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Court Opinion Summary — S. Muralidhar, J. (O.M.P(I) 2/2017)

Factual and Procedural Background

The petition was filed under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 seeking an injunction restraining the Respondent, Indiabulls Constructions Limited (ICL), from invoking or encashing certain bank guarantees (BGs) furnished as security for mobilisation advances. The matter was urgently listed on 23 February 2017, and the Court passed an interim order restraining encashment of 13 BGs until 28 February 2017. ICL filed an application seeking vacation of that interim order and informed the Court that three of the BGs subject to the earlier stay had already been encashed prior to the interim order. The Petitioner subsequently clarified that two of the 13 BGs were actually retention BGs and requested corrections; the Petitioner had also asked the State Bank of India to release monies pertaining to those retention BGs.

As of the hearing date in the opinion, out of a total of 16 BGs originally referenced, five had already been encashed. The scope of the petition was confined to a list of 13 specified mobilisation advance BGs, with an aggregate value of Rs. 3.10 crores. ICL expressed concern that two of the BGs were close to expiry; the Petitioner assured the Court those two BGs had been kept alive by instructions to the bank. Substantively, several work orders were issued by ICL engaging the Petitioner as a subcontractor for work at Centrum Park, Phase 2, Sector 103, Gurugram; contract clauses regarding mobilisation advance, BGs and release conditions were reproduced in the order. It is undisputed that ICL terminated the subcontract, engaged another vendor to complete the work at the Petitioner’s risk and cost, and that the accounts were being settled; the work remained incomplete even by the substituted vendor.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Court should grant interim relief under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 restraining ICL from invoking and encashing the unconditional mobilisation advance bank guarantees.
  2. Whether one or both of the recognized exceptions to restraining encashment of an unconditional bank guarantee — (a) fraud of an egregious nature; or (b) irretrievable harm or injustice of an irreversible kind — are established so as to justify injuncting the invocation/encashment.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments (as placed before the Court)

  • The Petitioner contended that part or all of the mobilisation advance had already been adjusted against earlier bills and that the entire mobilisation advance had effectively been recovered from current bills, leaving nothing more to be recovered from the Petitioner.
  • On that basis, the Petitioner argued that ICL's invocation of the mobilisation advance BGs despite the recovery constituted a 'fraudulent' act and therefore fell within the Supreme Court’s exception permitting injunctions against encashment.
  • The Petitioner relied on authorities such as Bhasin Associates Limited v. Hyundai Heavy Industries Company Ltd., Yog Systems India Ltd. v. Su-Kam Power Systems Ltd., and Gangotri Enterprises Limited v. Union of India to support the contention that injunctive relief was warranted under the exceptions.

Respondent's Arguments (as placed before the Court)

  • ICL submitted that the stage for return or release of the mobilisation advance BGs had not been reached because the work under the contract had not been completed; the subcontract had been terminated and a new vendor engaged to finish the work.
  • ICL emphasised that the BGs were unconditional and irrevocable, and therefore the bank was bound to honour them on demand; the exceptions to restraining encashment were not attracted.
  • ICL relied on a series of Supreme Court decisions including BSES Limited v. Fenner India Limited, Vinitec Electronics Private Ltd. v. HCL Infosystems Ltd., and the Division Bench decision in Consortium of Deepak Cable India Ltd. & Abir Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. Teestavalley Power Transmission Limited to argue that mere recovery under running bills or disputes over performance do not justify injunctions against an unconditional BG.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Bhasin Associates Limited v. Hyundai Heavy Industries Company Ltd. (decision dated 4 April, 1991 in Leave Application No. 11649 of 1990 and Suit No. 3908 of 1990) Cited by Petitioner in support of argument that encashment may be injuncted where exceptions apply (fraud/irretrievable injury). Court noted the Petitioner relied on this decision but did not find the present facts to amount to the kind of fraud or irretrievable harm contemplated in that authority.
Yog Systems India Ltd. v. Su-Kam Power Systems Ltd. (reference in order) Cited by Petitioner as supportive precedent for injuncting encashment under exceptional circumstances. Court recorded reliance but treated it as part of the Petitioner’s argument; the Court did not find the factual matrix of the present case comparable to attract the exception.
Gangotri Enterprises Limited v. Union of India (2016 (6) SCALE 664) Example of a case where the Supreme Court injuncted encashment of a BG; cited by Petitioner to show similar facts could justify injunction. Court considered the comparison and stated it was not satisfied that the present facts were similar to those in Gangotri that persuaded the Supreme Court to grant an injunction.
BSES Limited v. Fenner India Limited (2006) 2 SCC 728 Cited by Respondent for the principle that liability of the bank under an unconditional BG remains intact irrespective of disputes between contracting parties or recovery under bills. Court relied on this principle to observe that the bank's liability to honour an unconditional guarantee is not affected by recovery under running bills and that wrongful invocation generally gives rise to a claim for damages rather than injunctive relief.
Vinitec Electronics Private Ltd. v. HCL Infosystems Ltd. (2008) 1 SCC 544 Cited by Respondent among Supreme Court authorities limiting the scope for injunctions against unconditional BGs. Court treated this as reinforcing the settled position that courts should be slow to grant injunctions against unconditional BGs and that exceptions are narrow.
Consortium of Deepak Cable India Ltd. & Abir Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. Teestavalley Power Transmission Ltd. (2014) 215 DLT 246 (DB) Summarised by the Court to state the established two exceptions permitting injunctions: (A) fraud of egregious nature; (B) irretrievable harm or injustice of an irreversible kind. Court reproduced the Division Bench summary and used it as the framework to evaluate whether exceptions applied in the present case; concluded they did not.
Himadri Chemicals Industries Ltd. v. Coal Tar Refining Co. (2007) 8 SCC 110 Summarised the principles for refusing injunctions to restrain enforcement of BGs/LCs, including that courts should be slow to grant injunctions and that the bank is bound to honour unconditional guarantees. Court relied on the enumerated principles to support the conclusion that an unconditional BG entitles the beneficiary to realise it and that fraud/irretrievable injury are the narrow exceptions.
Mahatma Gandhi Sahakra Sakkare Karkhane v. National Heavy Engineering Coop. Ltd. (2007) 6 SCC 470 Explains that an unconditional and irrevocable BG cannot be prevented from being enforced by injunction except on the grounds of fraud or irretrievable injury. Court cited this to reinforce that the bank cannot raise objections and that injunctions are permitted only on the two narrow grounds.
U.P. State Sugar Corporation v. Sumac International Ltd. (1997) 1 SCC 568 Clarifies that fraud must be of an egregious nature to vitiate the underlying transaction and justify an injunction; envisages "a clear fraud of which the bank has notice." Court relied on this articulation to conclude that the petitioner had not shown the required egregious fraud or bank notice thereof.
Bolivinter Oil SA v. Chase Manhattan Bank NA (1984) [1] All ER 351 Quoted (Sir John Donaldson, M.R.) for the proposition that only in the wholly exceptional case where it is proved the bank knows a demand will clearly be fraudulent should an injunction be granted, and the evidence must be clear. Court used the quoted observation to emphasise the high threshold and the need for clear evidence of bank knowledge of fraud, which was not established here.
General Electric Technical Services Company Inc. v. Punj Sons (P) Ltd. (1991) 4 SCC 230 Authority that liability of the bank under an unconditional BG remains intact irrespective of recovery under mobilisation advance or running bills. Court applied this to conclude that failure to specify remaining mobilisation advance in the invocation letter is of little consequence to the bank's liability under the guarantee.
TRF Ltd. v. Energo Engineering Projects Ltd. (decision dated 17 February, 2017 in OMP (I) (Comm.) 66/2017) Observation that recovery by the beneficiary of amounts secured by the BG is not relevant to whether an injunction should be granted against invocation of an unconditional BG; remedy for wrongful encashment is damages. Court relied on this recent observation to support the proposition that recovery under bills does not justify injuncting an unconditional BG and that the proper remedy may be damages.
Itek Corporation's case (referenced) Referenced as an example of the type of situation akin to irretrievable harm warranting injunctive relief (mentioned in the Division Bench summary). Court cited the Division Bench's mention that irretrievable harm must be akin to the situation in Itek Corporation's case; found the present facts were not akin to that situation.
Elian's case (referenced) Referenced as another illustrative example of the kind of irretrievable injustice that might justify an injunction. Court noted that irretrievable harm must be of the kind found in Elian's case or similar; concluded such harm was not shown here.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded by first examining the contractual clauses and the terms of the BGs. The work orders expressly described mobilisation advance BGs as "unconditional and irrevocable" and provided that mobilisation BGs would be released only on fulfilment of work order terms and submission of work completion certificate to the extent of the advance. Two illustrative BGs were reproduced: BG0005771 and BG00002322, both containing clear "unconditional and irrevocable" language and provisions that a demand by the Owner (ICL) would be conclusive and binding on the bank.

The Court noted the undisputed factual position that ICL had terminated the subcontract and engaged another vendor, and that the work remained incomplete. The Petitioner sought to bring the matter within the two narrow exceptions to the rule against restraining encashment (fraud of an egregious nature; irretrievable harm or injustice), relying on several authorities. The Court undertook a precedent-based analysis, summarising the settled law (including the Division Bench summary in Consortium of Deepak Cable) that only two well-recognised exceptions justify injuncting an unconditional BG.

Applying those principles, the Court found that the Petitioner had not demonstrated an egregious fraud that would vitiate the entire underlying transaction or shown clear evidence that the bank had notice of any such fraud. The Court relied on U.P. State Sugar Corporation and the Bolivinter Oil passage to underline the need for clear evidence of bank knowledge of fraud. The Court also concluded that the Petitioner had not shown irretrievable harm or injustice of the kind recognized in precedents (for example, Itek Corporation's or Elian's cases).

Moreover, the Court observed that the wording of the BGs was unambiguous and that the bank's liability to honour the guarantees on demand remained intact irrespective of recovery under running bills. The Court accepted the legal position that, where an unconditional BG is wrongly invoked and encashed, the remedy generally lies in a damages claim rather than an injunction preventing encashment. On the facts pleaded, the Court considered the most that could be alleged was a wrongful invocation for which damages would be the appropriate remedy.

Having found that neither exception applied and that there were no special equities or evidence of egregious fraud, the Court concluded there was no reason to continue the interim order restraining encashment.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court vacated the interim order dated 23 February 2017 and dismissed the petition under Section 9. The ancillary applications were disposed of.

Implications:

  • Direct effect: The interim restraint preventing ICL from encashing the specified mobilisation advance bank guarantees is lifted; ICL is therefore permitted to proceed with invocation and encashment of the BGs in question in accordance with their terms. The bank is bound by the unconditional guarantees to honour payment on demand by ICL.
  • Remedies and consequences between parties: The Court indicated that, if the BGs were wrongfully invoked or encashed, the appropriate remedy for the Petitioner would generally be a claim for damages rather than an injunction preventing encashment of an unconditional BG.
  • Precedential scope: The Court clarified that its observations were limited to the grant of interim relief under Section 9 and were not intended to influence the final decision on the merits in the arbitral proceedings. The order does not purport to lay down a broader new precedent beyond applying the settled principles recited from higher authorities.

Order details: The Court directed that a copy of the order be provided dasti under the signature of the Court Master.

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    Wig Brothers Construction Private Limited Petitioner v. Indiabulls Constructions Limited

    S. Muralidhar, J.

    IA No. 2485/2017 (for exemption)

    1. Allowed, subject to just exceptions.

    O.M.P(I) 2/2017 & IA Nos. 2484/2017 and 2959/2017

    2. This is a petition under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (‘Act’) seeking to restrain the Respondent, Indiabulls Constructions Limited (‘ICL’), from invoking or encashing certain bank guarantees (‘BGs’), the prayer being confined to BGs furnished towards the mobilisation advance.

    3. On 23rd February, 2017, the petition was mentioned for urgent listing. In view of the urgency explained, it was directed by an order passed on that date that the 13 BGs mentioned in the petition would not be encashed by ICL till the next date i.e, 28th February, 2017.

    4. On the next date, an application being IA No. 2959 of 2017 was filed by ICL seeking vacation of the interim order passed by the Court. Learned counsel for ICL informed the Court that three of the BGs, the encashment of which had been stayed by the Court, had already been encashed by it even prior to the passing of the interim order on 23 February, 2017.

    5. Today, at the outset, Mr. Jivesh Nagrath, learned counsel appearing for the Petitioner clarified that of the 13 BGs mentioned as mobilisation advances BGs by the Petitioner, 2 of them in fact were retention amount BGs. He referred to an affidavit dated 25 February, 2017 filed by the Petitioner seeking to carry out the corresponding corrections in the petition. It is stated therein that the Petitioner had itself requested the State Bank of India (‘SBI’) by an email dated 23 February, 2017 to release the monies as far as the retention amount BGs were concerned.

    6. As of date, it appears that out of 16 BGs, in all 5 have already been encashed. The scope of the present petition therefore is confined to the following BGs:

    (i)BG0005771Rs. 25,00,000(ii)BG0000582Rs. 23,00,000(iii)BG0000583Rs. 21,00,000(iv)BG0002701Rs. 30,65,000(v)BG0002703Rs. 25,00,000(vi)BG0002706Rs. 14,00,000(vii)BG0002903Rs. 2,58,490(viii)BG0002911Rs. 20,37,845(ix)BG0002912Rs. 12,50,465(x)BG0003046Rs. 4,00,000(xi)BG0003262Rs. 2,00,000(xii)BG0002850Rs. 21,73,000(xiii)BG00002322Rs. 1,42,00,000

    7. The aggregate amount works out to Rs. 3.10 crores.

    8. During todays' hearing Mr. Dayan Krishnan, learned Senior counsel for ICL, expressed an apprehension that two of the BGs which were to expire on 2nd March, 2017 may not have been renewed. However, Mr. Jeevesh Nagrath, learned counsel for the Petitioner assured the Court on instructions that the said two BGs, have on the express instructions of the Petitioner to the Bank concerned, been kept alive.

    9. The facts in brief are that several work orders (WOs) were issued by ICL to the Petitioner by way of engaging it as a sub-contractor for the construction work at Centrum Park, Phase 2, Sector 103, Gurugram. The standard clauses in one of the WOs, relevant for the present petition read as under:

    “(7) Payment terms

    a. Mobilization Advance: 10%of the Contract Price shall be paid as free Mobilization Advance against unconditional Bank Guarantee payable at Mumbai. This mobilization advance shall be released with issuance of work order/LOI against unconditional bank guarantee. The recovery of mobilization advance shall commence from 2 RA bill and full recovery shall be made by the time 80%of the contract price is billed and paid.”

    (16) Risk &Compensation: In case of termination of the Work Order due to any reason (even if termination is due to non-performance or extra-ordinary delay by Sub-Contractor), the Sub-Contractor shall compensate the IC Limited for the loss suffered and for engaging another Sub-Contractor. However, the Sub-Contractor shall continue to be liable for all risks and costs and the IC Limited shall be entitled to adjust the cost against outstanding payments, is any payable to the Sub-Contractor.

    (17) Bank Guarantees/Indemnity Bond and Post Dated Cheque (PDC):

    a) For the due performance of the works by the Sub-Contractor, the Sub-Contractor shall if required by the IC Limited, furnish an irrevocable and unconditional Bank Guarantee of an International/Nationalized/Scheduled bank, having a branch at Mumbai, payable on demand, or Indemnity Bond and the PDCs equivalent to the amount of Performance guarantee that may be specified by the IC Limited. The terms of the said bank guarantee/Indemnity bond and PDC shall be on the format and as per the terms specified by the IC Limited. The obtaining of such bank guarantee/indemnity bond and PDC shall be at the expense of the Sub-Contractor.

    b) In case the Sub-Contractor is required to be paid any advance amount the same shall be paid as per the mutual Agreement by the parties subject to furnishing by the Sub-Contractor of an unconditional and irrevocable Bank Guarantee of an International/Nationalized/Scheduled bank, having a branch at Mumbai, payable on demand, for a sum that may be specified by the IC Limited. The terms of the said bank guarantee shall be on the format and as per the terms specified by the IC Limited. The obtaining of such bank guarantee shall be at the expense of the Sub-Contractor. The Bank Guarantee shall be valid for the entire duration of this Contract. The bank guarantee shall be released on the written request of the sub-Contractor and after the complete recovery or adjustment of such advance.

    c) Release Of Guarantee

    The Bank Guarantee for mobilization shall be returned to the Sub-Contractor only on fulfilling the Work Order terms and submission of work completion certificate to the extent of advance.”

    10. Since the present case pertains to mobilisation advance BGs, it is relevant that under Clause 17 (b), the BGs are termed as “unconditional and irrevocable”. Further, the BGs shall be released on the written request of the sub-contractor and “after the complete recovery or adjustment of such advance.” Clause 17 (c) further makes it clear that BG for mobilisation shall be returned to the sub-contractor “only on fulfilling the work order terms and submission of work completion certificate to the extent of advance.”

    11. As far as the terms of the BGs themselves are concerned, reference requires to be made illustratively to only two of them. BG No. BG0005771 dated 21st October, 2013 states that the SBI at the request of the Petitioner undertakes “to pay ICL an amount not exceeding Rs. 25,00,000/- against the refund of the advance paid by ICL by reason of any breach by M/s. Wig Brothers Construction Pvt. Ltd., of any of the terms and conditions contained in the said agreement.” It further states that SBI would pay “the amount due and payable under this guarantee without any demur, merely on a written demand from ICL stating that the amount claimed, is due by way of refund of the advance paid by ICL, by reason of breach by M/s. Wig Brothers Construction Pvt. Ltd., of any of the terms or conditions contained in the said Agreement.” It is further stated that “any such demand made on the bank shall be conclusive as regards the amount due and payable by the Bank under this guarantee.”

    12. BG No. BG00002322 dated 16 September, 2014 states that the Bank “undertakes to unconditionally and irrevocably pay to Owner immediately on demand, without any protest, contest or demur, and without any recourse to the Contractor, a sum not exceeding Rs. 1,42,00,000.” It further states that “any such payment made by the Owner on the Bank shall be conclusive and binding.” Further, “the Owner shall be the sole Judge as regards the performance of the contract and the Bank shall neither question the judgment or declaration of the Owner nor ask for any evidence on any account whatsoever.”

    13. The unconditional nature of both BGs is, therefore, apparent. As far as the bank is concerned, it is bound to honour its commitment to make payment on a mere demand being made by ICL for encashment.

    14. What is not in dispute between the parties is that ICL has terminated the sub-contract and has engaged another vendor to complete the work at the risk and costs of the Petitioner. It is also not in dispute that the parties are in the process of settling their accounts but as of date, the work has not been completed even by the substituted vendor.

    15. Mr. Nagrath, conscious of the legal position as regards interference by the Court with the encashment of BGs, seeks to bring the present case within the two exceptions viz., (a) fraud of egregious nature; and (b) irretrievable harm or injustice resulting from the encashment of the BG. He sought to place reliance on Bhasin Associates Limited v. Hyundai Heavy Industries Company Ltd. (decision dated 4 April, 1991 in Leave Application No. 11649 of 1990 and Suit No. 3908 of 1990) and Yog Systems India Ltd.… v. Su-Kam Power Systems Ltd.….) 608. His contention was that from the bills raised by the Petitioner, it was apparent that one part of the mobilisation advance already stood adjusted against the bills submitted in the past. The entire mobilisation advance has now been recovered from the current bills. Therefore, nothing remains to be recovered from the Petitioner. According to him, the Respondent's action in proceeding to encash the BGs for mobilisation advance despite recovering the entire advance is ‘fraudulent’, thereby attracting the first exception to the general rule as stipulated by the Supreme Court. He also refers to the decision of the Supreme Court in Gangotri Enterprises Limited v. Union of India 2016 (6) SCALE 664 and submits that the facts of the present case are similar to the facts of the said case where the Supreme Court had injuncted the encashment of a BG.

    16. Mr. Dayan Krishnan, learned Senior counsel appearing for the Respondent, on the other hand, refers to the fact that the stage for return of the advance of the BG towards the mobilisation advance has not been reached as of date since even the work has not been completed. He pointed out that the Petitioner was aware of the sub-contract having been terminated and a new vendor having been appointed to complete the unfinished work. Referring to a series of the decisions of the Supreme Court including BSES Limited v. Fenner India Limited. (2006) 2 SCC 728, Vinitec Electronics Private Ltd. v. Hcl Infosystems Ltd. (2008) 1 SCC 544 and Consortium of Deepak Cable India Limited & Abir Infrastructure Private Limited v. Teestavalley Power Transmission Limited (2014) 215 DLT 246 (DB), he submitted that the two exceptions carved out by the Supreme Court are not attracted in the present case. He emphasised that both BGs were unconditional and the question of the bank declining to honour its commitment upon invocation by ICL did not arise.

    17. The legal position as regards the power of the Court to interdict the encashment of the BG is settled. It has been neatly summarised in the decision of the Division Bench (DB) of this Court in Consortium of Deepak Cable India Limited & Abir Infrastructure Private Limited v. Teestavalley Power Transmission Limited (supra) as under:

    “145. … That certain amounts have been recovered under running bills and have to be adjusted for is of no concern in matters relating to invocation of bank guarantee. That there are serious disputes on questions as to who committed the breach of the contract are no circumstances justifying granting an injunction pertaining to a bank guarantee. Plea of lack of good faith and/or enforcing the guarantee with an oblique purpose or that the bank guarantee is being invoked as a bargaining chip, a deterrent or in an abusive manner are all irrelevant and hence have to be ignored. There are only two well recognized exceptions to the rule against permitting payment under a bank guarantee. The same are:

    A. A fraud of egregious nature;

    B. Encashment of the bank guarantee would result in irretrievable harm or injustice of an irreversible kind to one of the parties.

    146. The irretrievable harm or injustice of an irreversible kind must relate to a situation akin to the one found in Itek Corporation's case (supra) or of the kind or in Elian's case (supra).

    147. There is no separate third exception of a special equity justifying grant of an injunction to restrain the beneficiary from receiving under an unconditional bank guarantee and if there exists any third exception of a special equity the same has to be of a kind akin to irretrievable injustice or putting a party in an irretrievable situation.”

    18. In Himadri Chemicals Industries Ltd. v. Coal Tar Refining Co.. (2007) 8 SCC 110, the principles for grant of refusal to grant of injunction to restrain the enforcement of the BG or LC were summarised as under:

    “14. … (i) While dealing with an application for injunction in the course of commercial dealings, and when an unconditional Bank Guarantee or Letter of Credit is given or accepted, the Beneficiary is entitled to realize such a Bank Guarantee or a Letter of Credit in terms thereof irrespective of any pending disputes relating to the terms of the contract.

    (ii) The Bank giving such guarantee is bound to honour it as per its terms irrespective of any dispute raised by its customer.

    (iii) The Courts should be slow in granting an order of injunction to restrain the realization of a Bank Guarantee or a Letter of Credit.

    (iv) Since a Bank Guarantee or a Letter of Credit is an independent and a separate contract and is absolute in nature, the existence of any dispute between the parties to the contract is not a ground for issuing an order of injunction to restrain enforcement of Bank Guarantees or Letters of Credit.

    (v) Fraud of an egregious nature which would vitiate the very foundation of such a Bank Guarantee or Letter of Credit and the beneficiary seeks to take advantage of the situation.

    (vi) Allowing encashment of an unconditional Bank Guarantee or a Letter of Credit would result in irretrievable harm or injustice to one of the parties concerned.”

    19. In Mahatma Gandhi Sahakra Sakkare Karkhane v. National Heavy Engineering Coop. Ltd. (2007) 6 SCC 470, it is explained as under:

    “If the bank guarantee furnished is an unconditional and irrevocable one, it is not open to the bank to raise any objection whatsoever to pay the amounts under the guarantee. The person in whose favour the guarantee is furnished by the bank cannot be prevented by way of an injunction from enforcing the guarantee on the pretext that the condition for enforcing the bank guarantee in terms of the agreement entered between the parties has not been fulfilled. Such a course is impermissible. The seller cannot raise the dispute of whatsoever nature and prevent the purchaser from enforcing the bank guarantee by way of injunction except on the ground of fraud and irretrievable injury.”

    20. In the considered view of the Court, the mere fact that ICL may have proceeded to invoke the mobilisation advance BGs in the present case would not amount to ICL practising an ‘egregious fraud’ on the Petitioner as envisaged in the above decisions of the Supreme Court. As explained in U.P State Sugar Corporation v. Sumac International Ltd.. (1997) 1 SCC 568 which has been followed in a large number of decisions thereafter, “fraud must be of an egregious nature so as to vitiate the entire underlying transaction.” The Court envisaged “a clear fraud of which the bank has notice.” In this context, the Supreme Court referred to the following observations of Sir John Donaldson, M.R in Bolivinter Oil SA v. Chase Manhattan Bank NA (1984) [1] All ER 351 at 352):

    “The wholly exceptional case where an injunction may be granted is where it is proved that the bank knows that any demand for payment already made or which may thereafter be made will clearly be fraudulent. But the evidence must be clear both as to the fact of fraud and as to the bank's knowledge. It would certainly not normally be sufficient that this rests on the uncorroborated statement of the customer, for irreparable damage can be done to a bank's credit in the relatively brief time which must elapse between the granting of such an injunction and an application by the bank to have it charged.”

    21. From the facts pleaded in the present petition, it could at the highest bring the case of the Petitioner under the category of a wrong invocation of a BG for which the remedy lies in claiming damages. The Court is also not satisfied that the facts of the present case are similar to the facts in Gangotri Enterprises Limited v. Union of India (supra) where, in para 42, the Supreme Court highlighted the circumstances that persuaded it to proceed to grant an injunction.

    22. The wording of the BGs in the present case is unambiguous. The bank has no option but to honour the BGs upon invocation in terms thereof by ICL. In General Electric Technical Services Company Inc. v. Punj Sons (P) Ltd. (1991) 4 SCC 230 and as reiterated in BSES Limited v. Fenner India Limited (supra), “the liability of the Bank remained intact irrespective of the recovery of mobilisation advance or the non-payment under the running bills. The failure on the part of (the Beneficiary) to specify the remaining mobilisation advance in the letter for encashment of bank guarantee is of little consequence to the liability of the bank under the guarantee.”

    23. Recently, in TRF Ltd. v. Energo Engineering Projects Ltd. (decision dated 17 February, 2017 in OMP (I) (Comm.) 66/2017), this Court observed as under:

    “50. … the fact that the beneficiary may have already recovered much of the amounts secured by the BG are not relevant in deciding whether an injunction should be granted against invocation of such BG, particularly when it is unconditional. In other words, an unconditional BG has always been considered on a different footing by the Court. Even where a BG is wrongly invoked and encashed by a party, the remedy for the other party where the BG is unconditional is only to seek to make a claim against such allegedly unlawful invocation and encashment of the BG. It may not be a good ground to require the Court to injunct the encashment of the BG.”

    24. The Court is also not satisfied that there are any special equities in favour of the Petitioner at this stage which could persuade the Court to hold that irretrievable injustice would be caused to the Petitioner if BGs in question were permitted to be encashed by ICL.

    25. For the aforementioned reasons, the Court finds no reason to continue the interim order passed by it on 23 February, 2017. The said interim order is hereby vacated.

    26. It is clarified that the observations in this order are for the limited purpose of deciding the grant of interim relief under Section 9 of the Act and are not intended to influence the final decision on merits in the arbitral proceedings.

    27. The petition is dismissed. The applications are disposed of.

    28. A copy of this order be given dasti under the signature of Court Master.

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    Wig Brothers Construction Private Limited Petitioner v. Indiabulls Constructions Limited
    (Mar 7, 2017)