Dua, J.:— The only point raised in this writ petition on behalf of the petitioner is that no reasonable opportunity was given to the petitioner to show cause against the proposed punishment and reliance has been placed on a decision of the Supreme Court in P. Joseph John v. State Of Travancore-Cochin (1).
2. According to the allegations in the petition, the petitioner Amar Singh was confirmed as a Foot Constable in the Police Department.
3. On false allegations made by one Ved Parkash, he was suspended by the Superintendent of Police, Ludhiana, on September 29, 1952 and an enquiry was ordered into the allegation of drunkenness and the attempt to take away Ved Parkash's cycle. The Enquiry Officer, an Inspector of Police, exonerated the petitioner and held that nothing had been proved against him. This report is dated November 9, 1952 and ???s annexed to the petition as Annexure ‘A’. The Superintendent of Police ordered a fresh enquiry by his order dated November 11, 1952. For the second time again, the Enquiry Officer found the petitioner not guilty. A third time again, the Superintendent of Police ordered the enquiry and sent the case to the Deputy Superintendent of Police, who, in turn, gave a charge-sheet on the allegations mentioned above to the petitioner. According to the averments, no charge-sheet was given in regard to the giving of danda blows to or abusing the complainant. The report was this time submitted to the Superintendent of Police, who ordered re-examination of witnesses on certain specific matters as per his order dated January 7, 1953. The copy of the order and that of the charge-sheet are annexed as Annexures ‘D’ and ‘C’. The witnesses for the department were then re-examined by the Enquiry Officer in the absence of the petitioner and the petitioner was afforded no opportunity to be present at the time of their examination. The Deputy Superintendent of Police submitted his report with the finding that the petitioner was drunk and had removed the cycle and had also abused and beaten law-abiding citizens. This report is marked as Annexure ‘E’. On the basis of this report, the Superintendent of Police dismissed the petitioner on January 30, 1953.
4. A writ petition was presented to this Court against the order of dismissal and was allowed on April 3, 1958. The petitioner was thus ordered to be reinstated by the Superintendent of Police vide his order dated June 18, 1958, but was suspended the same day, the suspension order being operative retrospectively with effect from February 3, 1953. On May 13, 1958, the chargesheet was given to the petitioner, on June 24, 1958 a show cause notice. Both the charge-sheet and the show cause notice were passed on the report of the Deputy Superintendent of Police mentioned earlier and there was no reference in the chargesheet or the show-cause notice to the alleged abuses or beating given by the petitioner. Without initiating fresh proceedings, the Superintendent of Police dismissed the petitioner on October 13, 1958. The petitioner's appeal and revision were rejected by the Deputy Inspector General and Inspector General on February 3, 1960 and June 10, 1960 respectively. It is on these allegations that the order of the Superintendent of Police dated October 13, 1958 has been assailed as. also the orders on appeal and revision passed by the Deputy Inspector General and Inspector General, and as already noticed, the only grievance is that no reasonable opportunity has been afforded to the petitioner.
5. On behalf of the respondents, it is submitted that this Court on the previous writ proceedings (Civil Writ No. 95 of 1956) decided on April 3, 1958 quashed the order of dismissal dated February 3, 1953. The report of the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Ludhiana dated January 27, 1953 holding the petitioner guilty of the charge of misconduct was not held to be vitiated of tainted with any serious infirmity. According to Bishan Narain J., who decided that petition, on January 1953, the Superintendent of Police had called the petitioner and put certain questions to him but no show cause notice in respect of the proposed punishment as contemplated by law was ever given to the petitioner after the report of the Enquiry Officer dated January 27, 1953. It was on this basis that following The State of Punjab etc. v. Kirpal Singh etc. (2), the learned Judge quashed the order of dismissal dated February 3, 1953. I may here pause to note that the mention of January 30, 1953, as the date of the order of dismissal in paragraph 9 of the writ petition appears to me to be incorrect and the order of dismissal, as is clear from the order of Bishan Narain J., in the previous writ proceedings, seems to represent the correct position. That the order of dismissal is dated February 3, 1953 also appears to find support from the copy of the order of the Superintendent of Police dated October 13, 1958 (Annexure ‘J’) and of the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Ambala Range, dated February 3, 1960. (Annexure ‘K’. On behalf of the respondents, it is contended that previous decision did not quash all the proceedings relating to the enquiry against the petitioner from beginning to end and that it was open to the departmental authority after the order dated February 3, 1953, which was quashed by this j Court, to start from the stage of the en-; quiry report dated January 27, 1953; if, so submits the counsel, subsequent proceedings are not violative of Article 311 or of any rule of natural justice, then the petitioner cannot invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. Shri Pannu has sought assistance for his contention from Khem Chand v. Union of India etc. (3), Kapur Singh v. Union of India (4), and Mohan Singh Chaudhari v. Divisional Personnel Officer, Northern Railway (5). Reference is also made to certain Police Rules, but, in my opinion, they do not afford any helpful guidance in the matter. Rule, 7 of the Punjab Civil Services (Punishment and Appeals) Rules too does not take the matter any further.
6. Article 311(2) of the Constitution lays down that no member of a civil service mentioned in sub-Article (1) is to be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank until he has been given a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken in regard to him. It is true that a proper opportunity as contemplated by this provision of the Constitution must be afforded to the public servant concerned at the stage of the enquiry after the charge is supplied to him as well as at the second stage when punishment is about to be imposed on him, and if the first enquiry is materially defective and denies the public servant concerned an opportunity to prove his case, it is hardly possible to hold that the guarantee contained in Article 311(2) has been complied with. Whenever it is contended before the High Court that as a result of an order violating Article 311(2) has been passed, the Court is entitled to examine the matter and decide whether the requirements of the provision mentioned above have been satisfied or not. It is true that no general rule can be laid down and it is always a question to be determined on the facts of each case whether or not the officer concerned has had a reasonable opportunity, the only safe rule to be laid down in this connection is that departmental enquiries must observe rules of natural justice and if they are fairly and properly conducted, the decision reached by the enquiry officers on the merits cannot be canvassed or challenged on the ground that the procedure of Courts of law has not been followed by the enquiry officers. “Stating it broadly”, to reproduce the words of Venkatarama Aiyar J. in Union Of India v. T.R Varma (6) and quoted in State Of Madhya Pradesh v. Chintaman Sadashiva Waishampayan (7), “and without intending it to be exhaustive it may be observed that “rules of natural justice require that a party should have the opportunity of adducing all relevant evidence on which he relies, that the evidence of the opponent should be taken in his presence, and that he should be given the opportunity of cross-examining the witnesses examined by that party, and that no materials should be relied on against him without his being given an opportunity of explaining them.” Now the content of the reasonable opportunity under Article 311(2) of the Constitution is the same as in Section 240(3) of the Government of India Act, 1935, and an opportunity to show cause is reasonable even if it does not contemplate a further opportunity to examine witnesses before the authority competent to impose punishment provided there has been a fair and full enquiry at an earlier stage before the enquiry officer. Recently the Supreme Court had an occasion to consider this aspect in Major U.R Bhatt v. Union Of India (8), where Shah J., speaking for a Bench of five Judges after a review of the case law stated the legal position thus:—
“The content of the reasonable opportunity under Article 311 of the Constitution is the same as in Section 240(3) of the Government of India Act.
Counsel for the appellant contends that the observations made by Chief Justice Das indicate that at both the stages, namely, first before the Enquiry Officer and secondly, before the authority competent to impose punishment, the public servant concerned should be afforded the three opportunities set out in the judgment in Khem Chand's case (9). But this contention is, in our judgment, devoid of force. On page 1099 (of S.C.R): (at p. 308 of A.I.R) the learned Chief Justice observed approving the view of the Privy Council in High Commissioner for India v. I.M Lall (10), that if the public servant has been through the enquiry under Rule 55, it would not be reasonable that he should ask for a repetition at that stage if duly carried out, which implied that if no enquiry has been held under Rule 55 or any analogous rule applicable, then it will be quite reasonable for him to ask for an enquiry. It is evident that an opportunity to show cause is reasonable even if it does not contemplate a further opportunity to examine witnesses provided there has been a fair and full enquiry at an earlier stage before the Enquiry Officer. In the present case there was an inquiry held before the Enquiry Officer. The Enquiry Officer had afforded to the appellant an opportunity to remain present and to make his defence. It is true that all the witnesses of the State who could have been examined in support of their case were not examined viva voce, but that was because of the conduct of the appellant who declined to participate in the enquiry. He declined to take part in the proceeding and the Enquiry Officer was, in our view, justified in proceeding to act upon the materials placed before him. Once the appellant expressed a desire not to take further part in the proceeding of the Enquiry Officer, that Officer was entitled to proceed ex parte and to act upon the materials placed before him. The enquiry made by the Enquiry Officer cannot therefore be challenged either on the ground of unfairness or incompleteness, the appellant having been afforded the protection of the Constitution guaranteed under Section 240 clause 3 of the Government of India Act. The order of discharge from service passed against him by order of the Governor-General is not liable to be questioned on the ground that the materials may not have justified the passing of that order. It is not within the competence of the civil court to sit in judgment over the decision of the authority who is competent by law to dismiss a public servant provided he has been afforded an opportunity to defend himself consistently with the substance of the constitutional guarantee.”
7. It is true that Bhatt's case was governed by the Government of India Act, but the position under Article 311(2) is the same. On behalf of the petitioner nothing has been said impugning the proceedings before the Enquiry Officer which culminated in his report dated January 27, 1953. The order dated October 13, 1958 passed by the Superintendent of Police dismissing the petitioner is fairly exhaustive and he has taken into account almost every aspect of the matter. The further order passed by the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Ambala Range, on February 3, 1960 also deals with the petitioner's contention fairly exhaustively. The order on further revision passed by the Additional Inspector General of Police on June 10, 1960 also seems to have been passed after a proper and due scrutiny and deliberation.
8. As I read the order of Bishan Narain, J. in the previous proceedings, it did not contemplate a fresh enquiry de novo and the order of dismissal was quashed only on the ground of the failure to give a show cause notice in respect of the punishment proposed. This order did not exonerate or absolve the petitioner of his guilt. If, therefore, the departmental authorities proceeded from the stage of report of the Enquiry Officer and complied with the provisions of Article 311(2) of the Constitution, I do not see how it is open to any objection on the plea of violation of rules of natural justice. This Court is not entitled to go into the merits of the case, and if there is no violation of Article 311(2) or of any rules of natural justice, the order of the departmental authorities must be considered to be final and conclusive. In the instant case, nothing has been shown which would induce me to hold the impugned orders to be tainted with any constitutional infirmity with the result that this petition must fail and is hereby dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, however, there would be no order as to costs.