Per Chairman These appeals are directed against order dated 17.11.2015 passed by the Competition Commission of India (for short, the Commission) wherebyit held that the appellants have acted in a concerted manner in fixing and revising Fuel Surcharge (FSC) and thereby contravened Section 3(1) read with Section 3(3)(a) of the Competition Act, 2002 (for short, the Act) and imposed penalty of Rs. 63.74crores, Rs. 42.48 crores and Rs. 151.69 crores respectively on the three appellants.
2. Respondent No. 2-Express Industry Council of India, filed an information dated 25.04.2013 under Section 19(1) (a) of the Act with the allegation that the appellants, Air India Limited and Go Airlines (India) Limited had joined hands and formed a cartel to introduceFSC for transport cargo with effect from 15.05.2008 and uniformly increased the same from time to time adversely affecting the freight companies and the consumers.
3. The Commission considered the allegations contained in the information, heard the advocate and the representative of Respondent No. 2 and passed order dated 02.09.2013 under Section 26(1) of the Act, paragraphs 6 and 7 of which read as under:
6. In view of the aforesaid, it seems that the averments and allegations laid in the information prima facie indicate the existence of an agreement amongst the opposite parties to determine prices which requires a detailed and thorough investigation by the DG to, inter alia, examine the co- movement between fuel prices and FSC as also the parallelism/co-ordination between the opposite parties in fixing/revising FSC.
7. In view of the foregoing discussion, the Commission is of the opinion that the acts of opposite parties prima facie appear to be in contravention of section 3(1) read with section 3(3)(a) of the Act. This is a fit case for DG investigation.
4. In furtherance of the directive given by the Commission, the Director General (DG) issued notices to the appellants and other two airlines under Section 36(2) read with Section 41(2) and called upon them to furnish the specified information and documents.The appellants submitted their responses/replies, in which they denied the allegations that they had formed a cartel for the purpose of fixing FSC. Similar replies were filed by Air India Ltd. and Go Air (India) Ltd.
5. Notices were also issued to Board of Airlines Representatives, Air Cargo Forum India, Federation of Indian Airlines, Gammon Logistics Ltd., Green Air Logistics, Sovika Aviation Services Pvt. Limited, Air Economic Regulatory Authority, Director General Civil Aviation, Airport Authority of India and Domestic Air Cargo Agents Association of India under Section 36(2) read with Section 41(2) of the Act requiring them to supply the desired information and documents. All the noticees complied with the directions of the DG. Thereafter, the DG issued summons to Shri Vijay Kumar, Chief Operating Officer, Express Industry Council of India, Ms. Madhuri Madan, Deputy General Manager (Cargo Department), Air India Ltd., S/Shri R. Rammohan, Senior General Manager (Cargo), Jet Airways (India) Ltd., RaghuramanVenkataramani, Vice President (Cargo), SpiceJet Ltd., Mahesh Kumar Malik, Vice President (Cargo, Sales & Services), Interglobe Aviation Ltd. (IndiGo), Prasad Pathare, Manager (Legal), Go Airlines (India) Ltd., Anish Gandhi, Corporate Advisor, M/s. Sovika Aviation Services Ltd., Amit Bajaj, Director, Mituj Marketing Pvt. Ltd., Arvind Nayak, Managing Director, Nayak Aviation Services Pvt. Ltd., Yogesh Dhingra, Chief Financial Officer & Chief Operating Officer, Blue Dart Express Limited andAkhilesh Rao, Senior Vice President, Sovika Aviation Services Pvt. Ltd. and recorded their statements on different dates between 14.10.2014 and 20.01.2015.
6. The Joint Director General (for short, the Jt. DG), to whom the investigation appears to have been transferred in the midway, considered the allegations contained in the information filed by Respondent No. 2, replies submitted by the appellants and two other airlines and identified the following issues :
(i) What is the dynamics of the overall pricing inclusive of freight, FSC and other components?
(ii) Whether FSC is a significant component of the overall price to justify concerted action, if any?
(iii) What are the various factors on the basis of which FSC is determined?
(iv) What is the justification put forth by various airlines in respect of change in FSC?
(v) Whether the rationales given by airlines regarding revision of FSC are justifiable?
(vi) Whether the OPs are operating in a concerted manner while fixing FSC?
(vii) Whether the OPs have formed a cartel and violated the provisions of section 3(3) of the Act?
7. The Jt. DG analysed the material/evidence collected during the investigation, separately discussed each issue and recorded her observations/findings. In paragraph 6.7 of the report, the Jt. DG discussed Issue No. (i) and recorded her observations in paragraph 6.8 in the following words : 6.8 Thus, it is seen that the freight tariff, which is the most important component in the overall price of air cargo transportation by airlines, is highly variable and dynamic. The published tariff rates for any airline way from sector to sector, flight to flight (morning flights being premium for cargo and day flights being lean), nature of cargo, weight of cargo etc. Further, it also values from agent to agent, more attractive DEAL RATES being offered to an agent who provides regular high tonnage. Above all this, the actual rate (SPOT RATES) also depends on the availability of belly space just before departure. These Spot rates may not be reflected on the invoices/cargo sales reports and are separately settled through issuance of credit notes to the respective agent. To sum up, the overall pricing is highly variable, differentiated across airlines and products and dynamic.
8. She discussed Issue No. (ii) in paragraph 6.9 to 6.18 and recorded the following conclusions : 6.19 The above analysis shows that cargo revenue is ranging from 20% to 30% of the overall revenue and is certainly not such an insignificant component of the overall price so as to rule out any possibility of any cartelization. In fact, considering the annual tonnage carried by each airline and the fact that FSC is levied at a flat rate of per kg. of chargeable weight of cargo, it is seen that the revenue on account of FSC component is a predictable amount and unlike freight tariff, which is dynamic and not amenable to revenue forecasting, revenue on account of FSC can be easily forecasted with a fair degree of accuracy. Thus, FSC is not only a significant component of overall cargo pricing but also, a predictable amount.
9. Issue No. (iii) wasdiscussed by the Jt. DG in paragraphs 6.20 to 6.23 and the following conclusion was recorded in paragraph 6.27, which reads as under : 6.27 To sum up, it is seen that all airline companies have indicated that turbulence in ATF price was the main reason for introduction of FSC in domestic cargo market. ATF price is also the main factor affecting FSC. Apart from ATF price, certain other factors which have been stated to be taken into account while determining FSC include financial health of the company, dollar exchange rate, cost environment and market feedback. However, none of the airlines has been able to furnish any data or costing studies of any kind whatsoever in support of determination of FSC. No airline has been able to give any systematic breakup of weight attached to any parameter claimed to be important in determination of FSC. The above clearly points to the premise that indeed there has been no systematic basis for fixing of FSC and the same has been a nebulous, unilateral fixation by each airline.
10. The Jt. DG then considered Issue No. (iv), encapsulated the reasons put forward by the appellants and other airlinesto justify the revision of the FSC and recorded her observations in the following words : 6.33 The replies furnished by all the companies regarding the rationale for each revision in FSC as well as the statements recorded in this office have been examined minutely. It is observed that rate of FSC of all the airlines have moved in a particular direction in a given period of time. The range of price movement has also been found some for all the companies. 6.34 It may also be seen from the above replies, that no specific reason for FSC revision on various instances has been given by the companies. Although ATF price volatility has been stated to be the most important factor, this correlation between ATF price and FSC breaks down on several occasions.
11. For determining whether the rationale supplied by the airlines for revision of the FSC was justified (Issue No.V), the Jt. DG analysed the figures made available by them and observed that the movement of the FSC cannot be linked to any of the parameters enumerated in the preceding paragraphs. The summary of the observations recorded qua that issue is extracted below : The above discussion leads to the conclusion that volatility in ATF price was the reason for introduction, however, with the passage of time the rationale behind FSC rates has got shrouded in vagueness and other than market intelligence, the reasons offered by various airlines are not justified by any cogent basis.
12. The Jt. DG discussed the lasttwoissues by adverting to Section 3 of the Act and opined that there was no direct or indirect evidence to suggest formation of cartel. This is borne out from paragraphs 7.7 to 7.12 (In the numbering of paragraphs, paragraph 7.8 is missing), which are reproduced below : 7.7 Parallel action is being exhibited by the airlines in determination of FSC on certain nearby dates could either indicate the possibility of prior consultation of price movement and its range among the airlines through direct or indirect exchange of information through intermediaries. No specific reason for this seemingly parallel action in FSC fixation in certain period has been given by the companies. However, critical analysis in preceding Chapter along following lines does not lead to the conclusion that the above falls within the realm of concerted Practice.
a) Correlation between behaviour of individual airlines
b) Behaviour of market in terms of tonnage when change in FSC was made by one airline.
c) Dynamism and competiveness of overall price. As discussed FSC is a part of the overall price which has fixed components (FSC, D.O. Charges, AWB fee etc.) and variable components, namely, the actual freight tariff. The latter is highly variable, dynamic and dependent on various factors, both intra-airline as well as Inter-airline. This is represented graphically below using invoice analysis for periods where FSC was revised on close dates by three airlines : Sector BOM-CCU Period 01.06.12 15.06.12 Airline IndiGo SpiceJet Jet Airways FSC rate
11 11 11 Freight rate
38 45 40 Chargeable weight
67 64 54 Note : The above graph captures the freight tariff and FSC only for comparison across airlines on unit kg. basis. Certain other charges IndiGo SpiceJet Jet Airways BOM-CCU Series 1 such as AWB fee, DO charges etc. are not reflected here as these are not levied on chargeable weight basis. Sector BOM-DEL Period 01.11.12 15.11.12 Airline IndiGo SpiceJet Jet Airways FSC rate 13 13 13 Freight rate 26 14 17 Chargeable weight
148 144 114 Note : The above graph captures the freight tariff and FSC only for comparison across airlines on unit kg. basis. Certain other charges such as AWB fee, etc.are not reflected here as these are not levied on chargeable weight basis. The above analysis shows that there is no price parallelism in so far as the overall price is concerned. 7.9 The existence of an anti-competitive practice or agreement must be inferred from a number of coincidences and indicia which, taken together, may in the absence of another plausible explanation, constitute evidence of an IndiGo SpiceJet Jet Airway Series 1 Series 3 infringement of the competition rules. The body of evidence consists of : Direct Evidence 7.10 Proof by direct evidence means being able to show the existence of an agreement through real evidence, including written agreements, emails, notes and internal reports, or personal evidence, including testimony from the parties concerned or witnesses. In this case no direct evidence could be gathered confirming exchange of information regarding prices between OPs. Indirect Evidence 7.11 As direct evidence is hard to obtain, proof by presumption of a fact is becoming increasingly important. Presumption of a fact means inference of a fact from some other fact based on likelihood and correlation. Presumption of facts is used where the existence of agreements is proved through indirect or circumstantial evidence due to a lack of direct evidence. 7.12 The strength of circumstantial evidence required would need to be enough to exclude the possibility that the parties involved had acted independently. In order to carry out a threadbare analysis of the circumstantial evidences involved in the case, the facts gathered on the issue of alleged cartel have been tabulated in the check list prepared hereunder. On weighing the above, it is seen that the preponderance of circumstantial indices are not sufficient to conclude the existence of a cartel in terms of section 3(1) read with section 3(3)(a) of the Act. [Underlining is ours]
13. On the basis of the above noted discussion and observation, the Jt. DG concluded that the allegation levelled by Respondent No. 2 that the Domestic Airlines have indulged in anti-competitive conduct from 2008 to 2013 has not been proved and there is no violation of Section 3(1) and Section 3(3)(a) of the Act.
14. The report of the Jt. DG was considered by the Commission in its ordinary meeting held on 19.02.2015 and passed the following order: COMPETITION COMMISSION OF INDIA Case No. 30/2013 19.02.2015 Filed By : Express Industry Council of India Against OP1 Jet Airways India Ltd. OP2 Indigo Airlines OP3 SpiceJet Ltd. OP4 Air India Ltd. OP5 Go Airline (India) Ltd. Order In the present case, the Commission vide its order dated 02nd September 2013 under section 26(1) of the Competition Act, 2002 (Act) had directed the Director General (DG) to cause an investigation into the matter. Accordingly, the DG, after completing the investigation, has filed the investigation report. The Commission considered the investigation report filed by the DG in its ordinary meeting held today. The Commission decided to forward an electronic copy of the investigation report of the DG to the parties for filing their replies/objections. The Commission directed the parties to file their replies/objections latest by 24th March, 2015. The Informant is directed to provide a copy of its replies/objections to the Opposite Parties and each of the Opposite Parties is directed to provide a copy of its replies/objections to the Informant. The Opposite Parties are also directed to furnish their audited balance sheet and loss account/turnover for the last three financial years latest by 24th March 2015 at 10.30 A.M. The Secretary is directed to inform all concerned for necessary compliance.
15. The aforesaid order was communicated to the appellants and other airlines by the Secretary of the Commission vide letter/notice dated 23.02.2015 with a stipulation that the hearing shall take place on 01.04.2015.
16. On 10.03.2015, Respondent No. 2 filed an application for grant of time to file its replies to the investigation report and also for re-scheduling the hearing fixed on 01.04.2015. Same applications were also filed on behalf of SpiceJet Ltd. The Commission considered all the applications in its ordinary meeting held on 01.04.2015 and extended the time for filing replies/objections upto 20.04.2015. The date of hearing was also changed from 01.04.2015 to 19.05.2015. The hearing was again adjourned to 15.07.2015 at the instance of the counsel for Respondent No. 2. The hearing was once again adjourned to 23.07.2015 to 13.08.2015 because some of the parties had not exchanged their replies/objections. Finally, the arguments were heard by the Commission on 13.08.2015, on which date it was observed that appropriate order will be passed in due course.
17. After two months, the Commission passed the impugned order. It disagreed with the findings and conclusion recorded by the Jt. DG and held that the appellants have acted in a concerted manner in fixing and revising the FSC rates and thereby contravened the provisions of Section 3(1) and Section 3(3)(a) of the Act.The Commission alsoimposed penalty on the appellants under Section 27(b) of the Act @ 1% of the average of turnover of the last three financial years. The average turnover, Interglobe Aviation Limited (IndiGo Airlines), was taken as Rs.6374.57 Crores and penalty of Rs. 63.74 Crores was imposed. The average turnover of SpiceJet Ltd. was taken as Rs. 424.85 Crores and penalty of Rs. 42.48 Crores was imposed. The average turnover of the third appellant i.e. Jet Airways was taken as Rs.15169.50 Crores and penalty of Rs.151.69 Crores was imposed.
18. The appellants have challenged the impugned order on several grounds including the one that the same is vitiated due to violation of the principles of natural justice. In Appeals Nos. 07/2016 and 11/2016, the appellants have made categorical statements that before recording its disagreement with the findings and conclusion recorded by the Jt. DG, the Commissiondid not give any notice to themincorporatingthe reasons for disagreementand opportunity to file objections qua such reasons and make arguments on that basis.
19. At the preliminary hearing of Appeal Nos. 7 and 8 held on 09.02.2016, the Tribunal noted the arguments advanced by the learned senior counsel for the appellants and passed the following order : These appeals are directed against order dated 17.11.2015 passed by the Competition Commission of India (for short, the Commission) in Case No.30/2013 whereby the Commission directed the appellants to cease and desist from indulging in anti-competitive practices and imposed penalty @ 1% of their average turnover of three financial years, i.e. Rs.63.74 crores and Rs.42.48 crores respectively. One of the several grounds on which the appellants have questioned the impugned order is that even though the Director General, who was asked by the Commission to conduct investigation into the alleged anti-competitive activities of the appellants, submitted report with the finding that the appellants are not guilty of cartelization, the Commission held them guilty of acting in violation of section 3(1) read with section 3(3) and passed the impugned order without giving them Show Cause Notice indicating the reasons for disagreement and an opportunity of hearing. Both Shri Ramji Srinivasan and Shri Jayant Bhushan, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants argued that the impugned order is liable to be set aside on the ground of violations of principles of natural justice because the Commission did not issue any notice to the appellants indicating that it was not in agreement with the finding recorded by the Director General and did not give them an opportunity of hearing in the light of reasons of disagreement. On being asked by the Tribunal, Shri Ramji Srinivasan, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant in Appeal No.07/2016 produced photostat copy of the notice dated 23rd February, 2015 issued by the Secretary of the Commission in compliance of the direction given by the latter on 19th February, 2015 to show that without recording specific disagreement with the findings of the Director General and without calling upon the appellants to show cause in the context of the reasons for disagreement, the Commission passed the impugned order. He relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Gorkha Security Services vs. Government (NCT of Delhi 2014) NSCC 105 (Paragraph 21) and order dated 23.02.2015 passed by this Tribunal in Appeal No.17/2015, the Board of Control for Cricket in India vs. the Competition Commission of India and another (paragraph 24) and submitted that the impugned order is liable to be set aside. Shri Jayant Bhushan challenged the finding recorded by the Commission on the issue of formation of cartel and argued that having held that two of the airlines were not part of cartel, the finding recorded on this issue is liable to be set-aside. Learned counsel also questioned the penalty imposed by the Commission under Section 27 of the Competition Act, 2002 by arguing that the average of three financial years turnover could only be with reference to the relevant product and not the entire income generated by the appellants during those years. Issue notice to the respondents returnable on 09.03.2016. Issue notice on the applications for interim relief returnable on 09.03.2016. In the meanwhile, operation of the impugned order of the Commission shall remain stayed. An additional set of notices be given dasti to each of the appellants for effecting service upon the respondents. It is made clear that if the appellants fail to serve the notice on either of the respondents, the interim order passed today shall stand automatically vacated.
20. In Appeal No.11 of 2016, the notice was ordered on 22.02.2016 and operation of the impugned order was stayed.
21. On the next date of hearing i.e. 09.03.2016, the Tribunal noted that the respondents have been served and passed the following order: One of the questions which would require consideration in these appeals is whether the Competition Commission of India had, before directing the parties to file their replies/objections to the report submitted by the Director General, recorded its disagreement with the findings and conclusion of the Director General that no violation of the provisions of the Act had been established, recorded reasons for the disagreement and communicated the same to the appellants to enable them to file their response to those reasons and make their submissions. This aforesaid question was recorded by the Tribunal in its order dated 9th February 2016 in Appeal Nos.7 and 8 of 2016. Learned counsel for the Competition Commission of India requests for three days time to ascertain whether the Commission had in fact recorded reasoned disagreement with the findings and conclusion recorded by the Director General and gave notice to the appellants to file their response in the context of the reasons of disagreement. Put up on 15th March 2016.
22. S/Shri Ramji Srinivasan, Jayant Bhushan and A.N. Haksar, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants argued that the impugned order is liable to be set aside because the Commission did not give effective opportunity of hearing to their clients. Learned senior counsel submitted that even though there is no specific provision in the Act and the Competition Commission of India (General) Regulations, 2009 (for short, the Regulations), which obligate the Commission to record reasons for disagreement, if any, with the findings and conclusions recorded by the investigating officer (DG), communicate the same to the person against whom the investigation is conducted in terms of an order made under Section 26(1) and give such person opportunity to controvert the same, this requirement must be read as implicit in the scheme of the Act and the Regulations because by virtue of Section 36(1), the Commission is bound to act in consonance with the principles of natural justice and one of the facets thereof is that no person can be condemned unheard.Learned senior counsel emphasised that the opportunity to file objections or suggestions envisaged in Section 26(5) of the Act and Regulation 21 of the Regulations impliesan effective opportunity and not an empty formality, as has been done in this case. Shri Ramji Srinivasan submitted that in response to notice dated 23.03.2015 sent by the Secretary of the Commission incorporating order dated 19.02.2015 passed by the Commission, his clientdid not file any objection because the Jt. DG had submitted report with an unequivocal finding that the allegation of cartel has not been proved and that there is no violation of Section 3(1) and Section 3(3)(a) of the Act. Shri Jayant Bhushan and Shri A.N. Haksar submitted that their clients filed responses only to support the findings and the conclusion recorded by the Jt. DG. All the counsel emphasised that at the oral hearing held on 13.08.2015, the Commission did not give any indication of its intention to disagree with or overrule the findings recorded by the Jt. DG and, as such, they had no occasion to controvert the same. They submitted that if the Commission had recorded reasons for disagreement with the findings/conclusions recorded by the Jt. DG and communicated the same to their clients, they would have surely availed the opportunity to file their objections qua such reasons/conclusions and during the course of oral hearing, they would have convinced the Commission to approve the findings recorded by the Jt. DG.
23. Shri Samar Bansal and Shri Sandeep Mahapatra, learned counsel for the Commission and Shri Jimmy Pochkanawala, learned counsel for Respondent No.2 argued that the impugned order does not suffer from any legal infirmity and the finding recorded by the Commission that the appellants had formed a cartel and acted in contravention of section 3(1) read with section 3(3)(a) does not call for interference by the Tribunal. They emphasised that the findings and conclusions recorded by the Jt. DG were self-contradictory and the Commission did not commit any error by not approving the same. Shri Bansal and Shri Pochkanawala filed two charts to show, what they termed as, inconsistencies in the findings and conclusion recorded by the Jt. DG and submitted that the cause of the appellants was not at all prejudiced because the Commission had given them opportunity to file objections/suggestions, which was followed by oral hearing. Shri Bansal further argued that even if the Tribunal comes to the conclusion that the impugned order is not consistent with the principles of natural justice, the same may not be set aside because no prejudice has been caused to the appellants on account of the Commissions failure to record reasons for disagreement with the findings and conclusions recorded by the Jt. DG and giving them opportunity to file objections qua such reasons and advance arguments in support of the objections. In support of this arguments, Shri Bansal relied upon the following judgements :
(i) Messrs. Fedco (P) Ltd. and Another Vs. S.N. Bilgrami and others (1960) 2 SCR 408
(ii) State Bank of Patiala and Others Vs. S.K. Sharma (1996) 3 SCC
(iii) Islamic Academy of Education and Another Vs. State of Karnataka and Others (2003) 6 SCC 697
(iv) Haryana Financial Corporation and Another Vs. Kailash Chandra Ahuja (2008) 9 SCC 31
(v) Gorkha Security Services Vs. Government (NCT of Delhi) and Others (2014) 9 SCC 105
(vi) Queen on the Application of Daniel Faulkner Vs. Secretary of State for the Home Department (2006) EWHC 563 (Admin)
(vii) Byrne Vs. Kinematograph Renters Society Ltd. (1958) 1 WLR 762.
24. We have considered the respective arguments and carefully perused the record. Sections 19(1), 26(1), 26(2) to 26(8), 27 and 36(1) of the Act and Regulations 18, 20 and 21 the Competition Commission of India (General) Regulations, 2009 (for short, the Regulations) which have bearing on the determination of the point argued by learned counsel for parties read as under :
19. Inquiry into certain agreements and dominant position of enterprise.(1) The Commission may inquire into any alleged contravention of the provisions contained in sub-section (1) of section 3 or sub-section (1) of section
4 either on its own motion or on (a) [receipt of any information, in such manner and] accompanied by such fee as may be determined by regulations, from any person, consumer or their association or trade association; or (b) a reference made to it by the Central Government or a State Government or a statutory authority. (2) to (7) xxx xxx xxx
26. Procedure for inquiry under section 19. (1) On receipt of a reference from the Central Government or a State Government or a statutory authority or its own knowledge or information received under section 19, if the Commission is of the opinion that there exists a prima facie case, it shall direct the Director-General to cause an investigation to be made in to the matter: Provided that if the subject-matter of an information received is, in the opinion of the Commission, substantially the same as or has been covered by any previous information received, then the new information may be clubbed with the previous information. (2) Where on receipt of a reference from the Central Government or a State Government or a statutory authority or information received under section 19, the Commission is of the opinion that there exists no prima facie case, it shall close the matter forthwith and pass such orders as it deems fit and send a copy of its order to the Central Government or the State Government or the statutory authority or the parties concerned, as the case may be. (3) The Director-General shall, on receipt of direction under sub-section (1), submit a report on his findings within such period as may be specified by the Commission. (4) The Commission may forward a copy of the report referred to in subsection (3) to the parties concerned: Provided that in case the investigation is caused to be made based on a reference received from the Central Government or the State government or the statutory authority, the Commission shall forward a copy of the report referred to in sub-section (3) to t he Central Government or the State Government or the statutory authority, as the case may be. (5) If the report of the Director-General referred to in sub-section (3) recommends that there is no contravention of the provisions of this Act, the Commission shall invite objections or suggestions from the Central Government or the State government or the statutory authority or the parties concerned, as the case may be, on such report of the Director-General. (6) If, after consideration of the objections or suggestions referred to in subsection (5), if any, the Commission agrees with the recommendation of the Director-General, it shall close the matter forthwith and pass such orders as it deems fit and communicate its order to the Central Government or the State Government or the statutory authority or the parties concerned, as the case may be. (7) If, after consideration of the objections or suggestions referred to in subsection (5), if any, the Commission is of the opinion that further investigation is called for, it may direct further investigation in the matter by the Director-General or cause further inquiry to be made in the matter or itself proceed with further inquiry in the matter in accordance with the provisions of this Act. (8) If the report of the Director-General referred to in sub-section (3) recommends that there is contravention of any of the provisions of this Act, and the Commission is of the opinion that further inquiry is called for, it shall inquire into such contravention in accordance with the provisions of the Act.
27. Orders by Commission after inquiry into agreements or abuse of dominant position.-- Where after inquiry the Commission finds that any agreement referred to in section 3 or action of an enterprise in a dominant position, is in contravention of section 3 or section 4, as the case may be, it may pass all or any of the following orders, namely: (a) direct any enterprise or association of enterprises or person or association of persons, as the case may be, involved in such agreement, or abuse of dominant position, to discontinue and not to re- enter such agreement or discontinue such abuse of dominant position, as the case may be; (b) impose such penalty, as it may deem fit which shall be not more than ten percent. of the average of the turnover for the last three preceding financial years, upon each of such person or enterprises which are parties to such agreements or abuse: [Provided that in case any agreement referred to in section 3 has been entered into by a cartel, the Commission may impose upon each producer, seller, distributor, trader or service provider included in that cartel, a penalty of up to three times of its profit for each year of the continuance of such agreement or ten per cent. of its turnover for each year of the continuance of such agreement, whichever is higher.] (d) direct that the agreements shall stand modified to the extent and in the manner as may be specified in the order by the Commission; (e) direct the enterprises concerned to abide by such other orders as the Commission may pass and comply with the directions, including payment of costs, if any; (g) pass such other 45[order or issue such directions] as it may deem fit. [Provided that while passing orders under this section, if the Commission comes to a finding, that an enterprise in contravention to section 3 or section 4 of the Act is a member of a group as defined in clause(b) of the Explanation to section 5 of the Act, and other members of such a group are also responsible for, or have contributed to, such a contravention, then it may pass orders, under this section, against such members of the group.]
36. Power of Commission to regulate its own procedure.-- (1) In the discharge of its functions, the Commission shall be guided by the principles of natural justice and, subject to the other provisions of this Act and of any rules made by the Central Government, the Commission shall have the powers to regulate its own procedure. Regulation 18. Issue of direction to cause investigation on prima facie case (1) Where the Commission is of the opinion that a prima facie case exists, the Secretary shall convey the directions of the Commission 1[within seven days,] to the Director- General to investigate the matter. (2) A direction of investigation to the Director-General shall be deemed to be the commencement of an inquiry under section 26 of the Act.
20. Investigation by Director-General (1) The Secretary shall, while conveying the directions of the Commission under regulation 18, send a copy of the information or reference, as the case may be, with all other documents or materials or affidavits or statements which have been filed either along with the said information or reference or at the time of preliminary conference, to the Director-General. (2) The Commission shall direct the Director-General to submit a report within such time [as may be specified by the Commission which ordinarily shall not exceed sixty days from the date of receipt of the directions of the Commission]. (3) The Commission may, on an application made by the Director-General [giving sufficient reasons,] extend the time for submission of the respondent [by such period as it may consider reasonable]. (4) The report of the Director-General shall contain his findings on each of the allegations made in the information or reference, as the case may be, together with all evidences or documents or statements or analyses collected during the investigation : [Provided that when considered necessary, the Director General may, for maintaining confidentiality, submit his report in two parts. One of the parts shall contain the documents to which access to the parties may be accorded and another part shall contain confidential and commercially sensitive information and documents to which access may be partially or totally restricted]. (5) [Ten copies] of the report of the Director-General, along with a soft copy in document format, shall be forwarded to the Secretary within the time specified required. (6) If the Commission, on consideration of the report, is of the opinion that further investigation is called for, it may direct the Director-General to make further investigation and submit a supplementary report on specific issues within [such time as may be specified by the Commission but ordinarily not later than forty- five days].
21. Procedure for inquiry under section 26 of the Act. (1) On receipt of the report of the Director General, the Secretary shall place the said report before the Commission [within seven days,] for further orders and, in accordance with the direction of the Commission, forward [either a hard or a soft copy (in electronic form)] [of non confidential version] thereof to the Central Government or the State Government or the statutory authority, or the parties concerned, as the case may be. (2) If the report of the Director-General finds no contravention of the provisions of the Act, the Secretary shall [within seven days,] convey the directions of the Commission for inviting objections or suggestions [to be filed within fifteen days] from the Central Government or the State Government or the statutory authority, or from the parties concerned, as the case may be on such report of the Director-General. (3) If the Commission orders closure of the matter on consideration of the objections or suggestions, if any, referred to in sub-regulation (2), an agrees with the findings of the Director-General, the Secretary shall [within seven days,] convey the orders of the Commission to the Central Government or the State Government or the statutory authority or the parties concerned, as the case may be. (4) If the Commission, on consideration of the objections or suggestions, referred to in sub-regulation (2), directs further investigations in the matter by the Director- General or further inquiries in the matter to be made by an officer of the Commission so authorized by it, the Secretary shall [within seven days,] convey the directions of the Commission to the Central Government or the officer so authorized, as the case may be. (5) On an application made by the officer authorized by the Commission justifying the production of specified books or other documents, as may be required to make further inquiries under sub-regulation (4), the Commission may direct any person to produce such specified books or other documents relating to any trade carried out by such person or enterprise, as per the provisions of sub section (4) of section 36 of the Act. Explanation. - For the purpose of this sub- regulation, the word officer shall include the experts and professionals mentioned under sub-section (3) of section 17 or sub-section (3) of section 17 or sub- section (3) of section 36 of the Act. (6) On receipt of the report of the Director-General on further investigation or report of the authorized officer on further inquiries, as the case may be, the Secretary shall [with the approval of the Chairperson, fix the meeting of the Commission within seven days for consideration thereof]. (7) If the report of the Director-General mentioned under sub-regulation (1) finds contravention of any of the provisions of the Act, the Secretary shall obtain the orders of the Commission for inviting objections or suggestions from the Central Government or the State Government or the statutory authority or the parties concerned, as the case may be. (8) On consideration of the objections or suggestions from the Central Government or the State Government or the statutory authority or the parties concerned, or the report of further investigation or further inquiries, as the case may be, if the Commission is of the opinion that further inquiry is called for, the Secretary shall fix the meeting of the Commission for consideration thereof, after issue of notice as per regulation 22, to the Central Government or the State Government or the statutory authority or the parties concerned, as the case may be. (9) The Secretary shall keep the Director-General informed of the dates of the meetings of the Commission for inquiry under sub-section (7) or sub-section (8) of section 26 of the Act for appearing in person or through any of his officers in accordance with the provisions of section 35 of the Act.
25. Some of the above reproduced provisions were considered by a three judge Bench of the Supreme Court in Competition Commission of India vs. Steel Authority of India Limited [(2010) 10 SCC 744]. In that case, the Commission had challenged the maintainability of an appeal filed by the respondent against an order passed under Section 26(1) of the Act. The Supreme Court analysed the relevant provisions of the Act and the Regulations and laid down several propositions including the following:
78. Cumulative reading of these provisions, in conjunction with the scheme of the Act and the object sought to be achieved, suggests that it will not be in consonance with the settled rules of interpretation that a statutory notice or an absolute right to claim notice and hearing can be read into the provisions of Section 26(1) of the Act. Discretion to invite, has been vested in the Commission, by virtue of the Regulations, which must be construed in their plain language and without giving it undue expansion.
97. The above reasoning and the principles enunciated, which are consistent with the settled canons of law, we would adopt even in this case. In the backdrop of these determinants, we may refer to the provisions of the Act. Section 26, under its different sub-sections, requires the Commission to issue various directions, take decisions and pass orders, some of which are even appealable before the Tribunal. Even if it is a direction under any of the provisions and not a decision, conclusion or order passed on merits by the Commission, it is expected that the same would be supported by some reasoning. At the stage of forming a prima facie view, as required under Section 26(1) of the Act, the Commission may not really record detailed reasons, but must express its mind in no uncertain terms that it is of the view that prima facie case exists, requiring issuance of direction for investigation to the Director General. Such view should be recorded with reference to the information furnished to the Commission. Such opinion should be formed on the basis of the records, including the information furnished and reference made to the Commission under the various provisions of the Act, as afore-referred. However, other decisions and orders, which are not directions simpliciter and determining the rights of the parties, should be well reasoned analyzing and deciding the rival contentions raised before the Commission by the parties. In other words, the Commission is expected to express prima facie view in terms of Section 26(1) of the Act, without entering into any adjudicatory or determinative process and by recording minimum reasons substantiating the formation of such opinion, while all its other orders and decisions should be well reasoned.
26. Since the question agitated in the above noted case was confined to the maintainability of an appeal filed against an order passed by the Commission under Section 26(1) of the Act, the observations contained in the judgment that the rule of audi alteram partem, which is one of the facets of the principles of natural justice is not applicable at the stage of formation of prima facie opinion by the Commission do not have any bearing on the interpretation of other provisions of the Act, more so because Section 36(1) of the Act explicitly provides that in discharge of its function the Commission shall be guided by the principles of natural justice.
27. A careful reading of Section 26(1) shows that once the Commission forms an opinion that there exists a prima facie case, it shall direct the Director General to cause an investigation to be made into the matter. In terms of Regulation 18 read with Regulation 20, the direction of the Commission is required to be communicated by its Secretary to the Director General along with a copy of the information or reference with all other documents or materials or affidavits or statements which have been filed with the information or reference or at the time of preliminary conference. Section 26(3) requires the Director General to submit a report on its findings within the time specified by the Commission. Such findings must cover each of the allegations contained in the information or reference together with evidence or documents or statements or analysis collected during the investigation. Section 26(4) enjoins the Commission to forward the report of the Director General to the parties concerned. If the investigation is caused to be made based on a reference received from the Central Government or the State Government or the statutory authority, then the report is required to be sent to the appropriate Government or the statutory authority. The object of sending report to the appropriate Government or the statutory authority or the parties concerned is to enable them to submit objections or suggestions qua the findings recorded by the Director General. This exercise has to be undertaken by the Commission even if the Director General finds that there is no contravention of Sections 3 or 4 of the Act. The Commission can close the case if, after considering the objections or suggestions, it agrees with the recommendations of the Director General. If the Commission is not satisfied with the report of the Director General and forms an opinion that further investigation is called for then it can direct the Director General to make such investigation or cause further inquiry into the matter through an authorized officer or itself hold enquiry [Section 26(7) read with Regulation 21 (4)]. If the report of the Director General discloses contravention of provisions of the Act and the Commission opines that further inquiry is called for then it shall hold inquiry into such contravention. In such an eventuality, the Commission is required to give notice to the Central Government or the State Government or the statutory authority or the parties concerned [Section 26(8) read with Regulation 21 (8)] and invite their objections or suggestions. Not only this, the Secretary of the Commission is obliged to inform the Director General about the dates fixed for the meetings of the Commission, so as to enable him to appear in person or through an officer. If as a result of the inquiry held under Section 26(7) or 26(8) read with the relevant regulations, the Commission comes to the conclusion that contravention of Section 3 or Section 4 of the Act is established then it can pass appropriate order under Section 27 including an order for imposing penalty.
28. The exercise required to be undertaken by the Commission under Sections 26(7) or 26(8) read with the relevant regulations and an order passed under Section 27 which visits the concerned person with civil consequences makes the functions of the Commission adjudicatory/quasijudicial. Therefore, before recording an adverse finding against a person and holding him guilty of violating Section 3 or 4 of the Act, the Commission is obliged to comply with various facets of the principles of natural justice. This necessarily implies that while holding an inquiry under Section 26(7) or Section 26(8) the Commission is required to comply with the rule of audi alteram partem and give an effective opportunity of hearing to the person against whom a finding is likely to be recorded on the issue of contravention of Section 3 or Section 4 of the Act not only to controvert the allegation made against him as also the evidence/material proposed to be used in support of such allegation but also produced evidence to show that he/she/it has not violated any provision of the Act. If the Commission wants to rely upon some information/ material, which does not form part of the report of the Director General then such information/material must be disclosed to the person concerned and an effective opportunity has to be given to him to controvert the same. The Commission is also required to pass a speaking order to demonstrate application of mind to the relevant factors/considerations and exclusion of irrelevant and extraneous factors/considerations.
29. In the Board of Control for Cricket in India Vs. the Competition Commission of India, Appeal No.17 of 2013, the Tribunal considered the question whether the principles of natural justice are applicable to the proceedings held under the Act and, if so, whether the Commission could, without giving notice to the appellant indicating its disagreement on a crucial issue i.e. the nature of the relevant market and without giving opportunity to it file objections/submissions qua the reasons for disagreement, pass an orderagainst the appellant and impose penalty of Rs.52.24 Crores. The facts of that case were that after examining the averments contained in the information filed by one Shri Surinder Singh Barmi under section 19(1)(a) alleging violation of Section 4 of the Act by the appellant and Indian Premier League (IPL), the Commission passed an order under Section 26(1) and directed the DG to conduct an investigation into the matter. The DG submitted report dated 14.02.2012 with the finding that the conduct of the appellant in awarding various franchisee rights, media rights and other rights are discriminatory and unfair and the same has caused appreciable adverse effect on competition in violation of Section 4(2)(a)(i), 4(2)(b)(i) and 4(2)(c) of the Act. The Commission gave opportunity to the appellant to file objections against the findings recorded by the DG, heard the parties and passed the order, which became subject-matter of challenge in appeal filed under Section 53B(2). One of the grounds on which the appellant challenged the order of the Commission was that while the DG had defined the relevant market as the market of underlying economic activities which are ancillary for organizing the IPL Twenty-20 cricket tournament being carried out under the aegis of BCCI as per provisions of Section 2(r) of the Act, the Commission opined that the relevant market was organization of private professional cricket leagues/events in India, but without giving any indication of its disagreement with the DG and an opportunity to contest those reasons, the Commission passed order under Section 27 of the Act.The Tribunal noticed the provisions of Sections 19(1), 26(1), 26(2), 26(8), 27 and 36(1) of the Act and clauses 18, 20 and 21 of the Regulations and observed
14. A careful reading of Section 26(1) shows that once the Commission forms an opinion that there exists a prima facie case, it shall direct the Director General to cause an investigation to be made into the matter. In terms of Regulation 18 read with Regulation 20, the direction of the Commission is required to be communicated by its Secretary to the Director General along with a copy of the information or reference with all other documents or materials or affidavits or statements which have been filed with the information or reference or at the time of preliminary conference. Section 26(3) requires the Director General to submit a report on its findings within the time specified by the Commission. Such findings must cover each of the allegations contained in the information or reference together with evidence or documents or statements or analysis collected during the investigation. Section 26(4) enjoins the Commission to forward the report of the Director General to the parties concerned. If the investigation is caused to be made based on a reference received from the Central Government or the State Government or the statutory authority, then the report is required to be sent to the appropriate Government or the statutory authority. The object of sending report to the appropriate Government or the statutory authority or the parties concerned is to enable them to submit objections or suggestions qua the findings recorded by the Director General. This exercise has to be undertaken by the Commission even if the Director General finds that there is no contravention of Sections 3 or 4 of the Act. The Commission can close the case if, after considering the objections or suggestions, it agrees with the recommendations of the Director General. If the Commission is not satisfied with the report of the Director General and forms an opinion that further investigation is called for then it can direct the Director General to make such investigation or cause further inquiry into the matter through an authorized officer or itself hold enquiry [Section 26(7) read with Regulation 21 (4)]. If the report of the Director General discloses contravention of provisions of the Act and the Commission opines that further inquiry is called for then it shall hold inquiry into such contravention. In such an eventuality, the Commission is required to give notice to the Central Government or the State Government or the statutory authority or the parties concerned [Section 26(8) read with Regulation 21 (8)] and invite their objections or suggestions. Not only this, the Secretary of the Commission is obliged to inform the Director General about the dates fixed for the meetings of the Commission, so as to enable him to appear in person or through an officer. If as a result of the inquiry held under Section 26(7) or 26(8) read with the relevant regulations, the Commission comes to the conclusion that contravention of Section 3 or Section 4 of the Act is established then it can pass appropriate order under Section 27 including an order for imposing penalty.
15. The exercise required to be undertaken by the Commission under Sections 26(7) or 26(8) read with the relevant regulations and an order passed under Section 27 which visits the concerned person with civil consequences makes the functions of the Commission adjudicatory/quasi judicial. Therefore, before recording an adverse finding against a person and holding him guilty of violating Section 3 or 4 of the Act, the Commission is obliged to comply with various facets of the principles of natural justice. This necessarily implies that while holding an inquiry under Section 26(7) or Section 26(8) the Commission is required to comply with the rule of audi alteram partem and give an effective opportunity of hearing to the person against whom a finding is likely to be recorded on the issue of contravention of Section 3 or Section 4 of the Act not only to controvert the allegation made against him as also the evidence/material proposed to be used in support of such allegation but also produced evidence to show that he/she/it has not violated any provision of the Act. If the Commission wants to rely upon some information/ material, which does not form part of the report of the Director General then such information/material must be disclosed to the person concerned and an effective opportunity has to be given to him to controvert the same. The Commission is also required to pass a speaking order to demonstrate application of mind to the relevant factors/considerations and exclusion of irrelevant and extraneous factors/considerations. (Underlining is ours) The Tribunal thenreferred to the judgements of the House of Lords in Ridge Vs. Baldwin, 164 AC 40 and of the Supreme Court in State of Orissa vs. Dr. (Miss) Binapani Dei and others [AIR 1967 SC 1269], Rajesh Kumar Vs. CIT (2007) 2 SCC 181, Kothari Filaments and another Vs. Commissioner of Customs (Port), Kolkata (2009) 2 SCC 192, Balchandra L. Jharkihoili and others vs. B.S. Yeddyurappa and others (2011) 7 SCC 1, AyaaubkhanNoorkhanPathan vs. State of Maharashtra and others (2013) 4 SCC 465,as also the affidavit filed by the Secretary of the Commission and observed :
24. In her affidavit, Secretary of the Commission has made an attempt to show that there is no difference in the finding/conclusion recorded by the Director General and the Commission on the issue of relevant market and the appellant got full opportunity to show that Organization of Private Professional Cricket League/ Events in India constituted the relevant market, but she has not disputed that in the order passed under Section 26(1), the Commission had clearly mentioned that its focus was on the underlying economic activities which are ancillary for the organization of sports events. She has also not disputed that the Director General made investigation keeping in view the allegations contained in the information and the points formulated by the Commission and recorded a finding that the relevant market was underlying activities which are ancillary for organization of cricket in Twenty-20 format with respect to the IPL tournament.A careful scrutiny of the record reveals that while directing its Secretary to forward the report of the Director General to the appellant, the Commission had nowhere indicated that it did not agree with the finding recorded by the Director General on the issue of relevant market and the appellant should show as to why Organization of Private Professional Cricket League/ Events in India may not be treated as the relevant market. It is, thus, evident that the appellant did not get any opportunity to contest the proposed determination of the relevant market by the Commission. It is also worth mentioning that the appellant was served with copy of the Director Generalsreport in two installments and was called upon to file its objections/suggestions. Therefore, it was natural for the appellant to file reply only with reference to the findings and the conclusions recorded by the Director General. The Commission was expected to hear the appellant in the context of objections/suggestions filed in the context of the findings recorded by the Director General. If the Commission wanted to differ with the Director General on the issue of relevant market then it should have given notice spelling out its intention to do so and give an opportunity of hearing to the appellant, which was admittedly not done. Therefore, there is no escape from the conclusion that the finding recorded by the Commission that Organization of Private Professional Cricket League/Events in India is the relevant market is vitiated due to violation of the rule of audi alteram partem. [Emphasis supplied]
30. In Appeal No. 105 of 2012 Lafarge India Limited Vs. Competition Commission of India and Another and connected matters decided on 11.12.2015, the Tribunal considered the question whether the finding recorded by the Commission that the appellants had formed a cartel for fixing the price of cement and its decision to impose cumulative penalty ofRs.6,316.59crore on the appellants were vitiated due to violation of the principles of natural justice because the Chairperson of the Commission, who was not a party to the hearing held on three consecutive dates, participated in the decision-making process and authored the final order. The Tribunal made a comprehensive analysis of the provisions of the Act and the Regulations, referred to the two judgements of the Supreme Court in Competition Commission of India vs. Steel Authority of India Limited [(2010) 10 SCC 744] and Rangi International Limited vs. Nova Scotia Bank and others [(2013) 7 SCC 160]and observed :
48. The above survey of various provisions of the Act and the Regulations shows that even while amending the Act by Act 39 of 2007 and Act 39 of 2009, Parliament consciously decided to retain provisions relating to adjudicatory functions of the Commission in their full vigour and the mere fact that by virtue of substituted Section 22, the business of the Commission is required to be transacted in its meetings and the business would necessarily include exercise of adjudicatory functions/powers, cannot lead to an inference that while deciding the allegations contained in the information filed or reference made under section 19(1)(a) and passing orders under Sections 27, 33, 39, 42, 42A, 43, 43A, 44 and 45, the Commission exercises purely administrative power or discharge administrative functions or that while passing orders under those sections and also under Section 28, which can have far-reaching impact on the rights of the parties, the Commission is not required to act as per the accepted standard of fairness and render just decision after complying with the principles of natural justice as expounded by the Courts across the globe including the Supreme Court of India. Rather, on the basis of case law developed in this country, it must be held that like any other adjudicatory body, the Commission is bound to comply with various facets of the principles of natural justice and its proceedings must confirm to the objective standard of fairness.
49. The nature of the powers vested in the Commission and its functions came to be considered by a three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in Competition Commission of India Vs. Steel Authority of India Limited and Another - [(2010) 10 SCC 744] in the backdrop of challenge to an order passed by the Tribunal in an appeal filed by the respondent against the direction issued by the Commission under Section 26(1) of the Act. Though, the issue raised before the Supreme Court lay in a narrow compass, the Bench dealt with various facets of the Act and Regulations framed thereunder and made important observations. After noticing the contemporaneous legislations of United States, United Kingdom and Australia as also the Statement of Objects and Reasons incorporated in the Competition Bill, the Supreme Court observed : The various provisions of the Act deal with the establishment, powers and functions as well as discharge of adjudicatory functions by the Commission. Under the scheme of the Act, this Commission is vested with inquisitorial, investigative, regulatory, adjudicatory and to a limited extent even advisory jurisdiction. Vast powers have been given to the Commission to deal with the complaints or information leading to invocation of the provisions of Sections 3 and 4 read with Section 19 of the Act. The Bench then referred to Sections 19, 26, 53A and 53B and held that an appeal against the direction given by the Commission under Section 26(1) to the Director General to hold investigation is not appealable.
50. In Rangi International Limited vs. Nova Scotia Bank and others [(2013) 7 SCC 160], a two-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court considered the question whether the Commission and the Appellate Tribunal should record reasons in support of their orders and observed : The Competition Commission as well as the Competition Appellate Tribunal are exercising very important quasi-judicial functions. The orders passed by the Commission and the Appellate Tribunal can have far-reaching consequences. Therefore, the minimum that is required of the Commission as well as the Appellate Tribunal is that the orders are supported by reasons, even briefly. [Emphasis in original] The Tribunal then considered the nature and scope of judicial review of administrative and quasi-judicial actions/orders, relied upon the judgements of the Supreme Court in State of Orissa Vs. Dr. (Miss) Binapani Dei and others AIR 1967 SC 1269,A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India and others (1969) 2 SCC 262, SayeedurRehman Vs. State of Bihar (1973) 3 SCC 333, Maneka Gandhi Vs. Union of India (1978) 1 SCC 248, Mohinder Singh Gill Vs. Chief Election Commissioner (1978) 1 SCC 405, Mahipal Singh Tomar Vs. State of UP, (2013)
16 SCC 771, Manohar Vs. State of Maharashtra (2012) 13 SCC 14 and Institute of Chartered Accountants of India Vs. L.K. Ratna (1986) 4 SCC 537 and held that while deciding whether the allegations contained in the information filed/received under Section 19 have been proved and passing orders under Section 27, 33, 39, 42, 42A, 43, 43A, 44 and 45 of the Act, the Commission discharges quasi-judicial functions and it is bound to comply with the principles of natural justice. The Tribunal also considered the argument raised on behalf of the respondent that no prejudice had been caused to the appellants on account of participation of the Chairperson in the decision-making process despite the fact that he was not a party to the hearing held on three dates, noticed the judgements of the Supreme Court in Managing Director, ECIL Hyderabad and other Vs. B. Karunakar and others (1993) 4 SCC 737, State of Jammu and Kashmir and Others Vs. BakshiGulam Mohammad and Another AIR 1967 SC 122, M/s. Kanungo and Company Vs. Collector of Customs and others (1973) 2 SCC 438, Mohd. Shahabuddin Vs. State of Bihar (2010) 4 SCC 653, Board of Directors, Himachal Pradesh Transport Corporation vs. K C Rahi (2008) 11 SCC 502, Dr. Umrao Singh Choudhary Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh and Another (1994) 4 SCC 328 relied upon by learned senior counsel for the Commission and several other decisions and concluded that participation of the Chairman of the Commission, who did not hear the arguments had seriously prejudice the cause of the appellants. The discussion on this issue is contained in paragraph 95 of the Tribunals order, which is extracted below :
95. In our view, the prejudice caused to the appellants is writ large on the face of the record. As mentioned above, the Chairperson did not have the opportunity of hearing the arguments of the advocates for the parties, which lasted for three days i.e. 21st, 22nd and 23rd February, 2012 and yet he became party to the decision. Obviously, he did not know what are the nature and contents of the arguments of the seven Senior Advocates and other advocates, who appeared for the parties. The minutes of the meetings recorded on those dates do not show that the remaining six Members had recorded the arguments advanced by the learned advocates, as was done by the officer who heard the arguments in Ossein and Gelatine Manufacturers Association of India Vs. Modi Alkalies and Chemicals Limited and Another (supra). The Chairpersons participation in the decision-making process had salutary effect on the final verdict. As held by the Supreme Court in A.K. Kraipaks case, the views of the Chairperson must have influenced other six Members. His views must have operated in a subtle manner and as mentioned in the earlier part of the order, he appears to have authored both the versions (public and confidential) of order dated 20.06.2012.
31. We reiterate that the Courts across the globe have consistently held that the principles of natural justice are applicable to administrative actions/orders which affect the rights of the parties and also the quasi-judicial proceedings. In last 65 years, the Supreme Court and High Courts have delivered thousands of judgements/orders on this question. Some of the judgements, which have bearing on the questionarising in these appealsare noticed below :
(i) In Dhakeswari Cotton Mills Ltd. Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax [AIR (1995) SC 65] a five-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court was called upon to examine the legality and correctness of the orders passed by the Assessing Officer and the Tribunal constituted under the Income Tax Act, 1922. One of the grounds on which the appellant had questioned those orders was violation of the principles of natural justice. It was pleaded that the Income Tax Officer and the Tribunal had violated the fundamental rules of justice by not disclosing to the assessee what information had been supplied to them by the departmental representative and by not giving an opportunity to rebut the same. While setting aside the orders of the Assessing Officer and the Tribunal, the Supreme Court observed as under :
9. In this case we are of the opinion that the Tribunal violated certain fundamental rules of justice in reaching its conclusions. Firstly, it did not disclose to the assessee what information had been supplied to it by the departmental representative. Next, it did not give any opportunity to the company to rebut the material furnished to it by him, and lastly, it declined to take all the material that the assessee wanted to produce in support of its case. The result is that the assessee had not had a fair hearing. The estimate of the gross rate of profit on sales, both by the Income-tax Officer and the Tribunal seems to be based on surmises, suspicions and conjectures. It is somewhat surprising that the Tribunal took from the representative of the department a statement of gross profit rates of other cotton mills without showing that statement to the assessee and without giving him an opportunity to show that that statement had no relevancy whatsoever to the case of the mill in question. It is not known whether the mills which had disclosed these rates were situate in Bengal or elsewhere, and whether these mills were similarly situated and circumstanced. Not only did the Tribunal not show the information given by the representative of the department to the appellant, but it refused even to look at the trunk load of books and papers which Mr. Banerjee produced before the Accountant-Member in his chamber. No harm would have been done if after notice to the department the trunk had been opened and some time devoted to see what it contained. [Emphasis supplied]
(ii). In State of Orissa Vs. Dr. (Miss) Binapani Dei and others [AIR 1967 SC 1269], the Supreme Court considered whether the principles of natural justice are applicable to what was perceived as a purely administrative decision of the State Government to retire the respondent by relying upon the date of birth which was unilaterally changed by the competent authority. The Orissa High Court quashed the retirement of the respondent by holding that it was punitive and amounted to removal from service within the meaning of Article 311 of the Constitution. The High Court further held that the order of retirement was vitiated because the writ petitioner had not been given a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the proposed change in the date of birth recorded in her service book. While approving the second part of the High Courts order, the Supreme Court made the following important observations :
9. The deciding authority, it is true, is not in the position of a Judge called upon to decide an action between contesting parties, and strict compliance with the forms of judicial procedure may not be insisted upon. He is however under a duty to give the person against whom an enquiry is held an opportunity to set up his version or defence and an opportunity to correct or to controvert any evidence in the possession of the authority which is sought to be relied upon to his prejudice. For that purpose the person against whom in enquiry is held must be informed of the case he is called upon to meet, and the evidence in support thereof. The rule that a party to whose prejudice an order is intended to be passed is entitled to a hearing applies alike to judicial tribunals and bodies of persons invested with authority to adjudicate upon matters involving civil consequences. It is one of the fundamental rules of our constitutional set-up that every citizen is protected against exercise of arbitrary authority by the State or its officers. Duty to act judicially would therefore arise from the very nature of the function intended to be performed: it need not be shown to be superadded. If there is power to decide and determine to the prejudice of a person, duty to act judicially is implicit in the exercise of such power. If the essentials of justice be ignored and an order to the prejudice of a person is made, the order is a nullity. That is a basic concept of the rule of law and importance thereof transcends the significance of a decision in any particular case.
12. It is true that some preliminary enquiry was made by Dr S. Mitra. But the report, of that enquiry officer was never disclosed to the first respondent. Thereafter the first respondent was required to show cause why April 16, 1907 should not be accepted as the date of birth and without recording any evidence the order was passed. We think that such an enquiry and decision were contrary to the basic concept of justice and cannot have any value. It is true that the order is administrative in character, but even an administrative order which involves civil consequences, as already stated, must be made consistently with the rules of natural justice after informing the first respondent of the case of the State, the evidence in support thereof and after giving an opportunity to the first respondent of being heard and meeting or explaining the evidence. [Emphasis supplied]
(iii). In A. Kraipak Vs. Union of India and others - [(1969 2 SCC 262], the Supreme Court considered the question whether a person who was a candidate for selection from the State Service to All India Service (Indian Forest Service) could himself be a member of the Selection Committee. The facts of that case were that Naqishbund, who was himself a candidate for selection to the Indian Forest Service was made a member of the Selection Board. He did not participate in the meeting of the Selection Board when his name was considered, but did take part in the meetings held for selecting other persons including his competitors. The selections were challenged in a petition filed under Article 32 of the Constitution of India. On behalf of the respondents, it was argued that the selection of members for promotion to Indian Forest Service was purely an administrative matter and as such the rule of natural justice were not applicable. While rejecting this plea, the Supreme Court observed : The dividing line between an administrative power and a quasi-judicial power is quite thin and is being gradually obliterated. For determining whether a power is an administrative power or a quasi-judicial power one has to look to the nature of the power conferred, the person or persons on whom it is conferred, the framework of the law conferring that power, the consequences ensuing from the exercise of that power and the manner in which that power is expected to be exercised. Under our Constitution the rule of law pervades over the entire field of administration. Every organ of the State under our Constitution is regulated and controlled by the rule of law. In a Welfare State like ours it is inevitable that the jurisdiction of the administrative bodies is increasing at a rapid rate. The concept of rule of law would lose its vitality if the instrumentalities of the State are not charged with the duty of discharging their functions in a fair and just manner. The requirement of acting judicially in essence is nothing but a requirement to act justly and fairly and not arbitrarily or capriciously. The procedures which are considered inherent in the exercise of a judicial power are merely those which facilitate if not ensure a just and fair decision. In recent years the concept of quasi-judicial power has been undergoing a radical change. What was considered as an administrative power some years back is now being considered as a quasi- judicial power. [Emphasis in original] While holding that the participation of Naqishbund in the meetings by the Selection Board has the effect of influencing the final recommendation on the ground of bias, the Supreme Court took cognisance of the fact that each member of the Selection Board had filed affidavit swearing that Naqishbund had, in no manner, influenced their decision in making the selections and observed : The members of the selection board other than Naqishbund, each one of them separately, have filed affidavits in this Court swearing that Naqishbund in no manner influenced their decision in making the selections. In a group deliberation each member of the group is bound to influence the others, more so, if the member concerned is a person with special knowledge. His bias is likely to operate in a subtle manner. It is no wonder that the other members of the selection board are unaware of the extent to which his opinion influenced their conclusions. We are unable to accept the contention that in adjudging the suitability of the candidates the members of the board did not have any mutual discussion. It is not as if the records spoke of themselves. We are unable to believe that the members of selection board functioned like computers. At this stage it may also be noted that at the time the selections were made, the members of the selection board other than Naqishbund were not likely to have known that Basu had appealed against his supersession and that his appeal was pending before the State Government. Therefore there was no occasion for them to distrust the opinion expressed by Naqishbund. Hence the board in making the selections must necessarily have given weight to the opinion expressed by Naqishbund. [Underlining in original] The Court then considered the question whether the principles of natural justice are applicable in such matters, referred to the Queens Bench judgement in re H.K. (An Infant) [(1967) 2 QB 617] and answered the same in the affirmative. The observations made in that regard are extracted below : This takes us to the question whether the principles of natural justice apply to administrative proceedings similar to that with which we are concerned in these cases. According to the learned Attorney General those principles have no bearing in determining the validity of the impugned selections. In support of his contention he read to us several decisions. It is not necessary to examine those decisions as there is a great deal of fresh thinking on the subject. The horizon of natural justice is constantly expanding. The question how far the principles of natural justice govern administrative enquiries came up for consideration before the Queen's Bench Division In re H.K. (An Infant). [(1967) 2 QB 617 at p. 630] Therein the validity of the action taken by an Immigration Officer came up for consideration. In the course of his judgment Lord Parker C.J. observed thus: But at the same time, I myself think that even if an immigration officer is not in a judicial or quasi-judicial capacity, he must at any rate give the immigrant an opportunity of satisfying him of the matters in the sub- section, and for that purpose let the immigrant know what his immediate impression is so that the immigrant can disabuse him. That is not, as I see it, a question of acting or being required to act judicially, but of being required to act fairly. Good administration and an honest or bona fide decision must, as it seems to me, require not merely impartiality, nor merely bringing one's mind to bear on the problem, but acting fairly; and to the limited extent that the circumstances of any particular case allow, and within the legislative framework under which the administrator is working, only to that limited extent do the so-called rules of natural justice apply, which in a case such as this is merely a duty to act fairly. I appreciate that in saying that it may be said that one is going further than is permitted on the decided cases because heretofore at any rate the decisions of the courts do seem to have drawn a strict line in these matters according to whether there is or is not a duty to act judicially or quasi-judicially. In the same case Blain, J., observed thus: I would only say that an immigration officer having assumed the jurisdiction granted by those provisions is in a position where it is his duty to exercise that assumed jurisdiction whether it be administrative, executive or quasi-judicial, fairly, by which I mean applying his mind dispassionately to a fair analysis of the particular problem and the information available to him in analysing it. If in any hypothetical case, and in any real case, this court was satisfied that an immigration officer was not so doing, then in my view mandamus would lie. The aim of the rules of natural justice is to secure justice or to put it negatively to prevent miscarriage of justice. These rules can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made. In other words they do not supplant the law of the land but supplement it. The concept of natural justice has undergone a great deal of change in recent years. In the past it was thought that it included just two rules namely: (1) no one shall be a judge in his own case (Nemo debetessejudexpropria causa) and (2) no decision shall be given against a party without affording him a reasonable hearing (audi alteram partem). Very soon thereafter a third rule was envisaged and that is that quasi- judicial enquiries must be held in good faith, without bias and not arbitrarily or unreasonably. But in the course of years many more subsidiary rules came to be added to the rules of natural justice. Till very recently it was the opinion of the courts that unless the authority concerned was required by the law under which it functioned to act judicially there was no room for the application of the rules of natural justice. The validity of that limitation is now questioned. If the purpose of the rules of natural justice is to prevent miscarriage of justice one fails to see why those rules should be made inapplicable to administrative enquiries. Often times it is not easy to draw the line that demarcates administrative enquiries from quasi-judicial enquiries. Enquiries which were considered administrative at one time are now being considered as quasi-judicial in character. Arriving at a just decision is the aim of both quasi-judicial enquiries as well as administrative enquiries. An unjust decision in an administrative enquiry may have more far reaching effect than a decision in a quasi-judicial enquiry. As observed by this Court in Suresh Koshy George v. University of Kerala [Civil Appeal No. 990/68, decided on15-7-1968] the rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. What particular rule of natural justice should apply to a given case must depend to a great extent on the facts and circumstances of that case, the framework of the law under which the enquiry is held and the constitution of the Tribunal or body of persons appointed for that purpose. Whenever a complaint is made before a court that some principle of natural justice had been contravened the court has to decide whether the observance of that rule was necessary for a just decision on the facts of that case. [Underlining in ours]
(iv). In SayeedurRehman Vs. State of Bihar [(1973) 3 SCC 333], the Supreme Court while examining challenge to the decision of the Board of Secondary Education, which had reviewed its earlier order granting salary and allowances to the appellant albeit without giving him notice and opportunity of hearing, reversed the order of the Patna High Court and held : This unwritten right of hearing is fundamental to a just decision by any authority which decides a controversial issue affecting the rights of the rival contestants. This right has its roots in the notion of fair procedure. It draws the attention of the party concerned to the imperative necessity of not overlooking the other side of the case before coming to its decision, for nothing is more likely to conduce to just and right decision than the practice of giving hearing to the affected parties The omission of express requirement of fair hearing in the rules or other source of power claimed for reconsidering the order dated 22-4-1960, is supplied by the rule of justice which is considered as an integral part of our judicial process which also governs quasi-judicial authorities when deciding controversial points affecting rights of parties. [Emphasis in supplied]
(v). In Mohinder Singh Gill Vs. Chief Election Commissioner [(1978) 1 SCC 405], the Constitution Bench explained the Indian origin of principles of natural justice in the following words : Indeed, natural justice is a pervasive facet of secular law where a spiritual touch enlivens legislation, administration and adjudication, to make fairness a creed of life. It has many colours and shades, many forms and shapes and, save where valid law excludes, it applies when people are affected by acts of authority. It is the hone [Ed.: The word hone is usually used as a verb, meaning to sharpen. Rarely, it is also used a noun, as here, meaning whetstone.] of healthy government, recognised from earliest times and not a mystic testament of Judge-made law. Indeed from the legendary days of Adamand of Kautilya's Arthasastrathe rule of law has had this stamp of natural justice which makes it social justice. We need not go into these deeps for the present except to indicate that the roots of natural justice and its foliage are noble and not new-fangled. Today its application must be sustained by current legislation, case law or other extant principle, not the hoary chords of legend and history. Our jurisprudence has sanctioned its prevalence even like the Anglo-American system. The Court then proceeded to observe : Fair hearing is thus a postulate of decision making cancelling a poll, although fair abridgement of that process is permissible. It can be fair without the rules of evidence or form of trial. It cannot be fair if apprising the affected and appraising the representations is absent. The philosophy behind natural justice is, in one sense, participatory justice in the process of democratic rule of law. .. The silence of a statute has no exclusionary effect except where it flows from necessary implication. [Emphasis supplied]
(vi). In Mahipal Singh Tomar Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh [(2013) 16 SCC 771], the Supreme Court considered the effect of violation of natural justice in a case where copy of the enquiry report was not furnished to the delinquent and he was not given opportunity to represent his cause against the allegation of large scale irregularities in the placement of selected candidates in different colleges. While setting aside the order of the High Court and declaring the termination of the appellants service as illegal, the Supreme Court observed : In administrative law, the rules of natural justice have traditionally been regarded as comprising audialteram partem and nemo judex in sua causa. The first of these rules requires the maker of a decision to give prior notice of the proposed decision to the persons affected by it and an opportunity to them to make representation. The second rule disqualifies a person from judging a cause if he has direct pecuniary or proprietary interest or might otherwise be biased. The first principle is of great importance because it embraces the rule of fair procedure or due process. Generally speaking, the notion of a fair hearing extends to the right to have notice of the other side's case, the right to bring evidence and the right to argue. This has been used by the courts for nullifying administrative actions. The premise on which the courts extended their jurisdiction against the administrative action was that the duty to give every victim a fair hearing was as much a principle of good administration as of good legal procedure. [Emphasis added] For making the aforesaid observations, the Supreme Court relied upon paragraph 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 1950, and a number of decisions including A.K. Kraipak Vs. Union of India (supra), State of Orissa Vs. Binapani Dei (supra), SayeedurRehman V. State of Bihar (supra),Sirsi Municipality v. CecliaKom Francis Tellis-[(1973) 1 SCC 409], Maneka Gandhi Vs. Union of India- [(1978) 1 SCC 248], Mohinder Singh Gill Vs. Chief Election Commissioner- [(1978) 1 SCC 405], Union of India Vs. Tulsiram Patel [(1985) 3 SCC 398], Inderpreet Singh Kahlon Vs. State of Punjab [(2006) 11 SCC 356] and Onkar Lal Bajaj Vs. Union of India [(2003) 2 SCC 673].
(vii). Institute of Chartered Accountants of India Vs. L.K. Ratna [(1986) 4 SCC 537] contains an interesting discussion on the question of violation of principle of natural justice. For appreciating the proposition laid down in that case, it will be useful to notice the background facts. Respondent Lalit Kumar Ratna was a partner in M/s. A.F. Ferguson & Co., a reputed firm of Chartered Accountants. The other respondents, namely Ashok Kumar Behal and P.R. Bhoopatkar were employees in the firm. In 1947 Ferguson & Co. established a Management Consultancy Division. Ratna was head of the Division, and Behl and Bhoopatkar worked under him. On April 15, 1970, Ferguson & Co. wrote to the Institute enquiring whether it could send out letters to Auditor Firms apprising them of the existence of the Management Consultancy Service and whether it was forbidden from doing so by any rules of the Institute. The Secretary of the Institute replied that the Council had appointed a Sub-Committee for considering the ethical problems arising out of the functioning of the Institute's members in the area of Management Consultancy Service and the firm was requested to wait for the recommendations of the Sub-Committee.On December 8, 1971, Ratna issued a circular to the partners and principals of the firm setting forth guidelines on bringing the Management Consultancy Service brochures to the attention of their respective clients. Meanwhile, Ferguson & Co. also referred the matter to their solicitors, and the solicitors advised that making available of printed informative material in the form of a brochure would not be in contravention of clauses 6 and
7 in Part I of the First Schedule to the Act or otherwise amount to professional misconduct.A few days later the Council published an exposure draft, setting forth the proposals under consideration by the Council regarding the regulations and ethical rules in respect of Management Consultancy Services by Chartered Accountants and invited members to send their suggestions on the proposals. It was pointed out further that the recommendations to be made by the Council would require appropriate amendments in Part I of the First Schedule to the Act which contained rules in respect of professional misconduct. Meanwhile, Ratna had prepared a brochure relating to the Management Consultancy Service to be provided by Ferguson & Co. It was stated that the brochure was intended for the use of the clients of the firm who requested information regarding such services and that it was for limited circulation only, the clients themselves being warned of that restriction. On February 19, 1973, the Council wrote to Ferguson & Co. inviting its attention to the brochure and alleging that it contained information against the firm under Section 21 of the Chartered Accountants Act read with clauses 6 and 7 of Part I of the First Schedule to the Act, and in accordance with Regulation 11(5)(b) read with Regulation 12 of the Chartered Accountants Regulations, 1964, the firm was required to disclose to the Council the name of the member answerable to the charge of misconduct. In reply, the firm named Ratna as the Member responsible for the brochure. Thereafter, a charge-sheet was served upon L.K. Ratna, who filed written statement and denied allegation that he was guilty of professional misconduct. After considering the reply, the Council formed a prima-facie opinion that Ratna was guilty of professional misconduct and referred the case to the Disciplinary Committee comprising of its President, Vice-President and two Members as also nominee of the Government. The Disciplinary Committee heard Ratna and submitted report dated 14.02.1974 with the finding that Ratna was guilty of professional misconduct. The Institute accepted the findings recorded by the Disciplinary Committee and issued notice to the Ratna to show cause as to why his name may not be removed from the Register of Members for a period of five years. Copies of the report of the Disciplinary Committee and the findings of the Council were forwarded to Ratna. Similar proceedings were held against Behl and Bhoopatkar and they were found guilty by the Disciplinary Committee. They were also issued show cause notice as was done in the case of Ratna. Ratna, Behl and Bhoopatkar filed writ petitions in the Bombay High Court, which were allowed by a learned single Judge on the ground that they had not been given opportunity by the Council and also on the ground that two members of the Institute, who were members of the Disciplinary Committee, were disqualified from participating in the proceedings of the Council when it considered the report of the Disciplinary Committee. The Division Bench dismissed the appeal filed by the Institute. The Supreme Court referred to the relevant provisions of the Act and observed: The Council is empowered to find a member guilty of misconduct. The penalty which follows is so harsh that it may result in his removal from the Register of Members for a substantial number of years. The removal of his name from the Register deprives him of the right to a certificate of practice. As is clear from Section 6(1) of the Act, he cannot practice without such certificate. In the circumstances there is every reason to presume in favour of an opportunity to the member of being heard by the Council before it proceeds to pronounce upon his guilt. As we have seen, the finding by the Council operates with finality in the proceeding, and it constitutes the foundation for the penalty imposed by the Council on him. We consider it significant that the power to find and record whether a member is guilty of misconduct has been specifically entrusted by the Act to the entire Council itself and not to a few of its members who constitute the Disciplinary Committee. It is the character and complexion of the proceeding considered in conjunction with the structure of power constituted by the Act which leads us to the conclusion that the member is entitled to a hearing by the Council before it can find him guilty. The Supreme Court rejected the appellants argument that the person against whom the proceedings are held does not have a right to make representation before the Council questioning the report of the Disciplinary Committee by making the following observations : It is next pointed out on behalf of the appellant that while Regulation 15 requires the Council, when it proceeds to act under Section 21(4), to furnish to the member a copy of the report of the Disciplinary Committee, no such requirement is incorporated in Regulation 14 which prescribes what the Council will do when it receives the report of the Disciplinary Committee. That, it is said, envisages that the member has no right to make a representation before the Council against the report of the Disciplinary Committee. The contention can be disposed of shortly. There is nothing in Regulation 14 which excludes the operation of the principle of natural justice entitling the member to be heard by the Council when it proceeds to render its finding.The principles of natural justice must be read into the unoccupied interstices of the statute unless there is a clear mandate to the contrary. [Emphasis supplied]
(viii). In Punjab National Bank and others Vs. KunjBehariMisra [(1998) 7 SCC 84], a three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court considered the following question: When the enquiry officer, during the course of disciplinary proceedings comes to a conclusion that all or some of the charges alleging misconduct against an official are not proved then can the disciplinary authority differ from that and give a contrary finding without affording any opportunity to the delinquent officer. The facts of the case were that respondent in the first of the two cases, namely, KunjBehariMisra was charged with six allegations including the one that there was shortage of currency by Rs.1 lakh.The enquiry officer found the respondent guilty of only one charge, namely, that he did not sign the relevant register from 20.10.1981 to 09.11.1981, but exonerated him of the remaining five charges. The other delinquent Shri Shanti Prasad Goel was exonerated of all the charges. The Disciplinary Authority, namely, the Regional Manager of the appellant bank disagreed with the enquiry officer and that KunjBehariMisra was guilty for the shortage of currency. On that premise, he ordered recovery of Rs.1 lakh from Misra. The other delinquent was also held guilty of causing loss to the bank due to negligence on his part and a direction was issued for proportionate recovery from him. The appeal filed by the respondents were dismissed by the appellate authority. The Allahabad High Court allowed the writ petitions on the ground that the Disciplinary Authority, who had chosen to disagree with the conclusions recorded by the enquiry officer did not give notice and opportunity of hearing to the delinquents. The two-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court before whom the matter was listed, took cognizance of the apparently conflicting decisions in State Bank of India Vs. S.S. Koshal[(1994) Supp. (2) SCC 468] on the one hand and the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India Vs. L.K. Ratna[(1986) 4 SCC 537] and Ram KishanVs. Union of India [(1995) 6 SCC 157] on the other and referred the matter to a larger bench. The three-Judge Bench noticed the relevant statutory provisions, referred to the earlier judgements of different Benches including the judgements of five Judge Benches in the State of Assam Vs. Bimal Kumar Pandit [AIR 1963 SC 1612] and Managing Director, ECIL Vs. B. Karunakar (supra) and held : These observations are clearly in tune with the observations in Bimal Kumar Pandit case [AIR 1963 SC 1612] quoted earlier and would be applicable at the first stage itself. The aforesaid passages clearly bring out the necessity of the authority which is to finally record an adverse finding to give a hearing to the delinquent officer. If the enquiry officer had given an adverse finding, as per Karunakar case [(1993) 4 SCC 727: 1993 SCC (L&S) 1184 : (1993) 25 ATC 704] the first stage required an opportunity to be given to the employee to represent to the disciplinary authority, even when an earlier opportunity had been granted to them by the enquiry officer. It will not stand to reason that when the finding in favour of the delinquent officers is proposed to be overturned by the disciplinary authority then no opportunity should be granted. The first stage of the enquiry is not completed till the disciplinary authority has recorded its findings. The principles of natural justice would demand that the authority which proposes to decide against the delinquent officer must give him a hearing. When the enquiring officer holds the charges to be proved, then that report has to be given to the delinquent officer who can make a representation before the disciplinary authority takes further action which may be prejudicial to the delinquent officer. When, like in the present case, the enquiry report is in favour of the delinquent officer but the disciplinary authority proposes to differ with such conclusions, then that authority which is deciding against the delinquent officer must give him an opportunity of being heard for otherwise he would be condemned unheard. In departmental proceedings, what is of ultimate importance is the finding of the disciplinary authority. Under Regulation 6, the enquiry proceedings can be conducted either by an enquiry officer or by the disciplinary authority itself. When the enquiry is conducted by the enquiry officer, his report is not final or conclusive and the disciplinary proceedings do not stand concluded. The disciplinary proceedings stand concluded with the decision of the disciplinary authority. It is the disciplinary authority which can impose the penalty and not the enquiry officer. Where the disciplinary authority itself holds an enquiry, an opportunity of hearing has to be granted by him. When the disciplinary authority differs with the view of the enquiry officer and proposes to come to a different conclusion, there is no reason as to why an opportunity of hearing should not be granted. It will be most unfair and iniquitous that where the charged officers succeed before the enquiry officer, they are deprived of representing to the disciplinary authority before that authority differs with the enquiry officer's report and, while recording a finding of guilt, imposes punishment on the officer. In our opinion, in any such situation, the charged officer must have an opportunity to represent before the disciplinary authority before final findings on the charges are recorded and punishment imposed. This is required to be done as a part of the first stage of enquiry as explained in Karunakar case. [Emphasis supplied]
(ix). In State Bank of India Vs. K.P. Narayanan Kutty[(2003) 2 SCC 449], the Supreme Court considered the question whether the disciplinary authority can impose punishment on the premise that all the charges levelled against the delinquent have been proved, despite the fact that the enquiry officer had held that some of the charges were proved, some were partly proved and the remaining were not proved without giving notice and opportunity of hearing to the delinquent. After noticing various judgments to which reference has been made hereinabove, the Bench reiterated the ratio of the judgment in Punjab National Bank v. KunjBehariMisra (supra) in the following words : In para 19 of the judgment in Punjab National Bank case [(1998) 7 SCC 84] extracted above, when it is clearly stated that the principles of natural justice have to be read into Regulation 7(2) [Rule 50(3)(ii) of the State Bank of India (Supervising Staff) Service Rules, is identical in terms applicable to the present case] and the delinquent officer will have to be given an opportunity to persuade the disciplinary authority to accept the favourable conclusion of the enquiry officer, we find it difficult to accept the contention advanced on behalf of the appellants that unless it is shown that some prejudice was caused to the respondent, the order of dismissal could not be set aside by the High Court.
(x). In Kothari Filaments and Another Vs. Commissioner of Customs (Port), Kolkata and others [(2009) 2 SCC 192], the Supreme Court considered the correctness of an order passed by the Calcutta High Court dismissing the writ petition filed by the appellant against the order of the Customs, Excise and Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal, Calcutta, which, in turn, approved the order of confiscation and penalty passed by the competent authority under the Customs Act, 1962. After noticing the fact that the appellant had not been given opportunity to explain the material used against it, the Supreme Court observed :
14. The statutory authorities under the Act exercise quasi- judicial function. By reason of the impugned order, the properties could be confiscated, redemption fine and personal fine could be imposed and in the event an importer was found guilty of violation of the provisions of the Act. In the event, a finding as regards violation of the provisions of the Act is arrived at, several steps resulting in civil or evil consequences may be taken. The principles of natural justice, therefore, were required to be complied with.
15. The Act does not prohibit application of the principles of natural justice. The Commissioner of Customs either could not have passed the order on the basis of the materials which were known only to them, copies whereof were not supplied or inspection thereto had not been given. He, thus, could not have adverted to the report of the overseas enquiries. A person charged with misdeclaration is entitled to know the ground on the basis whereof he would be penalized. He may have an answer to the charges or may not have. But there cannot be any doubt whatsoever that in law he is entitled to a proper hearing which would include supply of the documents. Only on knowing the contents of the documents, he could furnish an effective reply. [Emphasis supplied]
(xi). In Balchandra L. Jharkihoili and Others Vs. B.S. Yeddyurappa and Others [(2011) 7 SCC 1], the Supreme Court set aside an order passed by the Karnataka High Court which had upheld the decision of the Speaker of the Karnataka Assembly to disqualify the appellant. One of the questions considered by the Supreme Court was whether the speaker was duty bound to supply the affidavits filed by the two MLAs, which constituted the foundation of his order. While answering the question in affirmative, the Supreme Court observed:
124. The Speaker apparently did not take into consideration the rule of evidence that a person making an allegation has to prove the same with supporting evidence and the mere fact that the allegation was not denied, did not amount to the same having been proved on account of the silence of the person against whom such allegations are made. Except for the affidavit filed by Shri K.S. Eswarappa, State President of the B.J.P., and the statements of two of the thirteen MLAs, who had been joined in the Disqualification Application, there is nothing on record in support of the allegations which had been made therein. Significantly, the said affidavits had not been served on the Appellants. Since Shri K.S. Eswarappa was not a party to the proceedings, the Speaker should have caused service of copies of the same on the Appellants to enable them to meet the allegations made therein.
125. In our view, not only did the Speaker's action amount to denial of the principles of natural justice to the Appellants, but it also reveals a partisan trait in the Speaker's approach in disposing of the Disqualification Application filed by Shri B.S. Yeddyurappa.If the Speaker wished to rely on the statements of a third party which were adverse to the Appellants' interests, it was obligatory on his part to have given the Appellants an opportunity of questioning the deponent as to the veracity of the statements made in the affidavit. This conduct on the part of the Speaker is also indicative of the hot haste with which the Speaker disposed of the Disqualification Petition as complained of by the Appellants.
126. The question does, therefore, arise as to why the Speaker did not send copies of the affidavit affirmed and filed by Shri Eswarappa as also the affidavits of the two MLAs, who had originally withdrawn support to the Government led by Shri Yeddyurappa, but were later allowed to retract their statements, to the Appellants. Given an opportunity to deal with the said affidavits, the Appellants could have raised the question as to why the said two MLAs, Shri M.P. Renukacharya and Shri NarasimhaNayak, were treated differently on account of their having withdrawn the letters which they had addressed to the Governor, while, on the other hand, disqualifying the appellants who had written identical letters to the Governor, upon holding that they had ceased to be members of the Bharatiya Janata Party, notwithstanding the Show-Cause notices issued to them. [Emphasis added]
(xii). The same is the ratio of the judgment in Gorkha Securities Services Vs. Government (NCT of Delhi) and others[(2014) 9 SCC 105], in which the Supreme Court made the following pertinent observations :
21. The Central issue, however, pertains to the requirement of stating the action which is proposed to be taken. The fundamental purpose behind the serving of show- cause Notice is to make the noticee understand the precise case set up against him which he has to meet. This would require the statement of imputations detailing out the alleged breaches and defaults he has committed, so that he gets an opportunity to rebut the same. Another requirement, according to us, is the nature of action which is proposed to be taken for such a breach. That should also be stated so that the noticee is able to point out that proposed action is not warranted in the given case, even if the defaults/breaches complained of are not satisfactorily explained. When it comes to blacklisting, this requirement becomes all the more imperative, having regard to the fact that it is harshest possible action.
22. The High Court has simply stated that the purpose of show-cause notice is primarily to enable the noticee to meet the grounds on which the action is proposed against him. No doubt, the High Court is justified to this extent.However, it is equally important to mention as to what would be the consequence if the noticee does not satisfactorily meet the grounds on which an action is proposed. To put it otherwise, we are of the opinion that in order to fulfil the requirements of principles of natural justice, a show-cause notice should meet the following two requirements viz:
i) The material/grounds to be stated on which according to the department necessitates an action; ii) Particular penalty/action which is proposed to be taken. It is this second requirement which the High Court has failed to omit. We may hasten to add that even if it is not specifically mentioned in the show-cause notice but it can be clearly and safely be discerned from the reading thereof, that would be sufficient to meet this requirement. xxx xxx xxx
26. In the present case, it is obvious that action is taken as provided in sub-clause (ii). Under this clause, as is clear from the reading thereof, the Department had a right to cancel the contract and withhold the agreement. That has been done. The Department has also a right to get the job which was to be carried out by the defaulting contractor, to be carried out from other contractor(s). In such an event, the Department also has a right to recover the difference from the defaulting contractor. This clause, no doubt, gives further right to the Department to blacklist the contractor for a period of 4 years and also forfeit his earnest money/security deposit, if so required. It is thus apparent that this sub-clause provides for various actions which can be taken and penalties which can be imposed by the Department. In such a situation which action the Department proposes to take, need to be specifically stated in the show-cause notice. It becomes all the more important when the action of black listing and/or forfeiture of earnest money/security deposit is to be taken, as the clause stipulates that such an action can be taken, if so warranted. The words "if so warranted", thus, assume great significance. It would show that it is not necessary for the Department to resort to penalty of blacklisting or forfeiture of earnest money/security deposit in all cases, even if there is such a power. It is left to the Department to inflict any such penalty or not depending upon as to whether circumstances in a particular case warrant such a penalty. There has to be due application of mind by the authority competent to impose the penalty, on these aspects. Therefore, merely because of the reason that Clause 27 empowers the Department to impose such a penalty, would not mean that this specific penalty can be imposed, without putting the defaulting contractor to notice to this effect.
27. We are, therefore, of the opinion that it was incumbent on the part of the Department to state in the show-cause notice that the competent authority intended to impose such a penalty of blacklisting, so as to provide adequate and meaningful opportunity to the appellant to show cause against the same. However, we may also add that even if it is not mentioned specifically but from the reading of the show-cause notice, it can be clearly inferred that such an action was proposed, that would fulfil this requirement. In the present case, however, reading of the show-cause notice does not suggest that noticee could find out that such an action could also be taken. We say so for the reasons that are recorded hereinafter.
28. In the instant case, no doubt the show-cause notice dated 6.2.2013 was served upon the appellant. Relevant portion thereof has already been extracted above (see para
5). This show-cause notice is conspicuously silent about the blacklisting action. On the contrary, after stating in detail the nature of alleged defaults and breaches of the agreement committed by the appellant the notice specifically mentions that because of the said defaults the appellant was as such liable to be levied the cost accordingly. It further says why the action as mentioned above may not be taken against the firm, besides other action as deemed fit by the competent authority. It follows from the above that main action which the respondents wanted to take was to levy the cost. No doubt, the notice further mentions that the competent authority could take other actions as deemed fit. However, that may not fulfil the requirement of putting the defaulter to the notice that action of blacklisting was also in the mind of the competent authority. Mere existence of Clause 27 in the agreement entered into between the parties, would not suffice the aforesaid mandatory requirement by vaguely mentioning other actions as deemed fit. As already pointed out above insofar as penalty of blacklisting and forfeiture of earnest money/security deposit is concerned it can be imposed only, if so warranted. Therefore, without any specific stipulation in this behalf, the respondent could not have imposed the penalty of blacklisting. The Supreme Court then considered the argument of the Additional Solicitor General that even though show-cause notice did not contain any indication of the proposed action of blacklisting, no prejudice was caused to the respondent and referred to the judgment in Haryana Financial Corporation and another vs. Kailash Chandra Ahuja (2008) 9 SCC 31 and observed : When we apply the ratio of the aforesaid judgment to the facts of the present case, it becomes difficult to accept the argument of the learned Additional Solicitor General. In the first instance, we may point out that no such case was set up by the respondents that by omitting to state the proposed action of blacklisting the appellant in the show-cause notice, has not caused any prejudice to the appellant. Moreover, had the action of blacklisting being specifically proposed in the show-cause notice, the appellant could have mentioned as to why such extreme penalty is not justified. It could have come out with extenuating circumstances defending such an action even if the defaults were there and the Department was not satisfied with the explanation qua the defaults. It could have even pleaded with the Department not to blacklist the appellant or do it for a lesser period in case the Department still wanted to blacklist the appellant. Therefore, it is not at all acceptable that non-mentioning of proposed blacklisting in the show-cause notice has not caused any prejudice to the appellant. This apart, the extreme nature of such a harsh penalty like blacklisting with severe consequences, would itself amount to causing prejudice to the appellant. [Emphasis supplied]
32. We may now revert to these appeals. A careful scrutiny of the record shows that after conducting detailed investigation, the Jt. DG recorded findings/ conclusions in respect of the seven issues framed by her and held that the allegation of formation of cartel and violation of section 3(1) read with section 3(3)(a) has not been proved against the appellants. The Commission considered the report of the Jt. DG in its meeting held on 19.02.2015 and passed the usual order for supply of copies thereof to the parties to enable them to file their replies/ objections. That order does not contain any indication that the Commission had disagreed with the findings and conclusions recorded by the Jt. DG and formed a reason-based opinion that the allegation of formation of cartel and violation of section 3(1) read with section 3(3)(a) appears to have been proved against the appellants. The letter/notice dated 23.02.2015 issued by the Secretary of the Commission also did not give any hint to the appellants that the Commission had not agreed with the findings and conclusions recorded by the Jt. DG. Even at the stage of oral hearing, the Commission did not give any indication to the appellants that it was not in agreement with the findings/ conclusions recorded by the Jt. DG called upon them to show cause as to why an affirmative finding may not be recorded on the issue of formation of cartel in the matter of levy of FSC and why they should not be held guilty of having acted in contravention of section 3(1) read with section 3(3)(a) of the Act. However, in the final order passed on 17.11.2015, the Commission recorded its disagreement with the Jt. DG and held that the appellants are guilty of forming a cartel andacting in contravention of those provisions and imposed penalty under Section 27.
33. From what has been mentioned in the preceding paragraph, it is clear that till the passing of the impugned order, the Commission had, at no stage of the proceedings held after the receipt of investigation report, given any notice to the appellants indicating/incorporating the reasons for its disagreement with the findings/conclusions recorded by the Jt. DG that the appellants had not formed any cartel or acted in contravention of Section 3(1) and Section 3(3)(a) of the Act and no opportunity was given to them to show that the reasons recorded by the Commission for its disagreement with the findings and conclusion recorded by the Jt. DG were untenable and also showthat they had neither formed any cartel nor acted in contravention of the provisions of the Act. In other words, the Commission passed the impugned order without giving an action-oriented notice to the appellants and an effective opportunity to controvert what the Commission had perceived as contrary to section 3(1) read with section 3(3)(a) of the Act and this amounts to clear violation of the basics of natural justice, which the Commission was duty bound to comply within view of the mandate of Section 36(1) of the Act.
34. We are further of the view that violation of the principles of natural justice by the Commission has caused serious prejudice to the appellants because they have been condemned without being afforded an opportunity to present their cause against the proposed action and burdened with huge financial liability running into crores of rupees. If the Commission had informed the appellants that it proposes to disagree with the findings and conclusions recorded by the Jt. DG and given them an opportunity to file objections against the reasons for disagreement and also given them chance of oral hearing, then the latter may have put forwarded various arguments to persuade/ convince the Commission that the Jt. DG had rightly returned a negative finding on the issue of formation of cartel and that no attempt had been made by them to arbitrarily determine the FSC or revise the same. By omitting to give notice to the appellants incorporating the reasons for its disagreement with the findings and conclusion recorded by the Jt. DG, the Commission deprived the appellants of a valuable opportunity to effectively defend themselves against the proposed action. Therefore, there is no escape from the conclusion that the violation of the principles of natural justice by the Commission has caused serious prejudice to the appellants and the impugned order cannot be sustained by applying the ratio of the judgement of the Constitution Bench inManaging Director, ECIL Hyderabad and OthersVs. B. Karunakar and Others (supra).
35. Before concluding we may notice and deal with the judgments on which reliance has been placed by Shri Samar Bansal, learned counsel for the Commission. (a). The first case in the compilation filed by Shri Samar Bansal is order dated 23.02.2015 passed by the Tribunal in Appeal No.17/2013 The Board of Control for Cricket in India Vs. The Competition Commission of India and Another. We have already referred to the relevant portions of that order. Therefore, it is not necessary to repeat the same. (b). In State Bank of Patiala and others Vs. S.K. Sharma (supra), the two- Judge Bench of the Supreme Court considered the question whether the order of punishment passed by the appellant was vitiated due to alleged non-furnishing of the copies of the statements of witnesses and documents to the respondent. The respondent had challenged the order of punishment by filing a suit. The same was decreed by the Trial Court only on that ground. Copies of the statements of the witnesses and documents were not supplied to him. The appeals against the decree passed by the Trial Court were dismissed by the First Appellate Court and the High Court. The Supreme Court took cognisance of the fact that even though the copies of the statements of the witnesses and documents were not supplied to the respondent, he was allowed to peruse the same half an hour before cross-examination and he availed that opportunity. After noticing the provisions of Regulation 68 of the State Bank of Patiala (Officers) Service Regulations, 1979, the judgments In Ridge Vs. Baldwin, 1964 AC 40 and Vasudevan Pillai Vs. City Council of Singapore (1968) 1 WLR 1278, R. Vs. Secretary of State for Transport, ex p Gwent County Council (1987) 1 All ER 161, Jankinath Sarangi Vs. State of Orissa (1969) 3 SCC 392, Chintapalli Agency Taluk Arrack Sales Coop. Society Ltd. Vs. Secy. (Food and Agriculture) Govt. of A.P. (1977) 4 SCC 337, S.L. Kapoor Vs. Jagmohan (1980) 4 SCC 379, Hira Nath Mishra Vs. Principal, Rajendra Medical College (1973) 1 SCC 805, K.L. TripathiVs. State Bank of India (1984) 1 SCC 43, Managing Director, ECIL Vs. B. Karunakar (1993) 4 SCC 727, C.B. GautamVs. Union of India (1993) 1 SCC 78 and various other decisions, the Supreme Court culled out the following principles : (1) An order passed imposing a punishment on an employee consequent upon a disciplinary/departmental enquiry in violation of the rules/regulations/statutory provisions governing such enquiries should not be set aside automatically. The Court or the Tribunal should enquire whether (a) the provision violated is of a substantive nature or (b) whether it is procedural in character. (2) A substantive provision has normally to be complied with as explained hereinbefore and the theory of substantial compliance or the test of prejudice would not be applicable in such a case. (3) In the case of violation of a procedural provision, the position is this: procedural provisions are generally meant for affording a reasonable and adequate opportunity to the delinquent officer/employee. They are, generally speaking, conceived in his interest. Violation of any and every procedural provision cannot be said to automatically vitiate the enquiry held or order passed. Except cases falling under no notice, no opportunity and no hearing categories, the complaint of violation of procedural provision should be examined from the point of view of prejudice, viz., whether such violation has prejudiced the delinquent officer/employee in defending himself properly and effectively. If it is found that he has been so prejudiced, appropriate orders have to be made to repair and remedy the prejudice including setting aside the enquiry and/or the order of punishment. If no prejudice is established to have resulted therefrom, it is obvious, no interference is called for. In this connection, it may be remembered that there may be certain procedural provisions which are of a fundamental character, whose violation is by itself proof of prejudice. The Court may not insist on proof of prejudice in such cases. As explained in the body of the judgment, take a case where there is a provision expressly providing that after the evidence of the employer/government is over, the employee shall be given an opportunity to lead defence in his evidence, and in a given case, the enquiry officer does not give that opportunity in spite of the delinquent officer/employee asking for it. The prejudice is self-evident. No proof of prejudice as such need be called for in such a case. To repeat, the test is one of prejudice, i.e., whether the person has received a fair hearing considering all things. Now, this very aspect can also be looked at from the point of view of directory and mandatory provisions, if one is so inclined. The principle stated under (4) hereinbelow is only another way of looking at the same aspect as is dealt with herein and not a different or distinct principle. (4)(a) In the case of a procedural provision which is not of a mandatory character, the complaint of violation has to be examined from the standpoint of substantial compliance. Be that as it may, the order passed in violation of such a provision can be set aside only where such violation has occasioned prejudice to the delinquent employee. (b) In the case of violation of a procedural provision, which is of a mandatory character, it has to be ascertained whether the provision is conceived in the interest of the person proceeded against or in public interest. If it is found to be the former, then it must be seen whether the delinquent officer has waived the said requirement, either expressly or by his conduct. If he is found to have waived it, then the order of punishment cannot be set aside on the ground of the said violation. If, on the other hand, it is found that the delinquent officer/employee has not waived it or that the provision could not be waived by him, then the Court or Tribunal should make appropriate directions (include the setting aside of the order of punishment), keeping in mind the approach adopted by the Constitution Bench in B. Karunakar (1993) 4 SCC 727. The ultimate test is always the same, viz., test of prejudice or the test of fair hearing, as it may be called. (5) Where the enquiry is not governed by any rules/regulations/statutory provisions and the only obligation is to observe the principles of natural justice or, for that matter, wherever such principles are held to be implied by the very nature and impact of the order/action the Court or the Tribunal should make a distinction between a total violation of natural justice (rule of audi alteram partem) and violation of a facet of the said rule, as explained in the body of the judgment. In other words, a distinction must be made between no opportunity and no adequate opportunity, i.e., between no notice/no hearing and no fair hearing. (a) In the case of former, the order passed would undoubtedly be invalid (one may call it void or a nullity if one chooses to). In such cases, normally, liberty will be reserved for the Authority to take proceedings afresh according to law, i.e., in accordance with the said rule (audi alteram partem). (b) But in the latter case, the effect of violation (of a facet of the rule of audi alteram partem) has to be examined from the standpoint of prejudice; in other words, what the Court or Tribunal has to see is whether in the totality of the circumstances, the delinquent officer/employee did or did not have a fair hearing and the orders to be made shall depend upon the answer to the said query. [It is made clear that this principle (No. 5) does not apply in the case of rule against bias, the test in which behalf are laid down elsewhere. (6) While applying the rule of audi alteram partem (the primary principle of natural justice) the Court/Tribunal/ Authority must always bear in mind the ultimate and overriding objective underlying the said rule, viz., to ensure a fair hearing and to ensure that there is no failure of justice. It is this objective which should guide them in applying the rule to varying situations that arise before them. (7) There may be situations where the interests of State or public interest may call for a curtailing of the rule of audialteram partem. In such situations, the Court may have to balance public/State interest with the requirement of natural justice and arrive at an appropriate decision. The above noted judgement is clearly distinguishable. The facts of that case reveal that even though the copies of the statements of the witnesses and documents were not supplied to the respondent, he was allowed to peruse the same before cross-examination and he availed that opportunity. In the background of those facts, the Court held that the alleged violation of principles of natural justice occasioned on account of non-supply of copies of the statements of witnesses and documents had not caused any prejudice to the respondent and the High Court had committed an error by setting aside the order of punishment. (c). In Queen on the Application of Daniel Faulkner Vs. Secretary of State for the Home Department [(2006) EWHC 563 (Admin)], the High Court of Justice Queens Bench Division Administrative Court considered the question whether the decision of the Parole Application filed by Daniel Faulkner was vitiated due to violation of the principles of natural justice. It was argued on behalf of the appellant that Daniel Faulkner, who had been sentenced to life-imprisonment,the decision on his application by the Parole Board was vitiated due to infraction of the rules of natural justice. After noticing some earlier decisions, the Queens Bench rejected the plea of violation of principles of natural justice by the Parole Board by making the following observations :
38. Applying this statement of the law to the facts of the present case, I conclude that there was no new material in the report so as to require thedisclosure of the report to the claimant in order to enable him to make submissions before the Secretary of State made a final decision. This is aquestion of procedural fairness and what is required will depend on the particular circumstances of each case. The claimant says that the reportincluded further recommendations for work and assessment but the report was more than an analysis of the material which was before the Board.In particular, it was, he says, an application of expertise in order to identify new work to be undertaken and new assessments. He complains thathe had no opportunity to address these new matters before the Parole Board. He says that it raised new areas of concern which he was notpermitted to address.
39. However, it does not seem to me that in the particular circumstances of this case there was any obligation to disclose the report so as to enablethe claimant to make submissions on it. When one examines the report, it becomes clear that it is based entirely on the evidence which wasbefore the Parole Board. The report itself sets out the sources of information on which the report is based and they are all matters which werecontained in the folio which was lodged before the Parole Board. There was no new evidence here, and the contrary is not suggested. The reportundoubtedly contained an expert assessment, but it seems to me that it falls clearly within the Carltona principle. There were conclusions drawnand recommendations made as to what action should be taken, but those conclusions and recommendations turned on the interpretation of thematerial which was before the Parole Board and on which the claimant had had an opportunity to make representations. (d). In Byrne Vs. Kinematograph Renters Society Ltd. [(1958) 1 SLR 762], the Chancery Division rejected the argument that the Joint Investigation Committee was bound to comply with the principles of natural justice before being directed to discontinue the exhibition of filmsin cinemas. The facts of that case were that on receipt of the representation of the inspectors who found that there were discrepancies in the box office return, the plaintiff was asked to attend a meeting of Joint Investigation Committee. At the meeting, he was confronted with the report of the Investigation team, but he was not allowed to see it. Following that meeting, the first defendant recommended its members not to supplythe films to the plaintiff. In the suit filed by the plaintiff, a prayer was made that the recommendations of the Joint Investigation Committee be declared as null and void on the ground of violation of the principles of natural justice. While rejecting the arguments, the Court of Chancery Division made the following observations : (4)That a domestic tribunal like J.I.C. was not required by the principles of natural justice to conduct itself like a court of law, and although therewere no rules of universal application to every kind of inquiry and to every kind of domestic tribunal,natural justice required: (a) that the personaccused should know the nature of the accusation made against him; (b) he should be given an opportunity to state his case; and (c) the tribunalmust act in good faith. Russell v. Duke of Norfolk (supra) applied. (5) That although the methods of the defendants might be deplored, they had not in the circumstances failed to comply sufficiently with the rulesof natural justice and the plaintiff's claim failed. The aforesaid two judgements turned on their own facts. In the first case, the Court found that the claimant had an opportunity to make representation against the adverse recommendations made against him. In the second case, the Chancery Division took the view that a domestic tribunal like Joint Investigation Committee was not required to comply with the principles of natural justice. (e). In the fourth decision relied upon by Shri Samar Bansal is Haryana Financial Corporation and Another Vs. Kailash Chandra Ahuja [(2008) 9 SCC 31]. The respondent had challenged his dismissal from service on the ground of that a copy of the enquiry report was not supplied to him. The High Court allowed the writ petition on the ground that non-supply of copy of the enquiry report had resulted in violation of the principles of natural justice. The two Judge Bench of the Supreme Court relied upon the ratio of the judgment in B. Karunakars case and held that in the absence of any plea by the delinquent that non-supply of enquiry report had prejudiced his cause, the High Court was not justified in quashing the order of punishment. From the tenor of this judgement, it is clear that the respondent had not pleaded that the non-supply of enquiry report has caused prejudice to him and that was the solitary reason for this Court for refusal to uphold the order of the High Court which had quashed the order of punishment. (f). In Fedco (P) Ltd. Another v. S.N Bilgrami Others (1960) 2 SCR 408, the Supreme Court rejected the argument based on violation of the principles of natural justice in a case involving cancellation of license granted under the Imports Control Order, 1955 by observing that the petitioner had been informed of the ground on which the action was proposed to be taken and mere absence of particulars in the notice was not sufficient to quash the cancellation of license, more so because the appellant had been warned five time about violation of conditions of license and the affidavit did not contain specific denial of the allegation of fraud. (g). The last judgment relied upon by learned counsel for the Commission, i.e., Islamic Academy of Education and another v. State of Karnataka and others (2003) 6 SCC 697, merely contains a discussion on the binding character of the earlier decision in T.M.A. Pie Foundation vs. State of Karnataka (2002) 8 SCC
481. In that case, the Supreme Court merely discussed the methodology of interpretation of an earlier decision and no proposition has been laid down, which may have any bearing on the questions raised in these appeals.
36. The above analysis of the judgments relied upon by Shri Bansal makes it clear that ratio of none of them has any bearing on the issue raised in these appeals and at the cost of repetition we hold that the Commissions failure to give notice to the appellants incorporating the reasons of its disagreement with the findings and conclusions recorded by the Jt. DG and giving them an effective opportunity to show that they had not formed any cartel for jacking-up fuel surcharge from time to time has not only resulted in gross violation of principles of natural justice, but has also caused prejudice to them.
37. In the result, the appeals are allowed, the impugned order is set-aside and the matters are remanded to the Commission with the following directions :
(I) The Commission shall re-consider the report of the Jt. DG and take appropriate decision under Section 26(8) of the Act. If the Commission disagrees with the findings and conclusions recorded by the Jt. DG, then it shall indicate the reasons for such disagreement and issue notice to the parties incorporating the reasons of disagreement and give them opportunity to file their replies/ objections.
(II) After receiving the replies/ objections of the parties, the Commission shall hear them and pass appropriate order in accordance with law.
38. If the appellants or any other party feels aggrieved by the final order, which may be passed by the Commission, then it shall be free to avail appropriate legal remedy. [G.S. Singhvi] Chairman [Rajeev Kher] Member 18th April, 2016