Citation Codes

Equivalent Citations

citation codes

Case Number

Civil Writ No. 1041 of 1968

Judges

Bal Raj Tuli, J.

Acts

rule 12 of the Punjab Tahsildari Rules, 1932.
rule of the Punjab Tehsildari Rules, 1932,
rule 14 of the Punjab Tahsildari Rules.
section 11 of the Revenue Act.

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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (as provided)

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner joined service as a Naib Tahsildar in Punjab in 1938. In 1949 a charge-sheet with fifteen charges was served; the petitioner pleaded not guilty and an enquiry under the Punjab Tahsildari Rules was conducted by the Deputy Commissioner, Hoshiarpur, as Enquiry Officer. The Enquiry Officer submitted a report and the Commissioner, Jullundur Division (respondent No. 2), issued a show-cause notice and, after considering the petitioner's reply, found three charges (Nos. 3, 6 and 15) proved and dismissed the petitioner on 7 December 1950. An appeal to the Financial Commissioner (respondent No. 1) was rejected on 10 May 1952.

The petitioner sued the State of Punjab on 19 February 1955 seeking a declaration that the dismissal order of 7 December 1950 was illegal and void and sought consequential reliefs. The trial Court dismissed the suit on 5 June 1956; the Senior Subordinate Judge reversed and decreed the suit on 23 January 1957. The State appealed (R.S.A. No. 370 of 1957) and Mahajan, J., accepted that appeal on 26 April 1960, setting aside the decree of the Senior Subordinate Judge but remanding the matter for reconsideration of allegations in paragraph 22 of the plaint, asking that the Senior Subordinate Judge keep in view K.R. Sharma v. State of Punjab.

On remand, the Senior Subordinate Judge found the Enquiry Officer had not given a reasonable opportunity (copies of previous witness statements were not supplied), but also found no prejudice had resulted and dismissed the petitioner's appeal on 11 June 1960. The petitioner then filed R.S.A. 1374 of 1960 in this Court. Mahajan, J., allowed that appeal on 11 October 1963, concluding there had been no proper enquiry (rules of natural justice violated for failure to supply witness statements) and decreed the suit; he observed that this would not bar the Government from instituting a fresh enquiry because there were serious charges of corruption and it was in the petitioner's interest to clear himself.

Consequent to that appellate decision, the petitioner was reinstated by an order of the Commissioner, Jullundur Division dated 28 December 1963 (with the explicit caveat "without prejudice to the result of the departmental enquiry to be held against him"). The Commissioner requested the Deputy Commissioner, Hoshiarpur, (on 17 January 1964) to prepare a fresh draft charge-sheet and supporting materials for a fresh departmental enquiry.

The petitioner made representations (25 February 1964 and subsequently) arguing that no fresh enquiry was warranted (the High Court had set aside the dismissal only because he was not given a reasonable opportunity), that the evidence already on record proved the charges false or fabricated, and sought opportunity to show a fresh enquiry was unnecessary. Administrative communications followed, and an enquiry process was begun by the Sub-Divisional Officer (Dasuya) in mid‑1965 but was adjourned and then stayed after the petitioner raised objections. Finally, on 4 January 1968 the Commissioner issued a fresh charge-sheet (seven charges) and the petitioner received it on 20 January 1968 and replied. The petitioner challenged the 1968 charge-sheet by filing the present writ petition (18 March 1968), seeking restraint of the fresh enquiry. The High Court initially stayed the enquiry in respect of those charges of which the petitioner had been exonerated in 1950 but refused to stay the enquiry into the three charges found proved earlier; those three had since been enquired into and the report submitted but action stayed pending this petition.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether a fresh departmental enquiry may be lawfully held in respect of charges for which the petitioner had previously been found "exonerated" by the Commissioner and where the earlier enquiry and the Commissioner's order were subsequently set aside by the High Court on appeal.
Whether the starting of a new enquiry in January 1968 was barred by (a) the earlier stay of proceedings initiated in June 1965, or (b) the passage of time and alleged delay (including reliance on executive instructions/standing orders requiring expeditious disposal).
What is the legal effect, for the purposes of res judicata or finality, of prior quasi‑judicial administrative orders that have been set aside on appeal — specifically, whether earlier dropped or exoneratory findings continue to bind the authority or preclude a fresh enquiry.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

The petitioner contended that no further enquiry could be held into charges of which he had been exonerated by the Enquiry Officer and the Commissioner in 1950 — in short, that the fresh enquiry should be confined only to the three charges (Nos. 3, 6 and 15) of the previous charge-sheet found proved by the Commissioner.
He asserted that the stay and adjournments of the June 1965 enquiry (the Sub-Divisional Officer's proceedings) amounted to abandonment or exoneration such that a fresh enquiry could not be lawfully initiated in January 1968.
The petitioner relied on several judicial authorities and administrative decisions (including Thakur Dan Singh Bist v. Registrar of Companies and a Financial Commissioner decision in Karnail Singh) to support the proposition that previously dropped or exonerated charges cannot be revived by a later enquiry; he also invoked executive instructions/standing orders directing expeditious disposal of departmental proceedings to argue that delay vitiated continued proceedings.
He sought an opportunity to show on the existing evidence that no charge was proved and that some charges were fabricated, thereby arguing that a fresh enquiry was not warranted in any event.

Respondents' Position (as reflected in the return and Court's recounting)

The respondents relied on the fact that the entire earlier enquiry and the Commissioner's order had been set aside by this Court (Mahajan, J.), which had expressly ordered that a fresh enquiry ought to be held because the earlier proceedings were held to have violated principles of natural justice. The effect of that appellate decision was to obliterate the earlier enquiry report and the Commissioner's order.
The respondents asserted that the Sub-Divisional Officer's enquiry that was started in June 1965 and later stayed by reason of the petitioner's representation did not amount to abandonment; the Commissioner had redrafted the charge-sheet in light of objections and issued a fresh (shorter) charge-sheet in January 1968. The delay in starting enquiry in January 1968 was explained in the return as attributable to time taken for collection of material and difficulties due to reorganisation of the State of Punjab.
The respondents argued that executive instructions and standing orders relied upon by the petitioner are administrative directions and do not confer enforceable rights to quash departmental proceedings for delay; court authority was cited to show such instructions are not judicially enforceable rights.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For (as stated in the opinion)	Application by the Court (how the opinion treated the authority)
R. Venkata Rao v. Secretary of State, AIR 1937 PC 31	One of several cases cited where action had been taken on previous reports and therefore a second enquiry could not be held.	Grouped with other similar authorities; the Court observed these cases were distinguishable because in those matters action had been taken on the earlier reports, unlike the present case where the earlier enquiry was set aside.
Dwarkachand v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1958 Raj 38	Another case cited for proposition that where action has been taken on earlier reports a subsequent enquiry may be barred.	Distinguished on facts: in the present case the prior enquiry was wholly set aside by an appellate court.
S.V.G. Iyengar v. State of Mysore, AIR 1961 Mysore 37	Cited among cases involving the effect of prior enquiries and whether a second enquiry could be held.	Distinguished; the Court noted in those authorities the previous report had been acted upon, unlike here.
Shri Kalyan Singh v. The State of Punjab, 1967 SLR 129	Cited as authority in the grouping of cases dealing with the effect of previous reports and subsequent enquiries.	Distinguished on the ground that earlier proceedings in those cases had resulted in action, unlike the instant case where the entire earlier enquiry had been set aside.
Shri Niranjan Dass Sehgal v. The State of Punjab, 1968 SLR 183	Included in the group of cases addressing whether a subsequent enquiry could be held when action had been taken on previous reports.	Distinguished for the same reason as the other grouped cases.
State of Haryana v. Roshan Lal Sharma, 1970 SLR 739	Held that dropping certain charges by the authority amounted to exoneration and that a successor authority could not vary such a quasi‑judicial order unless statutory power to review existed.	The Court analyzed and distinguished Roshan Lal Sharma: that case involved a predecessor authority having dropped charges and those orders having effect; here the prior quasi‑judicial orders were set aside by the High Court, so Roshan Lal Sharma did not support the petitioner's position.
Thakur Dan Singh Bist v. Registrar of Companies, A.I.R. 1960 Allahabad 160	Cited by the petitioner (via the Enquiry Officer's statements) as authority supporting the non‑revival of dropped charges.	The Court noted the petitioner cited this case but found the judgments relied upon by the petitioner afforded no assistance on the facts before it.
Karnail Singh v. The State (Financial Commissioner), 1955 L.L.T. 23	Referred to by the petitioner as part of the authorities supporting the argument that certain charges could not be reopened.	The Court observed this authority was among those cited by the petitioner but found them not applicable to the present factual and appellate posture.
C.D. Prabhu v. The Deputy Commissioner, South Kanara (1969 SLR 362)	Case where a first enquiry had been completed and no action taken, and a later second enquiry was held — cited for the proposition that completion and inaction may bar a second enquiry.	Distinguished on facts: in the present matter the June 1965 enquiry was stayed and not completed; more importantly the first (1949–50) enquiry had been set aside by the High Court, so Prabhu did not bar a fresh enquiry here.
E.S. Athithyaraman v. The Commissioner (Madras), 1971 SLR 41	Held that long delay and surrounding circumstances can lead to the conclusion that proceedings were dropped.	Distinguished: the Court concluded the facts of Athithyaraman (long unexplained delay after completion of enquiry and showing of circumstances) were not present in the instant case.
Mohan Singh v. Financial Commissioner Punjab, 1967 SLR 79	Discussed status of standing orders: they are administrative directions, and where they conflict with statutory Tahsildari Rules, the rules prevail; standing orders derive from superintendence under section 11 of the Revenue Act.	The Court observed Mohan Singh's statements and held that the standing orders (executive instructions) do not help the petitioner to establish a legal right to quash proceedings for delay; court relied on statutory/precedential distinction between rules and executive instructions.
State of Uttar Pradesh v. Babu Ram Upadhaya, AIR 1961 SC 751	Authority on treating rules made under a statute as having the same effect as if contained in the Act (cited in connection with Mohan Singh).	Used to support the proposition that Tahsildari Rules (statutory) prevail over mere standing orders (administrative directions); applied to show petitioner could not rely on standing orders as enforceable rights.
G.J. Fernandez v. The State of Mysore, AIR 1967 SC 1753	Held that executive instructions do not confer rights enforceable in court; breach of such instructions is a matter for the Government, not a basis for private legal rights.	The Court applied Fernandez to reject the petitioner's reliance on executive instructions/standing orders to argue that delay alone required quashing of the enquiry.
A. Junus v. The Comptroller and Auditor General of India, 1970 SLR 318	Contains a quotation regarding judicial willingness to create administrative law standards and to treat departmental regulations as having legal or quasi‑legal effect in some contexts.	The Court noted the quotation but held it did not assist the petitioner in view of Fernandez and the established proposition that executive instructions do not create enforceable rights.
K.R. Sharma v. State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1958 Punj. 27	Cited by Mahajan, J., to be kept in view on remand for consideration by the Senior Subordinate Judge.	Mentioned as a case the remanding Judge directed should be considered by the Senior Subordinate Judge; not otherwise relied upon in the present noted judgment for a specific legal proposition beyond the direction to keep it in view.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded through discrete factual and legal steps, each anchored to the procedural history set out in the record:

The Court accepted the critical appellate fact: the entire earlier enquiry (1949–50) and the Commissioner's consequent order had been set aside by this Court (Mahajan, J.) on the ground that rules of natural justice had been violated (petitioner had not been supplied prior witness statements). That appellate setting-aside had the legal effect of obliterating the earlier enquiry report and the Commissioner's order from the record.
Because the earlier enquiry and order were quashed, the Court reasoned it could not treat some findings from that earlier proceeding as continuing to bind the parties (i.e., it could not treat exoneration on some charges as surviving while other charges were treated as not surviving). The Court emphasized that an obliterated/enquiry set aside cannot operate as res judicata or as an existent administrative determination barring fresh enquiry.
The petitioner relied on authorities where a subsequent enquiry was barred because action had already been taken upon previous enquiry reports (or where charges had been dropped and thus amounted to exoneration). The Court examined those cases (including the Division Bench decision in State of Haryana v. Roshan Lal Sharma) and distinguished them on the facts: in those authorities the earlier quasi‑judicial orders or actions remained in force; in the present case they had been set aside by an appellate court.
With respect to the argument that the June 1965 enquiry (before the Sub‑Divisional Officer) had been stayed and hence a fresh enquiry in January 1968 was barred as an abandonment, the Court found the distinction that (a) the June 1965 proceedings were not completed and (b) the Commissioner, having considered petitioner's objections, redrafted the charge-sheet and ultimately issued a new memorandum in January 1968. The Court therefore held that the stay did not equate to abandonment or exoneration and did not bar the January 1968 enquiry.
The Court addressed the petitioner's reliance upon delays and executive instructions/standing orders requiring expeditious enquiry. It distinguished between statutory rules (the Tahsildari Rules) and executive standing orders, citing Mohan Singh and State of Uttar Pradesh v. Babu Ram Upadhaya for the proposition that standing orders are administrative directions and, where in conflict with statutory rules, must yield to the rules. More importantly, relying on G.J. Fernandez, the Court held that executive instructions do not create enforceable legal rights that a subject may invoke to quash departmental proceedings for delay.
Considering all of the above, the Court concluded that: (i) the appellate setting aside of the 1949–50 enquiry removed any finality that would have prevented a fresh enquiry; (ii) the stay of 1965 did not amount to abandonment; (iii) delay, in the circumstances explained (material collection and State reorganisation), did not vitiate the initiation of the January 1968 enquiry; and (iv) reliance on executive instructions to establish a judicially enforceable right to have proceedings quashed for delay was unsustainable.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

Petition dismissed.

Implications and immediate consequences (as stated in the opinion):

The writ petition challenging the 1968 charge-sheet and seeking to restrain the fresh departmental enquiry was dismissed for lack of merit. The Court found no legal bar to holding a fresh enquiry on the charges at issue because the earlier enquiry and the Commissioner's order had been set aside on appeal.
The Court rejected the petitioner's contentions that the earlier stay or delay amounted to abandonment or that executive instructions required quashing of the enquiry. The Court made clear that executive instructions/standing orders do not confer enforceable rights which a court will entertain to quash a departmental proceeding for delay.
The practical effect for the parties is that the State (respondents) remained free to proceed with departmental enquiry (subject, of course, to observance of the principles of natural justice and the applicable statutory rules). The Court did not set a precedent disallowing judicial review of any procedural infirmity; rather it distinguished the petitioner's factual and legal position from authorities that had barred re‑enquiry where earlier findings remained operative.
The order dismissed the petition "but without any order as to costs," i.e., no costs awarded against the petitioner.

Note: This summary is restricted to and derived solely from the content of the provided opinion. No facts or legal positions beyond those explicitly contained in the opinion have been added.

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Parkash Nath Saida (Petitioner) v. The Financial Commissioner (Revenue) Punjab And Others (S).

Bal Raj Tuli, J.:— The petitioner joined service as Naib Tahsildar in the Province of Punjab in 1938. In 1949, he was served with a charge-sheet containing 15 charges to which the petitioner pleaded not guilty. Accordingly, the enquiry was held under the Punjab Tahsildari Rules by the Deputy Commissioner, Hoshiarpur, who was appointed as the Enquiry Officer. After the report was submitted by the Enquiry Officer, a notice was issued to the petitioner by the Commissioner, Jullundur Division, (respondent 2) to show cause why he should not be dismissed from service. The petitioner submitted a reply to this notice and, after considering the same, the Commissioner found that three charges, namely, charges No. 3, 6 and 15 mentioned in the charge-sheet were proved against the petitioner and he, therefore, passed the order of his dismissal from service on December 7, 1950. The petitioner filed an appeal to the Financial Commissioner (respondent 1), but the same was rejected by order dated May 10, 1952.

2. On February 19, 1955, the petitioner filed a suit against the State of Punjab for a declaration that the order of his dismissal from the post of Naib Tahsildar passed by the Commissioner, Jullundur Division, on December 7, 1950, was wrong, illegal, null, void without jurisdiction, ultra vires and inoperative and was not passed in due process of law and was of no consequence whatever against the petitioner who continued to be a member of the Punjab Service of Tahsildar and Naib Tahsildars in the Jullundur Division. Certain other consequential reliefs were also prayed for. This suit was dismissed by Shri Om Nath Vohra, Subordinate Judge First Class, Jullundur, on June 5, 1956. Against that decree, an appeal was filed in the Court of the Senior Subordinate Judge, Jullundur, which was accepted and the petitioner's suit was decreed with costs throughout on January 23, 1957. Against that decree, the State of Punjab filed an appeal in this Court (R.S.A No. 370 of 1957). That appeal was accepted by Mahajan, J., on April 26, 1960, and the decree passed by the learned Senior Subordinate Judge was set aside. The decree passed by the trial Court was upheld on all points except the point covered by paragraph 22 of the plaint and the case was remanded to the Senior Subordinate Judge for decision in the light of the observations made by the learned Judge in his judgment, which were as under:

“The Senior Sub-ordinate Judge decided in favour of the appellant on the interpretation of Article 311 of the Constitution. With that interpretation I have not agreed. In this view of the matter, the only course left open is to send back the case to the learned Senior Subordinate Judge for determination of the allegations in paragraph 22 of the plaint. It may be mentioned that the learned Senior Subordinate Judge will keep in view the decision of this Court in K.R Sharma v. State of Punjab (A.I.R 1958 Punj. 27). In case the learned Senior Subordinate Judge comes to the conclusion that the plaintiff was not afforded proper opportunity by the Enquiry Officer, he should decree the suit otherwise he should dismiss the plaintiff's suit.”

3. After remand, the Senior Subordinate Judge held that the Enquiry Officer did not afford a reasonable opportunity to the petitioner as the copies of the previous statements of the witnesses examined at the enquiry were not supplied to him, but that no prejudice had been caused to the petitioner by the failure of the Enquiry Officer to supply the requisite copies. In view of this finding, the learned Senior Subordinate Judge dismissed the appeal of the petitioner on June 11, 1960. Against that decree, R.S.A 1374 of 1960 was filed in this Court by the petitioner. That appeal again came up for hearing before Mahajan, J., who came to the conclusion that there had been no proper enquiry by the enquiry Officer and the lower appellate Court had taken an erroneous view of the matter. The appeal of the petitioner was allowed and the Judgment and decrees of the Courts below were set aside and the suit of the petitioner was decreed on October 11, 1963. The learned Judge, however, observed in the end as under:—

“This will, however not mean that it debars the Government from instituting a fresh enquiry and it would be necessary in the present case to do so because there are serious charges of corruption against the appellant. It is also in the interest of the appellant that he clears himself of those charges in a proper enquiry.”

4. In the body of the judgment the learned Judge clearly held:—

“No copies of the statements of the witnesses recorded prior to the enquiry were made available to the appellant permitted to copy them out himself; even he was not allowed inspection of those statements. Therefore, it must he held that the rules of natural justice have been violated and thus there has been no proper enquiry in the present case”

5. It is evident from this judgment that the whole enquiry against the petitioner was held to be improper and violative of the principles of natural justice and it was on that basis that the suit of the petitioner was decreed. The effect of this judgment was that the Enquiiy Officers report was quashed and the State or Punjab was left at liberty to insuture a fresh enquiry. In fact it was emphasised that a fresh enquiry must be held as there were serious a charges of corruption against the petitioner and it was in his interest to clear himself of those charges in a proper enquiry.

6. After the decision of his appeal by this Court, the petitioner was reinstated by ??? of the Commission Jullundur Division dated December 28, 1963. This order reads as under:—

“Consequent upon setting aside by the High Court of Punjab, vide their judgment dated 11-10-1963, in civil Regular Appeal No. 1374 of 1960. Shri Parkash Nath v. Punjab State, of the order dated 7-12-1950 of dismissal of Shri Parkash Nath then Naib Tahsildar candidate of this Division, passed by Shri J.M Srinagesh, I.C.S then Commissioner, Jullundur Division, Shri Parkash Nath is hereby reinstated in service, from the date he left charge of the post of Naib Tahsildar Zira, on his being placed under suspension, vide the then Commissioner's order dated 30-7-1949, without prejudice to the result of the departmental enquiry to be held against him.

And consequent upon his reinstatement in service Shri Parkash Nath is hereby posted as Naib Tahsildar to deal with the work pertaining to requisitioning of land for the Small Arms Classification Ranges at Jullundur, under the Military Lands Requisitioning Officer, Jullundur, against the post sanctioned by Government vide their memorandum No. 1(IV)-5J 63/48618 dated 3-12-1969.”

7. A copy of this order was forwarded to the Deputy Commissioner, Hoshiarpur, on January 17, 1964, and he was requested to draw up immediately a fresh draft charge-sheet along with a statement of allegations and lists of witnesses and documents, in the light of the observations of the High court made in its judgment dated October 11, 1963, and send the same to the Commissioner's office for the purpose of starting a fresh departmental enquiry against the petitioner. Against the holding of the fresh enquiry, the petitioner made a representation to the Commissioner, Jullundur Division, on February 25, 1964, the relevant portion of which reads as under:—

“As regards fresh enquiry, I beg to state that I may kindly be given an opportunity to convince your honour that no fresh enquiry is warranted. The High Court has set aside the order of dismissal only on the ground that 1 was not given a reasonable opportunity of defence. The High Court declined to go into the question whether the charges were proved or not on the evidence Jed before the Enquiry Officer Even if the High Court had not added a rider in their judgment that there should be a fresh enquiry, your honour could start a fresh enquiry. The reinstatement order given to me shows that it is intended to start a fresh enquiry against me. I am prepared to face an enquiry, but before it is started I beg to get an opportunity of explaining my position that even on the evidence which has already come on the charges (howsoever defective the enquiry was) it is clear that no charge is proved and rather it is clearly proved that the charges were fabricated against me to ruin my career. I have already suffered a great loss in my career, and do not wish to be harassed any more by any unwarranted ecquiries. In case I am unable to satisfy you that fresh enquiry is tot warranted, your honour may order a fresh enquiry. It is, therefore, repeated that this opportunity may kindly be given to me to convict your honour that fresh enquiry is not warranted.”

8. In this representation, the petitioner had asked for certain other reliefs with regard to arrears of pay, allowances, promotion, lien etc., and, with regard to those matters, an order was passed by the Commissioner, Jullundur Division, on July 3, 1964, but it is unnecessary to set out its contents. The Sub-Divisional Officer (Civil). Dasuya, sent a tetter to the Deputy Commissioner. Kangra, at Dharamsala, to ask the petitioner to appear before him at Dasuya at 10 A.M on August 14, 1965. The letter was written to the Deputy Commissioner, Kangra as the petitioner was posted as Naib Tahsildar, Hamirpur in those days. The petitioner appeared before the Sub-Divisional Officer (Civil). Dasuya, on August 14, 1965, and directed to appear on August 28, 1965, which was the next date fixed for the enquiry. On that date, it was adjourned to September 17, 1965, for recording the prosecution evidence. In the meantime, on August 31, 1965, the petitioner made a representation to the Commissioner. Jullundur Division, stating that the Sub-Divisional Officer, Dasuya, had fixed September 17, 1965, as the date for recording the evidence of the prosecution witnesses as he intended to hold the enquiry against him on all the fifteen charges which were the subject-matter of the previous enquiry held in 1950. The petitioner requested the Sub-Divisional Officer to give him a fresh charge-sheet together with the statement or allegations on which it was proposed to hold the enquiry against him but the Enquiry Officer told him that he had received a letter from the office of the Commissioner, Punjab, on June 15, 1965, directing him to hold the enquiry on all the fifteen charges which were the subject-matter of the previous enquiry in 1950. The petitioner was, however told by him that there was no need of giving a fresh charge-sheet and also there was no need of aaking for his explanation as his explanation previously tendered in 1949 had been considered unsatisfactory by the then Commissioner and had been rejected. It was further pointed out that the petitioner had been exonerated of all charges except Nos. 3, 6 and 15 by the Commissioner in 1952 and on principles anolognus to res judicata fresh edquiry could not be started against him on those charges. Reference was made to the decision of the Allahabad High Court in Thakur Dan Singh Bist v. Registrar of Companies, A.I.R 1960 Allahabad 160, and a judgment of the Financial Commissioner in Karnail Singh v. The State, 1955 L.L.T 23. In the end it was stated as under:—

“I took charge after reinstatement on 24th January, 1964, and on 25th February, 1964, I wrote to your honour that I was prepared to face fresh enquiry and requested for hearing to which I was entitled under rule 14 of the Punjab Tahsildari Rules. But after a period of about 1¾ years after my reinstatement no fresh charge-sheet has been drawn and the matter had been delayed unnecessarily. I myself want to clear my position with regard to charges No. 3. 6 and 15 with a view to clear my position and to enable me to claim my promotion and arrears of salary to which I am entitled. It is, therefore, requested that the Enquiry Officer may kindly be asked to stay proceedings till I am given a charge-sheet and my explanation is considered by your honour”.

9. On September 16, 1965, the petitioner received a telegram from the Sub-Divisional Officer, Dasuya, reading. “Need not attend seventeenth September”. It is appeared that the Sub-Divisional Officer, Dasuya, stayed the enquiry under the orders of the Commissioner which must have been passed on the representation of the petitioner. No orders were, however, communicated to the petitioner on his representation dated August 31, 1965, and on January 4, 1968, a charge-sheet was issued to the petitioner by the Commissioner, Jullundur Division, consisting of seven charges and he was asked to state in writing within a period of fourteen days from the receipt of the memorandum whether he admitted the truth of all or any of the charges, what explanation or defence, if any, he had to offer and whether he desired to be heard in person. In this memorandum, he was told that it was proposed to take action against him under rule 12 of the Punjab Tahsildari Rules, 1932. These seven charges included the four charges of which the petitioner had been exonerated by the Commissioner, Jullundur Division, in his order dated December 7, 1950, and three charges were the same as charges No. 3, 6 and 15, in the previous charge-sheet of which he had bean held guilty. The petitioner received the memorandum alongwith the charges on January 20, 1968, and submitted his reply to the same. In that reply, he pointed out that the enquiry into the charges of which he was exonerated in the previous enquiry could not be held. He further staled that these charges were false and had been fabricated against him by Shri L.C Vashist, Additional Deputy Commissioner Hoshiarpur. With regard to the other three charges, he submitted his explanation. Thereafter, the petitioner filed the present petition on March 18, 1968, in which a prayer has been made that the respondent should be restrained from holding the enquiry in pursuance of the charge-sheet served on him in January 1968. This petition was admitted on March 19, 1968, and the learned Judges stayed the enquiry with regard to those charges of which the petitioner had been exonerated by the Commissioner on December 7, 1950 but refused to stay the enquiry into the charges of which the Commissioner had found him guilty. I am informed that the enquiry into those three charges has since been completed and the enquiry report has been submitted, but no action has been taken thereon in view of the pendency of this writ petition.

10. The learned counsel for the petitioner has vehemently argued that no further enquiry can be held into the charges of which he was exonerated by the previous Enquiry Officer and the Commissioner while imposing the punishment. In short, the submission is that the enquiry that has now been ordered should be confined only to charges No. 3, 6 and 15 in the previous charge-sheet of which he was held guilty. I find substance in this submission because Mahajan, J., set aside the enquiry proceedings as a whole holding that the enquiry had not been properly held because the petitioner was not supplied the copies of the statements of the witnesses previously recorded and thus the rules of natural justice had been violated. The learned Judge also expressed the view rather strongly that a fresh enquiry must be held as there were charges of corruption against the petitioner and it was only fair that he should be given an opportunity of clearing himself of those charges. The effect of that judgment is that the previous enquiry report and the order of the Commissioner thereon dated December 7, 1950, have been obliterated from existence. Under the circumstances, it cannot be said that the petitioner had been exonerated of the charges es alleged by him. It cannot be held that for certain charges the enquiry report and the order of the Commissioner continued to exist while with regard to some other charges they did not. The judgments relied upon by the learned counsel afford no assistance on this point. They are—

1. R. Venkata Rao v. Secretary of State, AIR 1937 PC 31;

2. Dwarkachand v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1958 Raj 38;

3. S.V.G Iyengar v. State of Mysore, AIR 1961 Mysore 37;

4. Shri Kalyan Singh v. The State of Punjab, 1967 SLR 129;

5. Shri Niranjan Dass Sehgal v. The State of Punjab, 1968 SLR 183; and

6. The State of Haryana v. Roshan Lal Sharma, 1970 SLR 739;

11. In those cases action had been taken on the previous reports and, therefore, it was held that the second enquiry could not be held. In one case, although an enquiry was held and in pursuance thereof a show-cause notice was issued, no action was taken after the explanation was received from the delinquent officer to show cause notice, and a fresh enquiry was ordered. In none of those cases was the previous enquiry set aside as a whole, and when a fresh enquiry ordered. The latest judgment of this Court brought to my notice on the subject is by a Division Bench (S.B Capoor and R.S Narula, JJ.) in the State of Haryana v. Roshan Lal Sharma, 1970 SLR 739. In that case, Roshan Lal Sharma was a Tehsildar and a charge-sheet was served on him together with a summary of allegations under rule of the Punjab Tehsildari Rules, 1932, as there were certain allegations of misconduct against him. He denied the allegations and the case was put up before the Financial Commissioner (Revenue), Punjab, who found that certain charges were baseless and ordered the Commissioner to make an enquiry into the remaining charges. The order was duly conveyed to the Commissioner but not to Roshan Lal Sharma. In the meantime, the State of Punjab was reorganised and the respondent was allocated to the State of Haryana. The Financial Commissioner (Revenue), Haryana, made an order that the enquiry against Shri Sharma should be held on all the charges which had been framed against him including those which had been ordered to be dropped by the Financial Commissioner, Punjab. It was contended that under the Rules, the Financial Commissioner (Revenue), Haryana, could not legally review the order passed by his predecessor and the enquiry could not be held on the charges already dropped. On these facts, it was held that the dropping of certain charges against the public servant means his exoneration therefrom and that order being a quasi-judicial order was not liable to be varied at the will of the authority unless the relevant statute or the rules gave the authority the power to review. It is evident that the judgment is distinguishable. In the present case, the quasi-judicial orders previously passed were set aside by a learned Judge of this Court in appeal and those were obliterated from be record. It cannot therefore, be said that the previous orders operate as res judicata or debar the Government from holding a fresh enquiry on those charges. This submission is, therefore, repelled.

12. The second submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Sub-Divisional Officer. Dasuya, was appointed by the Commissioner to hold the enquiry in June, 1965, and that enquiry had been stayed in September, 1965. A fresh enquiry, there, could not be started in January, 1968, as the effect of the abandoning of the previous enquiry started in June, 1965, was that the petitioner was exonerated of the charges levelled against him. In support of this plea, reliance has been placed on a judgment of a Division Bench of the Mysore High Court in C.D Prabhu v. The Deputy Commissioner, South Kanara, District Bangalore, 1969 SLR 362. That judgment is again distinquishable. In that case, the first enquiry had been completed against the delinquent official but no action was taken thereon and a second enquiry was ordered on the same charges a long time thereafter. In the present case, the enquiry by the Sub-Divisional Officer, Dasuya, was stayed in view of the representation made by the petitioner on August 31, 1965. Apparently, the learned Commissioner found substance in some of the objections raised by him and, therefore, redrafted the charge-sheet in which only seven charges out of fifteen were recorded. It has been explained in the return that delay occured in starting the enquiry in January, 1968, on account of the reason that time was taken in collecting the material for the enquiry and soma difficulties were experienced due to the re-organisation of the State of Punjab. In my opinion, the starting of the enquiry in January, 1968, was not barred on the ground that the enquiry started in June, 1965, had not been proceeded with. If that enquiry had been completed and no action was taken thereon there would have been substance in the submission of the learned counsel supported by the judgment, referred to above. I may repeat that in this case the first enquiry held in 1949 and 1950 was set aside and, thereafter, although a second enquiry was ordered in June, 1965, it was not proceeded with. The stay of that enquiry as a result of the representation made by the petitioner, did not mean that the enquiry against him had been abandoned. Respondents No. 2 was, therefore, within his right to start the fresh enquiry in January, 1968, to which there is no bar. The starting of an enquiry after a long time is, no doubt, to be deprecated, but it does not vitiate the enquiry that has been ordered.

13. The learned counsel for the petitioner has relied on a judgment of the Madras High Court in E.S Athithyaraman v. The Commissioner Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments (Administration) Department, Madras, 1971 S.L.R 41. That judgment is again distinguishable on facts. In that case, after the completion of the enquiry against the delinquent official, a show-cause notice was issued to him to which be submitted a reply on December, 14, 1961; but nothing was heard about the matter till August 25, 1965, when he received a communication from the Assistant Commissioner to the effect that an enquiry would be conducted on September 1, 1965. On that date, the official was present, but no enquiry was actually conducted and thereafter the official was communicated an order dated November 4, 1965, proposing to impose the penalty of reduction in rank on him. On these facts, the learned Judge of the Madras High Court held that:—

“Such a long delay in this matter, coupled with certain other circumstances, clearly leads to the conclusion that the respondent must be deemed to have dropped the entire proceeding.”

14. Evidently, on the facts of this case the same cannot be said.

15. The learned counsel for the petitioner has then relied on certain executive instructions issued by the Government for the expeditious disposal of the enquiry proceedings. Copies of those instructions are annexures ‘P’, ‘Q’ and ‘R’. As I have pointed out above, the first enquiry in 1949 and 1950 was expeditiously held, but the same was set aside by this Court. The second enquiry was started in June, 1965, but was stayed due to certain objections raised by the petitioner. The third enquiry was started in January, 1968, and the petitioner filed the present petition for the quashing of that enquiry. It cannot, therefore, be said that any departmental proceeding started against the petitioner was not finished within the time prescribed by the instructions. Reliance has been placed by the learned coursed on a judgment of Narula, J., in Mohan Singh v. Financial Commissioner Punjab, 1967 SLR 79, wherein it was held that:—

“the status of standing orders issued by the Financial Commissioner under the Revenue Act is no more than that of administrative directions or executive instructions. It has been repeatedly held that rules made under a statute must be treated for all purposes of construction of obligation exactly as if they were in the Act and are to be of the same effect as if contained in the Act and have, therefore, to be judicially noticed for all purposes. This was authoritatively so held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Babu Ram Upadhaya (AIR 1961 SC 751). Once it is settled that the Tehsildari Rules are statutory and the standing orders contain merely executive directions, there appears to be no difficulty in holding that wherever the standing order comes into conflict with the Tahsildari Rules, the same must give way in favour of the statutory rules. It appears to that these standing orders can only be issued because of the general power of superintendence granted to Financial Commissioner under section 11 of the Revenue Act.”

16. Evidently, these observations do not help the learned counsel for his submission. Lastly, the learned counsel has relied upon a judgment of the Kerala High Court in A. Junus v. The Comptroller and Auditor General of Indio, 1970 S.L.R 318, wherein a quotation has been given from an article by W.H.R Wade on “Anglo-American Administrative law”, which appeared in 81 Law Quertarly Review 357 at page 376, loading as under:—

“The implication of this passage is clear. The Court is prepared to create what might be called a special administrative law to govern the exercise of powers. It does, indeed, sometimes rely on what to an English lawyer would seem the more natural argument that departmental regulations may be regarded as delegated legislation having the force of law so as to bind the department and sometimes, there is a broader constitutional argument, that the regulations are a kind of crystallisation of due process, which when once it has been so formulated must thereafter be observed. But whatever the detailed reasoning the underlying attitude is that the Court wants to see powers exercised according to ascertainable rules and standards, and so is disposed to seize upon any rules and standards that can be related to the case, whether or not they are prescribed with binding legal force.”

17. The observations made by the learned author cannot afford any assistance to the learned counsel in view of the judgment of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in G.J Fernandez v. The State of Mysore, AIR 1967 SC 1753, wherein it has been held that executive instructions do not confer any right on the subject which can be enforced through a Court of law. They are executive instructions meant for the Government Departments and the breach of those instructions is a matter for the Government to take notice of and the subject cannot base his legal right on those instructions. Even if there is some delay in the disposal of the enquiry proceedings, the executive instructions, on which reliance has been placed by the petitioner, do not entitle him to urge that the enquiry proceedings should be quashed on the ground of delay.

18. For the reasons given above, I find no merit in this petition which is dismissed, but without any order as to costs.

19. Petition dismissed.

Parkash Nath Saida (Petitioner) v. The Financial Commissioner (Revenue) Punjab And Others (S).

Structured Summary of the Opinion (as provided)

Factual and Procedural Background

Legal Issues Presented

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

Respondents' Position (as reflected in the return and Court's recounting)

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Holding and Implications

Parkash Nath Saida (Petitioner) v. The Financial Commissioner (Revenue) Punjab And Others (S).

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