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Case Number

CR No. 3833 of 2009 (O&M)

Attorney(S)

Mr. R.S Rai, Sr. Advocate, with Mr. Gauttam Dutt, Advocate, for the petitioner.

Judges

Vinod K. Sharma, J.

Acts

SECTION 26 PROTECTION OF WOMEN FROM DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ACT 2005
section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure
ARTICLE 227 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA

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Smart Summary

Synopsis of the Court's Oral Judgment (Vinod K. Sharma, J.)

Dated: 14.07.2009. Matters: CM No.15969-CII of 2009; CR No.3833 of 2009 (Revision under Article 227).

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion records two items: (i) an application (CM No.15969-CII of 2009) under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure seeking permission to place documents (Annexures P.1–P.14) on record and exemptions/permissions regarding certified, translated, photographic and typed copies of certain annexures, and (ii) a revision petition (CR No.3833 of 2009) under Article 227 of the Constitution of India challenging an order dated 24.12.2008 of the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), Chandigarh, which was affirmed by the lower appellate court by order dated 03.06.2009 granting a temporary mandatory injunction in favour of the plaintiff/respondents.

The litigation concerns a suit by the plaintiffs (the petitioner's father-in-law and mother-in-law) for a declaration that the defendants have no right of residence at House No. 1118, Sector 45-B, Chandigarh, and for mandatory and permanent injunctions directing the defendants (including the petitioner / defendant No.2) to vacate the property and restraining interference with the plaintiffs' possession and privacy.

The petitioner (defendant No.2) is the daughter-in-law (Smt. Shubhwant Kaur) of the plaintiffs and had filed an application under section 26 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 claiming a right of residence in the in-laws' house. The courts below recorded several undisputed facts relevant to the dispute, including (inter alia) that the house is the exclusive self-acquired property of Sh. Pirthi Pal Singh, that Smt. Shubhwant Kaur along with her son is staying on the ground floor, and that the plaintiffs have no other accommodation in Chandigarh or adjoining areas.

The lower courts held that, in view of the Supreme Court's decision in S.R. Batra v. Taruna Batra (AIR 2007 SC 1119), the petitioner has no right to claim residence in the self-acquired house of her father-in-law. The lower appellate court nonetheless made an interim arrangement (detailed in the opinion) ordering the husband to provide rented accommodation or enabling the petitioner to arrange accommodation and recover rent, and gave the petitioner 45 days to vacate the premises and put the plaintiffs into possession. The petitioner sought revision of that order before the High Court.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the petitioner (daughter-in-law) has a legal right to residence in the father-in-law's self-acquired house under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act or otherwise.
Whether the orders of the courts below granting a temporary/interim mandatory injunction (which directs vacation and restoration of possession) were rightly granted and sustainable in law, including under the principles governing interlocutory mandatory injunctions.
Whether the interim order of the lower appellate court effectively granted the main relief and, if so, whether that rendered the interim order impermissible.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments (as recorded)

Reliance on the Kerala High Court decision in S. Prabhakaran v. State of Kerala (2009 (2) RCR (Civil) 883) to contend that a wife has a right to live in the household of the husband or parents-in-law if she lived in a domestic relationship in that household.
Contended that the impugned interim order could not be sustained because, by way of interim order, the main relief itself stood granted; reliance was placed on Balwant Singh v. Avtar Singh (2003 (3) PLR 854) for the proposition that an interim injunction resulting in grant of the main relief cannot be granted.

Respondents' / Courts' Position (as recorded)

The courts below relied on the authoritative pronouncement of the Supreme Court in S.R. Batra v. Taruna Batra (AIR 2007 SC 1119) and recorded that the petitioner had no right of residence in a self-acquired house of her father-in-law.
The courts below found, on the admitted facts, that the plaintiffs are absolute owners and had a prima facie case for possession, and that considerations of comparative mischief, balance of convenience and irreparable injury favoured granting interim mandatory relief restoring possession to the plaintiffs.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
S.R. Batra v. Taruna Batra, AIR 2007 SC 1119	Held that a wife is entitled to claim right to residence only in a "shared household" as defined, which does not include a self-acquired property of the husband's relatives; a broad interpretation making every house where husband and wife at some time lived a "shared household" would be chaotic.	The court applied this authoritative Supreme Court pronouncement to conclude that the petitioner has no right or claim to residence in the self-acquired house of her father-in-law.
S. Prabhakaran v. State of Kerala, 2009 (2) RCR (Civil) 883 (Kerala HC)	Held that a wife has a right to live in the household of the husband or parents-in-law if she lived in a domestic relationship in that household.	The petitioner relied on this decision to contend a right of residence; the High Court rejected that contention in view of the Supreme Court's decision in S.R. Batra (supra).
Neetu Mittal v. Kanta Mittal & Or., 2008 (4) RCR (C) 630 (Delhi HC)	Explained that parents may allow a son and daughter-in-law to live in a self-acquired house out of affection, but there is no legal right to force residence against the parents' consent; the support of parents is not a legal obligation.	The court cited this reasoning to support the view that a woman cannot claim a right to live in the house of her husband's parents against their consent, particularly where the property is self-acquired.
Balwant Singh v. Avtar Singh, 2003 (3) PLR 854	On the facts of that case, an interim injunction resulting in grant of the main relief itself cannot be granted; cited for the general principle that such grants are normally impermissible though not an absolute rule.	The petitioner relied on this authority to contend the impugned order improperly granted main relief by way of interim order; the court observed the case is fact-specific and refused to accept the argument as an absolute rule applicable here.
M/s Aerizzona thru. Its Proprietor S. Surinder Singh v. Gurdarshan Singh Brar, 2006 (6) RCR (Civil) 71	Stated that there is no bar to grant of mandatory injunction where the three ingredients (prima facie case, balance of convenience, irreparable injury) are proved.	The High Court referenced this proposition to justify that a mandatory interim injunction may be granted if the three traditional ingredients are satisfied.
Dorab Cawasji Warden v. Coomi Sorab Warden and others, (1990) 2 SCC 117	Explained that in awarding interlocutory injunctions courts must consider comparative mischief or inconvenience and exercise judicial discretion; guidelines include prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable injury.	The court relied on this Supreme Court guidance in assessing whether the interim mandatory injunction in favour of the plaintiffs was justified by the balance of convenience and other equitable considerations.
Metro Marins and another v. Bonus Watch Co.(P) Ltd. And others, (2004) 7 SCC 478	Reaffirmed principles regarding interlocutory mandatory injunctions and the exercise of judicial discretion.	The High Court noted that this decision followed the principles in Dorab Warden and applied those principles in upholding the courts below.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded from the undisputed factual findings recorded by the courts below: that the house is the exclusive self-acquired property of Sh. Pirthi Pal Singh; that Smt. Shubhwant Kaur (the petitioner) was residing on the ground floor with her son; that divorce proceedings and a criminal case (s.307 IPC) involving the husband were pending; and that the elderly plaintiffs had no other accommodation in Chandigarh.

The court first addressed the petitioner's statutory and other legal contentions seeking residence rights in the in-laws' house under section 26 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005. It observed and relied upon the Supreme Court's ruling in S.R. Batra v. Taruna Batra that a right of residence for a wife attaches only to a "shared household" (as sensibly interpreted) and does not include the self-acquired property of the husband's relatives. On that basis the court found that the petitioner has no legal right of residence in the self-acquired house of her father-in-law.

The court then considered the petitioner's reliance on contrary authority (S. Prabhakaran) but declined to accept that approach in the face of the authoritative Supreme Court pronouncement in S.R. Batra. The court also considered the petitioner's submission that the interim order impermissibly granted the main relief, relying on Balwant Singh; the court noted Balwant Singh is fact-specific and that the proposition that an interim order can never grant main relief is not absolute.

Applying the established equitable tests for interlocutory mandatory injunctions (prima facie case, balance of convenience, irreparable injury) as stated in Dorab Cawasji Warden and followed in Metro Marins and M/s Aerizzona, the High Court found that the plaintiffs, being absolute owners, had a prima facie case for possession of the property which was allegedly taken without legal right. Considering comparative mischief and inconvenience, the courts below had rightly concluded that the respondent-plaintiffs were entitled to interim mandatory relief restoring possession.

The court therefore rejected the petitioner's challenges, including the contention about the interim order amounting to grant of main relief, and upheld the orders below which included directions regarding rented accommodation and the 45-day timeline for vacating the premises.

Separately, the court allowed the procedural application under section 151 CPC (CM No.15969-CII of 2009) permitting filing of specified annexures and exemptions/permissions concerning certified, translated and photographed copies as stated in the application.

Holding and Implications

CORE RULING: The revision petition is DISMISSED.

Direct consequences for the parties (as recorded in the opinion):

The orders of the courts below granting a temporary mandatory injunction in favour of the plaintiffs (father-in-law and mother-in-law) stand upheld by the High Court.
The appellate court's interim arrangement remains effective: the husband (Vikramjit Singh Chugh) was directed to place on record within one month a registered rent note providing minimum two-bedroom accommodation for his wife and children in Chandigarh and to submit particulars before the trial court; if he fails, Smt. Shubhwant Kaur is entitled to arrange her own accommodation and recover the rent from him; she was given 45 days to vacate the disputed premises and to put the plaintiffs in possession.
The procedural application under section 151 CPC to place the listed annexures on record and for associated exemptions was allowed.

Broader legal implications: The court applied and reaffirmed existing Supreme Court authorities (notably S.R. Batra and Dorab Cawasji Warden) in the context of claims to residence in self-acquired property and the grant of interlocutory mandatory injunctions. The opinion does not purport to lay down any new precedent beyond the application of those existing authorities to the facts before the court.

Order pronounced orally by Vinod K. Sharma, J. (rp Judge). Result: Petition dismissed. CM allowed.

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Shubhwant Kaur Subh Petitioner v. Lt. Col. Prithi Pal Singh Chugh & Ors. S

Vinod K. Sharma, J. (Oral)

CM No. 15969-CII of 2009

This application has been filed under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure for permission to place on record Annexure P.1 to P.14 and further for exemption from filing the certified copies of Annexurs P.1 to P.11, P.13 and P.14 with permission to file true translated copies of Annexures P.4 and P.7, true photographs of Annexure P.6 as also true typed copies of Annexures P.1 to P.3, P.5 and P.8 to P.14.

For the reasons stated in the application, the prayer is granted.

CM stands allowed.

CR No. 3833 of 2009

This revision petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is directed against the order dated 24.12.2008 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division) Chandigarh, as affirmed by the learned lower appellate court, by order dated 3.6.2009 granting relief of temporary mandatory injunction in favour of the plaintiff/respondents.

The plaintiff/respondents are father-in-law/mother-in-law of the petitioner/defendant No. 2, who filed a suit for declaration, that the defendants have no right of residence at House No. 1118, Sector 45-B, Chandigarh. Relief of mandatory injunction was prayed for directing the defendants, including the petitioner/defendant to vacate the property in dispute along with her family. Relief of permanent injunction was also prayed restraining the defendants from interfering in the peaceful life and liberty as well as privacy of the respondents. Prayer was also for restraining defendants from dispossessing the plaintiff/respondent from the house.

In the said suit, petitioner herein moved an application under section 26 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, claiming right of resistance in the house of her in-laws.

The learned courts below on the basis of pleadings and documents placed on record recorded that the following facts were not in dispute:-

a) Sh. Pirthi Pal Singh is the exclusive owner of the house in question and it is his self-acquired property.

b) Snt. Subhwant Kaur is his daughter-in-law. A divorce petition is pending between Shubhwant Kaur and Sh. Vikramjit Singh Chugh.

c) On the statement of Smt. Shubhwant Kaur a Criminal case under section 307 IPC has been registered against Vikramjit Singh Chugh.

d) Smt. Shubhwant Kaur along with her son is staying in the ground floor which consists kitchen, bathroom.

e) Both the old aged plaintiffs have no other accommodation to stay in Chandigarh or in the adjoining area and earlier they were staying with her married daughter Poojneet Kaur Chugh wife of Sqn. Ldr. R.D Fialhoand the later is working as a Combat Member of Indian Air Force and was posted at Air Force Station, Bathinda but now has been transferred to Guwahati w.e.f 11.05.2009”

On the admitted facts learned courts below in view of the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of S.R Batra v. Taruna Batra AIR 2007 SC 1119 recorded a finding that the petitioner has no right or claim residence in the self-acquired house of her father-in-law.

However, in order to protect the rights of the petitioner, learned lower appellate court by way of impugned order has been pleased to order as under:-

“However, Vikramjit Singh Chugh husband of the appellant had undertook to provide three room set rented accommodation. He placed on file a rent note executed on 16.05.2008 for a period of 11 months but the period of 11 months has expired. He is directed to place on record within one month from today a registered rent note providing minimum two bed room set accommodation for his wife and children within the area of Chandigarh and shall submit an application giving full particulars of such accommodation before trial court within one month from today. In case he failed to furnish the same then Smt. Shbhwant Kaur shall be entitled to arrange her own accommodation and in that eventuality she shall be entitled to recover the rent from Sh. Vikramjit Singh. However, Smt. Shubhwant Kaur is given 45 days time from today to vacate the premises in question and to put her old aged parents in law namely Pirthi Pal Singh and Harbhajan Kaur into possession.”

Mr. R.S Rai, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner placed reliance on the judgment of Hon'ble Kerala High Court in the case of S. Prabhakaran v. State of Kerala 2009(2) RCR (Civil) 883, wherein Hon'ble Kerala High Court has been pleased to lay down, that wife has a right to live in the household, whether it be the joint family house of the husband or the residential building of the parents-in-law, if the wife lives or has at any stage lived in a domestic relationship either singly or along with the husband, to contend that the petitioner can claim right of residence in the house of father-in-law.

The plea raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner cannot be accepted in view of the authoritative pronouncement of Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the case of S.R Batra v. Taruna Batra (supra), wherein Hon'ble Supreme Court has been pleased to lay down as under:-

“25. If the aforesaid submission is accepted, then it will mean that wherever the husband and wife lived together in the past that property becomes a shared household. It is quite possible that the husband and wife may have lived together in dozens of husbands paternal grant parents, l his maternal parents, uncles, aunts, l brothers, sisters, nephews, nieces etc. If the interpretation canvassed by the learned counsel for the respondent is accepted all these houses of the husbands relatives will be shared households and the wife can well insist in living in the all these shared households and the wife can well insist in living in the all these houses of her husband's relatives merely because she had stayed with her husband for some time in those houses in the past. Such a view would lead to chaos and would be absurd.”

26. xx xx xx

28. As regards Section 17 (1) of the Act in our opinion the wife if only entitled to claim a right to residence in a shared household, and a shared household would only mean the house belonging to or taken on rent by the husband, or the house which belongs to the joint family of which the husband is a member. The property in question in the present case neither belongs to Amit Batra nor was it taken on rent by him nor is it a joint family property or which the husband Amit Batra is a member. It is the exclusive property of appellant No. 2, mother of Amit Batra. Hence it cannot be called a “Shared household.

29. No doubt the definition of ‘shared household in Section 2 (s) of the Act is not very happily worded, and appears tobe the result of clumsy drafting, but we have to give it can interpretation which is sensible and which does not lead to chaos in society.”

Hon'ble Delhi High Court in the case of Neetu Mittal… v. Kanta Mittal & Or.… 2008 (4) RCR (C) 630, has been pleased to lay down as under:-

“In fact the parents of the husband may allow him to live with them so long as their relations with the son (husband) are cordial and full of love and affection. But if the relations of the son or daughter in law with the parents of husband turn sour and are not cordial, the parents can turn them out of their house. The son can live in the house of parents as a matter of right only if the house is an ancestral house in which the son has a share and he can enforce the partition. Where the house is self-acquired house of the parents, son, whether married or unmarried, has no legal righty to live in that house and he can live in that house only at the mercy of his parents up to the time the parents allow. Merely because the parents have allowed him to live in the house so long as his relations with the parents have to bear his burden through the life.

9. Once a person gain majority, he becomes independent and parents have no liability to maintain him.; It is different thing that out of love and affection, the parents may continue to support him even when he becomes financially independent or continue to help him even after his marriage. This help and support of parents to the son is available only out of their love and affection and out of mutual trust and understanding. There is no legal liability on the parents to continue to support a disobedient son or a son which become liability on them or a son who disrespects or dis-regards them or becomes a source of nuisance for them or trouble for them The parents can always for sake such a son and daughter-in-law and tell them to leave their house and lead their own life and let them live in peace. It is because of love, affection, mutual trust, respect and support that members of a joint family gain from each other that the parents keep supporting their sons and families of sons. In turn, the parents get equal support, love affection and care. Where this mutual relationship of love, care trust, and support goes, the parents cannot be forced to keep a son or daughter in law. A woman has her rights of maintenance against her husband or sons/daughters. She can assert her rights, if any, l against the property of her husband, but she cannot thrust herself against the parents of her husband, nor can claim a right to live in the house of parents of her husband, against their consult and wishes.”

It is then contended by the learned senior counsel for the petitioner that the impugned order cannot be sustained as by way of interim order main relief itself stands granted. In support of this contention reliance has been placed on the judgment of this court in the case of Balwant Singh… v. Avtar Singh… 2003 (3) PLR 854. This judgment is on the facts and circumstances of that particular case. This Hon'ble Court in this case has been pleased to lay down that an interim injunction resulting in grant of decree of main relief itself cannot be granted, as the entitlement is yet to be determined. However, this cannot be an absolute rule, though normal position as per settled law.

This court in the case of M/s Aerizzona thru. Its Proprietor S. Surinder Singh v. Gurdarshan Singh Brar 2006 (6) RCR (Civil) 71 laid down, that there is no bar to grant of mandatory injunction in case three ingredients i.e prima facie case, balance of convenience, as well as irreparable injury being caused or likely to be caused is proved on record.

Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Dorab Cawasji Warden v. Coomi Sorab Warden and others (1990) 2 SCC 117, has been pleased to lay down as under:-

“Since the relief of an interim injunction is all the same an equitable relief the court shall also consider whether the comparative mischief or inconvenience which is likely to ensue from withholding the injunction will be greater than that which is likely to arise from granting it, which means that the balance of convenience is in favour of the plaintiff seeking the relief.

xx xx xx

The grant or refusal of an interlocutory mandatory injunction shall ultimately rest in the sound judicial discretion of the court to be exercised in the light of the facts and circumstances in each case. Though the above guidelines are neither exhaustive nor complete or absolute rules, and there may be exceptional circumstances needing action, apply them as prerequisite for the grant or refusal of such injunctions would be a sound exercise of a judicial discretion.”

This view was again followed in the case of Metro Marins and another v. Bonus Watch Co.(P) Ltd. And others (2004) 7 SCC 478.

If the principles laid down above are applied to the facts of the present case it would be seen that the plaintiff/respondents being absolute owners have a prima facie case to have possession of the property which was illegally taken by the petitioners, without any legal right.

Learned courts below in view of the comparative mischief and inconvenience rightly held that the respondent-plaintiffs were entitled to interim mandatory injunction.

Second contention of the learned senior counsel for the petitioners also deserves to be rejected.

No merit.

Dismissed.

14.07 2009 (Vinod K. Sharma)

rp Judge

Shubhwant Kaur Subh Petitioner v. Lt. Col. Prithi Pal Singh Chugh & Ors. S

Synopsis of the Court's Oral Judgment (Vinod K. Sharma, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

Legal Issues Presented

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments (as recorded)

Respondents' / Courts' Position (as recorded)

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Holding and Implications

Shubhwant Kaur Subh Petitioner v. Lt. Col. Prithi Pal Singh Chugh & Ors. S

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