Kapur, J.:— This is a defendant's appeal against the judgment and decree of the learned Subordinate Judge 1st Class, Delhi, decreeing possession of the property in suit and costs against defendant No. 2 (the present appellant).
2. On 29th June, 1938, one Khima and his son Khubi purchased leasehold rights of two plots of land Nos. 16 and 17 respectively from the Nazool authorities and they built two houses Nos. 8292 and 8294. On 1st August, 1941, by a sale deed exhibited P. 5 at page 13 of the typed paper-book, they sold this property to Eric Hemant Kumar Sen for a sum of Rs. 4,000. This safe deed is attested by Amulya Rattan Sharma, defendant No. 2, the present appellant. Out of the sale price Rs. 3,000 were paid to the vendors before the Registrar and Rs. 1,000 was kept by Erie Hemant Kumar Sen to be paid to a previous creditor of the vendors one Ch. Fakir Chand. At the time of payment of money before the Registrar there were present Chaudhry Fakir Chand, the creditor of the vendors, Amulya Rattan Sharma the present appellant who was identified by Chaudhry Raghbir Singh Naib Tehsildar. The payment was actually made by Eric Hemant Kumar Sen vendee who is shown as present at the time or the registration. The Sub-Registrar's endorsement is attested by Khima, Khubi, Fakir Chand, Amulya Rattan Sharma, defendant No. 2 and Chaudhari Raghbir Singh. Subsequent to the registration of this sale deed Rs. 1,000 was paid by the Eric Hemant Kumar Sen and this is witnessed by receipts Exhibits D.7 to D. 15, each for a hundred rupees. We have seen the original receipts which recite the payment of Rs. 100 each by Eric Hemant Kumar Sen to Fakir Chand. At the bottom of the receipts there is a writing in a different ink and in a different hand-writing purporting to be by one Khiman saying that Rs. 100 had been received from Amulya Rattan Sharma. The receipt from Fakir Chand bears a stamp of one anna, but that portion of the receipt which is from Khiman bears no such stamp. The receipt from Khiman is alleged to be thumb marked by him. On 17th August, 1944, Eric Hemant Kumar Sen agreed to sell the property in dispute to Har Parshad for Rs. 14,000 and executed a receipt, exhibit P. 2, evidencing receipt of Rs. 99 as earnest money by Eric Hemant Kumar Sen. This money seems to have been paid through Pt. Kirpa Ram. On the 24th August, 1944, a mutation of the said property was sanctioned in the Nazool papers in favour of Har Parshad and Kirpa Ram in equal shares. It may be mentioned here that Eric Hemant Kumar Sen had made an application far the change of names and also had admitted before the Land Officer that he had received Rs. 14,000 from Har Parshad and Kirpa Ram and that he had sold his rights in the land plus the superstructures to Har Parshad and Kirpa Ram.
3. Har Parshad and Kirpa Ram brought a suit on the 31st April, 1945 for possession of the property in suit against Eric Hemant Kumar Sen, Amulya Rattan Sharma, Hira Lal Khullar, Ji Kishan Nigia and Mangal Bycyclewala alleging the agreement to sell and subsequent payment on the 23rd August, 1944 of Rs. 13,901 and the mutation which has already been referred to and that defendants Nos. 2, 3, 4 and 5 were in possession, but had no interest in the ownership of the property and that the plaintiffs were entitled to possession thereof. He also alleged that defendant No. 2 (Amulya Rattan Sharma) was in possession as a tenant of defendant No. 1 and that defendants Nos. 3 to 5 were other tenants, but defendants Nos. 2 to 5 had refused to pay rent or to admit ownership of the plaintiffs and the plaintiffs were entitled to actual physical possession of the property. In the prayer clause they prayed for actual physical possession against all the defendants and also prayed that if it was necessary a decree for specific performance be also passed in their favour against defendant No. 1 and that defendant No. 1 be ordered to do all acts necessary to put the plaintiffs in full and physical possession of the property.
4. Defendant No. 1 admitted the plaintiffs' claim, but defendant No. 2 contested it and pleaded that the property was jointly purchased by him and defendant No. 1 in equal shares and that out of the consideration he had paid half, that is Rs. 2,000 and because of the friendship between him and defendant No. 1 the sale deed was executed in the name of defendant No. 1 alone and that plaintiffs were estopped by their conduct, the mutation in favour of the plaintiffs did not confer any rights on them and that they were not owners of the property in dispute. He also pleaded that he had made improvements on the property and was entitled to get the amount spent by him.
5. The trial Judge framed the following issues:—
1. Is defendant No. 2 the owner of one half of the property in dispute?
2. Is he not estopped by his conduct and letters D.1/1 to D.1/11 adressed to defendant No. 1 from pleading his ownership.
3. If issues Nos. 1 and 2 are decided in favour of defendant No. 2, is plaintiff entitled to specific performance of the contract to sell against defendant No. 1 or against defendant No. 2?
4. Is the plaintiff entitled to a decree for possession against defendants Nos. 2 to 5 in this suit if it is proved that he is entitled to specific performance?
5. Are the plaintiffs estopped from bringing the suit against defendant No. 2?
6. Has the defendant No. 2 effected any improvement to the property in suit or has he contributed any bit towards it and if so is he entitled to this amount and from whom? Can he claim this amount in this suit?
7. Relief.
8. Whether there has been a complete sale in favour of the plaintiffs or not?
6. On 1st May, 1946, an order was passed by the learned trial Judge deciding an objection by the defendant to the production of the sale-deed on the ground that the cause of action had not accrued to the plaintiffs on the date of the institution of the suit as there was no valid sale in their favour at the time and subsequent sale-deed could not form basis of the suit. He held that even if the suit was premature and the cause of action had accrued after the institution of the suit, the suit could not be dismissed and he relied on several cases. Subsequently on 5th July, 1947, he decreed the plaintiffs suit holding that defendant No. 2 was not the owner of half of the property and that he was estopped by his conduct and letters Exhibits D.1/1 to D.1/11 to plead his ownership, that plaintiffs were not estopped from bringing the suit, that defendant No. 2 had not proved that he had made any improvements in the property, that there was a complete sale in favour of the plaintiffs and that they were entitled to a decree for possession of the house in dispute. Against this decree defendant No. 2 has come up in appeal to this Court.
7. A preliminary objection was taken by the counsel for the plaintiffs that Har Parshad respondent died on 2nd July, 1948 and that the application for bringing his legal representatives on the record was filed in this Court on 22nd April, 1949 and be submitted, therefore, that the appeal had abated in toto and even if the share of the two purchasers was ascertainable, the appeal should be held to have abated with regard to the share of Har Parshad. In view of what our findings on the merits of the appeal would be I do not think it is necessary to decide this question.
8. The learned Advocate for the appellant has submitted that he has proved his ownership to the extent of one half and basis his claim on the following grounds:—
1. That the sale was negotiated by him.
2. He paid Rs. 1,000 to Eric Hemant Kumar Sen before the registration and another Rs. 1,000 to Fakir Chand through Khiman.
3. He paid rates and taxes of the property in dispute and he was recorded in the Municipal register as owner thereof.
4. He was in possession of the property and he was effecting repairs.
5. At any rate the plaintiffs were not entitled to a decree for possession on the cause of action laid in the plaint.
9. After giving my careful consideration to the submission of the learned Advocate on the various points raised, I am of the opinion that there are no merits in the present appeal and my reasons are as follows:—
1. The fact that negotiations for the purchase of the property were carried on by defendant No. 2, even if proved, is wholly colourless argument.
2. I am unable to hold on the evidence which has been produced that Rs. 1,000 was paid to Eric Hemant Kumar Sen by defendant No. 2 just outside the Sub-Registrar's office. Defendant No. 2 has appeared as witness in the case and he has admitted that in August 1941 he had Rs. 300 in cash and that he had no account in any bank. Nothing has been shown by him on this record that he was possessed of a sum of Rs. 1000 which he could have given at the time of the registration. In 1942, defendant No. 2 was in receipt of Rs. 62 per mensem as wages and out of this he had to meet the expenses of two wives and six children and he did not receive any income from the pint land which he claims was owned by him. Even in 1944 his wages were not more than Rs. 88 per mensem. The payment of this sum of Rs. 1,000 is sought to be corroborated by the evidence of Khiman D.W 4. But in my opinion this witness is thoroughly unreliable and I am not prepared to place any reliance on his testimony. He has deposed that the Bengali Baboo, meaning ‘Sen’ said that he could not purchase these two houses as he had not enough money and yet this point was never put to Sen when he came into the witness-box. The second point on which this witness deposed is with regard to Fakir Chand. That also was never put to defendant Eric Hemant Kumar Sen. The fact that this witness made himself a party to the fabrication of that portion of receipt Exhibits D.7 to D.16 which recites the payment of money by Sharma to Khiman is quite sufficient to show the falsity of this witness. The next witness who deposed to the payment of Rs. 1,000 is Mahbub Singh D.W 3, the scribe of the deed of sale. How six years after the execution of this deed he was in a position to depose to the payment of this money is beyond comprehension particularly when he could not remember how many deeds he wrote on that day. His cross-examination shows that he is not also a truthful witness. The next witness is Ch. Raghbir Singh Naib Tehsildar D.W 6. He had deposed to the fact that Sharma and Eric Hemant Kumar Sen were very friendly and that Eric Hemant Kumar Sen had told him that he and Sharma were purchasing the house jointly and that the purchase price would be paid by half and half. He has also stated that Rs. 1,000 was paid by Sharma to Eric Hemant Kumar Sen just near the door of the Sub-Registrar's room. These facts were never put to Eric Hemant Kumar Sen himself and even this witness was not in a position to state where Rs. 1,000 had come from. He did not know anything about Sharma. The evidence of this witness, I am unable to believe and I am surprised that a person in a respectable position of Naib Tehsildar should come in the witness-box to depose to a fact of this kind. On this evidence I must, therefore, hold that the payment of Rs. 1,000 has not been proved.
10. With regard to the payment of Rs. 100 to Ch. Fakir Chand through Khiman, again I must hold that the defendant has not made out his case. He has sought to rely on the statement of Khiman, D.W 3, whose evidence I have discussed above and it is payment of this sum which is sought to be proved by the receipts Exhibits D.7 to D.15, which I have already held are fabricated to the extent that the writing which evidences the receipt of Rs. 100 by Khiman is subsequent fabrication.
11. With regard to payment of rates and taxes only one receipt has been produced which is dated 2nd March, 1944. This does not shaw the ownership of Sharma. Even a person in occupation may pay these taxes. The Municipal Register on which the defendant has relied again is not of much assistance. We do not know under what law these registers are kept or whether it is necessary under any law to give the ownership of the property in these registers. Even it these registers are kept under a statute no presumption of correctness is attached to these registers, at any rate the value of these registers is very little. The defendant then relied on notice Exhibit D.28 which was sent by the Rent Controller to Sharma defendant No. 2. Neither this document nor the document Exhibit D.29 which is the appeal Sharma v. Faktr Chand regarding rent are any evidence or the fact that Sharma, defendant No. 2, was the owner of the property. There is no valid explanation why the sale deed was executed in the name of Eric Hemant Kumar Sen and that Sharma, defendant No. 2, attested the sale deed. That this defendant had no title in the property is shown by the letters written by defendant No. 2 to defendant No. 1 and these are exhibits D.1 to D.11 These letters show that defendant No. 1 was demanding rent from defendant No. 2 and he had also given notice to vacate the bouse. It was admitted in Exhibit D.1/6 that the real owner of the property was Eric Hemant Kumar Sen and Sharma even offered to pay rent of Rs. 20 per mensem. These facts are absolutely inconsistent with the ownership of the property in dispute. The whole course of conduct of defendant No. 2 shows that he never lay any claim to the property and throughout admitted that the property belonged to Eric Hemant Kumar Sen. No doubt he was in possession, but he was only a licensee and he was there because of the friendship between the two defendants. I, therefore, hold that this part of the defendant's case has not been proved and that the trial court rightly came to the conclusion that the house—belonged to Eric Hemant Kumar Sen.
12. During the course of the trial Eric Hemant Kumar Sen executed a sale deed in favour of the plaintiffs and the submission of defendant No. 2 before us was that a decree should have been passed in the terms of the cause of action alleged in the plaint and anything that had happened subsequent to the institution of the suit could not be taken into account by the trial Court and therefore, the suit of the plaintiffs as against him should have been dismissed. I am unable to agree with this contention. In my opinion courts should take notice of events which happen subsequent to the suit in order both to avoid unnecessary litigation and to do complete justice between the parties.
13. In Sabbaraya Chetty v. Nachiar Ammal . A.I.R 1918 Mad. 143. it was held that Courts have power, in certain circumstances to grant a decree in a case, where the cause of action arose subsequently to the filing of the plaint. In this case the suit had been brought for payment of money which became payable able after the institution of the suit. But the Court passed a decree holding that the Courts had powers to grant such a decree where a cause of action arose subsequent to the suit. Chinta Haran Das v. Radka Charan Poddar . 1917 37 I.C 962. and Sethrucheria Rama Chandra v. Maharaja of Feypore . 1916 34 I.C 411. were relied on. In Doraiswami Pillai v. Chinnia Goundan . A.I.R 1918 Mad. 272., it was held that a suit for redemption was liable to be dismissed on the pleadings in the plaint and as the plaintiff during the pendency of the suit obtained a conveyance, which cured his want of title, a decree for redemption was given. No doubt in this case amendment had been allowed. In Amrit Lal Vadi Lal v. Kanti Lal Lalbkai . 133 I.C 244., it was held that a Court of appeal can vary a decree under appeal not only for error but also on grounds which have come into existence since it was passed: In Surnammal v. Thangavelu Madaliar . A.I.R 1940 Mad. 412. the case decided by Abdur Rahmm, J., a mortgage was executed by the father of defendants Nos. 1 and 2 in favour of Muthukumara Swami Pillai who died leaving him surviving a widow and two daughters. After the death of the widow, one of the daughters of the mortgagee brought a suit for sale of the mortgaged property without impleading the other daughter and an objection was taken that the plaintiff was not entitled solely and exclusively to sue on the mortgage. The other daughter of the mortgagee died during the pendency of the suit and the plaintiff by survivorship was entided to the whole property left by her father. The suit was decreed by the trial Court, but was dismissed on appeal to the District Judge. Under these circumstances it was held by Abdur Rahman, J., that Courts should take notice of the events which happen after the institution of a suit and this at times is essential for the courts to do. The Court need not be hypertechnical in these matters and ought to take such events as have occurred after the institution of the suit into consideration in order to avoid further unnecessary litigation and do complete justice between the parties.
14. The Lahore High Court also has taken the same view and had held that even where a cause of action arose only after the suit has been instituted, still the suit may be decreed in certain circumstances, See Tulsi Ram v. Dina Nath . A.I.R 1926 Lah. 145. and Labhu Ram v. Chamu Faju . A.I.R 1929 Lah. 409.
15. The Calcutta High Court also have taken the same view in Nuri Mian v. Ambica Singh . I.L.R 44 Cal. 47.. There it was held that ordinarily the decree in a suit should accord with the rights of the parties as they stand at the date of its institution. But where it is shown that the original relief claimed has, by reason of subsequent change of circumstances, become inappropriate or that it is necessary to have the decision of the Court on the altered circumstances in order to shorten litigation or to do complete justice between the parties, it is incumbent upon a Court of justice to take notice of events which have happened since the institution of the suit and to mould its decree according to the circumstances as they stand at the time the decree is made.
16. The matter seems to have been laid at rest by a judgment of the Federal Court in Lachmeshwar Prasad Shukul v. Kashwar Lal Chaudhri . A.I.R 1946 F.C 5. where it was held that the hearing of an appeal under the procedural law of India is in the nature of re-hearing and therefore in moulding the relief to be granted in a case on appeal, the appellate Court is entitled to take into account even facts and events which have come into existence after the decree appealed against. Consequently, the appellate Court is competent to take into account legislative changes since the decision in appeal was given and its powers are not confined only to see whether the lower Court's decision was correct according to the law as it stood at the time when its decision was given.
17. If a Court of appeal can take into consideration subsequent events and facts it is all the more reasonable that a Court of first instance should be able to do so. In this case particularly the matter was brought before the Court as early as on the 1st of May 1946 and an adjudication was made on this point. The learned Judge allowed the sale deed which had come into existence later on, to be placed on the file on payment of costs. I do not think that any injustice has been cane because of this. On the other hand, in my opinion, for the doing of complete justice between the parties, the learned judge has rightly allowed this document to be placed on the file and has taken into consideration the fact that the defect in the title of the plaintiffs, if any, had been removed. In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed. The plaintiffs will have their costs in this Court and in the Court below.
18. Harnam Singh, J.:— I agree.
19. Appeal dismissed.