Commission's jurisdiction despite arbitration clause. Relied upon to reject the arbitration-based objection to jurisdiction.
Lt. Col. Anil Raj & anr. Vs. M/s. Unitech Limited (Consumer Case No.346 of 2013) National Commission's discussion confirming remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is in addition to other remedies and arbitration does not automatically bar Consumer Fora. Quoted at length to support the view that consumer remedy is cumulative and arbitration clause does not preclude consumer proceedings.
Secretary, Thirumurugan Cooperative Agricultural Credit Society Vs. M. Lalitha (2004) 1 SCC 305 Authority for the principle that consumer protection remedies are additional and not barred by arbitration clauses (as referred in the quoted National Commission text). Used in the chain of authorities to support Commission's jurisdiction despite arbitration clause.
Skypak Couriers Ltd. Vs. Tata Chemicals Ltd. (2000) 5 SCC 294 One of the Supreme Court decisions cited in the quoted passage supporting the principle that consumer protections are additional remedies. Referred as part of the judicial support for maintaining consumer forum jurisdiction in presence of arbitration clause.
National Seeds Corporation Limited Vs. M. Madhusudhan Reddy & Anr. (2012) 2 SCC 506 Another Supreme Court decision supporting the same theme (cited in the quoted text). Referred in the chain of authority supporting the Commission's jurisdiction.
Smt. Reshma Bhagat & Anr. Vs. M/s Supertech Ltd. (Consumer Complaint No.118 of 2012) Authority that an NRI buyer can be a consumer; NRIs are not barred from owning property in India for residential purposes. Used to reject the argument that the complainant (an NRI) did not qualify as a consumer.
Kavita Ahuja Vs. Shipra Estate Ltd. & Jai Krishna Estate Developer Pvt. Ltd. (Consumer Complaint No.137 of 2010) Held that buyers of residential units are consumers unless it is proved they booked units for commercial purposes. Applied to hold complainant is a consumer in absence of evidence of commercial intent.
DLF Universal Limited Vs. Nirmala Devi Gupta (Revision Petition No.3861 of 2014) National Commission authority aligning with the principle that buyers of residential units are consumers. Cited to reinforce the conclusion that complainant is a consumer.
Narne Construction P. Ltd. Vs. Union of India and Ors. (II (2012) CPJ 4 (SC)) Held that housing construction or building activity constitutes a "service" under Section 2(1)(o) of the Consumer Protection Act. Applied to establish that the transaction falls within the Act's definition of service and hence the complaint is maintainable before the Consumer Forum.
Haryana Agricultural Marketing Board Vs. Bishambar Dayal Goyal & Ors. (AIR 2014 S.C. 1766) Affirmation that housing/construction activities fall within the definition of "service". Relied upon to support the maintainability of the consumer complaint.
Lucknow Development Authority vs M.K. Gupta (1994 SCC (1) 243) Held that failure to deliver possession by the stipulated period amounts to denial of service. Applied to hold the delay in delivery constituted material deficiency in service by the builder.
Brig Ajay Raina (Retd.) and another Vs. M/s Unitech Limited (Consumer Complaint No.59 of 2016) Illustrates that a delayed offer of possession (after several years) need not be accepted by the allottee. Relied upon to hold complainant was not obliged to accept the belated offer of possession.
Emaar MGF Land Limited and another Vs. Dilshad Gill (III (2015) CPJ 329 (NC)) and M/s Emaar MGF Land Ltd. & Anr. Vs. Dr. Manuj Chhabra Held that a purchaser is not obliged to accept possession offered after a significant delay beyond the committed date. Applied to support the view that the complainant could refuse the delayed offer of possession and seek refund.
Inderjit Singh Bakshi Vs. S.M.V. Agencies Pvt. Ltd. (FA No.729 of 2013) Noted that an allottee is not obliged to take possession unless the flat is complete in every respect, including completion certificate. Used to reject reliance on a mere partial completion certificate and to characterize the 15.02.2016 offer as paper possession.
UOI vs. Tata Chemicals Ltd. (2014) 6 SCC 335 Affirmed that when money received must be refunded, interest generally follows as a matter of course. Applied to award interest on the refund ordered in favor of the complainant.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Commission proceeded in a stepwise manner, addressing each contested legal issue by reference to the record and relevant authorities cited in the opinion:

  1. Arbitration clause and jurisdiction: The Commission rejected the defendants' contention that the arbitration clause ousted its jurisdiction. It relied on its earlier decisions (Abha Arora; Praveen Kumar Arora) and the National Commission's reasoning in Lt. Col. Anil Raj which, in turn, relied on Supreme Court authorities, to hold that remedies under the Consumer Protection Act are in addition to other statutory remedies and that existence of an arbitration clause does not automatically bar consumer fora from entertaining complaints.
  2. Territorial jurisdiction: The Agreement was executed in Chandigarh and many communications were issued from the builder's Chandigarh office. The Commission held that part of the cause of action arose in Chandigarh and therefore the State Commission had territorial jurisdiction to hear the complaint; the territorial objection failed.
  3. Whether the complainant is a "consumer": The Commission rejected the assertion that the complainant (an NRI) bought the unit purely as an investment and therefore could not be a consumer. It noted the complainant's pleading that the unit was for residential use for his parents and absence of any evidence from the opposite parties to the contrary. The Commission relied on precedent (Reshma Bhagat; Kavita Ahuja; DLF Universal v. Nirmala Devi Gupta) holding that residential buyers are consumers unless proved to have booked for commercial purposes, and concluded the complainant fell within Section 2(1)(d).
  4. Maintainability before Consumer Forum vs Civil Court: The Commission held housing construction falls within the definition of "service" under Section 2(1)(o) of the Act (citing Narne Construction and Haryana Agricultural Marketing Board). Since the claim relates to deficiency in service and consumer remedies are alternative and cumulative under Section 3, the complaint is maintainable before the Consumer Forum; the objection that only a Civil Court could decide was rejected.
  5. Delay in delivery and deficiency in service: Clause 11(a) stipulated delivery by 28.02.2015. Relying on Lucknow Development Authority v. M.K. Gupta, the Commission held failure to deliver by the stipulated date without valid force majeure amounted to denial/deficiency of service. Opposite parties had not proved any force majeure.
  6. Whether complainant was obliged to accept belated/partial possession offers: The Commission considered the offer of possession dated 15.02.2016, the partial completion certificate (dated 10.09.2014), and the occupation certificate (dated 19.08.2015). It concluded:
    • The partial completion certificate was not a final completion certificate and did not explain why possession was not offered by 28.02.2015 despite that partial certificate.
    • The occupation certificate was obtained after the promised date and opposite parties did not explain the delay in offering possession even after obtaining it in August 2015.
    • Photographic evidence (dated 01.03.2016) demonstrated the project remained incomplete and lacking basic amenities; hence the 15.02.2016 offer amounted to "paper possession".
    • Precedent (Emaar cases; Brig Ajay Raina) supports that an allottee is not obliged to accept possession offered after an unreasonable delay; an allottee need not accept possession unless the flat is complete and a final completion/certificate is available (Inderjit Singh Bakshi).
    The court therefore concluded the complainant was not obliged to accept the delayed offer.
  7. Entitlement to refund, compensation and interest: Given the material violation and the fact that substantial amounts were paid and used by the builder, the Commission held the complainant was entitled to refund. The ledger (Annexure C-10) showed a credit of Rs.75,95,023.95; opposite parties failed to produce convincing contrary account statements. The Commission invoked the principle (UOI v. Tata Chemicals) that when money received must be refunded, interest ordinarily follows. It awarded refund of the sum Rupees 75,95,023.95 with interest at 15% p.a. from the respective dates of deposit until realization, awarded Rs.3,00,000 as compensation for mental agony/harassment and escalation in prices, and Rs.50,000 as litigation costs.
  8. Conditions for enforcement and penal interest: The payment of awarded amounts was ordered within 45 days of certified copy; failing which the refund amount (sr. no. (i)) would carry penal interest at 18% p.a. (instead of 15%) from the respective dates of deposit, and amounts at sr. nos. (ii) and (iii) would carry interest @15% p.a. from date of filing until realization.
  9. Charge in favour of bank: The Commission clarified that Proforma Opposite Party No.3 (the lending bank) would have the first charge on any amount payable to the extent of the complainant's dues to the bank.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: COMPLAINT PARTLY ACCEPTED.

Direct consequences and terms of the order (as recorded in the opinion):

  • Opposite parties No.1 and 2 (DLF Universal Limited) are jointly and severally directed to refund Rs.75,95,023.95 to the complainant along with interest at 15% per annum from the respective dates of deposit until realization.
  • Opposite parties No.1 and 2 shall pay compensation of Rs.3,00,000 to the complainant for mental agony, physical harassment and escalation in prices.
  • Opposite parties No.1 and 2 shall pay litigation costs of Rs.50,000 to the complainant.
  • All amounts awarded at items (i) to (iii) are to be paid within 45 days of receipt of certified copy of the order. If not paid within that period, the refund amount (item (i)) shall carry penal interest at 18% p.a. (instead of 15%) from the respective dates of deposit; items (ii) and (iii) shall carry interest at 15% p.a. from the date of filing of the complaint until realization.
  • Proforma Opposite Party No.3 (the bank/lender) will have the first charge on amounts payable, to the extent of any sums due from the complainant to the bank.
  • Certified copies of the order to be provided to the parties free of charge; the file to be consigned to record room after completion.

The Commission's decision does not purport to set aside legislative provisions; rather it applies existing consumer-protection principles and authorities to resolve the dispute on its facts. The opinion records that the complaint was partly accepted and gives concrete monetary relief and directions as to interest, compensation, costs, timelines and the bank's charge.

    Mr. Pradeep John David v. DLF Universal Limited

    STATE CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION,

    U.T., CHANDIGARH

    Complaint case No. : 87 of 2016
    Date of Institution : 09.03.2016
    Date of Decision : 27.05.2016

    Mr.Pradeep John David son of Dr.P.C. David, aged 45 years, F-104, Sunrays House, B 985, Sector A, Mahanagar Extension, Lucknow-226006, Uttar Pradesh.

    Presently residing at 100 Martin Crossing Court (NE) Calgary Alberta, Canada T3J 3J8. …… Complainant

    V e r s u s

    1. DLF Universal Limited (earlier Known as DLF India Limited), having its Registered Office at Shopping Mall, 3rdFloor, Arjun Marg, DLF City, Phase-I, Gurgaon-122002, Haryana, through its Chairman/ Managing Director/Director/Authorized Signatory.

    2. DLF Universal Limited (earlier known as DLF India Limited), SCO No.90-191-192, Sector 8-C, Chandigarh, 160009, through its Chairman/Managing Director/ Director/Authorized Signatory. ....Opposite parties No.1 and 2

    3. ICICI Bank, SCO No.129-130, Sector 9-C, Chandigarh, through its Branch Manager. ….Proforma Opposite Party No.3

    Complaint under Section 17 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986.

    BEFORE: JUSTICE JASBIR SINGH (RETD.), PRESIDENT.

    MR. DEV RAJ, MEMBER.

    MRS. PADMA PANDEY, MEMBER.

    Argued by:- Sh.Sandeep Bhardwaj, Advocate for the complainant.

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    Ms.Ekta Jhanji, Advocate for opposite parties No.1 & 2. Service of opposite party no.3 dispensed with vide order dated 11.03.2016

    PER MRS. PADMA PANDEY, MEMBER

    The facts in brief are that allured by rosy pictures and assurance of lavish facilities, shown in the brochure Annexure C-1 and also various salient features projected by representatives of opposite parties No.1 and 2, the complainant moved an application with them, for purchase of a flat, in their project, under the name and style of Hyde Park Estate IF, New Chandigarh, Mullanpur, Punjab. Alongwith the application form, an amount of Rs.6 lacs was paid as earnest money. Subsequently, the complainant was allotted floor No.IF-R1-E411-GF/(Car Parking)P-R1-E411-GF, measuring 1881 square feet @Rs.3900/- per square feet, in the said project. Total sale price of the said unit was fixed at Rs.80,19,010.04Ps., which included External Development Charges, Preferential Location Charges, Maintenance Security Charges etc. The complainant opted for construction linked payment plan. It was stated that, in order to make payment towards the said unit, the complainant raised housing loan, to the tune of Rs.64 lacs, from Proforma opposite party no.3. It was further stated that initially, as per demands raised by opposite parties No.1 and 2, the complainant paid an amount of Rs.20,41,301/- by 30.12.2012.

    2. It was further stated that on 29.01.2013, Independent Floor Buyer's Agreement (Annexure C-5) was executed between the parties. As per Clause 11 (a) of the Agreement, opposite parties No.1 and 2 were required to deliver possession of the unit, in question, to the complainant, within a period of 30 months, from the date of application dated 30.08.2012 i.e. on or before 28.02.2015, subject to force majeure circumstances. It was further stated that, as per the demands raised by opposite parties No.1 and 2, the complainant had paid an amount of Rs.75,95,023.95Ps., till 28.02.2015, i.e. more than 95% of the sale consideration, but possession of the unit was not even offered by the stipulated date.

    3. It was further stated that the representatives of the complainant visited the site a number of times but were shocked to see that there was no development. Even basic amenities were not in existence. Various telephone calls made and also visits made to the office of opposite parties No.1 and 2, at Chandigarh, to know about status of the project, yielded no result. When possession of the unit, in question, was not offered to the complainant, by the stipulated date, he sought refund of the amount deposited, alongwith interest and compensation, but opposite parties No.1 and 2 flatly refused to do so. It was further stated that, on the other hand, vide letter dated 15.02.2016 (Annexure C-6), an illegal demand of Rs.34,89,642.63Ps., was raised by opposite parties No.1 and 2. It was further stated that vide the said letter, it was intimated to the complainant to make payment of the said amount, so as to enable opposite parties No.1 and 2 to handover possession of the unit.

    4. It was further stated that, on receipt of letter dated 15.02.2016, the complainant came to India, and visited the site, but was shocked to see that still there was no development there and basic amenities were also not made available. It was further stated that despite the fact that all basic amenities such as roads, electricity, water, sewerage, storm water, drainage etc. were not available at the site, opposite parties No.1 and 2 offered paper possession of the unit, in question vide letter dated 15.02.2016. It was further stated that even as on today, major part of the project is as good as jungle. Even access to the unit was not made available. Necessary permissions/certificates were also not obtained by opposite parties No.1 and 2, from the competent authorities. It was further stated that when despite requests having been made to opposite parties No.1 and 2, refund was not made to the complainant, he sent email dated 04.03.2016 (Annexure C-9), as final notice, but to no avail.

    5. It was further stated that the aforesaid acts of opposite parties No.1 and 2 amounted to deficiency in providing service and adoption of unfair trade practice. Hence, this consumer complaint was filed by the complainant, seeking refund of the amount deposited alongwith interest, compensation and litigation expenses.

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    6. Opposite parties No.1 and 2 in their joint written reply pleaded that this Commission has got no territorial jurisdiction to entertain the complaint. It was further pleaded that in the face of arbitration clause contained in the Agreement, dispute if any, was required to be referred to an Arbitrator, as such, the consumer complaint was not maintainable. It was further pleaded that the complainant being an NRI, had purchased the said unit for future gain, as such, he did not fall within the definition of a consumer, as defined under Section 2 (1) (d) of the Act. It was further pleaded that since the proceedings before the Consumer Foras are summary, in nature, this Commission is not competent to adjudicate this complaint. In other words, it is said that only a Civil Court could adjudicate the dispute, in question. It was admitted that the complainant had purchased the unit, in question, from opposite parties No.1 and 2. Execution of Agreement was also admitted. It was also admitted that possession of the unit was to be delivered within 30 months, from the date of signing of application i.e. latest by 28.02.2015. It was admitted that possession of the unit was not even offered by the stipulated date. It was further stated that the complainant has paid an amount of Rs.69,76,212/- and not Rs.75,95,023.95Ps., as mentioned in the complaint. It was further stated that possession of the unit was offered to the complainant on 15.02.2016, after obtaining partial completion certificate and occupation certificate. It was further stated that the complainant was a defaulter in making payment of installments. It was further stated that the development work, which is going on, is for the clubhouse, play area, yoga centre etc. amenities. It was further stated that, however, other basic amenities are all upto the mark. The remaining averments were denied, being wrong. It is prayed that the complaint having no substance, be dismissed.

    7. Service of opposite party no.3 was dispensed with, by this Commission, vide order dated 11.03.2016, as no relief has been pressed against it, by the complainant.

    8. The complainant and opposite parties No.1 and 2 led evidence in support of their cases, by way of filing their respective affidavits, alongwith which, number of documents were attached.

    9. The first question that falls for consideration is, as to whether, in the face of existence of arbitration clause in the Agreement, to settle disputes between the parties through Arbitration, in terms of provisions of Section 8 (amended) of Arbitration Act 1996, this Commission has no jurisdiction to entertain the present complaint. It may be stated here that the objection raised by opposite parties No.1 and 2, in this regard, deserves rejection, in view of the judgment passed by this Commission in Abha Arora Vs. Puma Realtors Pvt. Ltd. and another, consumer complaint No.170 of 2015, decided on 01.04.2016 and Praveen Kumar Arora and another Vs. Emaar MGF Land Limited, Consumer Complaint no.198 of 2015, decided on 04.04.2016, wherein this issue was dealt, in detail, while referring various judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India; the National Commission, New Delhi, and also Section 3 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. Ultimately it was held by this Commission that even in the face of existence of arbitration clause in the Agreement, to settle disputes between the parties through Arbitration, in terms of provisions of Section 8 (amended) of 1996 Act, this Commission has jurisdiction to entertain the consumer complaint. It was also so said by the National Commission, recently, in a case titled as Lt. Col. Anil Raj & anr. Vs. M/s. Unitech Limited, and another, Consumer Case No. 346 of 2013, decided on 02.05.2016. Relevant portion of the said case, reads thus:-

    "In so far as the question of a remedy under the Act being barred because of the existence of Arbitration Agreement between the parties, the issue is no longer res-integra. In a catena of decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, it has been held that even if there exists an arbitration clause in the agreement and a Complaint is filed by the consumer, in relation to certain deficiency of service, then the existence of an arbitration clause will not be a bar for the entertainment of the Complaint by a Consumer Fora, constituted under the Act, since the remedy provided under the Act is in addition to the provisions of any other law for the time being in force. The reasoning and ratio of these decisions, particularly in Secretary, Thirumurugan Cooperative Agricultural Credit Society Vs. M. Lalitha (Dead) Through LRs. & Others - (2004) 1 SCC 305; still holds the field, notwithstanding the recent amendments in the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1986. [Also see: Skypak Couriers Ltd. Vs. Tata Chemicals Ltd. - (2000) 5 SCC 294 andNational Seeds Corporation Limited Vs. M. Madhusudhan Reddy & Anr. - (2012) 2 SCC 506.] It has thus, been authoritatively held that

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    the protection provided to the Consumers under the Act is in addition to the remedies available under any other Statute, including the consentient arbitration under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1986."

    10. In view of the above, and also in the face of ratio of judgments, referred to above, passed by the National Commission and this Commission, the arguments raised by Counsel for opposite parties No.1 and 2, stands rejected.

    11. The next question, that falls for consideration, is, as to whether, this Commission has got territorial Jurisdiction, to entertain and decide the complaint, or not. According to Section 17 of the Act, a consumer complaint could be filed by the complainant, before the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, within the territorial Jurisdiction whereof, a part of cause of action arose to him. In the instant case, Independent Floor Buyers Agreement was executed between the parties at Chandigarh. Not only this, perusal of record reveals that almost all the letters had been issued by opposite parties No.1 and 2, from their office at Chandigarh i.e. from "DLF India Limited, Chandigarh Technology Park, Plot No.2, Tower-D, Ground Floor, Chandigarh, U.T." Since, as per the documents, referred to above, a part of cause of action, arose to the complainant, at Chandigarh, this Commission has got territorial Jurisdiction to entertain and decide the complaint. The objection taken by opposite parties No.1 and 2, in their written version, in this regard, therefore, being devoid of merit, must fail, and the same stands rejected.

    12. The next question, that falls for consideration, is, as to whether, the complainant fell within the definition of a consumer, as defined by Section 2 (1) (d) (ii) of the Act, or not. It may be stated here that the mere objection of opposite parties No.1 and 2that since the complainant is a Non-Resident Indian (NRI), as such he had purchased the unit, by way of investment, to gain huge profits, by selling the same, as and when there was escalation in prices, does not carry any weight and is liable to be rejected. It has been mentioned by the complainant, in para no.2 of his complaint that the said unit has been purchased by him, for permanent settlement of his parents, in or around Chandigarh, in the vicinity of his family friends. It has also been clearly mentioned in the complaint that the said unit was purchased by him, exclusively for residential purpose of his family and also he has never indulged himself, in sale of even a single property. On the other hand, nothing contrary to this, has been proved by opposite parties No.1 and 2, by placing on record, any document. Even otherwise, the mere fact that it was a residential unit, which was allotted, in favour of the complainant, was sufficient to prove that it was to be used for the purpose of residence, by the complainant, might be on or off while he visits to India or his family. There is nothing, on the record, that the complainant is a property dealer, and deals in the sale and purchase of property. No evidence was also produced, by the opposite parties, to prove that the complainant owned a number of other residential properties, in the tricity, and, as such, the unit, in question, was purchased by him, by way of investment, with a view to resell the same, as and when, there was escalation in the prices thereof. At the same time, no law debars an NRI, who basically belonged to India, to purchase a residential property in India. Under similar circumstances, the Hon'ble National Commission, in a case titled as Smt. Reshma Bhagat & Anr. Vs. M/s Supertech Ltd. Consumer Complaint No. 118 of 2012, decided on 04.01.2016, held as under:-

    "We are unable to clap any significance with these faint arguments. It must be borne in mind that after selling the property at Bangalore, and in order to save the money from riggers of capital gain tax, under Section 54 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, there lies no rub in getting the property, anywhere, in whole of India. There is not even an iota of evidence that they are going to earn anything from the flat in dispute. From the evidence, it is apparent that the same had been purchased for the residence of the complainants. Moreover, Sh. Tarun S. Bhagat, who is an independent person. It cannot be made a 'rule of thumb' that every NRI cannot own a property in India. NRIs do come to India, every now and then. Most of the NRIs have to return to their native land. Each NRI wants a house in India. He is an independent person and can purchase any house in India, in his own name."

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    13. Thus, in the absence of any cogent evidence, in support of the objection raised by opposite parties No.1 and 2, mere bald assertion to that effect, cannot be taken into consideration. In a case titled as Kavita Ahuja Vs. Shipra Estate Ltd. and Jai Krishna Estate Developer Pvt. Ltd. Consumer Complaint No.137 of 2010, decided on 12.02.2015, by the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, New Delhi, it was held that the buyer(s) of the residential unit(s), would be termed as consumer(s), unless it is proved that he or she had booked the same for commercial purpose. Similar view was reiterated by the National Commission, in DLF Universal Limited Vs Nirmala Devi Gupta, Revision Petition No. 3861 of 2014, decided on 26.08.2015. The principle of law, laid down, in the aforesaid cases, is fully applicable to the present case. Under these circumstances, by no stretch of imagination, it can be said that, being NRI, the unit, in question, was purchased by the complainant, by way of investment, with a view to earn profit, in future. The complainant, thus, falls within the definition of a 'consumer', as defined under Section 2(1)(d) of the Act. Such an objection, taken by opposite parties No.1 and 2, in their written reply, therefore, being devoid of merit, is rejected.

    14. The next question, that falls for consideration, is, as to whether, the present consumer complaint was not maintainable, and only a Civil Court can decide the case. It may be stated here, that the complainant hired the services of opposite parties No.1 and 2, for purchasing the unit, in the manner, referred to above. According to Clause 11 (a) of the Agreement, opposite parties No.1 and 2 were required to deliver possession of the unit, in question, to the complainant, within a period of 30 months, from the date of application dated 30.08.2012 i.e. on or before 28.02.2015, alongwith all basic amenities as mentioned in Brochure and Agreement. Section 2 (1) (o) of the Act, defines service as under:-

    "service" means service of any description which is made available to potential users and includes, but not limited to, the provision of facilities in connection with banking, financing insurance, transport, processing, supply of electrical or other energy, board or lodging or both, housing construction, entertainment, amusement or the purveying of news or other information, but does not include the rendering of any service free of charge or under a contract of personal service"

    From the afore-extracted Section 2(1)(o) of the Act, it is evident that housing/construction, also comes within the definition of a service. In Narne Construction P. Ltd., etc. etc. Vs. Union Of India and Ors. Etc., II (2012) CPJ 4 (SC), it was held that when a person applies for the allotment of a building or site or for a flat constructed by the Development Authority and enters into an agreement with the Developer, or the Contractor, the nature of transaction is covered by the expression 'service' of any description. Housing construction or building activity carried on by a private or statutory body constitutes 'service' within the ambit of Section 2(1)(o) of the Act. Similar principle of law was laid down, in Haryana Agricultural Marketing Board Vs. Bishambar Dayal Goyal & Ors. (AIR 2014 S.C. 1766). Under these circumstances, the complaint involves the consumer dispute, and the same is maintainable. Not only this, as stated above, Section 3 of 1986 Act, provides an alternative remedy. Even if, it is assumed that the complainant has a remedy to file a suit, in the Civil Court, the alternative remedy provided under Section 3 of 1986 Act, can also be availed of by him, as he falls within the definition of consumer. In this view of the matter, the objection of opposite parties No.1 and 2 in this regard, being devoid of merit, must fail, and the same stands rejected.

    15. The next question, that falls for consideration, is, as to within which period, possession of the unit, in question, was to be delivered to the complainant. As stated above, according to Clause 11 (a) of the Agreement, opposite parties No.1 and 2 were required to deliver possession of the unit, in question, to the complainant, within a period of 30 months, from the date of application dated 30.08.2012 i.e. on or before 28.02.2015. Admittedly, in the present case, possession of the unit, in question, was not delivered to the complainant, by the stipulated date. The Hon'ble Supreme Court

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    of India, in Lucknow Development Authority vs M.K. Gupta, 1994 SCC (1) 243, held that if a builder fails to deliver possession of the property by the stipulated period, the delay so caused is denial of service. Thus, it could very well be said that the act of non-delivery of possession of the unit, by the stipulated date, in the absence of any force majeure circumstances, is a material deficiency on the part of opposite parties No.1 and 2.

    16. The next question that falls for consideration, is, as to whether, the complainant was bound to accept offer of possession, in respect of the unit, in question, when the same was offered to him vide letter dated 15.02.2016, i.e. after long delay of about one year, and that too, in the absence of any force majeure circumstances. It may be stated here that non-delivery of possession of the unit, in question, by the stipulated date, is a material violation of the terms and conditions of the Agreement. It is not the case of opposite parties No.1 and 2 that the said delay occurred, on account of force majeure circumstances, met by them, on account of some stay or any other valid reason. Under similar circumstances, this Commission, in the case of Brig Ajay Raina (Retd.) and another Vs. M/s Unitech Limited, Consumer Complaint No.59 of 2016, decided on 24.05.2016, while relying upon the judgments rendered by the Hon'ble National Commission, held as under:-

    "Further, even if, it is assumed for the sake of arguments, that offer of possession, was made to the complainants, in July 2015 i.e. after a delay of about three years, from the stipulated date, even then, it is not obligatory upon the complainants to accept the same. It was so held by the National Commission in Emaar MGF Land Limited and another Vs. Dilshad Gill, III (2015) CPJ 329 (NC). Recently also, under similar circumstances, in the case of M/s. Emaar MGF Land Ltd. & Anr. Vs. Dr.Manuj Chhabra, First Appeal No.1028 of 2015, decided on 19.04.2016, the National Commission, held as under:-

    "I am of the prima facie view that even if the said offer was genuine, yet, the Complainant was not obliged to accept such an offer, made after a lapse of more than two years of committed date of delivery".

    The principle of law laid down in the aforesaid cases is fully applicable to the present case. It is therefore held that the complainants could not be held guilty, of filing the present complaint, seeking refund of the deposited amount, alongwith interest and compensation, as possession of the unit was not offered to them by the stipulated date.

    17. In view of the above, it is held that since there was a material violation on the part of opposite parties No.1 and 2, in not handing over possession by the stipulated date, as mentioned in the Agreement, the complainant was at liberty, not to accept the offer made after a long delay, and on the other hand, was right by seeking refund of the amount deposited, alongwith interest and compensation, by way of filing the instant complaint.

    18. No doubt, reliance was placed by opposite parties No.1 and 2, on the partial completion certificate Annexure R-6, to contend that basic amenities were complete at the site. First of all, it may be stated here that, it was only a partial completion certificate and not a final completion certificate in respect of the said project. Further, perusal of partial completion certificate reveals that it was issued on 10.09.2014, but, at the same time, it is also not clarified by opposite parties No.1 and 2, as to what stopped them, thereafter, to offer possession of the unit to the complainant, by the stipulated date i.e. by 28.02.2015, once they had obtained the said certificate, in case, they were ready, to do so. Besides this, It is clearly mentioned in the said certificate that still final completion certificate is to be issued by the Competent Authority. No document has been brought on record, to prove that the conditions imposed upon opposite parties No.1 and 2, in the partial completion certificate has been complied with, as a result whereof, they have been issued final completion certificate. Therefore, in the absence of final completion certificate, having been issued to opposite parties No.1 and 2, it is open to the complainant, to say no to the possession, so offered to him and that too after a long delay of about one year. Similar view was taken by the Hon'ble National Commission, in Inderjit Singh Bakshi Versus

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    S.M.V. Agencies Private Limited, FA No. 729 of 2013, decided on 30.11.2015, observing as under:-

    "An allottee is not obliged to take possession of a flat unless it is complete in every respect, including the completion certificate".

    19. The principle of law laid down in the aforesaid case, is fully applicable to the present case. Opposite parties No.1 and 2 have failed to produce on record, anything including any judgment of the Appellate Fora, which says that a builder can offer or deliver possession of a unit, even on obtaining partial completion certificate also. Thus, no shelter can be taken by opposite parties No.1 and 2, under the partial completion certificate dated 10.09.2014, in any manner.

    20. As far as obtaining of occupation certificate dated 19.08.2015, in respect of the unit, in question, is concerned, it may be stated here that, firstly, it has been obtained after the stipulated date of delivery i.e. after 28.02.2015 (promised date) and secondly, as held above, in the absence of final completion certificate and also once there was a material violation on the part of the builder, in not handing over possession, in time, it is not obligatory for the purchaser to accept possession after that date. Even this much has not been clarified by opposite parties No.1 and 2, as to what stopped them, to offer possession of the unit, in question, before February 2016, when occupation certificate had already been obtained by them, in August 2015. Why did they take six months to offer possession, after obtaining occupation certificate on 19.08.2015, for sending offer of possession, is also not clarified. Thus, it could very well be said that even by the time, occupation certificate was obtained on 19.08.2015, basic amenities were not in existence at site. Had basic amenities been provided at the site, by the date occupation certificate was obtained by opposite parties No.1 and 2, they would have definitely offered possession of the unit, in the said month only i.e. in August 2015, but they failed to do so. No help, therefore, can be drawn by opposite parties No.1 and 2, from the certificate, referred to above, having been obtained after the stipulated date.

    21. Not only this, it is very significant to mention here that perusal of photographs dated 01.03.2016 (date of newspaper 'The Times of India, Chandigarh"), Annexure C-7 colly., reveals that the project is still not habitable. Power back up unit is still under construction. Footpaths have been left half constructed. Construction material such as sand, bricks etc. is lying on the half constructed roads. Roads have been constructed in parts. Besides this, other amenities shown in brochure Annexure C-1 are not even in sight. Thus, it could very well be said that even by 01.03.2016, basic amenities were not in existence, at the site. Thus, the act and conduct of opposite parties No.1 and 2, in offering possession of the unit, in question, in the absence of basic amenities and also basic construction work, depicted in the photographs, amounted to deficiency in providing service and adoption of unfair trade practice and as such it could very well be said that it was mere a paper possession and nothing else, to which the complainant was not under an obligation to accept.

    22. Further, even if, it is assumed for the sake of arguments, that offer of possession, was made to the complainant, in February 2016, which event was to have been happened in February 2015, it is not obligatory upon the complainant to accept the same, in view of the law laid by the Hon'ble National Commission in Emaar MGF Land Limited and another Vs. Dilshad Gill and M/s Emaar MGF Land Ltd. & Anr. Vs. Dr.Manuj Chhabra, cases (supra), wherein (Dr.Manuj Chhabra case) it was held that

    "……even if the said offer was genuine, yet, the Complainant was not obliged to accept such an offer, made after a lapse of more than two years of committed date of delivery".

    The principle of law laid down in the aforesaid cases is fully applicable to the present case.

    23. The next question, that falls for consideration, is, as to whether, the complainant is entitled to refund of the amount deposited by him. Once it has been held that it was not obligatory upon the complainant to accept offer of possession, after the stipulated date and also the offer already made by opposite parties No.1 and 2, has also been held to be a mere paper offer, we are of the considered view, that refund of the amount deposited, should be ordered. The complainant cannot be made to wait for an indefinite period, for delivery of actual physical possession of the unit. As stated above,

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    opposite parties No.1 and 2 failed to prove, by placing on record, any cogent and convincing material, that they encountered any force majeure circumstances, as a result whereof, possession of the unit, in question, was delayed. Opposite parties No.1 and 2, therefore, had no right, to retain the hard-earned money of the complainant, deposited towards price of the unit, in question. The complainant is, thus, entitled to get refund of amount deposited by him. In view of above facts of the case, opposite parties No.1 and 2, are also under an obligation to compensate the complainant, for inflicting mental agony and causing physical harassment to him, as also escalation in prices, which in our considered view, if granted to the tune of Rs.3 lacs, will be fair, adequate and reasonable.

    24. It is to be further seen, as to whether, interest, on the amount refunded can be granted, in favour of the complainant. An amount of Rs.75,95,023.95Ps., was paid by the complainant, without getting anything, in lieu thereof. The fact of making payment of Rs.75,95,023.95Ps., by the complainant, is evident from page 138 of the customer ledger Annexure C-10, issued by opposite parties No.1 and 2, on 01.03.2016. Credit amount in the account of the complainant on the said page is shown as Rs.75,95,023.95Ps. On the other hand, nothing has been brought on record, in the shape of any other statement of accounts, to prove to the contrary. To prove that lesser amount has been deposited by the complainant, than the one, claimed by him, some document in that regard was required to be produced on record, which is not so in the present case. The said amount has been used by opposite parties No.1 and 2, for their own benefit. There is no dispute that for making delayed payments, opposite parties No.1 and 2 were charging heavy rate of interest (@18% p.a.) as per Clause 39 (a) of the Agreement, for the period of delay in making payment of instalments. It is well settled law that whenever money has been received by a party and when its refund is ordered, the right to get interest follows, as a matter of course. The obligation to refund money received and retained without right implies and carries with it, the said right. It was also so said by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, in UOI vs. Tata Chemicals Ltd (Supreme Court), (2014) 6 SCC 335 decided on March 20th, 2014. In view of above, the complainant is certainly entitled to get refund of the amount deposited by him, to the tune of Rs.75,95,023.95Ps., alongwith interest @15% p.a., from the respective dates of deposits (less than the rate of interest charged by opposite parties No.1 and 2, in case of delayed payment i.e. 18% p.a., as per Clause 39 (a) of the Agreement), till realization.

    25. No other point, was urged, by Counsel for the parties.

    26. For the reasons recorded above, this complaint is partly accepted, with costs. Opposite parties No.1 and 2, are jointly and severally, directed as under:-

    i. To refund the amount of Rs.75,95,023.95Ps., to the complainant, alongwith interest @15% p.a. from the respective dates of deposits onwards.

    ii. To pay compensation, in the sum of Rs.3 lacs, for causing mental agony and physical harassment, to the complainant, as also escalation in prices.

    iii. To pay cost of litigation, to the tune of Rs.50,000/-, to the complainant.

    iv. The payment of awarded amounts mentioned at sr.nos.(i) to (iii), shall be made, within a period of 45 days from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order, failing which, the amount mentioned at sr.no.(i) shall carry penal interest @18% p.a. instead of @15%, from the respective dates of deposits onwards, and interest @15% p.a., on the amounts mentioned at sr.nos.(ii) and (iii), from the date of filing of this complaint, till realization.

    27. However, it is made clear that Proforma Opposite Party No.3, from which the complainant has availed loan, for making payment of installments towards the said unit, will have the first charge of the amount payable, to the extent, the same is due to be paid by him (complainant).

    28. Certified Copies of this order be sent to the parties, free of charge.

    29. The file be consigned to Record Room, after completion. Pronounced.

    27.05.2016

    Sd/-

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    [JUSTICE JASBIR SINGH (RETD.)]

    PRESIDENT

    Sd/-

    (DEV RAJ)

    MEMBER

    Sd/-

    (PADMA PANDEY)

    MEMBER

    Rb.

    9

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