G.S Singhvi, J.:— This is a petition to quash the order Annexure P-12 dated 19.7.1993 passed by the Government terminating the service of the petitioner who was then working as Deputy Advocate General, Punjab.
2. In order to adjudicate the various issues which arise out of the pleadings, it is necessary to notice the relevant facts. The petitioner is possessed with the following academic and research qualifications:
(i) LL.B
(ii) LL.M
(iii) Ph.D in Constitutional Law of India.
3. She has written books and articles titled “Jurisdiction of Amending Process under the Indian Constitution”, “Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985— Theory and practice”, “The Veto Power of the President, Hang or not to Hang” and “Constitutionality of Section 497 of the Indian Penal Code”.
4. The petitioners was enrolled as an Advocate in the year 1970 by the Bar Council of Punjab and Haryana. She and two others were appointed as Assistant Advocate Generals in the pay scale of Rs. 2000-2500/- by an order dated 24.8.1986 After about 7 months, she was appointed as Public Prosecutor under Section 24(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
5. One post of Deputy Advocate General fell vacant on 30th November, 1990 due to the retirement of Shri S.K Syal. In order to fill up that post, the Government of Punjab wrote to the Advocate General to send his proposal for promotion from amongst the existing Assistant Advocate Generals. The petitioner was considered along with other Assistant Advocate General. By an order dated 11.4.1991, she was appointed as Deputy Advocate General in the pay scale of Rs. 4500-6100/-. After she had worked as Deputy Advocate General for about 2 years and 3 months, the Governor of Punjab issued the impugned order terminating her service. The petitioner has challenged the order Annexure P-12 on the grounds of arbitrariness, mala fides and violation of the principles of natural justice.
6. The respondents have pleaded that the petitioner's appointment as Assistant Advocate General and as Deputy Advocate General was purely contractual and termination of her engagement is justified in view of the terms and conditions incorporated in the order dated 11.4.1991 The allegations of mala fides have been refuted in the separate written statements filed by respondents No. 1 and 2, respondents No. 3 and respondent No. 4.
7. First question which requires adjudication by the Court relates to the nature of the appointment/engagement of the petitioner. Shri S.S Saron, Shri S.S Shergill and Shri MR. Midha strenuously submitted that the appointment of the petitioner as Assistant Advocate General and as Deputy Advocate General cannot be equated with an appointment to the Government service but is a purely contractual engagement of personal service and, therefore, the petitioner is not entitled to be reinstated as Deputy Advocate General. They relied on para 2(vii) of the order dated 28.4.1986 and 5(a) and (b) of the order dated 11.4.1991 to show that the petitioner was not appointed on a civil post but her service was purely contractual in nature. Shri Saron relied on the observations made in the following judgments by the Supreme Court:
(i) Smt. J. Tiwari v. Smt. Jawala Devi Vidya Mandir, (1979) 4 SCC 160 : AIR 1981 SC 122: [1979(1) SLR 614 (SC)].
(ii) Executive Committee of Vaish Degree College, Shamli v. Lakshmi Narain, (1976) 2 SCC 58 : AIR 1976 SC 888 : [1976(1) SLR 213 (SC)].
(iii) Harpal Singh Chauhan v. State of U.P, (1993) 3 SCC 552 : [1993(4) SLR 639 (SC)].
(iv) State of U.P v. U.P State Law Officers, Association, JT 1994(1) SC 225 : [1994(1) SLR 533 (SC)]
(v) Joginder Singh Wasu v. State of Punjab, (1994) 1 SCC 184 : [1994(1) SLR 3 (SC)].
(vi) State Of U.P v. U.P Government Counsel (Crl.) Welfare Association., JT 1995(2) SC 490 : [1994(5) SLR 755 (SC)].
8. Shri Gulshan Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that she was appointed as a whole time government servant and as such the incorporation of the clause treating her service to be contractual cannot make any difference. He invited the Court's attention to the letter Annexure P-17 written by Shri Kuldeep Singh, the then Advocate General, who later adorned the office of the Judge, Supreme Court of India, the Punjab Government notification No. 38/11/80-FR(9) dated 3.3.1980 and the recommendations made by the Third Pay Commission in Chapter 28 of Part-I of its report to show that the appointment of the Assistant Advocate General and Deputy Advocate General cannot be equated with a contract of personal service. He relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Shrilekha Vidyarthi v. State of U.P, (1991) 1 SCC 212 : AIR 1991 SC 537 : [1990(6) SLR 1 (SC)] and the following decisions of this Court:
(i) State of Punjab v. D.N Rampal, LPA No. 165 of 1983, decided on 29.3.1984 : [1985(1) SLR 14 (Pb. & Hry.)].
(ii) Mohinder Pal Singh Gill v. State of Punjab, CWP No. 3361 of 1980 decided on 28.9.1981
(iii) V.P Parashar v. State of Punjab, L.P.A No. 56 of 1985, decided on 1.12.1988
9. Shri Sharma pointed out that the S.L.P No. 13228 of 1989 filed by the State of Punjab against the order of the Division Bench dated 1.12.1988 has been dismissed by the Supreme Court on 6.11.1989
10. I have given serious thought to the vexed question relating to the nature of the petitioner's employment. Before analysing the rival contentions, it will be useful to take cognisance of the following facts.
(a) On the basis of the recommendations made by the Pay Commission, the Punjab Government decided to determine the strength of its Law Officers. For this purpose, notification No. 38/11/80-FBR (9) dated 3.3.1980 was issued. The relevant extract of this notification is quoted below:—
Extract of the: notification dated 3.3.80
S.No
Designation of Post
No. of post
Existing scale of pay
Revised scale of pay
Remarks
1.
Advocate General
1
1500/- fixed
Contractual
2.
Addl. Advocate General
1
1000/- fixed
Contractual
3.
Deputy Advocate General
3
1500-1800
2200-2500
4.
Assistant Advocate General
X
1300-1600
2000-2300
11. A look at the above quoted extract of the notification dated 3.3.1980 gives an indication that the Government has treated the posts of Advocate General and Additional Advocate General as contractual with fixed fee as retainer whereas contractual with fixed fee as retainer whereas the posts of Deputy Advocate General and Assistant Advocate General have been treated as regular posts.
(b) The post of Assistant Advocate General is filled on the recommendations of a Selection Committee consisting of the Home Secretary, the Legal Rememberancer and the Advocate General.
(c) The Assistant Advocate Generals and the Deputy Advocate Generals are appointed on whole time basis.
(d) Rules 1.3 and 1.4 of the Punjab Civil Services Rules, Volume I, Part I which empower the Government to make contractual appointments are not made applicable to the appointments of the Assistant Advocate Generals and the Deputy Advocate Generals and they are not required to enter into special agreement in terms of Rule 1.3
(e) Shri B.N Rampal, who was working as Assistant Advocate General, Punjab was promoted as Deputy Advocate General vide memo No. 14193/2JJ-75/40167 dated 5.12.1975 and he was retired from service w.e.f 31.5.1978 on attaining the age of superannuation.
(f) When the petitioner was appointed as Assistant Advocate General, the following terms and conditions were incorproated in the order dated 28.4.1986:
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2. The terms and conditions of their appointment will be as under:—
(i) They will be whole time Government employees and will do all criminal and miscellaneous work entrusted to them by the Advocate General, Punjab.
(ii) Their appointment is purely temporary and services are terminable without assigning any reason and without notice.
(iii) For conducting civil cases only, they will be paid two third of the prescribed fee.
(iv) If on any particular day they have no criminal case to conduct in the High Court, fees payable to them in civil cases will be reduced by the amount of their salary for that day.
(v) In the matter of leave and travelling allowance, they will be governed by the Punjab Civil Services Rules.
(vi) House Rent Allowance will be admissible to them.
(vii) Their services are contractual in nature and, as such, they will not be entitled to any other benefit viz. pension, gratuity and encashment of leave etc.
(viii) Their appointment would be against a non-pensionable post.”
(g) On November 23, 1990, the Government had written to the Advocate General to send proposal for promotion against one post of Deputy Advocate General. Paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of that letter are reporduced below for the purpose of reference:
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2. At present the sanctioned strength of the posts of Deputy Advocate General, Punjab in your office is four. Out of these one post of Deputy Advocate General, Punjab will become available after the retirement of Shri S.K Sayal, Dy. Advocate General on 30.11.1990 (AN).
3. According to the instructions issued by the Chief Secretary to Government Punjab vide circular letter dated 17.9.1956 for filling up every vacant post by promotion, slab of three suitable officers/officials is to be formed. It is further pointed out that according to the Punjab Government circular letter No. 149-SW-74/8105 dated 4.5.1974 for filling up the vacancies of Class I and II Services by promotion, 14% posts are to be reserved for the persons of Scheduled Castes and these reserved candidates are to be promoted against the following Sr.Nos of the roster:
1, 7, 15, 22, 30, etc.
4. In view of these facts you are, therefore, requested that a proposal according to the Government policy/instructions for filling up of the one post of Deputy Advocate General, Punjab by promotion from amongst the working Assistant Advocate Generals Punjab may be sent to the government along with their service, ACRs and Special report etc. immediately.
Deputy Secretary Home (K)
(h) In the order dated 11.4.1991, by which the petitioner was appointed as Deputy Advocate General, the following conditions were incorporated:
“1. She will be whole-time Government employee and will do all criminal and miscellaneous work entrusted to her by the Advocate General, Punjab.
2. Her appointment is purely temporary and her services are terminable without assigning any reason and without any notice.
3. In the matter of leave and travelling allowances she will be governed by the Punjab Civil Services Rules.
4. House Rent Allowances will be admissible to them at the rate sanctioned by Government from time to time.
5. (a) Her services are contractual in nature and, as such, she will not be entitled to any other benefits viz. pension, gratutity and encashment of leave etc.
(b) The period of this contract is under consideration of the Government and the decision to this effect to be communicated separately and will be deemed to be part of the appointment letter.”
(i) The Annual Confidential Reports of the petitioner have been maintained in accordance with the instructions issued by the Government. The Advocate General has been making entires in the capacity of reporting officer and the same have been counter signed by the Home Secretary.
(j) From what has been stated above, it is crystal clear that the posts of Advocate General and Additional Advocate General have been treated as contractual but the posts of Deputy Advocate Generals and Assistant Advocate Generals have been treated as regular posts. Appointment to the latter category of post is made by selection and the appointees are given regular pay scale. The provisions of the Punjab Civil Services Rules are applicable to them in the matters of leave and travelling allowance. Likewise, the provisions of the revised pay rules are also applied to the Deputy Advocate Generals and Assistant Advocate General. Above all, they are treated as whole-time Government employees. The manner and the method of appointment of the petitioner, the grant of regular pay scale to her and the terms and conditions of the orders dated 28.4.1986 and 11.4.1991 are clearly indicative of the fact that there existed a relationship of master and servant between the respondent No. 1 and the petitioner and her appointment cannot be treated as a Contract of personal service.
12. In L.P.A No. 165 1983 which was filed against the order dated November 23, 1982 passed by the learned Single Judge allowing C.W.P No. 4341 of 1981 filed by Shri D.N Rampal, who had retired as a Deputy Advocate General on attaining the age of superannuation, for grant of pension, a Division Bench of this Court was called upon to examine the nature of appointment of the Assistant Advocate General and Deputy Advocate Generals in the context of the plea raised by the appellant that the services of the petitioners were contractual in nature M.M Punchhi, J. (as he then was) speaking for the Bench noticed the plea of the appellant and rejected the same. The relevant extracts of the judgment of the Division Bench are reproduced below:
“The defence adopted by the State in both the cases are in a sense, common. It is maintained by the State that the services of both Rampal and Gill were contractual in nature and, as such, the claim to pension lay only if the terms and conditions of the appointments permitted. Secondly, it was maintained that, in the absence of a clear stipulation in the appointment orders about the total applicability of the Civil Services Rules, the entire body of Rules could not be automatically attracted. Thirdly, claim of pension had not been reserved in the appointment letters and correspondence. And fourthly, pension could not be given merely because Rampal and Gill had been allowed to retire from service.
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It has been noticed in the V.P Parashar's case (supra) that there were seven posts of Assistant Advocate General in the office of the Advocate General, Punjab and those posts were non- contractual. An argument was raised in that case that since those posts were regular posts, and when pay scales thereof had been revised by the Government on the recommenation of the Pay Commission, that implied that those were meant to be filled up by persons appointed on regular basis. The contention was by-passed by holding that the State Government was not precluded from making a contractual appointed to a regular post. Support for the view was taken from the provision of rule 1.3 of the Punjab Civil Services Rules, Volume I Part I which is in the following terms:
“1.3 When in the opinion of the competent authority special provisions inconsistent with these rules are required with reference to any particular post or any conditions of service, that authority may, notwithstanding anything otherwise contained in these rules, and subject to the provision of clause (2) of Article 310 of the Constitution of India (see Appendix 1), provide agreement with the person appointed to such post for any matters in respect of which, in the opinion of that authority, special provisions are required to be made; provided that in every agreement so made it shall be provided that in respect of any matter for which no provision has been made in the agreement, provisions of these rules shall apply.”
13. Support was also sought from Rule 1.4 of the said Rules, whereunder it is provided that the Punjab Civil Services Rules shall not apply to any government employee between whom and the Government, a specific contract or agreement subsists in respect of any matter dealt with in the rules to the extent upto which specific provision is made in the contract of agreement. Based on the aforesaid rules the decision went against the petitioner in V.P Parashar's case (supra) for his services were held contractual. It is precisely on that ground now the learned Additional Advocate General has contended that the services of Rampal and Gill too were contractual in nature and as such the Punjab Civil Services Rules were not applicable, whereunder alone pension could be claimed as of right.
14. As was conceded before us, the seven posts of Assistant Advocate General in the office of the Advocate General, Punjab, are partly permanent and partly temporary. These may or may not formally form a cadre but they provide undoubtedly substantive employment. A Full Bench of the Patna High Court in Bishandeo Mehta v. The State of Bihar, 1981(3) Services Law Reporter 467, explained the phenomenon like this:
“Both in the State Services as well as in Subordinate Service a member of posts are permanent. Temporary posts are also created from time to time, which according to exigency of the service, may be made permanent at a later stage. Appointments to permanent posts etc. sometimes on substantive basis, and in some cases on probation, officiating or temporary basis. The probationery and officiating appointments are of a temporary nature. Similarly, so far as the temporary posts are concerned. Substantive appointments can be made and are, in fact sometimes made even on temporary posts.”
This seems to us to be the correct position in law so far as substantive appointments are concerned and we are in respectfully agreement with the view expressed.”
15. The aforementioned decision of the Division Bench was noticed and followed by another Division Bench in L.P.A.No 56 of 1985 ‘V.P Parashar v. State of Punjab’. Dealing with the issue relating to the nature of the service of the appellant, the Division Bench observed.
“In the light of the above facts, it has to be decided whether the service of the appellant as Assistant Advocate General was contractual in nature or was a regular appointment governed by the Rules. Rules 1.3 of Volume I, Part I, of the Rules, inter alia, lays down that when in the opinion of the competent authority, special provisions are inconsistent with the Rules are required with reference to any particular post or any conditions of service, that authority may, notwithstanding anything otherwise contained in the Rules, and subject to the provisions of clause (2) of Article 310 of the Constitution of India, provide agreement with the person appointed to such post for any matters in respect of which in the opinion of that authority special provisions are required to be made. It further provides that in every agreement so made it shall be provided that in respect of any matter for which no provision has been made in the agreement, provisions of the Rules shall apply. Rule 1.4 ibid, inter alia, lays down that the Rules not apply to any Government employee between whom and the Government a specific contract of agreement subsists in respect of any matter dealt with herein to the extent upto which specified provisions is made in the contract or agreement. Different types of model forms of agreement for use in the case of Government employees engaged on contract are given in Form Pb. C.S.R No. 1. It is not disputed on either side that on agreement as envisaged by these Rules has been executed between the appellant and respondent No. 1. In fact, but for condition No. (vii) reproduced above, there is no document or instrument to show that the appointment of the appellant was contractual and what were the terms and conditions of the contract.
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It is in the context of the above facts that the question whether the appellant was a regular Government servant governed by the Rules or his service was contractual in nature is to be decided. Thus, the burden squarely lies on respondents No. 1 and 2 to show how the appellant formed a class apart from the other six incumbents in the posts of Assistant Advocate General and why he alone should be treated to be an Assistant Advocate General on contractual basis while the others were regular Government servants governed by the Rules.
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No doubt, clause (vii) of the terms and conditions of the letter of appointment, Annexure P.1 stipulates that the service of the appellant shall be contractual in nature and he shall not be entitled to any other benefits except those mentioned therein but, as is evident, after his entry into service the appellant was treated as a regular Government employee. He was granted annual increments first in the then existing scale of pay and then in the revised scale of pay, which could be made applicable only to the cases of Government servants governed by the Rules. There is no agreement or a fresh letter of appointment to evidence the fact that it was independent of the Revised Scales of Pay Rules, 1979 that the new scale of pay was made applicable to the case of the appellant. No doubt, the letter of appointment Annexure P.1 of clause (vii) of the terms and conditions does not provide the duration for which the appellant had been appointed but as has been stated above his performance was reviewed on his attaining the age of 55 of years, envisaged by rule 5.32 of Volume II of the Rules and ultimatley he was ordered to cease to function as Assistant Advocate General on the date he attained the age of 58 years.”
16. The Division Bench also examined the validity of the clause contained in the letter of appointment suggesting that the appointment of the appellant was contractual. Rejecting the plea of the respondent, the Division Bench held:
“Learned counsel for the respondents vehemently argued that the appellant never made a grievance against the stipulation of clause (vii) in the terms and conditions of his letter of appointment Annexure P.1 The following observations of the final court in Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Ltd. v. Brojo Nath Ganguly, (1986) 3 SCC 156 : AIR 1986 SC 1571 : [1986(2) SLR 345 (SC)] aptly repel this contention:
The principle deducible from various precedents is that the Courts will not enforce and will, when called upon to do so, strike down an unfair and unreasonable clause in a contract, entered into between parties who are not equal in bargaining power. For instance, the above principle will apply where the inequlity of bargaining power is the result of the great disparity in the economic strength of the contracting parties. It will apply where the inequality is the result of circumstances, whether of the creation of the parties or not. It will apply to situations in which the weaker party is in a position in which he can obtain goods or services or means of livelihood only upon the terms imposed by the stronger party or go without them. It will also apply where a man has no choice, or rather no meaningful choice, but to give his assent to a contract or to sign on the dotted line in a prescribed of standard form or to accept a set of rules as part of the contract, however, unfair, unreasonable and unconscionable a clause in that contract or form or rules may be. The types of contract to which the principle formulated above applies are not contracts which are tainted with illegality but are contracts which contain terms which are so unfair and unreasonable that the shock the conscience of the Court. They are opposed to public policy and require to be adjudged void.”
Recently again, the Supreme Court had the occasion to deal with a similarly question in Y.K Mehta v. Union of India, 1988 Supp SCC 750 : A.I.R 1988 S.C 1970, and in the context of the facts of that case it was held thus:—
“The first question as to whether the Staff Artistes of Doordarshan are Government servants or not, need not detain us long. It has already been noticed that although initially their appointments were made on contract basis, subsequently the Staff Artistes were being appointed upto the age of 55-60 years on a time scale like a regular Government servant. Indeed; they possess all the criteria of a Government servant. The question one came up before us in Union Of India v. M.A Chowdhary, (1987) 4 SCC 112 : A.I.R 1987 SC 1526, which was disposed of by the following order:—
“Shri A.K Ganguli, learned counsel for the Union of India submits that Article 311 of the Constitution is applicable to the Staff Artistes of the All India Radio. We are of the view that the statement made on behalf of the Government represents the true legal position because the Staff Artistes are holding civil posts under the Government. In view of the above statement, this appeal filed against the judgment of the High Court of Allahabad in Special Appeal no. 258 of 1974 which has also taken the view that Article 311 is applicable to those Staff Artistes has to be dismissed. This appeal is accordingly dismissed. No costs.”
It will appeal from the order extracted above that we took the view that the Staff Artistes of All India Radio were holding civil posts under the Government. There is no distinction between the Staff Artists of All India Radio and those in the Doordarshan. Accordingly, we hold that having regard to the service conditions of the Staff Artistes of Doordarshan and in view of the said decision, the staff Artistes of Doordarshan including the petitioners are Government servants.”
17. Mr. Anand Swaroop, the learned Senior Advocate for the respondents, relying on Bihar Biri Leaves Co. v. State of Bihar, (1981) 1 SCC 537, contended that the appellant accepted clause (vii) of the terms and conditions embodies in Annexure P-1 with his eyes open. He cannot now turn round and say that the said clause is unreasonable. We are of the considered view that the ratio of New Bihar Biri Leaves Co.'s case (supra) has no application to the case in hand. Respondent No. 1 is required in the present case to satisfy the twin test of classification as discussed above before it can successfully put forward the defence that the retractual and clause (vii) ibid binds him. In our view, clause (vii) of the terms and conditions of the appointment of the appellant vide Annexure P-1 is clearly violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. It is void and cannot work against the interests of the appellant either as regards his claim for confirmation in service as Assistant Advocate General for grant of retirement benefits to him.”
18. In Kumari Shrilekha Vidyarthi v. State of U.P (supra), the Surpeme Court examined the legality of the circular G.O No. D-284-Seven-Law Ministry dated 6.2.1990 issued by the Government of Uttar Pradesh terminating the appointments of all Government Counsel (Civil, Criminal, Revenue) in all the districts of State of Uttar Pradesh. It was argued on behalf of the State of Uttar Pradesh that the relationship of the appointees to the office of the Government Counsel in the district was purely contractual and counsel had no right to insist on continuance of the engagement. The Supreme Court noticed this contention and the provisions of the Legal Remembrancer's Manual U.P, the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and then held that the Government Counsel in the district are Law Officers who hold an office or post under the State. The Court also held that the persons who are appointed as Public Prosecutors hold a public office which cannot be whittled down by the assertion that their engagement is purely contractual between a client and his lawyer. The relevant portions of the judgment of the Supreme Court are extracted below:
“According to the learned Additional Advocate General of the State of U.P, the relationship of the appointees to these offices of Government Counsel in the districts is purely contractual depending on the terms of the contract and is in the nature of an engagement of the Counsel by a private party who can be changed at any time at the will of the litigant, with there being no right in the Counsel to insist on continuance of the engagement. The learned Additional Advocate General contended that for this reason, the relationship being purely contractual, which cannot be continued against the will of either party, there is no scope for the argument that the State does not have the right to change the Government Counsel at its will. It is common ground that the appointment, termination and renewal of tenure of all Government Counsel in the districts is governed by certain provisions contained in the Legal Remembrancer's Manual, in addition to S.24 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, applicable in the case of public prosecutors. The learned Additional Advocate General did not dispute that if Art. 14 of the Constitution of India is attracted to this case like all State actions, the impugned circular would be liable to be quashed if it suffers from the vice of arbitrariness. However, his argument is that there is no such vice. In the ultimate analysis, it is the challenge of arbitrariness which the circular must withstand in order to survive. This really is the main point involved for decision by us in the present case.”
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The above provisions in the L.R Manual clearly show that the Government Counsel in the districts are treated as Law Officers of the State who are holders of an ‘office’ or ‘post’. The aforesaid provisions in Chapter VII relating to appointment and conditions of engagement of District Government Counsel show that the appointments are to be made and ordinarily renewed on objective assessment of suitability of the person based on the opinion of the District Officer and the District Judge; and character roll is maintained for keeping a record of the suitability of the appointee to enable an objective assessment for the purpose of his continuance as a Law Officer in the district. There are provisions to bar private practice and participation in political activity by D.G.Cs Apart from Cl. 3 of 7.06 to which we shall advert a little later, these provisions clearly indicate that the appointment and engagement of District Government Counsel is not the same as that by a private litigant of his counsel and there is obviously an element of continuity of the appointment unless the appointee is found to be unsuitable either by his own work, conduct or age or in comparison to any more suitable candidate available at the place of appointment. Suitability of the appointee being the prime criterion for any such appointment, it is obvious that appointment of the best amongst those available, is the object sought to be achieved by these provisions, which, even otherwise, should be the paramount consideration in discharge of this governmental function aimed at promoting public interest. All Govt. Counsel are paid remuneration out of the public exchequer and there is a clear public element attaching to the ‘office’ or ‘post’.
The learned Additional Advocate General contended that clause 3 of para 7.06 says that the appointment of a District Government counsel is only professional engagement terminable at Will on either side and not appointment to a post under the Government; and the Government has the power to terminate the appointment at any time ‘without assigning any cause’. He contended that this power to terminate the appointment at any time without assigning any cause and the clear statement that the appointment is only professional engagement terminable at Will on either side is sufficient to indicate that the relationship is the same as that of a private client and his counsel. In our opinion, this provision has to be read not in isolation, but in the context in which it appears and along with the connected provisions, already referred. The expression ‘professional engagement’ is used therein to distinguish it from ‘appointment to a post under the Government’ in the strict sense. This, however, does not necessarily mean that a person who is not a Government servant holding a post under the Government does not hold any public office and the engagement is purely private with no public element attaching to it. This part of Cl. 3 Para 7.06 means only this and no more. The other part of cl. 3 which enables the Government to terminate the appointment ‘at any time without assigning any cause’ can also not be considered in the manner, suggested by the learned Additional Advocate General. The expression ‘at any time’ merely means that the termination may be made even during the subsistence of the terms of appointment and ‘without assigning any cause’ means without communicating any cause to the appointee whose appointment is terminated. However, without assigning any cause’ is not to be equated with ‘without existence of any cause’. It merely means that the reason for which the termination is made need not to be assigned or communicated to the appointee.
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19. There can be not doubt that this function of the Public Prosecutor relates to a public purpose entrusting him with the responsibility of so acting only in the interest of administration of justice. In the case of public Prosecutors, this additional Public element flowing from statutory provisions in the Code of Criminal Procedure, undoubtedly, invest the Public Prosecutors with the attribute of holder of a public office which cannot be whittled down by the assertion that their engagement is purely professional between a client and his lawyer with no public element attaching to it.
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20. We are, therefore, unable to accept the argument of the learned Additional Advocate General that the appointment of District Government Counsel by the State Government is only a professional engagement like that between a private client and his lawyer, or that is is purely contractual with no public element attaching to it, which may be terminated at any time at the sweet will of the Government excluding judicial review. We have already indicated the presence of public element attached to the ‘office’ or ‘post’ of District Government Counsel of every category covered by the impugned circular. This is sufficient to attract Article 14 of the Constitution and bring the question of validity of the impugned circular within the scope of judicial review.”
21. In Harpal Singh Chauhan's case (supra), the Supreme Court considered the plea of the appellants that they were entitled to continue as District Government Counsel. Their Lordships accepted the appeal of Harpal Singh Chauhan and others on the ground that the District Magistrate, Muradabad had failed to discharge his duty in accordance with Section 24 of the Code of Criminal Procedure read with Chapter VII of the Legal Remembrancer's Manual. However, the appeals filed by Sarvesh Sharma and others were rejected on the ground that the refusal of the Government to appoint them was not arbitrary. While dealing with the issue, their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed:
“It is true that none of the appellants can claim, as a matter of right, that their terms should have been extended or that they should be appointed against the existing vacancies, but, certainly, they can make a grievance that either they have not received the fair treatment by the appointing authority or that the procedure prescribed in the Code and in the Manual aforesaid, have not been followed. While exercising the power of judicial review even in respect of appointment of members of the legal profession as District Government Counsel, the Court can examine whether there was any infirmity in the “decision making process”. Of course, while doing so, the Court cannot substitute its own judgment over the final decision taken in respect of selection of persons for those posts.”
22. In State of U.P v. U.P State Law Officers Association, (supra), the Supreme Court examined the correctness of the order passed by the High Court by which the Government's decision to discontinue the engagement of brief holders was quashed. The facts which are, borne out from a bare perusal of the judgment of the Supreme Court are that by an order dated 23.1.1990, the State Government removed 26 of the 64 Law Officers working for the U.P State Government in the High Court. One of the conditions incorporated in the appointments of these officers was that they could be removed at any time without giving any reason whatsoever. Their Lordships made reference to the provisions of the Legal Remembrancer's Manual and also of the judgment in Kumari Shrilekha Vidyarthi's case and then observed:
“Legal profession is essentially a service oriented profession. The ancestor of to-day's lawyer was no more than a spokesman who rendered his services to the needy members of the society by articulating their case before the authorities that be. The services were rendered without regard to the remuneration received or to be received. With the growth of litigation, lawyering became a full-time occupation and most of the lawyers came to depend upon it as the sole source of livelihood. The nature of the service rendered by the lawyers was private till the government and the public bodies started engaging them to conduct cases on their behalf. The government and the public bodies engaged the services of the lawyers purely on a contractual basis either for a specified case or for a specified or an unspecified period. Although the contract in some cases prohibited the lawyers from accepting private briefs, the nature of the contract did not alter from one of the professional engagement to that of employment. The lawyer of the Government or a public body was not its employee but was a professional practitioner engaged to do the specified work. This is so even to-day, though the lawyers on the full time rolls of the government and the public bodies are described as their law officers. It is precisely for this reason that in the case of such law officers, the saving clause of Rule 49 of the Bar Council of India Rules, waives the prohibition imposed by the said rule against the acceptance by a lawyer of a full-time employment.
“xxxxxx
The mode of appointment of lawyers for the public bodies, therefore, has to be in conformity with the obligation cast on them to select the most meritorious. An open invitation to the lawyers to compete for the posts is by far the best mode of such selection. But sometimes the best may not compete or a competent candidate may not be available from among the competitors. In such circumstances, the public bodies may resort to other methods such as inviting and appointing the best available, although he may not have applied for the post. Whatever the method adopted, it must be shown that the search for the meritorious was undertaken and the appointments were made only on the basis of the merit and not for any other consideration.
23. Their Lordships then proceeded to examine the nature of appointment of the 26 Law Officers and observed:
“As the facts narrated earlier show, out of 26 respondent-law officers, the period of contract of nine of them had expired and they were continued till further orders. The remaining seventeen had continued after the expiry of their initial term without even formal orders of extension. In other words, none of the 26 officers had any right to hold the office on the date of their removal, even under the initial terms of appointment which stipulated the contractual period. This is apart from the fact that the terms of the contracts also provided that the appointment could be terminated at any time without assigning reason.
“xxxxxx
What is further, since the appointment of District Government Counsel is made strictly on the basis of comparative merits and after screening at different levels, the termination of their services is not consistent with the public interests. We are, therefore, of the view that the High Court committed a patent error of law in setting aside the order dated 23.7.1990 terminating the services of the respondent-law officers.”
24. In Joginder Singh Wasu v. State of Punjab (supra) the Apex Court examined the nature of relationship between the Advocate General and the State Government are held:
“The relationship between the Advocate-General and the State Government is essential that of an Advocate and a client in relation of his appearance in court and arguing the case before the court on behalf of the State.
“xxxxxx
Once, as observed above, the relationship between the parties, namely, the Advocate-General and the State is that of an advocate and a client, a client may propose the fees. It is open to the advocate to stipulate a higher fee. If that is not agreed to he cannot compel the client that he must be entrusted with the brief for him to conduct on the fee stipulate by him.”
25. In State Of U.P v. U.P Government Counsel (Crl.) Welfare Association. (supra), reference was made to the earlier decision in State of U.P v. U.P State Law Officers Association (supra) and the appeal directed against the interim order passed by the High Court was allowed.
26. A careful study of the decisions, to which reference has been made herein above, shows that in Harpal Singh Chauhan's case (supra), the only question decided by the Apex Court related to the interpretation of Section 24 read with Chapter VII of the Legal Remembrancer's Manual (U.P) and their Lordships did not examine the issue like the one raised the present case. In State of U.P v. U.P Law Officers Association (supra) and in State Of U.P v. U.P Government Counsel (Crl.) Welfare Association. (supra), their Lordships dealt with the cases of brief holders who were engaged by the Government to appear on its behalf in the High Court. Though the terms and conditions on which the brief holders were engaged by the Government have not been set out in the judgments of the Apex Court, on a perusal of the entire judgments it becomes clear that the brief holders were not engaged on terms and conditions similar to those incorporated in the orders dated 28.4.1986 and 11.4.1991 by which the petitioner had been appointed as Assistant Advocate General and Deputy Advocate General. In Joginder Singh Wasu's case, the Apex Court made some observations on the relationship between the Advocate General and the State Government. Their Lordships neither dealt with the issue relating to the nature of appointment of the Assistant Advocate General in the State of Punjab nor any finding has been recorded in the context of their terms and conditions. As against this, in D.N Rampal's case and in V.P Parashar's case the two Division Benches were called upon to decide the issue whether the services of the Assistant Advocate Generals and Deputy Advocate Generals were contractual in nature and after taking note of the relevant rules and the conditions of appointment, the Division Benches held that these appointments were not contractual. In my opinion, the direct and unequivocal pronouncements of the two Division Benches cannot be declared as not laying down correct law in view of the decisions on which Shri Saron and other counsel representing the respondents have placed reliance because the issues decided by the Apex Court were totally different. The terms and conditions of the persons whose cases were decided by the Apex Court were not similar to those of Shri D.N Rampal and Shri V.P Parashar, whose cases were decided by this Court. Those terms and conditions are also not pari materia to the terms and conditions on which the petitioner had been appointed as Assistant Advocate General and Deputy Advocate General. In fact, the very first condition of the orders of appointment issued in favour of the petitioner declares that she will be whole-time Government employee. I am not suggesting that the Government is not empowered to engage counsel on contract basis to contest cases on its behalf in different Courts. In fact, the notification dated 3.3.1980 shows that the posts of Advocate General and Additional Advocate General were contractual in nature but having decided to employ the Assistant Advocate Generals and Deputy Advocate Generals as regular employees of the Government, the non-official respondents are not entitled to plead that their engagement is contractual in nature. The purpose of incorporating clause (vii) in the order dated 28.4.1986 and clause 5(a) and (b) in the order dated 11.4.1991 appears to be to deny the benefit which are otherwise admissible to Government employees on retirement, but incorporation of these clauses is not sufficient to hold that the petitioner had been engaged on a contract of personal service. The fact that the petitioner was appointed in regular time scale, benefit of annual grade increments was given to her, she was called upon to exercise option under the revised pay rules and the fact that the Annual Confidential Report were recorded from time to time go a long way to negate the case set up by the respondents that the petitioner's appointment was in the nature of a contract of personal service and as such the writ petition is not maintainable.
27. In Mundrika Prasad Singh; v. State Of Bihar, (1979) 4 SCC 701 : AIR 1979 SC 1871, Mukul Dalai v. Union of India, (1988) 3 SCC 144, the Apex Court has held that the office of a Government Pleader and Public Prosecutor is a public office. In Ms Clelland v. Northern Ireland General Health Services Board, 1957-2 All ER 129, the House of Lords examined the claim of the plaintiff for grant of declaration against the unlawful termination of service. After taking note of the fact that the plaintiff's contract of service was one of master and servant, the House of Lords held that the contract was exhaustive as regards the reasons for which the defendant-Board could terminate the service of the plaintiff and since none of those reasons existed, the termination of service of the plaintiff by the Board was nullity. It is thus clear that even in a case of pure contract of master and servant the House of Lords declared that the termination of the employment was ineffective and the plaintiff was entitled to a declaration that she continued in service. A case involving dismissal of an employee of public authority whose appointment was subject to the pleasure of the authority was considered in Malloch v. Aberdeen Corporation, (1971) 2 All ER 1278. Speaking on behalf of the Court, Lord Wilberforce observed:
“The appellant's challenge to the action taken by the respondents raises a question in my opinion, of administrative law. The respondents are a public authority, the appellant holds a public position fortified by statute. The considerations which determine whether he was been validly removed for that position go beyond the mere contract of employment, though no doubt including it. They are, in my opinion to be tested broadly on arguments of public policy and not to be resolved no narrow verbal distinctions. The appellant is entitled to complain if, whether in procedure or in substance, essential requirements, appropriate to his situation in the public service under the respondents, have not been observed and, in case of non- observance, to come to the courts for redress.
“xxxxxx
………So, while the courts will necessarily respect the right, for good reasons of public policy, to dismiss without assigned reasons, this should not, in my opinion, prevent them from examining the frame work and context of the employment to see whether elementary rights are conferred on him expressly or by necessary implication, and how far these extend……….”
28. In my opinion, the observations made in the aforementioned cases can usefully be relied upon to support the view taken by the two Division Benches in D.N Rampal's case and V.P Parashar's case. Thus, I hold that the appointment of the petitioner was not in the nature of contract of personal service, but as a regular Government employee.
29. The second issue, namely, whether clause 2(vii) of the order dated 28.4.1986 and clause 5(a) and (b) of the order dated 11.4.1991 are unconstitutional and arbitrary need not take long to be decided because in V.P Parashar's case, similar issue has been considered and decided in favour of the appellant. The Division Bench held that in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Ltd. v. Brojo Nath Ganguly, (1986) 3 SCC 156 : AIR 1986 SC 1571, the stipulation made in clause (vii) in the terms and conditions of the letter of appointment is unconstitutional. I may add that in Delhi Transport Corporation v. Delhi Transport Mazdoor Congress, 1991 Supp (1) SCC 600 : AIR 1991 SC 101 : [1990(5) SLR 311 (SC)], the ratio of the two Judges Bench in Barojo Nath Ganguly's case has been approved by a majority of 4:1. Therefore, the clause contained in the orders dated 28.4.1986 and 11.4.1991 suggesting that the Government has absolute power to terminate the employment of the petitioner without any reason or rhyme or the incorporation of the condition that the employment is contractual in nature cannot but be held as wholly arbitrary, unjust and unconstitutional.
30. The next important issue which requires decision is whether the impugned order terminating the services of the petitioner is liable to be quashed on account of violation of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution and arbitrariness. Shri Gulshan Sharma argued that the decision of the Government to dispense with the service of the petitioner is totally arbitrary and capricious. Learned counsel also argued that the power vesting in the Government to terminate the service without assigning reasons has been exercised for extraneous purpose and, therefore, it amounts to colourable exercise of power. On the other hand, Shri Saron argued that the Government terminated the petitioner's service in accordance with the terms and conditions of employment and the petitioner has not right to seek declaration of continuity of employment. He argued that as a client, the Government had absolute freedom not to engage the petitioner and, therefore, its decision to dispense with the service of the petitioner due to unsatisfactory performance cannot be subjected to judicial review.
31. I may have accepted Shri Saron's argument regarding non-justifiably of the impugned decision terminating the service of the petitioner if it was a case of engagement of an Advocate on payment of a particular fee. However, that is not the fact situation as already held above, the petitioner had been appointed as a whole-time Government employee. In the first instance, she was appointed as an Assistant Advocate General. Later on, she was appoint as a Deputy Advocate General after due consideration of the cases of serving Assistant Advocate Generals. The ACR dossier of the petitioner placed before the court shows that in the year 1986-87, the then Advocate General Shri G.S Grewal assessed the petitioner as ‘Good’ under the heading capacity and intelligence, reputation and honesty, acquaintance with law, rules and orders, general behaviour, punctuality and regularity, standard of pleading and arguments, knowledge and experience in criminal law and prosecution, quickness in the disposal of work, impartiality. She was rated ‘Good’ in the column relating to grading and no defect was pointed out. The remarks given by the Advocate General were approved by the Secretary to Government of Punjab, Department of the Home Affairs and Justice. For the year 1987-88, similar entries have been recorded by Shri K.P Bhandari, the then Advocate General, Punjab. The Chief Secretary, Government of Punjab, recorded express agreement with the assessment made by the reporting authority. For the year 1988-89 also, Shri K.P Bhandari gave identical remarks to the petitioner under different headings and the Financial Commissioner, Home and Secretary to Government of Punjab recorded ‘no reasons to differ’. For the year 1989-90, Shri H.S Bedi, the then Advocate General (now a Judge of the High Court) rated the petitioner as ‘Good’ under different headings. He recorded ‘Very Good’ against the column of impartiality. The Chief Secretary agreed with the remarks recorded by Shri H.S Bedi. For the year 1990-91. Shri H.S Mattewal, the then Advocate General, recorded ‘Good’ entries in various columns and the Secretary, Home Affairs and Justice Department, agreed with him. Thus, it is clear that from 1986-87 to 1990-91, the petitioner has been rated as ‘Good’ on all counts. These entries must have been taken into consideration by the then Advocate General while recommending the case of the petitioner for appointment as Deputy Advocate General and by the Government while appointing her as Deputy Advocate General.
32. Shri Saron has produced before me six sheets which purported to have been signed by the respondent No. 4 on 14.7.1992, 12.10.1992, 9.1.1993, 4.10.1993, 2.7.1993 and 17.7.1993, showing that for the period from 1.4.1992 to 30.6.1992, 1.7.1992 to 30.9.1993, 1.10.1992 to 31.12.1992, 1.1.1993 to 31.3.1993, 1.4.1993 to 30.6.1993 and 1.7.1993 to 30.9.1993 her performance was highly unsatisfactory and some of the Hon'ble Judges before whom the petitioner had appeared had expressed their dissatisfaction with the work of the petitioner. Shri Saron also produced the statement regarding the Annual Confidential Reports of other Law Officers working in the office of Advocate General. This statement is reproduced below:
“Report with regard to ACRs of Law Officers from 1991-92 to 1994-95
Sr. No.
Name of the Law Officers
Remarks
1.
Sh.H.S Riar, Ex. Addl. A.G
ACR not recorded.
2.
Sh.J.S Kehhar, Ex. Addl. A.G
ACR not recorded.
3.
Sh. J.S Chaudhary, Ex. Addl. A.G
-do-
4.
Sh. Ashok Aggarwal, Ex. Addl. A.G
-do-
5.
Sh. K.S Sidhu, Ex. Addl. A.G
-do-
6.
Sh. R.K Joshi, Ex. Addl. A.G
-do-
7.
Sh. S.K Sharma, DAG, Pb.
ACR for 1992-93 recorded only. (Not sent/counter signed by the Govt.)
8.
Sh. S.S Saron, DAG, Pb.
ACR not recorded
9.
Sh. S.S Rang, Ex. DAG, Pb.
-do-
10.
Stat. S.K Bhatia, Ex. DAG, Pb.
-do-
11.
Sh. S.S Dhaliwal, DAG, Pb.
-do-
12.
Smt. Jai Shree Anand, DAG, Pb.
-do-
13.
Sh. M.C Berry, DAG, Pb.
-do-
14.
Sh. Satish Bhanot, DAG, Pb.
-do-
15.
Sh. A.R Sidhu, AG, Pb.
-do-
16.
Sh. M.S Gill, DAG, Pb.
-do-
17.
Sh. S.S Shergill, DAG, Pb.
-do-
18.
Sh. P.S Thiara, Ex. AAG, Pb.
-do-
19.
Sh. I.P.S Sidhu, Ex. AAG, Pb.
ACR recorded for 1991-92 1992-93 (not sent/counter 1993-94 signed by the 1994-95 Govt.)
20.
Sh. H.S Sidhu, Ex. AAG, Pb.
ACR recorded for 1991- 92 1992-93 (not sent/1993-94 counter signed 1994-95 by the Govt.)
21.
Smt. Charu Tuli, as AAG, Pb.
ACR not recorded
22.
Sh. G.S Cheema, as AAG, Pb.
-do-
23:
Sh. N.S Boparai, as AAG, Pb.
ACR recorded for 1991-92 (not sent 1992-93 counter signed 1993-94 by the Govt.). 1994-95
24.
Radhir Singh, As AAG, Pb.
ACR not recorded.
25.
Sh. A.K Jain, Ex. AAG, Pb.
-do-
26.
Sh. Parminder Singh, AAG, Pb.
-do-
27.
Sh. Vikash Cuccria, AAG, Pb.
-do-
28.
Sh. Arun Walia, AAG, Pb.
-do-
29.
Sh. A.G Masih, AAG, Pb.
-do-
30.
Sh. N.D.S Mann, AAG, Pb.
-do-
31.
Sh. Manjit Singh, AAG, Pb.
-do-
32.
Sh. G.S Gill, AAG, Pb.
-do-
33.
Sh. Ajaypal Singh Kang, AAG, Pb.
-do-
34.
Sh. Varinderpal Singh, Ex. AAG, Pb.
-do-
35.
Sh. A.S Jatana, Ex. AAG, Pb.
-do-
36.
Sh. Shakti Singh Ex. AAG, Pb.
-do-
37.
Sh. Gulshan Sharma, Ex. DAG, Pb.
-do-
38.
Sh. K.K Bhaniwala, as AAG, Pb.
ACR recorded for 1993-94 (not sent/counter 1994-95 signed by the Govt.)
39.
Sh. M.K Garg, Ex. AAG, Pb.
ACR recorded for 1993-94 (not sent/1994-95 counter signed by the Govt.)
40.
Sh. G.S Nahar, Ex. AAG, Pb.
ACR recorded for 1993-94 (not sent/1994-95 counter-signed by the Govt.)
41.
Sh. G.S Nihalsinghwala, AAG, Pb.
ACR not recorded
42.
Sh. P.S Teji, Ex. AAG, Pb.
-do-
43.
Sh. D.S Dhillon, as AAG, Pb.
-do-”
33. On being asked by the Court Shri Saron candidly admitted that the reports of the petitioner which were filled by the respondents No. 4 were not sent to the Financial Commissioner-cum-Secretary, Home and Justice Department or the Chief Secretary. He also admitted that the reports were not conveyed to the petitioner. Why this was not done in the case of the petitioner has not been explained by the respondents. Moreover, in the written statement filed by them, the respondents have not made any reference to the so called adverse remarks. Rather they have made a general statement that the petitioner's work and performance was not satisfactory. To support this plea, no material has been placed before the Court except the arbitrary remarks recorded by the respondent No. 4 in complete violation of the provisions of the government instructions regarding drawal of the A.C.Rs It is, thus, clear that no material was available with the respondent No. 1 for forming an opinion that the petitioner was unsuitable or that her performance was bad so as to warrant the exercise of power to terminate her service in accordance with the terms and conditions of appointment. I, therefore, hold that the impugned decision is vitiated by arbitrariness and the other dated 19.7.1993, which has been passed without any rhyme or reason, is liable to be sent aside.
34. The petitioner has also levelled allegations or personal ill-will and mala fides against the respondent No. 4. She has given some facts suggesting that the respondent No. 4 wanted to help his brother and daughters, who are also practising as Advocates in Punjab and Haryana High Court, and he felt annoyed with the petitioner because she refused to adopt a particular line in the cases in which his relations were appearing as opposite counsel. These allegations have been denied by the respondent No. 4. After perusing the allegations made by the petitioner and the reply of the respondent No. 4, I am of the opinion that the petitioner has failed to prove the same. The burden to prove the serious allegations of mala fides by the petitioner heavily lay upon her and as she has not been able to establish the same by producing cogent evidence, it is not possible to hold that the impugned decision is vitiated due to mala fides of respondent No. 4.
35. Before concluding, I deem it necessary to dispose of the objections raised by the respondents that this petition is barred by the principle of res judicate. According to the respondents, the petitioner had instituted C.W.P No. 15327 of 1990 and as the same was withdrawn without liberty to file a fresh one this petition is liable to be dismissed on the ground of res judicate. I have gone through the contents of C.W.P No. 15327 of 1990 and, in my opinion, the dismissal of that writ petition as withdrawn cannot operate as res judicate because the prayere made in that petition was totally different that the prayer made in this petition. In C.W.P No. 15327 of 1990, the petitioner had sought promotion as Deputy Advocate General, confirmation of her service and deletion of the contractual clause from the letter of appointment. She had also prayed for seniority. In this case, the primary challenge is to the order dated 19.7.1993 and as such the petitioner cannot be non-suited on the ground that C.W.P No. 15327 of 1990 was dismissed as withdrawn. For the reasons mentioned above, the writ petition is allowed. The order dated 19.7.1993 is declared illegal and quashed. The petitioner shall get all consequential benefits.
36. Petition allowed.