M.M Kumar, J.:— The petitioner is the unsuccessful candidate for the teaching post of PTI being less meritorious than respondent No. 4 and has approached this Court for issuance of a writ in the nature of certiorari quashing his selection and appointment.

2. Brief facts of the case are that on October 18, 2003, the Haryana Staff Selection Commission advertised 382 posts of PTI Teachers in various leading newspapers (P-1). The last date for submissions of the applications was November 7, 2003. The petitioner claimed that he has the qualification of M.A, B.A and Certificate Course in Physical Education (CP.Ed) and that he was fully eligible in accordance with the qualification required to be fulfilled by the advertisement. He applied for the post under general category and annexed all the certificates showing his educational qualification. He had also acquired experience of working as PTI in a recognized High School at Palwal and had duly attached the certificate of experience dated May 8, 2003, along with other certificates of participation in Sports (P-2 and P-3). The petitioner was called for interview on March 16, 2004. It is appropriate to mention that the criteria of selection was published by the Haryana Staff Selection Commission-respondent No. 3 (for brevity ‘the Commission’), on September 1, 2004 when the result of the selection was declared. The criteria adopted by the Commission is based on academic qualification and marks obtained in the interview which is as follows:—

“CRITERIA FOR SELECTION:

Adv. No. 7-2003, CAT. No. 3.

The criteria adopted by the Commission for making selection is given below:—

a) Academic qualification 60 marks b) Marks obtained in the Viva Voce out of 30 marks Total: 90 marks.”

3. It has been alleged by the petitioner that Pawan Kumar-respondent No. 4 has been selected on account of the influence exerted by one Mr. Mool Chand Sharma, a member of the Commission because respondent No. 4 is son of brother-in-law of Mr. Mool Chand Sharma. According to the assertion made in paras 7 and 8 of the petition, respondent No. 4 is simply a matriculate with IIIrd division and could not have been preferred over the petitioner who has a brilliant academic record along with the teaching experience.

4. In response to notice of motion, respondents No. 1 and 2 have filed their written statement. Respondent No. 3 has filed a separate written statement. However, they have taken common stand. Respondent No. 3 has specifically asserted that a criteria was evolved on November 7, 2003 (R-3/1) for selection for the said post. The petitioner appeared for interview against Roll No. 539 and obtained 48.70 marks out of 90 marks whereas the last selected candidate had secured 55.01 marks. Respondent No. 4 Mr. Pawan Kumar, who appeared under roil No. 1431 belonged to general category and he had obtained 58.26 marks out of 90 marks. Accordingly he was selected and the petitioner on account of lower marks than that of last selected candidate in general category could not make his grade in the selection list. It has also been asserted that once the petitioner has appeared in the selection process than, a plea in the nature of estopple would arise against him in view of the judgments of the Supreme Court in cases of Chander Parkash Tiwari v. Shakuntla Shukla, 2002 (3) RSJ 507 and Devki Nandan Sharma v. State of Haryana, 2002 (1) RSJ 64 : [2001 (4) SLR 791 (Pb. & Hry.)]. It has also been claimed that the-Commission is an independent agency and it is not influenced by any extraneous pressures. Respondent No. 4 has filed his separate reply by asserting that his name has figured at Sr. No. 52 of the merit list of the selected candidates. He has clarified that he is a 2nd Class matriculate of the year 1993 as per detail marks card annexure R- 1. He has also obtained qualification of Certificate of Physical Education (C.P.Ed) from the Director of Sports and Youth Services of Maharashtra State from Amravati Centre (R-2), in Ist Division. Still further, he has practical experience of having worked as PTI from April 1, 1997 to October 31, 2000 and imparting instructions to 6th to 10th Class of Modern Vidya Mandir High School, Shiv Nagar, Railway Road, Palwal (R-3). He claimed that his result was excellent. He has also referred to his activity in the N.C.C It is significant to notice that respondent No. 4 has categorically denied that he is son of brother-in-law of Mr. Mool Chand Sharma, respondent No. 5, a member of the Commission.

5. Mrs. Daya Chaudhary, learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that no marks have been allocated to the higher degree of M.A.B.A, and therefore, the criteria adopted on the basis of matric and +2 examinations violates Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution, as it merely confine the consideration to the basic qualification as well as essential qualification of Certificate in Physical Education. She has further argued that the malafide in respect of selection of respondent No. 4 are amply proved as no written statement has been filed by Mr. Mool Chand Sharma, member of the Commission, denying his relationship with respondent No. 4.

6. Mr. Harish Rathee, learned State counsel and Mr. O.P Gupta, learned counsel for respondent No. 4 have vehemently argued that there is categoric denial by respondent No. 4 of any relationship between him and respondent No. 5- Mr. Mool Chand Sharma, member of the Commission. According to the learned counsel, the aforementioned assertion has remained uncontroverted and in these circumstances the mala fide alleged against the selection of respondent No. 4 must be deemed to have remained unsubstantiated. They have also placed reliance on the judgments of the Supreme Court in the cases of P.M Latha v. State of Kerala, (2003) 3 SCC 541 : [2003 (2) SLR 675 (SC)] and Dalip Kumar Ghosh v. Chairman, 2006 (1) Services Law Journal 39, and argued that no marks for extra qualification are necessary to be granted. Learned State counsel has also produced before us the original record of the selection and the fact that the criteria was adopted by allocating 30 marks for basic qualification of matriculation and +2; 30 marks for Certificate of Physical Education and 30 marks for viva voce test.

7. Having heard the learned counsel at a considerable length and having perused the original record, we are of the considered view that this petition is liable to be dismissed. It is evident that the Commission has adopted a criteria which does not suffer from any violation of Articles 14 and 16(1) of the Constitution. In the case of Anzar Ahmad v. State of Bihar, (1994) 1 SCC 150 : [1993 (5) SLR 798 (SC)], Hon'ble the Supreme Court has held that in matters concerning selection for employment to a service, 50% marks allocated for viva voce and 50% marks for academic performance could not be said to have suffered from any arbitrariness warranting interference of the Court. In that regard, reference was made to the observations made in Lila Dhar v. State of Rajasthan, (1981) 4 SCC 159 : [1981 (3) SLR 56 (SC)], Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi, (1981) 1 SCC 722 : [1980 (3) SLR 467 (SC)] and Ashok alias Somanna Gowda v. State of Karnataka, (1992) 1 SCC 28. The gist of the aforementioned judgments and the principle governing the selection process has been summed up in the case of Ashok Kumar Yadav v. State of Haryana, (1985) 4 SCC 417, and the following para from the aforementioned judgment has been approved by their Lordships in Anzar Ahmad's case (supra):—

“…. The competitive examination may be based exclusively on written examination or it may be exclusively on interview or it may be a mixture of both. It is entirely for the Government to decide what kind of competitive examination would be appropriate in a given case…… It is not for the Court to lay down whether interview test should be held at all or how many marks should be allowed for the interview test. Of course the marks must be minimal so as to avoid charges of arbitrariness, but not necessarily always. There may be posts and appointments where the only proper method of selection may be by a viva voce test.

……… Now if both written examination and viva voce test are accepted as essential creatures of proper selection in a given case, the question may arise as to the weight to be attached respectively to them…… There cannotbe any hard and fast rule regarding the precise weight to be given to the viva voce test as against the written examination. It must vary from service to service according to the requirement of the service, the minimum qualification prescribed, the age group from which the selection is to be made, the body to which the task of holding the viva voce test is proposed to be entrusted and host of other factors. It is essentially a matter for determination by experts. The Court does not possess the necessary equipment and it would not be right for the Court to pronounce upon it unless to use the words of Chinnapa Reddy, J. in Lila Dhar case ‘exaggerated weight has been given with proven or obvious oblique motives.’

(emphasis added)”

8. The aforementioned view has been followed and applied in many other judgments including Jaswinder Singh v. State of J & K, (2003) 2 SCC 132, Vijay Syal v. State of Punjab, (2003) 9 SCC 401 : [2003 (4) SLR 452 (SC)] and Inder Parkash Gupta v. State of J & K, (2004) 6 SCC 786 : [2004 (3) SLR 658 (SC)].

9. When the facts of the present case are examined in the lights of the principle laid down by Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the aforementioned judgments, it becomes evident that respondent No. 3- the Commission has adopted three components of the selection process which have been explained in Annexure R-3/1 and the same reads as under:—

“Total Marks : 90 1. Basic qualification Matric/+2 or its equivalent (0.30 of the percentage of the marks obtained in whichever higher marks obtained) : 30 marks 2. Essential qualification Certificate in Physical Education conducted by the Haryana Education Department or an equivalent qualification recognized by the Haryana Education Department. : 30 marks 3. Vive-Voce (To assess the knowledge of the subject, communication skill, general knowledge, general awareness and intelligence)” : 30 marks

10. The various factors which are required to be considered as laid down by Hon'ble the Supreme Court in Lila Dhar's case (supra) cannot be deemed to have been ignored in the instant case. The nature of service, constituted the age of the candidates from which they are drawn into service, the effectiveness in meeting and dealing with others, adaptability, judgment, ability to lead and moral integrity etc. could more suitably be judged by an interview test. The Commission has allocated about 67% to academic qualifications whereas 33% marks have been allocated to oral interview. We are not able to see any exaggerated weight, having been given to viva test much less any oblique motives. We find no substance in the argument raised. Therefore, to say that more marks should have been allocated for academic qualification or some marks should have been given for higher qualification does not warrant any conclusion that the marks allocated for academic qualification suffers from any violation of Articles 14 and 16 (1) of the Constitution. We find considerable force in the argument raised on behalf of the respondents, that no marks are required to be allocated for higher qualification. In Dalip Kumar Ghosh's case (supra), higher marks were claimed for qualification for B.Ed when the recruitment was made of teachers in primary school, and similar was the position in P.M Lama's case (supra). The following para can be cited in support of the aforementioned proposition:—

“We find absolutely no force in the argument advanced by the respondents that B.Ed qualification is a higher qualification that TTC and therefore, the B.Ed candidates should be held to be eligible to complete for the post. On behalf of the applicants, it is pointed out before us that Trained Teacher's Certificate is given to teachers specially trained to teach small children in primary classes whereas for B.Ed degree, the training imparted is to teach students of classes above primary B.Ed degree holders, therefore, cannot necessarily be held to be holding qualification suitable for appointment as teachers in primary schools. Whether for a particular post, the source of recruitment should be from the candidates with TTC qualification or B.Ed qualification, is a matter of recruitment policy. We find sufficient logic and justification in the State prescribing qualification for the post of primary teachers as only TTC and not B.Ed Whether B.Ed qualification can also be prescribed for primary teachers is a question to be considered by the authorities concerned but we cannot consider B.Ed candidates, for the present vacancies advertised as eligible.”

11. The allegation of malafide as made by the petitioner against respondent No. 4 has remained unsubstantiated. There is specific written statement to the effect by respondent No. 4 that he is not son of brother-in-law of Mr. Mool Chand Sharma-respondent No. 5, who is member of the Commission. We are inclined to accept this position as sufficient answer to the allegation made against respondents No. 4 and 5. After all, the mutual relationship between two persons if denied by one would itself be sufficient because denial by one would be denial by the other as well. Some detail principles have been laid down by a Constitution Bench of Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of S. Partap Singh v. State Of Punjab., AIR 1964 SC 72, with regard to establishing the malafide and the question of controverting the same by filing personal affidavit of the respondents. That requirement has been fulfilled by the affidavit filed by respondent No. 4. Therefore, we do not find any substance in the allegation of malafide and accordingly, it is held that the selection of respondent No. 4 does not suffer from any biased or illegality. For all the reasons aforementioned, this petition fails and the same is dismissed.

12. Petition dismissed.