PER MRS. PADMA PANDEY, MEMBER
The facts in brief are that allured by rosy pictures and assurance of lavish facilities, shown in the brochure Annexure C-1 and also various salient features projected by representatives of opposite parties No.1 and 2, the complainant moved an application with them, for purchase of a flat, in their project, under the name and style of Hyde Park Estate IF, New Chandigarh, Mullanpur, Punjab. Alongwith the application form, an amount of Rs.6 lacs was paid as earnest money. Subsequently, the complainant was allotted floor No.IF-R1-E411-GF/(Car Parking)P-R1-E411-GF, measuring 1881 square feet @Rs.3900/- per square feet, in the said project. Total sale price of the said unit was fixed at Rs.80,19,010.04Ps., which included External Development Charges, Preferential Location Charges, Maintenance Security Charges etc. The complainant opted for construction linked payment plan. It was stated that, in order to make payment towards the said unit, the complainant raised housing loan, to the tune of Rs.64 lacs, from Proforma opposite party no.3. It was further stated that initially, as per demands raised by opposite parties No.1 and 2, the complainant paid an amount of Rs.20,41,301/- by 30.12.2012.
2. It was further stated that on 29.01.2013, Independent Floor Buyer's Agreement (Annexure C-5) was executed between the parties. As per Clause 11 (a) of the Agreement, opposite parties No.1 and 2 were required to deliver possession of the unit, in question, to the complainant, within a period of 30 months, from the date of application dated 30.08.2012 i.e. on or before 28.02.2015, subject to force majeure circumstances. It was further stated that, as per the demands raised by opposite parties No.1 and 2, the complainant had paid an amount of Rs.75,95,023.95Ps., till 28.02.2015, i.e. more than 95% of the sale consideration, but possession of the unit was not even offered by the stipulated date.
3. It was further stated that the representatives of the complainant visited the site a number of times but were shocked to see that there was no development. Even basic amenities were not in existence. Various telephone calls made and also visits made to the office of opposite parties No.1 and 2, at Chandigarh, to know about status of the project, yielded no result. When possession of the unit, in question, was not offered to the complainant, by the stipulated date, he sought refund of the amount deposited, alongwith interest and compensation, but opposite parties No.1 and 2 flatly refused to do so. It was further stated that, on the other hand, vide letter dated 15.02.2016 (Annexure C-6), an illegal demand of Rs.34,89,642.63Ps., was raised by opposite parties No.1 and 2. It was further stated that vide the said letter, it was intimated to the complainant to make payment of the said amount, so as to enable opposite parties No.1 and 2 to handover possession of the unit.
4. It was further stated that, on receipt of letter dated 15.02.2016, the complainant came to India, and visited the site, but was shocked to see that still there was no development there and basic amenities were also not made available. It was further stated that despite the fact that all basic amenities such as roads, electricity, water, sewerage, storm water, drainage etc. were not available at the site, opposite parties No.1 and 2 offered paper possession of the unit, in question vide letter dated 15.02.2016. It was further stated that even as on today, major part of the project is as good as jungle. Even access to the unit was not made available. Necessary permissions/certificates were also not obtained by opposite parties No.1 and 2, from the competent authorities. It was further stated that when despite requests having been made to opposite parties No.1 and 2, refund was not made to the complainant, he sent email dated 04.03.2016 (Annexure C-9), as final notice, but to no avail.
5. It was further stated that the aforesaid acts of opposite parties No.1 and 2 amounted to deficiency in providing service and adoption of unfair trade practice. Hence, this consumer complaint was filed by the complainant, seeking refund of the amount deposited alongwith interest, compensation and litigation expenses.
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6. Opposite parties No.1 and 2 in their joint written reply pleaded that this Commission has got no territorial jurisdiction to entertain the complaint. It was further pleaded that in the face of arbitration clause contained in the Agreement, dispute if any, was required to be referred to an Arbitrator, as such, the consumer complaint was not maintainable. It was further pleaded that the complainant being an NRI, had purchased the said unit for future gain, as such, he did not fall within the definition of a consumer, as defined under Section 2 (1) (d) of the Act. It was further pleaded that since the proceedings before the Consumer Foras are summary, in nature, this Commission is not competent to adjudicate this complaint. In other words, it is said that only a Civil Court could adjudicate the dispute, in question. It was admitted that the complainant had purchased the unit, in question, from opposite parties No.1 and 2. Execution of Agreement was also admitted. It was also admitted that possession of the unit was to be delivered within 30 months, from the date of signing of application i.e. latest by 28.02.2015. It was admitted that possession of the unit was not even offered by the stipulated date. It was further stated that the complainant has paid an amount of Rs.69,76,212/- and not Rs.75,95,023.95Ps., as mentioned in the complaint. It was further stated that possession of the unit was offered to the complainant on 15.02.2016, after obtaining partial completion certificate and occupation certificate. It was further stated that the complainant was a defaulter in making payment of installments. It was further stated that the development work, which is going on, is for the clubhouse, play area, yoga centre etc. amenities. It was further stated that, however, other basic amenities are all upto the mark. The remaining averments were denied, being wrong. It is prayed that the complaint having no substance, be dismissed.
7. Service of opposite party no.3 was dispensed with, by this Commission, vide order dated 11.03.2016, as no relief has been pressed against it, by the complainant.
8. The complainant and opposite parties No.1 and 2 led evidence in support of their cases, by way of filing their respective affidavits, alongwith which, number of documents were attached.
9. The first question that falls for consideration is, as to whether, in the face of existence of arbitration clause in the Agreement, to settle disputes between the parties through Arbitration, in terms of provisions of Section 8 (amended) of Arbitration Act 1996, this Commission has no jurisdiction to entertain the present complaint. It may be stated here that the objection raised by opposite parties No.1 and 2, in this regard, deserves rejection, in view of the judgment passed by this Commission in Abha Arora Vs. Puma Realtors Pvt. Ltd. and another, consumer complaint No.170 of 2015, decided on 01.04.2016 and Praveen Kumar Arora and another Vs. Emaar MGF Land Limited, Consumer Complaint no.198 of 2015, decided on 04.04.2016, wherein this issue was dealt, in detail, while referring various judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India; the National Commission, New Delhi, and also Section 3 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. Ultimately it was held by this Commission that even in the face of existence of arbitration clause in the Agreement, to settle disputes between the parties through Arbitration, in terms of provisions of Section 8 (amended) of 1996 Act, this Commission has jurisdiction to entertain the consumer complaint. It was also so said by the National Commission, recently, in a case titled as Lt. Col. Anil Raj & anr. Vs. M/s. Unitech Limited, and another, Consumer Case No. 346 of 2013, decided on 02.05.2016. Relevant portion of the said case, reads thus:-
"In so far as the question of a remedy under the Act being barred because of the existence of Arbitration Agreement between the parties, the issue is no longer res-integra. In a catena of decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, it has been held that even if there exists an arbitration clause in the agreement and a Complaint is filed by the consumer, in relation to certain deficiency of service, then the existence of an arbitration clause will not be a bar for the entertainment of the Complaint by a Consumer Fora, constituted under the Act, since the remedy provided under the Act is in addition to the provisions of any other law for the time being in force. The reasoning and ratio of these decisions, particularly in Secretary, Thirumurugan Cooperative Agricultural Credit Society Vs. M. Lalitha (Dead) Through LRs. & Others - (2004) 1 SCC 305; still holds the field, notwithstanding the recent amendments in the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1986. [Also see: Skypak Couriers Ltd. Vs. Tata Chemicals Ltd. - (2000) 5 SCC 294 andNational Seeds Corporation Limited Vs. M. Madhusudhan Reddy & Anr. - (2012) 2 SCC 506.] It has thus, been authoritatively held that
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the protection provided to the Consumers under the Act is in addition to the remedies available under any other Statute, including the consentient arbitration under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1986."
10. In view of the above, and also in the face of ratio of judgments, referred to above, passed by the National Commission and this Commission, the arguments raised by Counsel for opposite parties No.1 and 2, stands rejected.
11. The next question, that falls for consideration, is, as to whether, this Commission has got territorial Jurisdiction, to entertain and decide the complaint, or not. According to Section 17 of the Act, a consumer complaint could be filed by the complainant, before the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, within the territorial Jurisdiction whereof, a part of cause of action arose to him. In the instant case, Independent Floor Buyers Agreement was executed between the parties at Chandigarh. Not only this, perusal of record reveals that almost all the letters had been issued by opposite parties No.1 and 2, from their office at Chandigarh i.e. from "DLF India Limited, Chandigarh Technology Park, Plot No.2, Tower-D, Ground Floor, Chandigarh, U.T." Since, as per the documents, referred to above, a part of cause of action, arose to the complainant, at Chandigarh, this Commission has got territorial Jurisdiction to entertain and decide the complaint. The objection taken by opposite parties No.1 and 2, in their written version, in this regard, therefore, being devoid of merit, must fail, and the same stands rejected.
12. The next question, that falls for consideration, is, as to whether, the complainant fell within the definition of a consumer, as defined by Section 2 (1) (d) (ii) of the Act, or not. It may be stated here that the mere objection of opposite parties No.1 and 2that since the complainant is a Non-Resident Indian (NRI), as such he had purchased the unit, by way of investment, to gain huge profits, by selling the same, as and when there was escalation in prices, does not carry any weight and is liable to be rejected. It has been mentioned by the complainant, in para no.2 of his complaint that the said unit has been purchased by him, for permanent settlement of his parents, in or around Chandigarh, in the vicinity of his family friends. It has also been clearly mentioned in the complaint that the said unit was purchased by him, exclusively for residential purpose of his family and also he has never indulged himself, in sale of even a single property. On the other hand, nothing contrary to this, has been proved by opposite parties No.1 and 2, by placing on record, any document. Even otherwise, the mere fact that it was a residential unit, which was allotted, in favour of the complainant, was sufficient to prove that it was to be used for the purpose of residence, by the complainant, might be on or off while he visits to India or his family. There is nothing, on the record, that the complainant is a property dealer, and deals in the sale and purchase of property. No evidence was also produced, by the opposite parties, to prove that the complainant owned a number of other residential properties, in the tricity, and, as such, the unit, in question, was purchased by him, by way of investment, with a view to resell the same, as and when, there was escalation in the prices thereof. At the same time, no law debars an NRI, who basically belonged to India, to purchase a residential property in India. Under similar circumstances, the Hon'ble National Commission, in a case titled as Smt. Reshma Bhagat & Anr. Vs. M/s Supertech Ltd. Consumer Complaint No. 118 of 2012, decided on 04.01.2016, held as under:-
"We are unable to clap any significance with these faint arguments. It must be borne in mind that after selling the property at Bangalore, and in order to save the money from riggers of capital gain tax, under Section 54 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, there lies no rub in getting the property, anywhere, in whole of India. There is not even an iota of evidence that they are going to earn anything from the flat in dispute. From the evidence, it is apparent that the same had been purchased for the residence of the complainants. Moreover, Sh. Tarun S. Bhagat, who is an independent person. It cannot be made a 'rule of thumb' that every NRI cannot own a property in India. NRIs do come to India, every now and then. Most of the NRIs have to return to their native land. Each NRI wants a house in India. He is an independent person and can purchase any house in India, in his own name."
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13. Thus, in the absence of any cogent evidence, in support of the objection raised by opposite parties No.1 and 2, mere bald assertion to that effect, cannot be taken into consideration. In a case titled as Kavita Ahuja Vs. Shipra Estate Ltd. and Jai Krishna Estate Developer Pvt. Ltd. Consumer Complaint No.137 of 2010, decided on 12.02.2015, by the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, New Delhi, it was held that the buyer(s) of the residential unit(s), would be termed as consumer(s), unless it is proved that he or she had booked the same for commercial purpose. Similar view was reiterated by the National Commission, in DLF Universal Limited Vs Nirmala Devi Gupta, Revision Petition No. 3861 of 2014, decided on 26.08.2015. The principle of law, laid down, in the aforesaid cases, is fully applicable to the present case. Under these circumstances, by no stretch of imagination, it can be said that, being NRI, the unit, in question, was purchased by the complainant, by way of investment, with a view to earn profit, in future. The complainant, thus, falls within the definition of a 'consumer', as defined under Section 2(1)(d) of the Act. Such an objection, taken by opposite parties No.1 and 2, in their written reply, therefore, being devoid of merit, is rejected.
14. The next question, that falls for consideration, is, as to whether, the present consumer complaint was not maintainable, and only a Civil Court can decide the case. It may be stated here, that the complainant hired the services of opposite parties No.1 and 2, for purchasing the unit, in the manner, referred to above. According to Clause 11 (a) of the Agreement, opposite parties No.1 and 2 were required to deliver possession of the unit, in question, to the complainant, within a period of 30 months, from the date of application dated 30.08.2012 i.e. on or before 28.02.2015, alongwith all basic amenities as mentioned in Brochure and Agreement. Section 2 (1) (o) of the Act, defines service as under:-
"service" means service of any description which is made available to potential users and includes, but not limited to, the provision of facilities in connection with banking, financing insurance, transport, processing, supply of electrical or other energy, board or lodging or both, housing construction, entertainment, amusement or the purveying of news or other information, but does not include the rendering of any service free of charge or under a contract of personal service"
From the afore-extracted Section 2(1)(o) of the Act, it is evident that housing/construction, also comes within the definition of a service. In Narne Construction P. Ltd., etc. etc. Vs. Union Of India and Ors. Etc., II (2012) CPJ 4 (SC), it was held that when a person applies for the allotment of a building or site or for a flat constructed by the Development Authority and enters into an agreement with the Developer, or the Contractor, the nature of transaction is covered by the expression 'service' of any description. Housing construction or building activity carried on by a private or statutory body constitutes 'service' within the ambit of Section 2(1)(o) of the Act. Similar principle of law was laid down, in Haryana Agricultural Marketing Board Vs. Bishambar Dayal Goyal & Ors. (AIR 2014 S.C. 1766). Under these circumstances, the complaint involves the consumer dispute, and the same is maintainable. Not only this, as stated above, Section 3 of 1986 Act, provides an alternative remedy. Even if, it is assumed that the complainant has a remedy to file a suit, in the Civil Court, the alternative remedy provided under Section 3 of 1986 Act, can also be availed of by him, as he falls within the definition of consumer. In this view of the matter, the objection of opposite parties No.1 and 2 in this regard, being devoid of merit, must fail, and the same stands rejected.
15. The next question, that falls for consideration, is, as to within which period, possession of the unit, in question, was to be delivered to the complainant. As stated above, according to Clause 11 (a) of the Agreement, opposite parties No.1 and 2 were required to deliver possession of the unit, in question, to the complainant, within a period of 30 months, from the date of application dated 30.08.2012 i.e. on or before 28.02.2015. Admittedly, in the present case, possession of the unit, in question, was not delivered to the complainant, by the stipulated date. The Hon'ble Supreme Court
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of India, in Lucknow Development Authority vs M.K. Gupta, 1994 SCC (1) 243, held that if a builder fails to deliver possession of the property by the stipulated period, the delay so caused is denial of service. Thus, it could very well be said that the act of non-delivery of possession of the unit, by the stipulated date, in the absence of any force majeure circumstances, is a material deficiency on the part of opposite parties No.1 and 2.
16. The next question that falls for consideration, is, as to whether, the complainant was bound to accept offer of possession, in respect of the unit, in question, when the same was offered to him vide letter dated 15.02.2016, i.e. after long delay of about one year, and that too, in the absence of any force majeure circumstances. It may be stated here that non-delivery of possession of the unit, in question, by the stipulated date, is a material violation of the terms and conditions of the Agreement. It is not the case of opposite parties No.1 and 2 that the said delay occurred, on account of force majeure circumstances, met by them, on account of some stay or any other valid reason. Under similar circumstances, this Commission, in the case of Brig Ajay Raina (Retd.) and another Vs. M/s Unitech Limited, Consumer Complaint No.59 of 2016, decided on 24.05.2016, while relying upon the judgments rendered by the Hon'ble National Commission, held as under:-
"Further, even if, it is assumed for the sake of arguments, that offer of possession, was made to the complainants, in July 2015 i.e. after a delay of about three years, from the stipulated date, even then, it is not obligatory upon the complainants to accept the same. It was so held by the National Commission in Emaar MGF Land Limited and another Vs. Dilshad Gill, III (2015) CPJ 329 (NC). Recently also, under similar circumstances, in the case of M/s. Emaar MGF Land Ltd. & Anr. Vs. Dr.Manuj Chhabra, First Appeal No.1028 of 2015, decided on 19.04.2016, the National Commission, held as under:-
"I am of the prima facie view that even if the said offer was genuine, yet, the Complainant was not obliged to accept such an offer, made after a lapse of more than two years of committed date of delivery".
The principle of law laid down in the aforesaid cases is fully applicable to the present case. It is therefore held that the complainants could not be held guilty, of filing the present complaint, seeking refund of the deposited amount, alongwith interest and compensation, as possession of the unit was not offered to them by the stipulated date.
17. In view of the above, it is held that since there was a material violation on the part of opposite parties No.1 and 2, in not handing over possession by the stipulated date, as mentioned in the Agreement, the complainant was at liberty, not to accept the offer made after a long delay, and on the other hand, was right by seeking refund of the amount deposited, alongwith interest and compensation, by way of filing the instant complaint.
18. No doubt, reliance was placed by opposite parties No.1 and 2, on the partial completion certificate Annexure R-6, to contend that basic amenities were complete at the site. First of all, it may be stated here that, it was only a partial completion certificate and not a final completion certificate in respect of the said project. Further, perusal of partial completion certificate reveals that it was issued on 10.09.2014, but, at the same time, it is also not clarified by opposite parties No.1 and 2, as to what stopped them, thereafter, to offer possession of the unit to the complainant, by the stipulated date i.e. by 28.02.2015, once they had obtained the said certificate, in case, they were ready, to do so. Besides this, It is clearly mentioned in the said certificate that still final completion certificate is to be issued by the Competent Authority. No document has been brought on record, to prove that the conditions imposed upon opposite parties No.1 and 2, in the partial completion certificate has been complied with, as a result whereof, they have been issued final completion certificate. Therefore, in the absence of final completion certificate, having been issued to opposite parties No.1 and 2, it is open to the complainant, to say no to the possession, so offered to him and that too after a long delay of about one year. Similar view was taken by the Hon'ble National Commission, in Inderjit Singh Bakshi Versus
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S.M.V. Agencies Private Limited, FA No. 729 of 2013, decided on 30.11.2015, observing as under:-
"An allottee is not obliged to take possession of a flat unless it is complete in every respect, including the completion certificate".
19. The principle of law laid down in the aforesaid case, is fully applicable to the present case. Opposite parties No.1 and 2 have failed to produce on record, anything including any judgment of the Appellate Fora, which says that a builder can offer or deliver possession of a unit, even on obtaining partial completion certificate also. Thus, no shelter can be taken by opposite parties No.1 and 2, under the partial completion certificate dated 10.09.2014, in any manner.
20. As far as obtaining of occupation certificate dated 19.08.2015, in respect of the unit, in question, is concerned, it may be stated here that, firstly, it has been obtained after the stipulated date of delivery i.e. after 28.02.2015 (promised date) and secondly, as held above, in the absence of final completion certificate and also once there was a material violation on the part of the builder, in not handing over possession, in time, it is not obligatory for the purchaser to accept possession after that date. Even this much has not been clarified by opposite parties No.1 and 2, as to what stopped them, to offer possession of the unit, in question, before February 2016, when occupation certificate had already been obtained by them, in August 2015. Why did they take six months to offer possession, after obtaining occupation certificate on 19.08.2015, for sending offer of possession, is also not clarified. Thus, it could very well be said that even by the time, occupation certificate was obtained on 19.08.2015, basic amenities were not in existence at site. Had basic amenities been provided at the site, by the date occupation certificate was obtained by opposite parties No.1 and 2, they would have definitely offered possession of the unit, in the said month only i.e. in August 2015, but they failed to do so. No help, therefore, can be drawn by opposite parties No.1 and 2, from the certificate, referred to above, having been obtained after the stipulated date.
21. Not only this, it is very significant to mention here that perusal of photographs dated 01.03.2016 (date of newspaper 'The Times of India, Chandigarh"), Annexure C-7 colly., reveals that the project is still not habitable. Power back up unit is still under construction. Footpaths have been left half constructed. Construction material such as sand, bricks etc. is lying on the half constructed roads. Roads have been constructed in parts. Besides this, other amenities shown in brochure Annexure C-1 are not even in sight. Thus, it could very well be said that even by 01.03.2016, basic amenities were not in existence, at the site. Thus, the act and conduct of opposite parties No.1 and 2, in offering possession of the unit, in question, in the absence of basic amenities and also basic construction work, depicted in the photographs, amounted to deficiency in providing service and adoption of unfair trade practice and as such it could very well be said that it was mere a paper possession and nothing else, to which the complainant was not under an obligation to accept.
22. Further, even if, it is assumed for the sake of arguments, that offer of possession, was made to the complainant, in February 2016, which event was to have been happened in February 2015, it is not obligatory upon the complainant to accept the same, in view of the law laid by the Hon'ble National Commission in Emaar MGF Land Limited and another Vs. Dilshad Gill and M/s Emaar MGF Land Ltd. & Anr. Vs. Dr.Manuj Chhabra, cases (supra), wherein (Dr.Manuj Chhabra case) it was held that
"……even if the said offer was genuine, yet, the Complainant was not obliged to accept such an offer, made after a lapse of more than two years of committed date of delivery".
The principle of law laid down in the aforesaid cases is fully applicable to the present case.
23. The next question, that falls for consideration, is, as to whether, the complainant is entitled to refund of the amount deposited by him. Once it has been held that it was not obligatory upon the complainant to accept offer of possession, after the stipulated date and also the offer already made by opposite parties No.1 and 2, has also been held to be a mere paper offer, we are of the considered view, that refund of the amount deposited, should be ordered. The complainant cannot be made to wait for an indefinite period, for delivery of actual physical possession of the unit. As stated above,
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opposite parties No.1 and 2 failed to prove, by placing on record, any cogent and convincing material, that they encountered any force majeure circumstances, as a result whereof, possession of the unit, in question, was delayed. Opposite parties No.1 and 2, therefore, had no right, to retain the hard-earned money of the complainant, deposited towards price of the unit, in question. The complainant is, thus, entitled to get refund of amount deposited by him. In view of above facts of the case, opposite parties No.1 and 2, are also under an obligation to compensate the complainant, for inflicting mental agony and causing physical harassment to him, as also escalation in prices, which in our considered view, if granted to the tune of Rs.3 lacs, will be fair, adequate and reasonable.
24. It is to be further seen, as to whether, interest, on the amount refunded can be granted, in favour of the complainant. An amount of Rs.75,95,023.95Ps., was paid by the complainant, without getting anything, in lieu thereof. The fact of making payment of Rs.75,95,023.95Ps., by the complainant, is evident from page 138 of the customer ledger Annexure C-10, issued by opposite parties No.1 and 2, on 01.03.2016. Credit amount in the account of the complainant on the said page is shown as Rs.75,95,023.95Ps. On the other hand, nothing has been brought on record, in the shape of any other statement of accounts, to prove to the contrary. To prove that lesser amount has been deposited by the complainant, than the one, claimed by him, some document in that regard was required to be produced on record, which is not so in the present case. The said amount has been used by opposite parties No.1 and 2, for their own benefit. There is no dispute that for making delayed payments, opposite parties No.1 and 2 were charging heavy rate of interest (@18% p.a.) as per Clause 39 (a) of the Agreement, for the period of delay in making payment of instalments. It is well settled law that whenever money has been received by a party and when its refund is ordered, the right to get interest follows, as a matter of course. The obligation to refund money received and retained without right implies and carries with it, the said right. It was also so said by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, in UOI vs. Tata Chemicals Ltd (Supreme Court), (2014) 6 SCC 335 decided on March 20th, 2014. In view of above, the complainant is certainly entitled to get refund of the amount deposited by him, to the tune of Rs.75,95,023.95Ps., alongwith interest @15% p.a., from the respective dates of deposits (less than the rate of interest charged by opposite parties No.1 and 2, in case of delayed payment i.e. 18% p.a., as per Clause 39 (a) of the Agreement), till realization.
25. No other point, was urged, by Counsel for the parties.
26. For the reasons recorded above, this complaint is partly accepted, with costs. Opposite parties No.1 and 2, are jointly and severally, directed as under:-
i. To refund the amount of Rs.75,95,023.95Ps., to the complainant, alongwith interest @15% p.a. from the respective dates of deposits onwards.
ii. To pay compensation, in the sum of Rs.3 lacs, for causing mental agony and physical harassment, to the complainant, as also escalation in prices.
iii. To pay cost of litigation, to the tune of Rs.50,000/-, to the complainant.
iv. The payment of awarded amounts mentioned at sr.nos.(i) to (iii), shall be made, within a period of 45 days from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order, failing which, the amount mentioned at sr.no.(i) shall carry penal interest @18% p.a. instead of @15%, from the respective dates of deposits onwards, and interest @15% p.a., on the amounts mentioned at sr.nos.(ii) and (iii), from the date of filing of this complaint, till realization.
27. However, it is made clear that Proforma Opposite Party No.3, from which the complainant has availed loan, for making payment of installments towards the said unit, will have the first charge of the amount payable, to the extent, the same is due to be paid by him (complainant).
28. Certified Copies of this order be sent to the parties, free of charge.
29. The file be consigned to Record Room, after completion. Pronounced.
27.05.2016
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[JUSTICE JASBIR SINGH (RETD.)]
PRESIDENT
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(DEV RAJ)
MEMBER
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(PADMA PANDEY)
MEMBER
Rb.
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