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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Sections 147, 148, 504, 506(2), 323, 324, 325, 326, 302 read with Sections 34/149 IPC and Section 135 of the Bombay Police Act
  • Section 149 of the Penal Code
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Section 302 read with Sections 149/34 IPC, Section 357 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, Section 324 and 325 read with Sections 149/34 IPC
  • Section 149 of the Code
  • IPC (Indian Penal Code)
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Sections 147, 148, 504, 506(2), 323, 324, 325, 326, 302 read with Sections 34/149 IPC and Section 135 of the Bombay Police Act
  • Section 149 of the Penal Code
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Section 302 read with Sections 149/34 IPC, Section 357 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, Section 324 and 325 read with Sections 149/34 IPC
  • Section 149 of the Code
  • IPC (Indian Penal Code)
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

On 23-3-1998 an electric pole near the complainant’s house was damaged by a tractor driven by Accused 1. After being cautioned, Accused 1 threatened to “settle the matter” in the evening. At 6:00 p.m. on 24-3-1998, Accused 1 to 14 arrived on a tractor armed with an axe, iron pipes and a spear. They allegedly attacked the complainant, his relatives, and neighbours, causing multiple injuries; Unadbhai Desurbhai later died on 26-3-1998. An FIR was registered the same day and the accused were charged under Sections 147, 148, 302, 324, 325, 326 and allied provisions of the IPC and Bombay Police Act.

The Second Fast Track Judge, Amreli, convicted all fourteen accused on 24-6-2003 for murder (Section 302 read with Sections 149/34 IPC) and allied offences, sentencing them to life imprisonment and fines, with compensation ordered under Section 357 CrPC.

On appeal, the High Court of Gujarat (judgment dated 29-7-2009) acquitted Accused 1, 2 and 3–9 & 11–14 of the murder charge, retained lesser-injury convictions, but converted Accused 10’s conviction to Section 302 simpliciter. The complainant appealed to the Supreme Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the High Court erred in acquitting Accused 1, 2 and 3–9 & 11–14 of the offence under Section 302 read with Section 149 IPC.
  2. Whether, on the evidence, the remaining accused could be held liable for any lesser offence with the aid of Section 149 IPC.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The High Court’s reasoning for acquittal under Section 302/149 was “cryptic” and unsupported by evidence.
  • Findings that there was no common object or unlawful assembly ignored the factual matrix showing coordinated, armed attack.

Respondents' Arguments

  • The prosecution suppressed the true facts; the complainant’s party were the aggressors, evidenced by a cross-FIR lodged 15 minutes earlier by Accused 2.
  • Injuries and damage to the accused and their tractor establish a mutual fight, undermining prosecution claims of pre-planned unlawful assembly.
  • Discrepancies existed as to who drove the tractor at the time of incident.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
R. v. Sabed Ali, 1873 SCC OnLine Cal 64 Early exposition of Section 149 IPC: offence must be committed either in prosecution of common object or one the members “knew” was likely; “knew” implies antecedent expectation, not mere possibility. Cited to explain the dual limbs of Section 149 and the importance of members’ knowledge or object when attributing liability.
Mizaji v. State of U.P., 1959 Supp (1) SCR 940 Supreme Court analysis distinguishing the two parts of Section 149; requirement that knowledge be more than a mere possibility. Relied on as the governing test for determining collective liability; Court applied its framework to current facts.
Avtar Singh v. State of Haryana (citation noted only as “paras 27-28”) Continuation of Mizaji principles on Section 149 liability. Referenced as part of consistent jurisprudence supporting the applied test.
Roy Fernandes v. State of Goa, (2012) 3 SCC 221 Reaffirmation of Mizaji on common object and knowledge under Section 149. Cited illustratively to show settled law.
Lokeman Shah v. State of W.B., (2001) 5 SCC 235 Further application of Mizaji principles regarding collective intent. Referenced in the chain of authorities.
Lalji v. State of U.P., (1989) 1 SCC 437 Common object can be inferred from nature of assembly, arms used and behaviour. Used to infer unlawful assembly and common object from weapons wielded and conduct of accused.
Shambhu Nath Singh v. State of Bihar, AIR 1960 SC 725 Members of unlawful assembly may be convicted under Section 326/149 even if murder is committed by one member. Invoked to justify awarding conviction for Section 326/149 despite individual conviction of Accused 10 for murder.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court re-evaluated the evidence and legal standards governing Section 149:

  • Existence of Unlawful Assembly: Testimonies of six injured eyewitnesses, corroborated by medical evidence, established that all accused arrived together, armed and acting in concert, thereby forming an unlawful assembly.
  • Common Object Assessment: From the weapons (axe, iron pipes, spear) and violent attack, the Court inferred a common object to cause grievous hurt, though not necessarily murder.
  • Knowledge of Likely Offence: There was no prior enmity or evidence of pre-planned intent to kill; therefore, collective knowledge that murder was likely could not be attributed to all members save Accused 10, who actually inflicted the fatal head injury.
  • High Court’s Errors: The High Court incorrectly treated the existence of a cross-case as negating Section 149 and failed to re-appreciate evidence; this amounted to miscarriage of justice.
  • Appropriate Conviction: Given the established common object to inflict serious injuries, the remaining accused were liable under Section 326 read with Section 149 IPC, consistent with Shambhu Nath Singh precedent.
  • Quantum of Sentence: The accused had already served about 7½ years; considering the passage of time since the 1998 incident and absence of further violence, the Court limited the sentence to the period already undergone.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal was PARTLY ALLOWED. Accused 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 8, 11, 12, 13 and 14 were convicted under Section 326/149 IPC and sentenced to the period of imprisonment already undergone.

Implications: The decision reinstates collective liability for grievous hurt while affirming that Section 149 requires specific proof of common object or knowledge for a murder conviction. No new legal principle was created, but the judgment reinforces careful appellate scrutiny of trial evidence before altering collective liability findings.

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    Najabhai Desurbhai Wagh v. Valerabhai Deganbhai Vagh And Others

    L. Nageswara Rao, J.— By a judgment dated 24-6-2003, the Second Fast Track Judge, Amreli convicted Accused 1 to 14 who are Respondents 1 to 14 herein for committing an offence under Section 302 read with Sections 149/34 IPC and sentenced them to life imprisonment and a penalty of Rs 5000 in default of which they shall undergo six months' further imprisonment. The accused were also found guilty for the offences under Sections 324 and 325 read with Sections 149/34 IPC for which they were sentenced to six months' rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs 1000 in default of which they shall undergo two months' imprisonment. Accused 1, 2 and 10 were directed to pay Rs 10,000 each as compensation to the heirs of the deceased Unadbhai Desurbhai under Section 357 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. The remaining accused were directed to jointly pay Rs 20,000 as compensation to the heirs.

    2. Accused 1 to 14 filed an appeal before the High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad challenging their convictions and sentences. The High Court allowed 2009 SCC OnLine Guj 12127 the appeal partly by acquitting Accused 1 and 2 of the charge under Section 302 read with Sections 34/149 IPC. The convictions and sentences under Sections 324 and 325 read with Sections 34/149 IPC in respect of Accused 1, 2 and 3 were maintained. The convictions and sentences of Accused 3 to 9 and 11 to 14 under Section 302 read with Sections 34/149 IPC and Sections 324 and 325 read with Sections 34/149 IPC were set aside. The conviction of Accused 10 under Section 302 read with Sections 149/34 was converted to a conviction for the offence under Section 302 IPC simpliciter and he was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life. The complainant has filed this appeal aggrieved by the judgment of the High Court.

    3. The FIR was recorded on 24-3-1998 by the Sub-Inspector of Police, Rajula on a complaint made by the appellant herein. According to the complainant, an electrical light pole near his house was broken down by the tractor of Accused 1 on 23-3-1998. The complainant cautioned Accused 1 to drive the tractor carefully. Accused 1 took offence and informed the complainant that he would come back at 6.00 p.m to settle the matter. At 6.00 p.m, Accused 1 to 14, armed with axe, iron pipe and spear came on a tractor to the complainant's house. Jagabhai Bhayabhai was hit by the tractor due to which he sustained injury on his legs. The other accused attacked the complainant, his brother Unabhai Desurbhai, Jaga Bhaya and Bayabhai. Bhagwan Bhikha (Accused 7) gave a blow with an iron T-pipe on the left eyebrow of the complainant. Bhima Degan (Accused 3) inflicted an injury by spear on the left side of the complainant's stomach. Bhagabhai Rambhai, Rambhai Bhayabhai, Lakhman Sumara and Raningbhai Tapubhai came to the spot and they were also attacked by Accused 1 to 14. Unadbhai Desurbhai, Bhikabhai Desurbhai, Bhaga Ram and Lakhman Sumara sustained injuries on their heads. The complainant and the other injured persons shouted for help and the accused on seeing the villagers fled from the spot. The injured were taken for treatment in an ambulance of Gujarat Peeparu Port Ltd. Unadbhai Desurbhai died on 26-3-1998 while undergoing treatment. The accused were charged under Sections 147, 148, 504, 506(2), 323, 324, 325, 326, 302 read with Sections 34/149 IPC and Section 135 of the Bombay Police Act.

    4. In the trial, the prosecution examined 21 witnesses and relied upon several documents. Seven eyewitnesses including the complainant were examined. To prove the injuries PWs 14, 15, 16 and 17 were examined. Dr Popatbhai Bhaliya (PW 17) was the Medical Officer, Community Health Centre, Rajula on 24-3-1998. He examined the complainant, the deceased Unadbhai Desurbhai and other injured persons. He proved the medical certificates given by him regarding the injuries. Dr Hemangbhai Vasavdawas who treated the deceased was examined as PW 15. He stated that the cause of death was due to haemorrhage caused in the head by a solid blunt object. PW 14, Dr Govindbhai Parmar, conducted the post-mortem of the dead body of Unadbhai Desurbhai. Dr Madhukant (PW 16) was examined to speak about the injuries caused to Rainingbhai Tapu (PW 5). Relying upon the ocular testimonies which were corroborated by the medical evidence, the trial court held that the accused formed an unlawful assembly and attacked the complainant and others. The right to private defence set up by the accused was rejected by the trial court. On a detailed consideration of the material on record, the trial court found all the accused guilty of having committed the offence under Section 302 read with Sections 149/34 IPC for the death of Unadbhai Desurbhai. The accused were also found guilty of causing injuries to the others and were convicted under Sections 324 and 325 read with Sections 149/34 IPC.

    5. The High Court held that the offence under Section 302 read with Sections 149/34 IPC was not made out on the ground that there was a cross-case and that the accused neither formed an unlawful assembly nor was there previous concert to cause death. The High Court held that there was one injury on the head of the deceased Unadbhai Desurbhai and Accused 1, 2 and 10 were alleged to have caused the injury. As that injury on the head can be attributed to Accused 10, he was convicted under Section 302 IPC. The High Court held that Accused 1 and 2 cannot be held responsible for the said injury and acquitted them of the offence under Section 302 read with Sections 149/34 IPC. The remaining accused were also acquitted for the offence under Section 302 read with Sections 149/34 IPC. The conviction and sentence under Sections 324, 325 read with Sections 149/34 IPC were maintained.

    6. Lakshmanbhai Bhaikhabhai, Accused 10 did not prefer any appeal against his conviction and sentence. We are informed that he has served his sentence. We are also informed that during the pendency of the appeal before the High Court, Accused 4, 6 and 9 have died against whom the appeal abates.

    7. Ms Meenakshi Arora, learned Senior Counsel, appearing for the appellant submitted that the High Court committed a serious error in acquitting the accused under Section 302 read with Section 149 IPC in the facts and circumstances of the case. She submitted that the judgment of the High Court was cryptic and reasons given for the acquittal of the accused are unsustainable. The finding of the High Court that there was no previous concert to cause death and there was no unlawful assembly is without reference to the facts of the case.

    8. Mr Harin Raval, learned Senior Counsel, appearing for the accused submitted that the prosecution suppressed the true facts. He contended that the complainant's party were the aggressors in the fight that took place on 24-3-1998. He brought to our notice that Crime No. I-35 of 1998 was lodged at 8.30 p.m on 24-3-1998 at Rajula Police Station by Accused 2. The complaint preferred by the appellant was lodged 15 minutes after their complaint. He took us through the record to show that there were injuries received by the accused due to the attack by the complainant's party. He further submitted that the lights of the tractor were broken, its silencer was bent and its steering wheel was damaged. He highlighted the discrepancy on the question of who was driving the tractor. He referred to the evidence to show that Prakash Manubhai was the driver who was injured.

    9. Whether the High Court was right in acquitting the accused under Section 302 read with Section 149 IPC is the question that falls for our consideration in this case. The essential ingredients and the width and amplitude of Section 149 as well as its applicability to the facts of the case have to be examined. It would be relevant to refer to Section 149 IPC which is as under:

    “149. Every member of unlawful assembly guilty of offence committed in prosecution of common object.—If an offence is committed by any member of an unlawful assembly in prosecution of the common object of that assembly, or such as the members of that assembly knew to be likely to be committed in prosecution of that object, every person who, at the time of the committing of that offence, is a member of the same assembly, is guilty of that offence.”

    10. A Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court analysed Section 149 IPC in the year 1873 in R. v. Sabed Ali 1873 SCC OnLine Cal 64, (1873) 20 WR Cr 5, (1873) 11 Beng LR 347. Phear, J., speaking for the majority, held as under: (SCC OnLine Cal)

    “… It seems to me clearly not the case that every offence which may be committed by one member of an unlawful assembly while the assembly is existing i.e while the members are engaged in the prosecution of a common object, is attributed by Section 149 to every other member. The section describes the offence which is to be so attributed, under two alternative forms viz. it must be either, first — ‘an offence committed by a member of the unlawful assembly in prosecution of the common object of that assembly,’ or second — ‘an offence such as the members of that assembly knew to be likely to be committed in prosecution of that object.’
    Now, inasmuch as the continuance of the unlawful assembly is by the definition of Section 141 made coterminous with the prosecution of the common object, it seems tolerably clear that the legislature must have employed the words “prosecution of the common object” with some difference of meaning in these two passages respectively. Also the mere fact that the legislature thought fit to express the second alternative appears to show very distinctly that it did not intend the words “in prosecution” which are found in the first to be equivalent “during the prosecution”; for if they were then the second alternative would have clearly been unnecessary. And a comparison with this passage of the language which is used in Section 460, where the legislature makes all the persons concerned in committing a burglary punishable with transportation for life, if any one of their number at the time of committing of burglary causes death, etc., strongly bears out this view. I am of opinion that an offence, in order to fall within the first of the above alternatives i.e in order to be committed in the prosecution of the common object must be immediately connected with that common object by virtue of the nature of the object: for instance, if a body of armed men go out to fight, their common object is to cause bodily injury to their opponents, and in that case death, resulting from injury caused, would be homicide committed in prosecution of the common object. And an offence will fall within the second alternative if the members of the assembly, for any reason, knew beforehand that it was likely to be committed in the prosecution of the common object, though not knit thereto by nature of the object itself.
    It seems, thus, on a little consideration, to be apparent that the two alternatives of Section 149 do not cover all possible cases of an offence being committed by one member of an unlawful assembly during the time when the common object of the assembly is being prosecuted. It follows that, in every trial of prisoners on a charge framed under the provisions of Section 149 of the Penal Code, even when it is proved that the specified offence was committed by one of the members of the assembly during, so to speak, the pendency of that assembly, it yet remains an issue of fact to be determined on the evidence, whether that offence was committed in prosecution of the common object, as I have endeavoured to explain the meaning of those words in the first part of the section; and, if not, whether it was an offence such as the members of the assembly knew to be likely to be committed in the prosecution of the object.”

    (emphasis supplied)

    The Calcutta High Court was dealing with a case of riot over a dispute about a piece of land between Fukeer Buksh and Sabid Ali. Tureeboollah, who was a member of Sabid Ali's party of assailants, fired a gun and killed one Samed Ali. The trial court held that Tureeboollah was a member of the unlawful assembly of which the others in Sabid Ali's party were also members. It convicted all the accused under Section 302 read with Section 149 IPC. The High Court held that the conviction under Section 149 was unsustainable. In a concurring opinion, Jackson, J. held as follows: (Sabed Ali case 1873 SCC OnLine Cal 64, (1873) 20 WR Cr 5, (1873) 11 Beng LR 347, SCC OnLine Cal)

    “It appears to me that the construction of this Section 149, that is, a construction which shall be at once reasonable grammatical, involves two difficulties, or at least two points which call for attentive consideration—
    first— “The common object.”
    second— “Or such as the members of that assembly knew to be likely to be committed in the prosecution of that object.”
    It has been proposed to interpret the “common object” in a precise sense so as to indicate the exact extent of violence to which the rioters intended to go, namely, to take possession of the land by force extending, if need be, to wounding and the like. This, I think, is not the sense in which the words were intended to be understood. They are not, it seems to me, used in the same sense as “the common intention” in Section 34, which means the intention of all, whatever it may have been. The words here seem to have manifest reference to the defining Section 141, and to point to one of the five objects, which being common to five or more persons assembled together, make their assembly unlawful. For this reason, I think that any attempt to mitigate the rigour of the section by limiting the construction of the words “common object” must fail, and that any offence done by a member of an unlawful assembly, in prosecution of the particular one or more of the five objects mentioned in Section 141, which is or are brought home to the unlawful assembly, to which the prisoner belonged, is an offence within the meaning of the first part of the section.”

    11. Pontifex, J. agreed with the majority and interpreted the word “knew” in Section 149 in the following terms: (Sabed Ali case 1873 SCC OnLine Cal 64, (1873) 20 WR Cr 5, (1873) 11 Beng LR 347, SCC OnLine Cal)

    “To bring the offence of murder, as defined by the Code, within Section 149, I think it must either necessarily flow from the prosecution of the common object; or it must so probably flow from the prosecution of the common object that each member might antecedently expect it to happen. The offence of murder as strictly defined by the Code, requires a previous intention or knowledge in the perpetrator; and to “know” that murder is likely to be committed, is to know that some member of the assembly has such previous intention or knowledge. The word “knew” used in the second branch of the section is, I think, advisedly used, and cannot be made to bear the sense of “might have known”.”

    12. This Court in Mizaji v. State of U.P 1959 Supp (1) SCR 940, AIR 1959 SC 572, 1959 Cri LJ 777 observing that various High Courts of India had interpreted Section 149 held that every case has to be decided on its own facts. This Court proceeded to deal with Section 149 in detail as under: (AIR p. 576, para 6 : SCR pp. 948-49)

    “6. … The first part of the section means that the offence committed in prosecution of the common object must be one which is committed with a view to accomplish the common object. It is not necessary that there should be a preconcert in the sense of a meeting of the members of the unlawful assembly as to the common object; it is enough if it is adopted by all the members and is shared by all of them. In order that the case may fall under the first part the offence committed must be connected immediately with the common object of the unlawful assembly of which the accused were members. Even if the offence committed is not in direct prosecution of the common object of the assembly, it may yet fall under Section 149 if it can be held that the offence was such as the members knew was likely to be committed. The expression “know” does not mean a mere possibility, such as might or might not happen. For instance, it is a matter of common knowledge that when in a village a body of heavily armed men set out to take a woman by force, someone is likely to be killed and all the members of the unlawful assembly must be aware of that likelihood and would be guilty under the second part of Section 149. Similarly, if a body of persons go armed to take forcible possession of the land, it would be equally right to say that they have the knowledge that murder is likely to be committed if the circumstances as to the weapons carried and other conduct of the members of the unlawful assembly clearly point to such knowledge on the part of them all. There is a great deal to be said for the opinion of Couch, C.J, in Sabed Ali case 1873 SCC OnLine Cal 64, (1873) 20 WR Cr 5, (1873) 11 Beng LR 347 that when an offence is committed in prosecution of the common object, it would generally be an offence which the members of the unlawful assembly knew was likely to be committed in prosecution of the common object. That, however, does not make the converse proposition true; there may be cases which would come within the second part, but not within the first. The distinction between the two parts of Section 149 of the Penal Code cannot be ignored or obliterated. In every case it would be an issue to be determined whether the offence committed falls within the first part of Section 149 as explained above or it was an offence such as the members of the assembly knew to be likely to be committed in prosecution of the common object and falls within the second part.”

    Mizaji case 1959 Supp (1) SCR 940, AIR 1959 SC 572, 1959 Cri LJ 777 was referred to and relied upon in a long line of decisions of this Court. (See e.g Avtar Singh v. State of Haryana (2012) 9 SCC 432, paras 27-28, Roy Fernandes v. State of Goa (2012) 3 SCC 221, paras 31-32 and Lokeman Shah v. State of W.B (2001) 5 SCC 235, paras 20-21.)

    13. Applying the well-settled principles laid down by this Court we proceed to examine whether the accused can be convicted for an offence under Section 302 with the aid of Section 149 IPC. As per Section 141 IPC an assembly of five or more persons is designated an unlawful assembly if the common object of the persons composing that assembly is to commit an offence mentioned therein. Guidance is supplied by this Court regarding the requirement of examining the circumstances in which the incident occurred, the weapons used and the conduct of the accused during the course of the incident. In Lalji v. State of U.P (1989) 1 SCC 437 this Court held that:

    “8. … The common object of the assembly must be one of the five objects mentioned in Section 141 IPC. Common object of the unlawful assembly can be gathered from the nature of the assembly, arms used by them and the behaviour of the assembly at or before scene of occurrence. It is an inference to be deduced from the facts and circumstances of each case.”

    14. There is no dispute about the occurrence of the incident near the house of the appellant at 6.00 p.m on 24-3-1998. The oral testimonies of PW 1 to PW 6, who were injured witnesses are consistent. The manner in which the incident occurred, the weapons used by the accused and the nature of the injuries caused by the accused were stated clearly therein. The doctor who treated the injured were examined and they have proved the medical certificates issued by them. The doctors who treated the deceased Unadbhai Desurbhai were produced before the Court to speak about the cause of death. PW 14 who conducted the post-mortem on the body of Unadbhai Desurbhai was also examined. The situs of the incident is admitted to be near the house of the appellant. There is no denial of the incident by the accused. The submission of Mr Raval is that the complainant along with others attacked the accused and in the resultant free fight, persons from both sides were injured. On a careful examination of the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case, it is clear that accused formed an unlawful assembly. Armed with weapons like axe, iron pipes and spear, they proceeded to attack the appellant who rebuked the first respondent in the morning. After reaching the spot of the incident, they attacked the appellant and caused injuries to others who came to his rescue. The common object to commit an offence can be inferred from the weapons used and the violent manner of the attack.

    15. Having held that the accused formed into an unlawful assembly to commit an offence, what remains to be decided is whether they can be attributed with the knowledge about murder. One of the members of the unlawful assembly Lakshmanbhai Bhikabhai Vagh (A-10) was convicted and sentenced under Section 302 for committing the murder of Unadbhai Desurbhai. The question is whether there was a prior concert by all the members of the unlawful assembly to commit an offence of murder. The background in which the attack was made by the accused does not show that there was a common object of a murder amongst the accused. Accused 1 was infuriated on being questioned by the appellant regarding the damage to the electric pole near his house. Accused 1 along with the other accused intended to show their superiority and teach a lesson to the appellant. There is nothing on record to suggest any previous enmity between the parties. Common object to commit a murder cannot be inferred only on the basis that the weapons carried by the accused were dangerous. The above facts would indicate that no knowledge about the likelihood of an offence of murder being committed can be attributed to the members of the unlawful assembly, barring Lakshmanbhai Bhikabhai Vagh (A-10) who has been convicted under Section 302 IPC.

    16. Though the accused cannot be convicted under Section 302 with the aid of Section 149 IPC in view of the above findings, they would still be liable for a lesser punishment. The common object of the unlawful assembly to attack the appellant and others is proved. Considering the manner of the attack and the deadly weapons used, we are of the considered opinion that accused Valerbhai Deganbhai Vagh (A-1), Unadbhai Deganbhai Vagh (A-2), Bhimabhai Deganbhai Vagh (A-3), Unadbhai Bhagabhai Vagh (A-5), Bhagwanbhai Bhikabhai Vagh (A-7), Bhikabhai Jinabhai Vagh (A-8), Hasurbhai Bhikhabhai Vagh (A-11), Bhanabhai Bhikabhai Vagh (A-12), Patabhai alias Aatabhai Bhikabhai Vagh (A-13) and Bhavabhai Jikarbhai Vagh (A-14) are guilty of offence under Section 326 read with Section 149 IPC. We are informed that the accused have already undergone a sentence of seven-and-a-half years. Considering the fact that the incident occurred in the year 1998 and that there is no complaint from either side about any further violence since then we opine that the sentence can be limited to the period undergone.

    17. It is no more res integra that a finding of the commission of the offence under Section 326 read with Section 149 can be recorded against members of an unlawful assembly even if it is established that the offence under Section 302 was committed by one member of such assembly. (See Shambhu Nath Singh v. State of Bihar AIR 1960 SC 725, 1960 Cri LJ 1144.)

    18. The High Court found that the conviction of the accused under Section 302 read with Section 149 IPC cannot be upheld as there was neither an unlawful assembly nor a common object to cause death. The High Court miserably failed to consider the facts and circumstances of the case before coming to such conclusion. Section 149 IPC does not become inapplicable in all situations where there is a cross-case by the accused. The High Court ought to have taken note of the acquittal of the appellant and others in the said cross-case on 24-6-2003. The judgment of the High Court was delivered on 29-7-2009 2009 SCC OnLine Guj 12127 by which date there was no cross-case pending against the appellants. Recording a finding of acquittal without reappreciation of evidence by the appellate court would result in flagrant miscarriage of justice and that is exactly what happened in this case.

    19. The appeal is partly allowed and the accused Valerbhai Deganbhai Vagh (A-1), Unadbhai Deganbhai Vagh (A-2), Bhimabhai Deganbhai Vagh (A-3), Unadbhai Bhagabhai Vagh (A-5), Bhagwanbhai Bhikabhai Vagh (A-7), Bhikabhai Jinabhai Vagh (A-8), Hasurbhai Bhikhabhai Vagh (A-11), Bhanabhai Bhikabhai Vagh (A-12), Patabhai alias Aatabhai Bhikabhai Vagh (A-13) and Bhavabhai Jikarbhai Vagh (A-14) are convicted under Section 326 read with Section 149 IPC and sentenced to the period undergone.

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    Najabhai Desurbhai Wagh v. Valerabhai Deganbhai Vagh And Others
    (Feb 1, 2017)