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Smart Summary

Comprehensive Summary of the Provided Legal Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

(Based exclusively on the information contained in the provided opinion.)

The appellant is the State undertaking (the Corporation). The respondents are employees of the Corporation (including daily wage/ daily-rated workers). The respondents' service conditions are governed by statutory regulations under section 45 of the Road Transport Corporation Act, 1950 and by collective settlements between the Corporation and workers' unions.

A settlement dated 25 April 1956 contained Clause 49 (the principal clause in dispute) providing that employees working for 180 days continuously (including weekly offs and holidays) would be brought on the time scale of pay and receive benefits available to time scale workers. Subsequent settlements followed, including a 1968 settlement (which included Clause 9), a Corporation Resolution No. 8856 dated 31-8-1978, and a 1985 settlement (which included Clause 19). The Corporation contended that Resolution No. 8856 and Clause 19 of the 1985 settlement replaced Clause 49 of the 1956 settlement.

Several employees (respondents) filed complaints before the Industrial Court alleging denial of benefits under Clause 49. The Industrial Court, after hearing, directed the Corporation to withdraw unfair labour practice and to fix the pay of the respondents in the time scale as per Clause 49 with effect from the year immediately following the financial year in which each respondent completed continuous 180 days; monetary benefits were to be paid from the date of the complaints. The Corporation challenged those orders by way of writ petitions before Single Judges; the Single Judges upheld the Industrial Court's rulings. The Corporation then appealed to this Full Bench (Letters Patent Appeals) to resolve differences of opinion between Benches on whether Clause 49 was replaced and on limitation questions. The Full Bench heard arguments and delivered the judgment summarized here.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether Clause 49 of the 1956 settlement was replaced or modified by Clause 19 of the 1985 settlement and/or by Corporation Resolution No. 8856 (31-8-1978).
  2. Whether Clause 49 (1956) operates in a field totally different from Clause 19 (1985) (i.e., whether Clause 49 deals with grant of time scale whereas Clause 19 deals with absorption in permanent employment).
  3. Whether the Joint Committee (constituted under Clause 9 of the 1968 settlement) had the authority to alter, cancel or modify Clause 49 of the 1956 settlement or to deal with the financial/service-condition matters covered by Clause 49.
  4. Whether the respondents' complaints before the Industrial Court were barred by limitation, or whether the denial of benefits under Clause 49 constituted a continuing wrong (recurring cause of action) such that limitation did not bar the complaints.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant (Corporation)

  • Clause 49 of the 1956 settlement was "concealed and revised" in a Joint Committee meeting held on 15-4-1978, the Joint Committee being empowered by Clause 9 of the 1968 settlement to take such action.
  • The Corporation passed Resolution No. 8856 on 31-8-1978 which, the Corporation says, cancelled Clause 49 and provided that casual/daily-wage employees who completed an aggregate of 180 days in one financial year (from 1-4-1973) would be appointed temporarily in ephemeral vacancies in time scale of pay from 31-7-1978 prospectively.
  • In 1985 a new settlement (Clause 19) provided for absorption of daily rated workmen after 180 days and, together with the 1978 resolution, this modified and replaced Clause 49.
  • On limitation: The ephemeral time scale was granted, but prior to three years preceding the complaints; therefore the complaints were time-barred under the law of limitation; it was not a case of recurring cause of action. The appellant relied on decisions including the Shree Dhyaneshwar Maharaj Sansthan case and others to argue that the injury was complete before the limitation period and so the complaints were barred.

Respondents (Employees / Unions)

  • If the appellant's contentions were accepted, respondents would effectively be denied the right to obtain time scale, a right enjoyed by other employees doing identical work.
  • Clause 49 of the 1956 settlement was not modified, altered or replaced by any subsequent settlement (including Clause 19 of 1985) nor by Resolution No. 8856.
  • The Joint Committee was not authorized to decide financial matters or to cancel/change service conditions such as those in Clause 49; therefore no resolution of the Joint Committee could replace Clause 49.
  • On limitation: the denial of the time scale inflicts injury every month (a continuing wrong) and therefore the cause of action recurs month to month; also argued that deprivation of wages without due authority would amount to infringement of Article 300-A of the Constitution (as pleaded in the opinion).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Balkrishna Savalram Pujari Waghmare v. Shree Dhyaneshwar Maharaj Sansthan, AIR 1959 SC 798 Principle that if a wrongful act causes an injury which is complete, there is no continuing wrong; but if the wrongful act itself causes a continuing injury then it constitutes a continuing wrong (discussion of section 23 of Limitation Act context). The Court examined this rule and held that the facts of that case (complete ouster) are distinguishable from the present matter; the Court relied on the clarification in that decision that a continuing injury gives rise to a continuing wrong and hence allowed the continuing-wrong argument for respondents.
Bai Manchha v. Sardar Sajjadanashin Saiyad Mahamad Baker-el-Edrus, AIR 1963 Gujarat 168 Held that the injury was complete upon execution of a Kabuliat (contract executed under compulsion) and that section 23 of the Limitation Act did not apply where injury was complete at the relevant earlier date. The Court treated this as an example where the wrongful act produced a complete injury from the start; it distinguished that factual situation from the present recurring monthly denial of wages/time-scale benefits.
Textile Labour Association, Ahmedabad v. Ashok Mills Ltd., Ahmedabad, 1992 Lab. I.C. 575 (Full Bench) Rule that obligations such as payment of wages or amenities may create recurring monthly obligations; in such contexts failure to comply can be a recurring wrong leading to a continuing cause of action. The Court relied on this Full Bench authority to support the conclusion that non-compliance with Clause 49 (a recurring monetary obligation) produces a recurring cause of action and is not barred by limitation.
Regional Manager, Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation, Nagpur v. Regional Secretary, Maharashtra State Road Transport Kamgar Sanghatana, 1984 Lab. I.C. 1721 Held that unfair labour practice will continue to recur so long as a settlement remains unimplemented (recurring nature defeats limitation). The Court cited this decision in concluding that Clause 49 remained in force and non-compliance would be an unfair labour practice of a recurring nature, thereby supporting respondents on limitation.
Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation, Bombay v. Maharashtra Motor Kamgar Federation, Nagpur, 1986 Lab. I.C. 253 The opinion cited this decision among authorities relied upon by the appellant on limitation—specific rule/principle from the case was not detailed in the opinion. The opinion records that reliance was placed upon this decision by the appellant for the limitation point. The Court's detailed analysis of limitation relied on other authorities whose principles were explicitly discussed.
Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation v. Pandurang Ramaji Tamgadge (unreported, 20-11-1985) The Single Judge held that the functions of the Joint Committee could not bring about alterations or modifications in settled conditions of service and no right accrued to the Corporation to unilaterally cancel Item/Clause 49 in the absence of consensus. The Full Bench noted and relied on this reasoning to support the proposition that the Joint Committee lacked power to cancel or alter Clause 49.
Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation v. Vitthal Shrawan Sarkate (unreported, judgment delivered 1 March 1982) The Single Judge discussed the expanded scope of the reconstituted Joint Committee under Clause 9 and observed that its decisions were binding subject to Corporation/Government approval, but reiterated the distinction between financial and non-financial matters. The Full Bench referenced this decision in examining the scope of Clause 9 and the Joint Committee's jurisdiction; it formed part of the background for concluding that financial/service-condition matters like Clause 49 were outside the Joint Committee's competence.
Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation v. Mohd. Fasahatullah Khan (Writ Petition No. 1240/1987) — Division Bench, reported 1998 (1) C.L.R. 51 Held that Clause 9 of the 1968 settlement superseded earlier arrangements concerning the Joint Committee and that the charter of demands had been divided into monetary and non-monetary demands (monetary demands were to be settled separately; non-monetary by Joint Committee). The Full Bench expressly accepted and relied on this Division Bench's interpretation of Clause 9 and the preamble—using it to conclude that the Joint Committee was not authorized to decide the financial matters covered by Clause 49.
Ashok Gangadhar Tayade v. Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation, 1997 (3) Mh. L.J. 486 : 1997 (11) CLR 890 The Division Bench held that Clause 49 of the 1956 settlement regarding absorption after 180 days had been reviewed and replaced by Clause 19 of the 1985 settlement for the petitioners before it. The Full Bench considered this Division Bench decision, examined its reasoning (noting it relied mainly on claimed practical benefits to employees), and disagreed — holding that the Ashok Tayade conclusion was insufficient to establish replacement of Clause 49 by Clause 19.
Durgadas Ramlal Rane v. Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation (citation linked in the opinion) The opinion referenced this Court's judgment as part of the corpus of earlier decisions; the Full Bench observed that the earlier judgment may require reconsideration. The case was one of the precedents that led the Court to place the present appeals before a Full Bench for final disposal; the Full Bench noted the need to re-examine existing precedents.
Shri Ram Mills' case, 1950 ICR 1241 (IC Bom) Used (as cited by Full Bench decisions) to distinguish between occasions generating one-time arrears and recurring monthly obligations (e.g., wages) where the wrong may recur month to month. The Court cited the published principle to support the point that monetary obligations payable month to month give rise to recurring causes of action when withheld.
Maya Rani Punj (Smt) v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Delhi, (1986) 1 SCC 445 Principle that where a duty continues from day to day, non-performance from day to day constitutes a continuing wrong. The Court cited this Supreme Court authority to reinforce the conclusion that the continuing denial of time-scale benefits is a continuing wrong and not time-barred in the manner asserted by the Corporation.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Full Bench proceeded methodically, addressing the contested questions in sequence and grounding its reasoning in the textual content of the relevant settlements, the Corporation's own records (or lack thereof), and pertinent precedents cited before the Court.

1. Textual and conceptual distinction between Clause 49 (1956) and Clause 19 (1985)

  • The Court contrasted the subject-matter of the two clauses: Clause 49 (1956) relates to grant of a time scale of pay and all attendant benefits to employees who have completed 180 days (including weekly offs and holidays), whereas Clause 19 (1985) deals with absorption of daily-rated workmen after completion of 180 days (selection, vacancies, review of past cases, etc.).
  • Because these provisions address different legal concepts (time-scale benefits versus absorption into permanent service), the Court held they operate in different fields unless there is clear evidence the parties agreed otherwise.

2. Absence of evidence showing replacement/modification of Clause 49

  • The Court found no documentary material or other evidence produced by the Corporation to demonstrate that Clause 49 had been replaced or intended to be superseded by Clause 19 or by Resolution No. 8856. When asked, the Corporation's advocate candidly admitted there were no records prior to 1978 showing absorption into permanent service based on Clause 49.
  • Accordingly, assertions that Clause 49 had effectively been transformed into an absorption provision were treated as afterthoughts unsupported by the record.

3. Scope and authority of the Joint Committee under Clause 9 (1968)

  • Examining the preamble to the 1968 settlement and Clause 9, the Court observed that the parties deliberately split the charter of 64 demands into monetary and non-monetary categories: monetary demands (e.g., revision of pay scales, DA linkage, allowances, bonus arbitration) were to be settled separately, while residual/non-monetary matters were to be dealt with by the Joint Committee.
  • Given this textual framework, the Court concluded the Joint Committee was not empowered to decide financial matters of the kind encapsulated in Clause 49 (i.e., changes in pay-scale entitlements/service conditions). Therefore the Joint Committee's purported action (and any purported resolution cancelling Clause 49) could not validly replace Clause 49.
  • The Court emphasized that expressions in Clause 9 such as "all matters affecting the employees" must be read in the settlement's context (restricted to non-financial matters) and cannot be stretched to include changes to service conditions that are monetary in character.

4. Analysis on limitation — continuing wrong/recurring cause of action

  • The Court analyzed the limitation point by applying the authorities cited. It accepted the legal distinction that where a wrongful act causes a one-time, complete injury, limitation may run from that date (as in the Shree Dhyaneshwar Maharaj Sansthan and Bai Manchha examples). However, it concluded the present facts differ: the benefit of time-scale under Clause 49 is a recurring, month-to-month monetary entitlement.
  • The Court relied on authorities (Textile Labour Association/Ashok Mills Full Bench; Regional Manager M.S.R.T.C. decisions; Maya Rani Punj) recognizing that recurring monetary obligations (e.g., wages or amenities paid month to month) generate a fresh occasion of complaint each time the employer refuses to perform the continuing obligation, and thus a continuing wrong exists while default persists.
  • Applying that principle, the Court held the respondents were entitled to proceed despite portions of the grievance pre-dating three years prior to the complaints, because the denial of time-scale benefits produced a continuing injury each month and the complaints were therefore not barred by limitation.

5. Conclusion from the combined analysis

  • Because Clause 19 (1985) concerns absorption rather than grant of time scale, and because there was no clear documentary or agreed replacement of Clause 49, Clause 49 remained operative.
  • Resolution No. 8856 (31-8-1978) and any purported Joint Committee action purporting to cancel Clause 49 were held unenforceable and not binding upon the respondents.
  • The Industrial Court's decision (directing withdrawal of unfair labour practice and grant of time-scale benefits under Clause 49 with appropriate retrospective monetary relief as ordered) was supported by the Court's analysis.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Full Bench concluded that Clause 49 of the 1956 settlement is neither replaced nor revoked by Clause 19 of the 1985 settlement, and that Resolution No. 8856 is unenforceable and not binding upon the respondents. The appeals and petition were dismissed with costs along with cross-objections.

Implications (direct and limited to the parties):

  • The direct effect is that Clause 49 (1956) continues to govern the entitlement to time-scale of pay for workers who satisfy its conditions (completion of 180 days including weekly offs and authorized leave rules as stated in Clause 49), and the respondents remain entitled to the remedies awarded by the Industrial Court (including fixation in time scale and monetary benefits as ordered).
  • The Full Bench held that the Joint Committee (under Clause 9 of 1968) did not have authority to cancel or modify Clause 49 in respect of financial/service-condition matters and that Resolution No. 8856 cannot validly replace Clause 49.
  • No pronouncement in the opinion purports to create a new, sweeping precedent beyond application to these disputes; the Court’s ruling primarily resolves the specific disputes between the Corporation and the respondents and interprets the settlement clauses and limitation principles as applied to the facts before it.

Final Disposition: Appeals and petition dismissed with costs; cross objections dismissed.


End of summary — prepared strictly from the content of the provided opinion. No information has been added beyond what appears in the opinion.

    Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation, Nagpur v. Premlal .

    R.M.S Khandeparkar, J.:— Heard the advocates for the parties. Perused the records.

    2. Whether the Clause NO. 49 of 1956 settlement stands replaced by Clause No. 19 of 1985 settlement and by Resolution No. 8856 of the appellant Corporation, or whether the Clause No. 49 of 1956 settlement operates in the field totally different from the one in which Clause 19 of the 1985 settlement operates, are the common questions of law which arise for consideration in all these Letters Patent Appeals and on account of difference of opinion between two Benches of this Court on the said points, the matter had been ordered to be heard finally and decided by the Full Bench and that is how, all these matters were heard by this Bench, and are being disposed of by this judgment. The appellant Corporation is the State undertaking and the respondents are the employees of the said corporation. Apart from the State Transport Employees Service Regulations framed under section 45 of the Road Transport Corporation Act, 1950, the service conditions of the respondents/employees are also regulated by the settlements signed between the Corporation and various Unions representing the employees of the Corporation. One such settlement was arrived at on 25-4-1956 of which Clause No. 49 which is the subject-matter of the dispute in the present proceedings, formed the important clause of the said settlement in relation to the service conditions of the employees and more particularly of daily wage earners. Even after 1956, various settlement were arrived at between the Corporation and its employees and two of the settlements were arrived at in the year 1968 and 1985 which included Clause No. 9 and No. 19 respectively which are sought to be relied upon by the appellant to contend that the same along with the resolution No. 8856 have replaced Clause No. 49 of 1956 settlement.

    3. It is the contention of the Corporation that the Clause No. 49 of 1956 Settlement was concealed and revised in the Joint Committee Meeting held on 15-4-1978 and the Joint Committee was empowered to do so by virtue of Clause No. 9 of 1968 settlement and thereafter the Corporation in its meeting held on 31-8-1978 passed a resolution No. 8856 by which the persons in employment of daily wages as on 31-7-1978 and those who were to be employed on daily wages thereafter, in case they were to complete aggregate service of 180 days in one financial year commencing from 1-4-1973 onwards were to be appointed temporarily in ephemeral vacancies in time scale of pay as from 31-7-1978 or thereafter and that such an arrangement was to be effective from 31-7-1978 onwards. It is their further case that in the year 1985, new settlement was reached resolving for absorption of daily rated workmen after completion of 180 days continuous service and that is why Clause No. 19 was included in the said settlement. In short, the resolution of 1978 and Clause No. 19 of 1985 settlement modified and replaced clause 49 of 1956 settlement in relation to the service conditions of daily wage employees of the Corporation. The contention of the appellant is seriously disputed and denied by the respondents contending that if the plea of the appellant is accepted it would virtually amount to denial of right of getting time scale to the respondents which is otherwise being enjoyed by other employees who are doing identical work. It has been strenuously argued on behalf of the respondents that Clause 49 of 1956 settlement has not been modified or altered or replaced by any of the clauses of any subsequent settlement including clause 19 of 1985 settlement it is also submitted on behalf of the respondent that Joint Committee was not authorized to deal with the financial matters relating to the service conditions of the respondents and, therefore, no resolution of the Joint Committee could replace clause 49 of 1956 settlement.

    4. The second ground of challenge relates to bar of limitation in the matter of complaints filed by the respondents in the Industrial Court. The contention of the petitioner is that admittedly the ephemeral time scale was granted to the respondents, but it was prior to three years preceeding filing of the complaints by the respondents in the Industrial Court. The cause of action of filing the complaints had arisen much prior to three years of filing of the complaints by the respondent, and therefore, they were hopelessly barred by law of Limitation and, therefore, in the absence of any sufficient cause of condonation of delay being shown, the Industrial Court could not have entertained the said complaints. It is also sought to be contended that it was not a case of recurring cause of action and in the regard reliance is sought to be placed in the decisions in the matter of Balkrishna Savalram Pujari Waghmare v. Shree Dhyaneshwar Maharaj Sansthan reported in AIR 1959 SC 798, Bai Manchha widow of Nathubhai Bhagwanji v. Sardar Sajjadanashin Saiyad Mahamad Baker-el-Edrus reported in AIR 1963 Gujarat 168, The Textile Labour Association Ahmedabad v. Ashok Mills Ltd. Ahmedabad reported in 1992 Lab. I.C 575, Regional Manager, Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation, Nagpur v. Regional Secretary, Maharashtra State Road Transport Kamgar Sanghatana, Karanja reported in 1984 Lab. I.C 1721 and Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation, Bombay and etc. v. Maharashtra Motor Kamgar Federation, Nagpur reported in 1986 Lab. I.C 253. On the other hand, it is sought to be contended that the injury which is caused to the respondent on account of denial of time scale in terms of Clause 49 of 1956 settlement continues to be inflicted every month and, therefore, that is a continuing cause of action, besides contending that the deprivation of payment of money in the form of salary or wages without due authority of law would virtually amount to infringement of Article 300-A of the Constitution of India and, therefore, the petitioners cannot be heard in contending that the complaints were barred by law of limitation.

    5. Before considering the rival contentions, it would be worthwhile to take stock of the relevant clauses of the settlements as well as the resolution referred to above. They are:—

    (A) Clause 49 of 1956 Settlement reads thus:—

    “All employees working for 180 days including weekly offs and other holidays continuously will be brought on the time scale of pay and will get all the benefits available to time scale workers. Any absence on account of authorized leave will not be treated as break for the above purpose and will not also count for service.”

    (B) Clause 80 of the said 1956 settlement reads thus:—

    “A joint Committee should be constituted for enforcing the settlement and for removing grievances of workers. It should also ensure proper implementation of all terms of the agreements, settlements and decisions of Joint Committee and also see that no party does anything prejudicial to the rights and privileges of the S.T Corporation of its employees. The Implementation Committee referred to in demand No. 1(b) shall comprise of three persons nominated by the Corporation and three persons nominated by the S.T Workers Federation.”

    (C) The Resolution No. 8856 which is stated to have approved by the Corporation on 31-8-178 reads thus:—

    “(i) The present clause No. 49 in the settlement dated 25th April, 1956 stand cancelled.

    (ii) The persons in employment casually or daily wages as on 31-8-1978 and those who may be employed on daily wages thereafter if they have already completed or will complete an aggregate service of 180 days in one financial year commencing from 1-4-1973 who hereinafter be appointed temporarily in ephemeral vacancies in time scale of pay as from 31-7-1978 or thereafter.

    (iii) This provision is not operative with retrospective effect but will have only prospective effect from 31-7-1978 onwards.”

    (D) Clause 19 of 1985 settlement reads thus:—

    “19. Absorption of Daily Rated Workmen after completed Service of 180 days:—

    (i) The absorption of such workmen will be made as at present i.e subject to their selection at least once by the Competent Selection Committee and availability of clear vacancies;

    (ii) As far as possible no appointment except in the category of Driver will be made in future without selection of a workmen by the Committee;

    (iii) All past cases of daily wagers who are eligible for absorption will, be reviewed on the merits of each individual case and as per the laws on the subject;

    (iv) As regards surplus staff viz. Watchmen, the information will be called for from the divisions and the cases of examination will be put up to the Corporation Board of its directives.

    (E) Clause 9 of 1968 Settlement reads thus:—

    “9: Reconstitution of Joint Committee:—

    The meeting of the Joint Committee should be held once every month provided there is agenda, the Vice-Chairman of the Corporation should be the Chairman of the Joint Committee and the Secretary should be a worker. All matters affecting the employees will fall within the scope of the working of the Joint Committee. The decision of the Joint Committee should be binding on both the parties subject to Corporation and/or Government approval where required. In case there is no decision for any reason or any issue, the same will be decided by the Corporation. The Corporation shall, however, before deciding such issues give an opportunity to the representatives of all the four recognized Unions (one each) to be heard.

    This arrangement is in supersession of the earlier arrangement concerning the constitution and scope of functions of the Joint Committee.”

    6. At this stage, it will be also appropriate to glance through the decision of Division Benches as well as those by the learned Single Judges of this Court in relation to the subject matter of connected therewith.

    7. In an unreported decision dated 20-11-1985 in the matter of Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation v. Pandurang Ramaji Tamgadge in Writ Petition No. 436 of 1982 the learned Single Judge (Shri H.D Patel, J.) while considering the scope of powers of the Joint Committee pursuant to clause 9 in respect of functions and powers of such Joint Committee in 1968 settlement held that “the functions of the Joint Committee cannot bring about alterations, modifications or changes in the settled conditions of service of an employee and no right can accrue to the petitioner-Corporation to unilaterally cancel Item No. 49, in the absence of any consensus on the point, in the meeting held for the purpose.”

    8. Another learned Single Judge (Shri R.S Padhye, J.) in another unreported decision in the matter of Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation v. Vitthal Shrawan Sarkate in Writ Petition No. 255 of 1982 along with some other writ petitions, judgment being delivered on 1/2nd March, 1982 held that “since new Joint Committee was constituted, it naturally became necessary to define the scope of the functions of this new Joint Committee and its jurisdiction and effect of its decisions. Therefore, it was firstly provided that all matters affecting the employee will fall within the scope of the working of the Joint Committee. It was then provided that the decisions of the Joint Committee would be binding on both the parties subject of course to approval of the Corporation or the Government whenever so required under the Rules. Thirdly it was provided that in cases in which no decision for any reason on any issue could be reached, it would be for the Corporation to take a decision with a proviso added by providing that while deciding such issues, the Corporation should give an opportunity to the representatives of all the four recognized Unions of being heard. The end of the settlement is also material and it provides “this arrangement is in supersession of the earlier arrangement concerning constitution and scope of functions of the Joint Committee.” U-5 settlement of 1961 entrusted the Joint Committee with consideration of the question of making the appointing authority as punishing authority in default cases and modification in discipline and appeal procedure, while the scope of the newly formed Joint Committee was widened by providing that all matters affecting the employees would fall within the scope of the working of the Joint Committee.

    9. In the matter of Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation v. Mohd. Fasahatullah Khan in Writ Petition No. 1240/1987, when it came before the learned Single Judge (M.S Deshpande, J.) on 17-9-1992, taking note of difference of opinion between the two learned Single Judges in two different matters referred to above, found it appropriate that the controversy should be resolved; by referring the matter to the larger and, therefore, the matter was directed to be placed before the Hon'ble Chief Justice for reference to a Division Bench.

    10. Consequently by an order of the Hon'ble the Chief Justice, the Writ Petition No. 1240/1987 was placed before the Division Bench comprising of Shri M.B Ghodeswar and Shri B.H Marlapalle JJ. and by its judgment dated 21-10-1997 reported in 1998 (1) C.L.R 51, it was held that by incorporating Clause 9 in settlement of 1968 all the earlier arrangements concerning the constitution and scope of functions of Joint Committee were superseded and scope of working of the Joint Committee was in pari materia with the provisions contained in 1961 settlement. However, representation of the workers of the Joint Committee was changed in view of recognition of four Unions at the State level. The Division Bench took note of the following extract from the preamble of 1968 Settlement:

    “During the deliberations of the third meeting of the Negotiating Committee held on 6th/7th/8th March, 1968, it was unanimously decided that in view of the inordinate delay which lengthy discussions on all the 64 demands would entail, there should be a package deal covering the four major demands, viz. (1) revision of scales of pay, (2) linking of Dearness Allowance with the Cost of Living Index, (3) increase in existing allowances and grant of new allowances, and (4) arbitration in disputes relating to Bonus calculations. It was further decided that the remaining demands be dealt with by the Joint Committee already set up and functioning.”

    11. Considering the above quoted preamble of 1968 settlement, it was held by the Division Bench that it goes to show that it was agreed between the parties that the charter of demands was divided into two parts, namely, monetary demands and non-monetary demands and it was further decided between the parties that monetary demands will be settled separately, which were actually discussed and settled in the first two meetings of the Negotiating committee and the nonmonetary demands were to be discussed and settled by the Joint Committee. It was in this view of the agreement between the parties that Clause 9 was incorporated in the settlement reconstituting the Joint committee while specifically setting out the subjects under its purview.

    12. Meanwhile another case was disposed of in the matter of Ashok Gangadhar Tayade v. Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation on 21-8-1997 reported in 1997 (3) Mh. L.J 486 : 1997 (11) CLR 890 : [1998 (1) SLR 110 (Bom.)] by the Division Bench (Shri V.S Sirpurkar and B.H Marlapalle, JJ.) holding that “Clause 49 of 1956 settlement regarding absorption in regular service of Corporation on completion of 180 days of continuous service has been reviewed and replaced by Clause 19 of the 1985 Settlement, which clause has been reproduced hereinabove. The petitioners, therefore, cannot invoke Clause 49 of 1956 Settlement and their challenge to the Five Clauses of 1989 Settlement, as reproduced hereinabove, based on Clause 49 of 1956 Settlement is, therefore, invalid. As far as the petitioners are concerned, their absorption in temporary time scale or regular time scale is covered by Clause 19 of 1985 Settlement and they cannot reply upon any earlier Settlement signed between the Corporation and the Unions. This ruling was given after observing that “the controversy regarding the modification of Clause 49 of 1956 Settlement earlier in 1978 or by way of Settlement of 1961 and 1968 is not relevant in the present context inasmuch as the petitioners have been employed by Corporation only from 1-1-1986 onwards and the Settlement of 1985 covers their service conditions.”

    13. The respondents herein contending that they had been employed for number of years, some of them being employed since 1988, few others being from 1978 and some from 1978 and so on, and the Corporation was seeking to deny their right to get time scale of pay even though similar facility and similar arrangement was available in relation to other employees who were doing identical work, filed complaints before the Industrial Court and after hearing both the parties, the Industrial Court by its orders directed the petitioner Corporation to withdraw unfair labour practice and to fix the pay of the respondent in the time scale as per the provisions of Clause 49 of the Settlement of the 1956 with effect from the year immediately following the financial year in which the respective respondents had completed continuous 180 days of working as per the requirement of the said Clause 49, though the monetary benefit due and payable to the respondents consequent to grant of such time scale should be paid with effect from the date of complaints. Being aggrieved, the petitioners preferred writ petitions which came to be disposed of by the impugned judgment by the learned Single Judge Shri F.I Rebello, J. in Writ Petition Nos. 2691/96, 2104/97, 2795/97, 2310/96, 2515/96, 2797/97, 2796/97, 2520/96, 2385/97, 2487/96, 1460/97, 1656/97, 1594/97, 2486/96, 1585/97, 2519/96, 25/97, 1467/97, 1457/97, 2707/96 and 2514/96 and Shri J.N Patel, J. in W.P No. 3173/93 and Shri A.A Desai, J. in W.P No. 1624/96. The learned Single Judges have held that it is clear from the reading of the preamble and Clause 9 of 1968 settlement that for the first time instead of merely referring the disputes pertaining to the implementation of Settlement, the parties agreed that the demands raised in the year 1968 would be divided into two categories and that the financial demands were decided that the remaining demands were agreed to be referred to the Joint Committee. It was further held that it was in that context that the Division Bench had held that the Joint Committee had jurisdiction to decide the issue pertaining to the non-financial matters and there should be no escape from the said conclusion as in the Settlement itself it was provided that matters not covered by the Settlement of 1968 would be decided by the Joint Committee and that subsequent to the said settlement, there had been other settlements, a clause like clause 9 was absent. Considering all these things, it was held that “in the context of that, demand pertaining to pay scale is definitely a demand pertaining to financial matter and even assuming that Joint Committee could have going into this issue, clearly this was a demand pertaining to financial matter, it could not have been decided by the Joint Committee.” It was finally held that “it has also been contended that pursuant to the settlement of 1985, clause 49 of settlement of 1956 ceases to apply to the employees. That argument has to be rejected on the threshold. Clause 49 of settlement of 1956 speaks about giving a time scale to the workmen or, completion of 180 days. The settlement of 1985 on the other hand provides for regularization in service of such workmen. The said two clauses are, therefore, distinct.”

    14. Being aggrieved with the decision of the learned Single Judge, the appellants have preferred the present appeals. When the appeal No. 108/99 came up for hearing on admission before the Division Bench (Shri B.P Singh, C.J and Shri A.B Palkar, J.) after taking note of Clause 49 of 1956 settlement as well as clause 19 of 1985 settlement and the decision passed by the Division Bench as well as by learned Single Judge, it was observed that “prima facie it appears to us that while the settlement of 1956 particularly, clause 49 thereof deals with grant of time scale to employees engaged as daily wager, the settlement of 1985 deals with absorption of such daily waged employees. These are two different subjects. Since there is an vital distinction between daily waged employee and a regular employee. The fact that they may by given benefit of the same time scale, prima facie, appears to be immaterial in the present case.” After considering the judgment of the Division Bench in Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation v. Durgadas Ramlal Rane's case, it was observed that we, therefore, feel that the aforesaid judgment of this Court may required to be reconsidered, even though it is possible to take a view that it is per incuriam. In this background, the present appeal are placed before this Full Bench for the final disposal thereof.

    15. The first point for consideration therefore is whether Clause 19 of 1985 settlement replaces Clause 49 of 1956 settlement. Undoubtedly the Division Bench in Ashok Gangadhar Tayade's case as already observed above, has held that Clause 49 of 1956 settlement has been reviewed and replaced by Clause 19 of 1985 settlement. However, the perusal of para 12 of the judgment of the Division Bench in that regard, wherein the said finding has been arrived at would disclose that the Division Bench has arrived at the said conclusion solely on the basis of the contention of the Corporation that as a result of three settlement viz. 1985, 1989 and 1994, the employees of the Corporation have been fixed in the temporary time scale, regular time scale and their pay has been revised upwards each time and that, therefore, they have not been put to disadvantage financially and no other aspect was considered. While accepting the contention of the Corporation as above and placing reliance upon the annexures to the petitions disclosing some benefits had been granted to the employees in the matter of revision of pay, the Division Bench concluded that Clause 49 stands replaced by Clause 19. However, while deciding this issue, one cannot overlook the basic difference between the concept which was sought to be introduced by Clause 49 of 1956 settlement and the one which was introduced by way of Clause 19 of 1985 settlement. The former related to grant of time scale of pay and all the benefits available to the time scale workers to those who had completed 180 days continuously including weekly offs and other holidays, while the latter referred to the issue of absorption of daily rated workmen on completion of 180 days of continuous service. Needless to say that these are totally two different concepts relating to the mode of employment. In the absence of a specific clause in the 1985 settlement disclosing a clear understanding on the part of the parties to settlement of replace Clause 49 of 1956 settlement by clause 19 of 1985 settlement, there could be no justification to agree and accept the contention in that regard sought to be advanced on behalf of the appellants. Undisputably apart from mere arguments in that regard, no material either in the form of any document or otherwise in support thereof had been placed on record at any point of time by the appellant. To the specific query by the Court to the learned advocate for the appellant in the course of arguments as to whether there has been any document in the records of the Corporation, pertaining to the period prior to 1978, disclosing absorption of daily rated workmen in the permanent service of Corporation based on Clause 49 of 1956 settlement, the learned advocate candidly admitted that the Corporation does not have any such document nor any evidence in that regard was produced before Industrial Court or before the learned Single Judge. Apparently the contention about the Clause 49 of 1956 settlement being rated to absorption of the daily rated workmen in the permanent service of Corporation, is purely afterthought and that neither the settlement nor was the understanding between the parties at any point of time in relation to Clause 49 of 1956 settlement. Clause 19 of 1985 settlement on the face of it nowhere states about the same being in place of or in supersession of the Clause 49 of 1956 Settlement, nor it gives any indication of any such understanding on the part of the parties that by the said Clause 19 in 1985 Settlement they had agreed for the placement of Clause 49 of 1956 settlement. Being so, the contention of the appellant that Clause 19 of 1985 settlement replaces the Clause 49 of 1956 settlement was rightly rejected by the learned Single Judges and we have no hesitation in agreeing with the said view taken by the learned Single Judges in the matter.

    16. As regards the Resolution No. 8856 of the Corporation and the one proceeded by it that of Joint Committee in relation to cancellation of Clause 49 of 1956 settlement, it is to be noted that the Division Bench in Mohammad Fasahatullah Khan's case, as already observed above, had held that the settlement of 1968 discloses that the parties had agreed for division of Charter of demands into two parts, namely monetary demands and non-monetary demands and while the monetary demands were left for discussion and settlement by the Joint Committee. The said view has been clearly reiterated by learned Single Judge in the impugned judgment and has further explained that the preamble and the Clause 9 of the settlement clearly reveals that as there were altogether 64 demands, it was seen that it would take a longer time and as such there ought to be a package deal covering the four major demands which are relating to financial matters and remaining demands were referred to the Joint Committee which had jurisdiction to decide the issue pertaining to non-financial matters and that the issue pertaining to the demand relating to the time stale of pay being a demand pertaining to financial matters, it was not permissible for the Joint Committee to decide about the same. In fact the detail discussion on this aspect by the learned Single Judge coupled with the one by the Division Bench in Mohammad Fasahatullah Khan's case, does not warrant any further adjudication on the said issue. Suffice to say that we are in respectful agreement with the Division bench as well as the learned Single Judge in that regard. Indeed proper reading of Clause 9 and the preamble of the said settlement clearly reveals that out of 64 demands, four demands pertaining to the revision of pay scale, linking of Dearness Allowance with the costs of living index, increase in existing allowance and grant of new allowance and arbitration in disputes relating to bonus calculations were excluded from being left out for the decision by the Joint Committee and this apparently discloses that the Joint Committee was not authorized to deal with any financial matters as such and certainly not in relation to changes in the service conditions which were stipulated under Clause 49 of 1956 settlement.

    17. Much ado is made the expression “all matters affecting employees will fall within the scope of the working of the Joint Committee” and “this arrangement is in supersession of the earlier arrangement concerning the constitution and scope of functions of the Joint Committee” in clause 9 of 1968 settlement, viz. while comparing the same with Clause 80 of 1956 settlement. It is sought to be contended that while Clause 80 of 1956 settlement empowered Joint Committee to enforce settlement and to remove the grievances of the workers by ensuring proper implementation of all the terms of the settlement and the decision of the Joint Committee, the Clause 9 of the 1968 settlement empowered the Joint Committee to deal with all the matters affecting the employees and the said clause was in supersession of the earlier arrangements concerning the constitution and scope of functions of the Joint Committee. We are afraid, the petitioners are totally overlooking the differentiation made by themselves between financial and non-financial matters, while entering into settlement with the employees in 1968 and thereby leaving only non-financial matters for the decision by the Joint Committee while excluding the financial matters for discussion and decision by way of settlement. Besides, the expression “this arrangement is in supersession of the earlier arrangements concerning the constitution and scope of functions of the Joint Committee” has to be understood in the context in which clause 9 came to be recorded in the Settlement. Clause 9 was on account of the new situation that was created as a result of recognition of the four Unions at the State level and for empowering the Committee to deal with certain non-financial matters out of 64 demands. It was found necessary to revise the constitution of Joint Committee because of such recognition granted to four Unions at the State level. Consequently the Joint Committee was required to consist of the representatives of all the four Unions and, therefore, Clause 9 was recorded in the Statute and in that context it was stated that the arrangement was in supersession of the earlier arrangement. The expression “all matters affecting the employees” related to the scope of the working of the Joint Committee in relation to the non-financial matters pertaining to 64 demands and cannot be interpreted to mean that it had empowered the Joint Committee to deal with all matters relating to the service conditions of the employees including the financial matters. The expression “affecting the employees' would certainly relate to the matter which can affect the employees. However, it cannot be stretched to include “the service condition” of the employees. The matter may be affecting day-to-day functioning and problem in that regard faced by the employees but it cannot decide about all matters relating to service conditions. This is also apparent from the preamble of the said settlement as rightly observed by the learned Single Judge which specifically excluded financial matters by referring the same for decision by way of settlement and leaving non-financial matters for the decision of the Joint Committee. Every expression in the Settlement has to be read in the context in which it has been used and not otherwise. Being so, the contention on behalf of the appellant that Clause 9 empowered the Joint Committee to deal with the issue in relation to the service conditions agreed upon under Clause 49 of 1956 settlement is to be rejected and in that regard no fault can be found in the finding arrived at by the learned Single Judge.

    18. The next ground of challenge in the matter pertains to bar of limitation for entertaining the complaint at the instance of the respondents. There is no doubt that the complaints were filed almost beyond the period of three years front the date of commencement of grant of ephemeral time scale to the respondents and from the commencement of denial of benefits to them under Clause 49 of 1956 settlement. The contention of the respondent, however, is that it is a recurring cause of action which entitled them to approach the Industrial Court even beyond the period of three years from the date the petitioners started refusing the benefits under Clause 49 of 1956 settlement and, that the injury continued to be inflicted upon the respondents every month.

    19. The Apex Court in Shree Dhyaneshwar Maharaj Sansthan's case has ruled that “if the wrongful act causes an injury which is complete, there is no continuing wrong even though the damage resulting from the act may continue.” Referring to this rule, it was sought to be contended on behalf of the Corporation that there was specific denial of the alleged right under Clause 49 of 1956 settlement prior to the period of three years from the date of the filing of the complaint and, therefore, there was “ouster” of the respondents as far as the right under Clause 49 of 1956 settlement is concerned and as such resulting injury to the right was complete on the said date of ouster and what followed was only the result of the said injury and, therefore, there was no recurring cause of action as such so as to justify entertainment of the complaint even after the period of three years from the date of such ouster. The contention of the appellant in this regard is to be rejected as the very decision of the Apex Court leaves no scope for any such arguments in the facts of the case in hand. The Apex Court while delivering the said decision has held that “if, however, a wrongful act is of such a character that the injury caused by it itself continues, then the act constitutes a continuing wrong. In this contention it is necessary to draw a distinction between the injury caused by the wrongful act and what may be described as the effect of the said injury. It is only in regard to acts which can be properly characterized as continuing wrongs that section 23 can be invoked.”

    20. The above ruling was given in the facts of the case before the Apex Court which are revealed therefrom and read thus:—

    “Thus considered it is difficult to hold that the trustees' act in denying altogether the alleged rights of the Guravs as hereditary worshippers and in claiming and obtaining possession from them by their suit in 1922 was a continuing wrong. The decree obtaining by the trustees in the said litigation had injured effectively and completely the appellants' rights though the damage caused by the said decree subsequently continued. Can it be said that after the appellants were evicted from the temple in execution of the said decree, the continuance of their dispossession was due to a recurring act of tort committed by the trustees from moment to moment? As soon as the decree was passed and the appellants were dispossession in execution proceedings, their rights had been completely injured, and though their dispossession continued, it cannot be said that the trustees were committing wrongful acts or acts of tort from moment to moment so as to give the appellants a cause of action de die in diem. We think there can be no doubt that where the wrongful act complained of amounts to ouster, the resulting injury to the right is complete at the date of the ouster and so there would be no scope for the application of section 23 in such a case.”

    21. Apparently that was a case where the trustees had obtained an order of the Court and in execution of the said order, the Guravs were evicted from the temple and thereby there was total ouster of the right claimed by Guravs and what followed thereafter was only the result of such ouster. This is not the case in the matter in hand. The respondents are entitled for the benefit of time scale of pay in terms of Clause 49 of 1956 settlement every month and denial of such right virtually amounts to infliction of injury to the respondents every month by the petitioners and, therefore, there is a recurring cause of action in favour of the respondents. The decision of the Apex Court in Shree Dhyaneshwar Maharaj Sansthan's case, therefore, rather than assisting the appellants justifies the rejection of the contention of the appellants in relation to the bar of limitation.

    22. In Bai Manchha's case the plaintiffs who were the cultivators of the suit land and in possession of the same at all material times, had brought a suit in the year 1951 for a declaration that they were the occupants thereof or in the alternative for declaration that they were permanent tenants on a fixed rate of rent and that the defendant was only an Inamdar entitled to recover from them the land revenue. The plaintiffs had alleged that in 1923, the defendant had demanded from the cultivators double the rate of rent under threat and coercion and had given them a choice of either signing a Kabuliat agreeing to pay enhanced rate of rent or to vacate the lands and that the plaintiffs had executed the kabuliats and had been paying the enhanced rent year after year. The cause of action for the suit had allegedly arisen when the defendant had wrongly demanded the enhanced rate in 1923 and it continued to subsist day after day till 1951 when the defendant filed an application to the Mamlatdar for recovering the enhanced assessment for the current year. The suit was dismissed as barred by law of limitation under Article 120 of the Limitation Act. While holding that section 23 of the Limitation Act had no application to the facts of the said case, it was observed that the injury that was caused to the plaintiff was complete moment the act of execution of the Kabuliat under a threat or compulsion was done and the demands for enhanced rate made year after year in pursuance of that act were merely the effect of that wrong and did not make it a continuing wrong. It was also held that the right to sue accrued within the meaning of Article 120 of Limitation Act when the plaintiffs right was effectively invaded for the first time in 1923 and the filing of application to the Mamlatdar in 1951 did not constitute a fresh and independent invasion of the rights of the plaintiffs as occupants or permanent tenants so as to give them a fresh right to sue. Apparently, in Bai Manchha's case the injury was complete the moment the Kabuliat was executed and what followed thereafter was merely its result and not a fresh injury. Admittedly the Kabuliat was executed in the year 1923. The demands pursuant to the said Kabuliat were made every year after year. Being so, merely because demand was made according to such Kabuliat in 1951, it could not have been said that there was fresh injury caused so as to give rise for fresh cause of action. The Division Bench of the Gujarat in the regard has clearly observed that “demands which were made did not constitute a continuing injuries. The demands were the effects of the execution of the documents which the plaintiffs or their predecessors had executed in 1923 and 1942. They constitute the damage which was done to the interests of the plaintiffs or their predecessor by the series of acts which had been committed by the defendants's in 1923 and by the defendant in 1942.”

    23. The Full Bench of the Gujarat High Court in Ashok Mills' case rather than lending any assistance to the appellants clearly justifies the order of the Industrial Court as well as the learned Single Judge. Thereunder it has been ruled that “so far as the contravention of the terms of an agreement, settlement or award or effective order of the Wage Board are concerned, there may be continuous obligations from day to day or month to month, which may not be capable of being executed by single compliance once for all. As pointed out by the Full Bench in Shri Ram Mills' case, 1950 ICR 1241 (IC Bom) in the context of bonus of retrospective difference in the shape of past arrears, the occasion of change would arise once and for all while in the cases of wage awards or payments of such amenities month to month, the question of making an illegal change would arise every month, when these wages in the sense of basic wages or value of amenities would be refused by the employer. The employer can choose to withdraw that illegal change even voluntarily at any time and then there would be no grievance. It is only when the employer would persist in his illegal change that the employees would have to resort to the Labour Court for getting a decision about the illegal change and an order of its withdrawal. Therefore, in the context of such recurring obligations, the terms making of an illegal change could never have same meaning of change made once for all so that what continues is only its effect in the context of such recurring obligations to pay month to month the wages or value of such amenities. The illegal change would be made afresh every month when the employer would refuse to carry out that continuous obligation. Apparently it has been held that giving effect to the settlement relating to the payment of wages or final benefit under the settlement, the same are required to be given month to month and question of illegal change once and for all in such cases does not arise and, therefore, it is a recurring cause of action for the employee in case of non-compliance of the terms of the settlement in relation to the grant of monetary facility relating to the service conditions of the employees.

    24. The decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Regional Manager, Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation, Nagpur is also of no help to the appellants. Therein it was specifically ruled that “the respondent has invoked Item 9 of Schedule IV of the Act No. 1 of 1972, which entry relates to failure of implementing the settlement which according to both the parties is still in force and binding upon them. Therefore, in our opinion the unfair labour practice will continue to recur so long as the settlement remains unimplemented.” As already held above, Clause 49 of 1956 settlement is still in force and, therefore, non-compliance thereof would amount to unfair labour practice by the appellants and it will continue to recur till and until the appellants grant the benefit under said Clause 49 of 1956 settlement to the respondents.

    25. Similarly the decision in M.S.R.T.C's case by the Division Bench of this Court clearly assist the respondents. The Division Bench therein has held thus:

    “In order to ascertain whether the limitation has expired, it is necessary to find out whether the activities complained of as unfair labour practices are or recurring nature, or whether the occurrence of the unfair labour practices were over once it was engaged in and only the effect continues to flow therefrom. Where the occurrence is of recurring nature, the limitation would continue to extend as long as the occurrence continues. In other words, if the acts of partiality and favouritism continues from time to time the occurrence of unfair labour practice would be of a recurring nature, in which case the limitation will not come to an end on expiry of the ninety days from the date when the unfair labour practices were first committed. For this proposition reliance can be placed on the decision of this Court in Regional Manager, M.S.R.T.C v. Regional Secy., Maharashtra S.T Kamgar Sanghatana, 1984 Lab IC 1721.”

    26. It is well settled that as long as the default in performance of obligation continues, the wrong is deemed to have continued and therefore, it is to be taken as a continuing wrong. If the duty continues from day to day, the nonperformance of that duty from day to day is continuing wrong. (Maya Rani Punj (Smt) v. Commissioner Of Income Tax, Delhi, (1986) 1 SCC 445).

    27. In the case in hand as already observed above, the unfair labour practice by the appellants in continuing the denial of the benefits under Clause 49 of 1956 settlement to the respondents is of recurring nature and till and until such benefits are given, it will continue to recur and, therefore, there is no substance in the contention of the appellants that the complaints were barred by Law of Limitation. We, therefore, hold that Clause 49 of 1956 settlement is neither replaced nor revoked by Clause 19 of 1985 settlement. We also hold that the resolution No. 8856 is unenforceable and not binding upon the respondents. The Clause No. 49 of 1956 settlement operates in totally different field from Clause 19 of 1985 settlement inasmuch as that the former relates to the scale of pay whereas the latter pertains to absorption of the daily rated worker in permanent employment. The appeals and the petition therefore, lack merits and deserve to be dismissed with the cross objections.

    28. In the result, therefore, the appeals and the petition fail and are dismissed with costs, along with cross objections.

    29. Appeals and petition dismissed.

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