IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Civil Revision No. 212 of 2016 with .
Civil Revision No. 12 of 2017 . Reserved on : 30.03.2017 P
Date of decision : 6th A H pril, 2017 _______________________________________________ f ___________ Civil Revision No. 212 of 2016 Sh. Champeshwar Lall Sood & Anr. o …Petitioners/Landlords Versus Sh. Gurpartap Singh & Ors. t ..…Respondents.
Civil Revision No. 12 of 2017
r
Sh. Gurpartap Singh u ..…Petitioner o Versus Sh. Champeshwar Lall Sood & Ors. …Respondents Coram C
The Hon h 'ble M r. Justice Tarlok Singh Chauhan, Judge. W g hether approved for reporting? Yes. i For the Petitioner(s) : Mr. R. L. Sood, Senior Advocate, with Mr. Arjun Lall & Mr. Sanjeev Kumar, H
Advocates in CR No. 212 of 2016. Mr. Kashmir Singh Thakur and Harjeet Singh, Advocates in CR No. 12 of 2017 For the Respondent(s) : Mr. Kashmir Singh Thakur and
Harjeet Singh, Advocates, for
respondents No. 1 and 7 in CR No.
212 of 2016.
Mr. R. L. Sood, Senior Advocate, with
1
2
Mr. Arjun Lall & Mr. Sanjeev Kumar, Advocates for respondents No. 1 and 2 in CR No. 12 of 2017.
.
Justice Tarlok Singh Chauhan, Judge
.P
Since both these review petitions H are directed against the same order passed by the l f earned appellate authority on 2.11.2016, they were taken o up together for hearing
and are being disposed of by way of a common judgment.
2. The parties for the s r aket of convenience and for no other purpose, lest it ca u uses any prejudice to either of the parties, shall be refer o red to as the landlords and tenant(s).
3. T he C landlords are the owners of Shop No. 14, Middle Bazaar, h Shimla, measuring 313 sq. ft. (hereinafter referred to as th g e premises in question) as also one floor above the same i bearing Municipal No. 14/1, Middle Bazaar, Shimla. They in the H
year 2004, filed an eviction petition against the tenants on the ground that the tenants had sublet the premises in question to respondent No. 7 Shri Kanwar Ali without the written permission or consent of the landlords. This petition was allowed by the
learned Rent Controller vide order dated 26.8.2016 passed in
eviction petition No. 19-2 of 15/04.
3
4. The order of eviction was assailed by the tenant/respondent No. 1 by filing an appeal before the .
appellate authority and the same was registered as Rent Pe P tition No. 14-S/13(b) of 2016. The appeal was accompanied. by an application for stay being miscellaneous applica tio H n No. 58-S/6 of 2016. f
5. The landlords filed reply t to t o he application claiming therein mesne profits on the basis of an agreement executed by Bata India Ltd. in their favo u ur writh respect of premises known as 14/1, Middle Bazaar, o Shimla, which premises as observed above are situate just above the premises in question. Alongwith the agreement a n C affidavit of Harnam Singh, Manager of the Shimla Branch h of Bata Shoe shop was also filed and it was averred that
ibog th these documents clearly establish that the premises 14/1, Middle Bazaar had been let out by the petitioner/landlord No. 2
H
to Bata India @ Rs. 295.56 paise per sq. ft. with a provision for an increase of rental. Based upon the aforesaid agreement and affidavit, It was averred that if it all the stay is to be granted in favour of the tenant/respondent No. 1, he should be ordered to
pay the current use and occupation charges @ Rs. 313.54 paise
per sq. ft.
4
6. The learned appellate authority vide impugned order dated 2.11.2016 granted stay qua the operation and .
enforcement of the eviction order dated 26.8.2016 on P the condition that the tenants would pay the use and H occu.pation charges @ Rs.12,000/- per month to be paid f f rom 1 st September, 2016 onwards.
7. It is against this order th t at bo o th the parties have filed their respective revision petitions r . 8. The landlords u would argue that once there was sufficient material pla o ced before the appellate authority then it had no option C other than to consider the same and thereafter determine th e use and occupation charges which in this case have b h een proved to be @ Rs. 313.54 paise per sq. ft. It is further
iarg gued that as per the settled law the mesne profit or use and occupation charges have to be paid from the date of eviction
H
i.e. 26.8.2016 and could not have ordered to be paid from a later date i.e. 1.9.2016 onwards. 9. On the other hand, the tenant has assailed the impugned order on the ground that he is only running a small
tailoring shop and therefore, could not be compelled to pay use
and occupation charges at an exorbitant rate of Rs.12,000/- per
5
month more particularly when the adjoining shops in the vicinity had been rented out only on a meager rent of Rs. 2000/- to .
Rs.3000/- per month. P
I have heard learned counsel for the parti.es and have gone through the material placed on rec f or d. H10. Notably, the learned appellate authority in the impugned order has though made a r ef o erence to the judgment
rendered by the Hon'ble Suprem r e t Court in Atma Ram Properties (P) Ltd. vs. Federal Motors ( u P) Ltd. (2005) 1 SCC 705 and judgment rendered by this High Court in case Padam Devi and another vs. Karam Chand a C nd or o s. 2010 (Supp) Him L.R. 2052 and another as also the judg ment rendered by the Division Bench of this Court in Chama h n Lal Bali vs. State of Himachal Pradesh (2016) 3 SLC 1593,
iang d has further even come to the conclusion that the premises in question are situated in the heart of the city, however, while
H
putting the tenants to terms regarding payment of use and occupation charges the ratio laid down in these judgments appears to have been totally ignored. This would be evidently clear from para 13 of the impugned order, which reads thus:-
"13. Relying upon the ratio of authorities cited supra vis-à-vis bearing in mind the attendant facts and circumstances of the case, whereby, there are arguable points involved in
6
the appeal, which has been admitted for hearing vide separate order of even date today. According to the landlord, the similar premises has been rented out @ .
Rs.1,20,000/- per month which works out to Rs.295.56 P paise per square meters. The copy of agreement has al . so been annexed. It is prayed that the use and occu H pation charges be determined @ Rs. 325/- per square metre. On the contrary, it is prayed that the app f ella nt is paying the monthly rent @ 25.16 paise. He is o running a tailoring business. The tailoring business cann ot be compared with the business owned by the company Bata India Limited. Moresoever, the valua r tion t and maintainability of both the places i.e. Middle u Bazaar and the Mall, cannot be equated at par as there is a lot of difference amongst both the places. In this case, Bata Company is situated on the Mall, whereas, t o he demised premises is situated in the Middle
B az C aar. To my mind, it would be in the interest of justice that in case the applicant is hereby directed to pay use and h occupation charges to the landlord @ Rs. 12,000/- from g
01.09.2016. Prima facie the demised premises is situated in i
the heart of the city and in case the stay of execution and enforcement of eviction order dated 26.08.2016 is not H
stayed, the appellant-tenant will suffer irreparable loss and injury which cannot be compensated in terms of money. Balance of convenience also lies in his favour." 11. The Division Bench of this Court in Chaman Lal Bali (supra) was dealing with the question where the landlord had
claimed that even after an ejectment order having been
passed, there was no provision for claiming mesne profits or use
7
and occupation charges and the tenant or sub-lette or any other unauthorized occupants could conveniently scot over the .
premises for years and decades together by paying P the contractual rent. .
12. Negating the said contention, f th is H Court after placing reliance upon on various judg o ments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that from the t d ate of passing of eviction order, the tenant is liable to pay mesne profits or compensation for use and occupation c u hargres of the premises at the same rate at which the lan o dlord would have been able to let out the premises and e C arn rent if the tenant would have vacated the premises.
h A nswering the said question, It was held as under:-
ig
"23. In Marshall Sons and Co.(I) Ltd. vs. Sahi Oretrans (P) Ltd. and another (1999) 2 SCC 325, the Hon'ble
H
Supreme Court after taking into consideration the invariable delay in Court proceedings held that reasonable mesne profit which may be equivalent to the market rent should be awarded to prevent parties in wrongful possession from taking undue advantage of lengthy delays in the main
proceedings and thereafter in execution proceedings. It is
apt to reproduce paras 4 and 6 of the judgment which read
thus:
8
"4. From the narration of the facts, though it appears to us, prima facie, that a decree in favour of the appellant is not being executed for some reason or the other, we do not .
think it proper at this stage to direct the responde P nt to deliver the possession to the appellant since the suit . filed by the respondent is still pending. It is true that proceedings are dragged for a long time on one count or th H e other and on occasion become highly technica f l a ccompanied by unending prolixity, at every stag o e providing a legal trap to the unwary. Because of the delay unscrupulous parties to the proceedings take undue advantage and person who is in wrongful possession r dra t ws delight in delay in disposal of the cases by taking undue advantage of procedural
complications. It is also known fact that after obtaining a
decree for o posseussion of immovable property, its execution takes long time. In such a situation for protecting the interest
o f j C udgment creditor, it is necessary to pass appropriate orders so that reasonable mesne profit which may be h equivalent to the market rent is paid by a person who is g
holding over the property. In appropriate cases, Court may i
appoint Receiver and direct the person who is holding over the property to act as an agent of the Receiver with a H
direction to deposit the royalty amount fixed by the Receiver or pass such other order which may meet the interest of justice. This may prevent further injury to the plaintiff in whose favour decree is passed and to protect the property including further alienation.
6. Having considered the relevant submissions of the parties including the submissions with regard to market rent and without expressing any opinion on the merits of the contentions of the parties in the pending suit, we think it
9
appropriate to dispose of this matter with the following directions: .
(1) That the suit in question be disposed of as expeditiously as possible, preferably within one year from today; .P
(2) The respondents are directed to pay the mesne profits/compensation at the rate of Rs.10/- Hper sq. ft. from 1984 till today and at the rate o o f Rs.20 f /- from today till the disposal of the suit. While making this payment, the payments already made t shall be adjusted. So far as the arrears are concerne r d, it be paid in 12 equal monthly instalments.
24. The u principle of determining mesne profits after the e o viction order has been passed and the right of land C lord to receive higher rent than the contractual rent w as established by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Atma Ram Properties (P) Ltd. vs. Federal Motors (P) Ltd. (2005) 1 SCC h 705 wherein it was held as under:
i g
"19. To sum up, our conclusions are:- (1) while passing an order of stay under Rule 5 of Order 41 of
H
the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the appellate Court does have jurisdiction to put the applicant on such reasonable terms as would in its opinion reasonably compensate the decree-holder for loss occasioned by delay in execution of decree by the grant of stay order, in the event of the
appeal being dismissed and in so far as those proceedings
are concerned. Such terms, needless to say, shall be
reasonable.
10
(2) in case of premises governed by the provisions of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, in view of the definition of tenant contained in clause (l) of Section 2 of the Ac P t, the .tenancy does not stand terminated merely by its termination under the general law; it terminates w . ith the
passing of the decree for eviction. With e H ffect from that date, the tenant is liable to pa f y mesne profits or compensation for use and occupation of the premises at the same rate at which the landlord would have been able to let out the premises and ear o n rent if the tenant would
have vacated the pre r mises. The landlord is not bound by the contractual rate of t rent effective for the period preceding the da u te of the decree. (3) the do o ctrine of merger does not have the effect of postponing the date of termination of tenancy merely bec C ause the decree of eviction stands merged in the d ecree passed by the superior forum at a latter date." h 25. Notably, even though there is no express g
provision in the Act for the grant of mesne profit, but then, i
as held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Marshall Sons and Co.(I) Ltd. vs. Sahi Oretrans (P) Ltd. and another (1999) 2 SCC
H
325 that once a decree for possession has been passed and execution is delayed depriving the judgment-creditor of the fruits of decree, it is necessary for the Court to pass appropriate orders so that reasonable mesne profits which may be equivalent to the market rent is paid by a person
who is holding over the property.
26. Similar reiteration of law is found in the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Anderson Wright and
11
Co. vs. Amar Nath Roy and others AIR 2005 SC 2457, wherein it was held as under: .
"5. As held by this Court in Atma Ram Properties (P) Ltd. v. Federal Motors (P) Ltd. , once a decree for eviction P has been passed, in the event of execution of dec.ree for eviction being stayed, the appellants can b H e put on such reasonable terms, as would in the opin f ion of the appellate court reasonably compensate o the decree holder for loss occasioned by delay in execution of the decree by the grant of stay in the event of t he appeal being dismissed. It has also been held that wi t th effect from the date of decree
of eviction, the tenan r t is liable to pay mesne profits or
compensation for use and occupation of the premises at
the same rate at u which the landlord would have been able
to let out o the premises on being vacated by the tenant.
Whi C le determining the quantum of the amount so r eceivable by the landlord, the landlord is not bound by the h contractual rate of rent which was prevalent prior to the date of decree."
ig
27. In State of Maharashtra and another vs. M/s Super Max International Pvt. Ltd. and others AIR 2010 SC 722,
H
the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that while admitting the appeal after ejectment order, it is perfectly open to the appellate or the revisional court to direct the tenant to pay rent higher than the contractual rent, but the Court would not fix any excessive, fanciful or punitive amount. Since the
mesne profits are not assessed by the appellate authority on
the basis of the evidence led as per the Act, by production
of evidence, on fact on issue or relevant facts, but is merely
an assessment on the basis of prima-facie market rate is
12
existing at the time of admission of the appeal after eviction order, a benefit has been bestowed on the landlord that he would be reasonably compensated for loss occasioned by .
delay in execution of decree by grant of stay orde P r. The mesne profit or compensation payable to the lan . dlord is generally determined on the basis of the c H ogent material placed on record by the parties in the shape of the registered lease deeds of the loc f alit y indicating the tentative amount of the rent wh o ich as the landlord would be entitled to in a case he t ha d rented out the premises at the present market rat r e existing on the date of ejectment. However, there is no straight jacket formula.
28. It w u ould be noticed that the entire subject matter of m o esne profits in the event of a decree of eviction and appeal there against being filed, is a judge-made law chis C eled out by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in its various p ronouncements (some of which have been cited above), h the entire premise of the aforesaid judgments is that once a decree of eviction is passed, the tenant becomes unlawful
ig
occupant (subject to his right in appeal/revision), therefore, any contract between the parties also comes to an end. It is H
for this reason that the Courts have carved out this new principle for ensuring that the tenant in unlawful possession does not further prejudice the landlord, who is otherwise entitled to get possession of his property and for this purpose, have laid down that the tenant must pay a reasonable amount subject to the outcome of the
appeal/revision.
29. Even otherwise, the awarding of mesne profits does put a check on the diabolical plans of the tenant who
13
has been ordered to be evicted to further delay the matter and squat on the premises by paying a nominal or meager rent. .
13. It would be evidently clear from the af . orePsaid exposition of law that the courts after passing of H an order of eviction can always put the occupant of the f premises to terms including payment of mesne prof it. o The very purpose of awarding mesne profit or use and occupation charges is to put a check on the diabolical pla r ns otf the tenant who has been
ordered to be evicted and u ensure that he does not squat on the
premises by paying o a meager rent. At the same time even the
landlord is also compensated to receive higher rent than the
contrac h tual ren
Ct.
14. In Atma Ram Properties Pvt. Ltd. (supra), it has been
iclg early laid down that the tenant with the passing of the decree H
of eviction is liable to pay mesne profits or compensation for use and occupation charges of the premises at the same rate on which the landlord would have been able to let out the premises and earn rent if the tenant would have vacated the premises.
15. Likewise, in Marshals Sons and Co.(I) Ltd. vs. Sahi Oretrans (P) Ltd. (supra), it was categorically held that once a
14
decree for possession has been passed and execution is delayed depriving the judgment-creditor of the fruits of decree, .
it is necessary for the Court to pass appropriate orders so P that 'reasonable' mesne profits which may be equivalent .to the market rent is paid by a person who is holding f ov er H the property.
16. At the same time, it was als o o held that while fixing the amount, subject to payment o t f w hich the execution of the order/decree is stayed, the Co r urt would exercise restraint and would not fix any excessive u , fanciful or punitive amount.
17. Wh C at is ' o reasonable' is difficult to define and this expression b eing a relative term is required to be considered vis-à-vis, th h e fact situation obtaining in a particular case. A three Ho g n'ble Judge Bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Rena Drego i (Mrs) vs. Lalchand Soni and others (1998) 3 SCC 341, considered
H
the expression 'reasonable' in the following terms:- [9] It is difficult to give an exact definition of the word 'reasonable'. It is often said that "an attempt to give a specific meaning to the word 'reasonable' is trying to count
what is not number and measure what is not space." The
author of 'Words and Phrases" (Permanent Edition) has
quoted from In re Nice and Schreiber, 123 F, 987, 999 to give
a plausible meaning for the said word. He says "the
15
expression 'reasonable' is a relative term, and the facts of the particular controversy must be considered before the question as to what constitutes reasonable can be .
determined." It is not meant to be expedient or conve P nient but certainly something more than that. While inte . rpreting the word 'reasonable' in Section 13 of the Act, the Bombay High Court has suggested in Krishchand M H oorjimal v. Bai Kalavati, AIR 1973 Bombay 46, "that t f he word 'reasonable' cannot mean convenient or luxurious, though it may not necessarily exclude the ide t a o f c o onvenience and comfort." However, the express r ion reasonable can be taken as providing an angle which is conformable or agreeable to reasons, having u regard to the facts of the particular controversy. [10] In Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Jagan Nath Ashok Kumar, (19 o 87) 4 SCC 497 : (AIR 1987 SC 2316), this Court has
s tat C ed that "the word 'reasonable' has in law prima facie meaning of reasonable in regard to those circumstances of h which the actor, called upon to act reasonably, knows or g
ought to know." This has been reiterated by Sabyasachi i
Mukherjee, J. (as his Lordship then was) in Gujarat Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. Unique Erectors (Gujarat) P. H
Ltd., (1989) 1 SCC 532 : (AIR 1989 SC 973). 18. The expression reasonable again came up for consideration before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Union of India vs. Shiv Shankar Kesari, (2007) 7 SCC 798. It was held as
under:-
16
"[8] The word "reasonable" has in law the prima facie meaning of reasonable in regard to those circumstances of which the actor, called on to act reasonably, knows or .
ought to know. It is difficult to give an exact definitio . n o P f the word 'reasonable'. Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, Fourth Edition, page 2258 states that it would be u H nreasonable to expect an exact definition of the word "reasonable'. Reason varies in its conclusions according to th f e i diosyncrasy of the individual, and the times and c o ircumstances in which he thinks. The reasoning which t b uilt up the old scholastic logic sounds now like the jin r gling of a child's toy. (See: Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. M/s Jagan Nath Ashok Kumar and another (1987) 4 u SCC 497. and Gujarat Water Supplies and Sewerage Board v. Unique Erectors (Gujarat) Pvt. Ltd. and another [(1 o 989) 1 SCC 532]. [9] It is often said "an attempt to give a specific meaning to t he C word 'reasonable' is trying to count what is not number and measure what is not space". The author of 'Words and h Phrases' (Permanent Edition) has quoted from in re Nice & g
Schreiber 123 F. 987, 988 to give a plausible meaning for the i
said word. He says, "the expression 'reasonable' is a relative term, and the facts of the particular controversy must be H
considered before the question as to what constitutes reasonable can be determined". It is not meant to be expedient or convenient but certainly something more than that. [10] The word 'reasonable' signifies "in accordance with reason". In the ultimate analysis it is a question of fact,
whether a particular act is reasonable or not depends on
the circumstances in a given situation. (See: Municipal
Corporation of Greater Mumbai and another v. Kamla Mills
Ltd. (2003) 6 SCC 315)."
17
19. Even otherwise the expression 'reasonable' would only mean "rational according to the dictates of reason and not .
excessive or immoderate". An act is said to be reasonable w P hen it is conformable or agreeable to reason, having regard. to the facts of the particular controversy. In other w f or ds H 'reasonable' would mean what is just, fair and equit o able in contradiction to anything whimsical, capricious etc. Th e word 'reasonable' has in law prima facie meaning of r re t asonable in regard to those circumstances of which th u e person concerned is called upon to act reasonably knows or ought to know as to what was reasonable. It m C ay b o e unreasonable to give an exact definition of the word 'reasonable'. The reason varies in its conclusion accord h ing to idiosyncrasy of the individual and the time and
icig rcumstances in which he thinks, as has been held by Hon'ble Supreme Court in Veerayee Ammal vs. Seeni Ammal (2002) 1
H
SCC 134. 20. Therefore, the term 'reasonable', as has been used by the Hon'ble Supreme Court and this Court is required to be interpreted in a manner so as to ensure that the landlord is reasonably compensated for the loss occurred by the delay in execution of the decree by grant of stay order. The rent has to
18
be determined on case to case basis depending upon the cogent material placed on record by the parties and would .
therefore, normally be dependent upon the occupation, t P rade or business etc. of the tenant and would fur H ther n.ot be dependent solely on the capacity to pay or f ac tual earning of the tenant, who has suffered an order of eviction.
21. The fixation of mes t ne o profits and use and occupation charges are to be r assessed on the basis of the evidence led by the partie u s as to the prima facie market value existing at the time o o f admission of the appeal after the eviction order, which ha C s been exclusively bestowed on the landlord so that he wo uld be able to reasonably compensate for loss caused h by delay in execution of the decree by grant of stay
iorg der. The Court while doing so is not to be guided by the factors that the parties at one point of time while creating the
H
tenancy had agreed at a meager amount of rent, it would depend upon the material produced before the Court which under no circumstances can be ignored even though thereafter the rent so fixed may work out to be multiple times to the one
which was fixed at the time of creation of the tenancy.
19
22. Noticeably, even the tenant had not disputed the agreement entered between one of the landlord with Bata India .
Ltd., before the appellate authority wherein the rent fixed w P orks out to Rs. 295.56 paise per sq. feet and with H the in.crease contemplated in the agreement, the same o n the date of admission of the appeal was @ Rs. 325/- per sq f . feet.
23. The agreement reveals t tha t o the rentals therein have been fixed for two premises i.e r . 42, the Mall, Shimla and 14/1, Middle Bazaar, Shimla. From the photographs appended alongwith the petitio o n filed u by the landlord being Civil Revision Petition No. 212 C of 2016, which have not even being disputed by the tenant, the premise No. 42 is admittedly located on the prime l h ocation i.e. Mall Road, Shimla, whereas the premise No.
i14g /1 is sandwiched between the premises let out to the tenant and premise No. 42 is approachable only through the narrow
H
lane of about three feet. Therefore, obviously, the rental of these properties would be presumed to be worked out after taking into consideration the comparative advantage and disadvantages of both the premises.
24. So far as the premises which are in possession of the tenant are concerned, the same admittedly are situated on the
20
main Middle Bazaar, at the heart of Shimla town which over the years have now been come to be reckoned as 'Middle Mall' .
and is one of the important hub of business activity and P has great commercial potential though less than that of H the p.remises located on the Mall Road.
25. Therefore, the fixation of o the f monthly rental of Rs.12,000/- per month by the learne t d first appellate Court, even after concluding that the premises in question are in heart of the city is obviously erroneous becrause such rental is based upon
the alleged earning of th u e tenant instead of the same being
based upon th C e prim o a facie market rent that the landlord would have been able to let out on vacation by the tenant at the time of the h admis sion of the appeal after eviction order. Moreover,
iong ce the Court has before it a lease deed of the premises which pertains to a part of the same building then it will not normally be
H
wise, safe or prudent to rely upon any other document like rent deed of the so called adjoining premises in the vicinity to work out the prima facie market rent.
26. As observed earlier, the landlord has claimed an initial rent @ Rs. 295.56 paise which works out to be Rs. 295.56 paise x 313 sq. ft. = Rs.92,510.28 paise and has thereafter claimed
21
increase in rent in terms of the agreement @ Rs. 313.54 paise per sq. ft, which works out to Rs.313.54 paise x 313 sq. ft. = Rs. .
98,138.02 paise. However, I am not inclined to accede to P the request of the landlord at this stage as it cannot be H ignore.d that the premises in question though located in f the prime area of Shimla are yet located in the Middle B o azaar which essentially may not have the same business potential vis-à-vis those premises, which are located on r th t e main Mall Road. Therefore, taking into account all the u cumulative facts and circumstances and further bearing i o n mind the exposition of law laid down by the Hon'ble Su C preme Court in the judgments cited above, I am of the consi dered opinion that the rent of Rs.250/- per sq. ft. would b h alance the competing interest i.e. Rs.250/- x 313 sq. ft. =
iRsg . 78,250/-. Accordingly, the petition filed by landlord is partly allowed whereas the petition filed by the tenant is dismissed.
22
26.8.2016, and the same shall be deposited by him in the trial Court. .
(b) All arrears worked out on the aforesaid basis shall be deposited within 30 days, failing which the eviction order P shall forthwith become executable. .
(c) The landlord, for the present, H shall not be entitled to claim any increase of rent on the bas is of Clause 5 of the agreement dated 1stFebruary, 2013. f
(d) All interim orders passe o d from time to time by this Court shall be deemed to ha r ve t me rged with this order. 27. However, in th u e event of the eviction order being confirmed even by the learned Appellate Authority, the parties shall be at liber C ty to fi o le a substantive petition for determining the mesne profit s which needless to state shall be determined on the basis o h f the pleadings and evidence adduced and the order
ipag ssed by this Court shall not come in the way of either of the parties.
H
28. It goes without saying that any observation touching the merits of the case is purely for the purpose of deciding the question involved in these revision petitions and shall not be construed as an expression of final opinion in the main matter or
in any other proceedings.
April 6, 2017 (Tarlok Singh Chauhan)
(sanjeev) Judge