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AMICUS AI
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Neutral Citations
2010 DHC 2623
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
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  • Section 69(2) of the Indian Partnership Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act),
  • provisions of Sub-section (2) of Section 69 of the said Partnership Act,
  • Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred
  • TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
2010 DHC 2623
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Section 69(2) of the Indian Partnership Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act),
  • provisions of Sub-section (2) of Section 69 of the said Partnership Act,
  • Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred
  • TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The respondent is a partnership firm engaged in manufacturing gaskets at B-101, Rishi Nagar, Shakur Basti, Delhi and was an electricity consumer of North Delhi Power Limited (NDPL), the appellant. NDPL had been raising regular electricity bills which the respondent had been paying. The respondent filed a suit for a permanent injunction to restrain NDPL from disconnecting the electricity supply at the premises.

The Trial Court, by order dated 14 August 2002, allowed NDPL's application under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC seeking rejection of the plaint on the ground that the suit was barred by Section 69(2) of the Indian Partnership Act because the respondent was an unregistered partnership firm. The respondent challenged that order in a regular civil appeal. The Appellate Court relied on M/s. Raptakos Brett & Co. Ltd. v. Ganesh Property (AIR 1998 SC 3085) and held that the firm had been registered during the pendency of the suit (Form A showed registration w.e.f. 16 January 1997), which cured the defect; it deemed the suit instituted from the date of registration, allowed the appeal, set aside the Trial Court's order and remanded the matter for trial.

NDPL challenged the Appellate Court's order in these appeals contending that subsequent registration could not cure the defect of having instituted the suit as an unregistered firm under Section 69(2) of the Partnership Act. The substantial question of law formulated by the Court (in absence of the respondent at the hearing on 21 April 2010) was: “Whether subsequent registration of partnership firm during pendency of the suit cures the inherent defect of suit having been filed by an unregistered firm?”

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether subsequent registration of a partnership firm during the pendency of a suit cures the defect of the suit having been originally instituted by an unregistered firm, for the purpose of Section 69(2) of the Indian Partnership Act?

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The Appellate Court erred in law in holding that subsequent registration of the partnership firm cured the inherent defect arising from institution of the suit by an unregistered firm.
  • Section 69(2) of the Indian Partnership Act bars suits instituted by unregistered firms to enforce rights arising from a contract, and subsequent registration cannot validate a suit that was barred at the time of institution.

Respondent's Position

  • The respondent appeared initially through counsel on a few occasions but did not appear on 21 April 2010 when the substantial question was framed; the opinion contains no detailed account of any substantive arguments by the respondent at the hearing recorded in this judgment.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
M/s. Raptakos Brett & Co. Ltd. v. Ganesh Property, AIR 1998 SC 3085 Considered the effect if a partnership is registered during pendency of suit; suggested that if registration occurs before decree the defect might not survive and the suit could be treated as instituted from date of registration; distinguished between enforcement of contractual rights (barred) and enforcement of statutory/common law rights (not barred). The Appellate Court relied on this case to hold that subsequent registration cured the defect. The present Court examined that decision, noted the Court in Raptakos did not express any final opinion on the general question and did not refer it to a Larger Bench, and distinguished the present case because the respondent sought enforcement of a contractual right (which is barred under Section 69(2)).
M/s. Shreeram Finance Corporation v. Yasin Khan & Ors., (1989) 3 SCC 476 Held that a suit is hit by Section 69(2) when, on the date of suit, persons suing are not shown as partners in the Register of Firms; subsequent amendment or registration cannot save the suit. Relied upon by this Court to support the proposition that a suit filed by an unregistered firm cannot be validated by subsequent registration and is liable to be dismissed when Section 69(2) applies.
Delhi Development Authority v. Kochhar Construction Work & Anr., (1998) 8 SCC 559 From a bare reading of Section 69(2), institution of the suit by an unregistered firm against a third party is not valid unless the firm is registered and the persons suing are or have been shown in the Register of Firms as partners. Applied in support of the view in Shreeram that suits by unregistered firms to enforce contractual rights are barred and subsequent registration does not cure the defect.
Haldiram Bhujiawala & Anr. v. Anand Kumar Deepak Kumar & Anr., (2000) 3 SCC 250 Considered Raptakos and held Section 69(2) does not bar suits by unregistered firms when a statutory or common law right is being enforced; explained that reference to a contract in the plaint may be historical and not determinative if the right asserted is statutory or common law in nature. Used by the Court to distinguish cases where the asserted right is statutory or common law from the present case, which concerned enforcement of a contractual right and therefore falls squarely under the bar of Section 69(2).

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by quoting Section 69(2) of the Indian Partnership Act, which states that no suit to enforce a right arising from a contract shall be instituted by or on behalf of a firm against any third party unless the firm is registered and the persons suing are or have been shown in the Register of Firms as partners.

The Court analyzed the plain language and legislative intent of Section 69(2), observing that:

  • The Section bars enforcement of claims arising from contracts by unregistered firms against third parties; it also requires the persons suing to be shown in the Register of Firms as partners.
  • The provision places a disability on unregistered firms regarding their right to sue for contractual rights; this disability is not retrospective and must be assessed at the earliest stage of the suit.
  • Registration of the firm is a pre-condition to instituting a suit covered by Section 69(2); if a suit is filed by an unregistered firm it is liable to be dismissed because the defect exists at the time of institution.

The Court rejected the notion that subsequent registration cures the defect, reasoning:

  • Subsequent registration cannot validate a plaint filed on an earlier date by an unregistered firm because there is no legal provision permitting the court to treat the plaint as filed on any date other than the actual date of filing.
  • Provisions of Section 69 are mandatory and the High Court has no power to relieve a defaulting partnership firm from the disability imposed by the statute.

The Court examined prior authorities:

  • It referred to M/s. Shreeram Finance Corporation v. Yasin Khan, which held that where, on the date of suit, the persons suing were not shown as partners in the Register, the suit was not maintainable and subsequent amendment did not save it.
  • It relied on Delhi Development Authority v. Kochhar Construction to reinforce that a suit by an unregistered firm against a third party is invalid unless registration and partner entries exist on the date of institution.
  • Although the Appellate Court relied on M/s. Raptakos Brett & Co. Ltd., the present Court noted that Raptakos did not express a final, general opinion on whether subsequent registration cures all defects and that Raptakos distinguished between contractual claims (barred) and statutory/common law claims (not barred).
  • Haldiram Bhujiawala was considered: it confirmed Raptakos' approach that Section 69(2) does not bar enforcement of statutory or common law rights by unregistered firms, but the present case involves enforcement of a contractual right, so that exception does not apply.

Applying the statutory text and these precedents to the facts, the Court concluded that because the respondent's suit sought enforcement of a contractual right and was instituted by an unregistered firm, subsequent registration during the pendency of the suit could not cure the inherent defect. The Trial Court therefore was correct in treating the plaint as barred under Section 69(2).

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal is allowed. The judgment and decree of the First Appellate Court dated 6 February 2008 is set aside and the Trial Court's order dated 14 August 2002 is upheld. There are no orders as to costs.

Additional orders: Applications for stay (CM Nos. 10951/2008 and 10983/2008) became infructuous on disposal of the appeals and were dismissed.

Implications: The direct effect of this decision is that the respondent's suit, having been instituted by an unregistered partnership firm to enforce a contractual right, cannot be validated by subsequent registration of the firm; the plaint properly rejected by the Trial Court stands upheld. The opinion does not announce any broader, new rule beyond applying existing statutory interpretation and precedent; no broader implications or new precedent were set forth in the text of this judgment.

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    North Delhi Power Limited v. Jagdamba Gasket (India)

    JUDGMENT

    ARUNA SURESH, J. (Oral)

    1. Parties to both the appeals are same. Since similar substantial question of law has been formulated in both the appeals on 21st April 2010, therefore, vide this common order both the appeals are being decided.

    2. Respondent (plaintiff in the suit) is a partnership firm carrying on its business of manufacturing gasket at B-101, Rishi Nagar, Shakur Basti, Delhi. It is electricity consumer of North Delhi Power Limited, the appellant (hereinafter referred to as ‘NDPL’) (defendant in the suit) through K. No. 506-1737717 IP. Appellant has been raising regular bills for consumption of electricity which were being paid by the respondent.

    3. Respondent filed a suit for permanent injunction against the appellant for restraining it from disconnecting supply of electricity in the said premises. Trial Court vide its order dated 14th August, 2002 allowed the application of the appellant filed under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred to as ‘CPC’), seeking rejection of the plaint on the grounds that suit was hit under Section 69(2) of the Indian Partnership Act (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’), respondent being an unregistered partnership firm. It rejected the plaint holding that suit filed by an unregistered partnership firm i.e respondent was hit by provisions of Section 69(2) of the Act.

    4. Respondent challenged the order of the Trial Court in regular civil appeal. Appellate Court, while relying upon ‘M/s. Raptakos Brett & Co. Ltd. v. Ganesh Property’, AIR 1998 SC 3085 held that even if the suit had been filed by an unregistered partnership firm against the third party and was treated as incompetent as per provisions of Section 69(2) of the Act, but since during pendency of the said suit, the firm in order to put its house in order, got itself registered, which fact was brought on record by the firm by placing Form A before the Appellate Court showing registration of the firm w.e.f 16 January 1997, the defect in filing the earlier plaint was cured and it no longer survived. Appellate Court further observed that suit in question would be deemed to be instituted from the date of registration i.e 16 January, 1997. It allowed the appeal, set aside the Trial Court's order dated 14 August, 2002 and remanded back the case for trial.

    5. In these appeals, appellant has challenged the order of the Appellate Court alleging that the Appellate Court did not properly interpret Section 69(2) of the Act, while allowing the appeals and subsequent registration of the firm could not have cured the inherent defect in filing the suit by an unregistered partnership firm.

    6. After receipt of notice of the appeal, respondent put in appearance through Mr. Hari Narayan Takkar, Advocate on three occasions but none appeared on its behalf on 21 April 2010, therefore, in the absence of respondent, following substantial question of law was formulated:-

    “Whether subsequent registration of partnership firm during pendency of the suit cures the inherent defect of suit having been filed by an unregistered firm?”

    7. None has appeared on behalf of the respondent. Ms. Saahila Lamba on behalf of the appellant has argued that the Appellate Court committed an error in law by holding that subsequent registration of an unregistered firm cures the inherent defect in filing the suit as the suit was filed by an unregistered firm, which is barred under Section 69(2) of the Act.

    8. Section 69(2) of the Act, so far as is relevant for the purpose of just decision of these appeals read as follows;-

    “69. Effect of non-registration (2) No suit to enforce a right arising from a contract shall be instituted in any court by or on behalf of a firm against any third party unless the firm is registered and the persons suing are or have been shown in the Register of Firms as partners in the firm.”

    9. Thus, it is clear that this Section bars enforcement of a claim by an unregistered firm against a third party to enforce a right arising from a contract. Not only this, persons suing should have been shown in the Register of Firms as partners in the firm.

    10. Eventually, under this Section, firms which did not choose to register under the provisions of the Act have been put in a disability as regards their right to sue. Section 69(2) of the Act is not retrospective in nature. Perception of Section 69 of the Act is against institution of the suit itself and its applicability has to be judged in the first instance at the earliest stage of the suit. Therefore, a suit by an unregistered firm cannot be valid by the subsequent registration of the firm as, subsequent registration cannot cure the defect which existed at the time of institution of the suit. Registration of a firm is a pre-condition to its right to institute a suit of the nature mentioned in Section 69 (2) of the Act. Therefore, if a suit is filed by an unregistered firm, it is liable to be dismissed.

    11. Provisions of Section 69 of the Act are mandatory in nature and there is no power with the High Court to grant the defaulting partnership firm any relief against the disability imposed by the Section. Registration of a firm after institution of the suit does not save it from bar of Section 69(2) of the Act. Intention of the legislature is clear from bare perusal of the Section that only a registered partnership firm can file a suit to enforce a contract with a third party. It would be incorrect to say that if partnership firm is subsequently registered, the suit may be considered to have been instituted on the date when the firm was registered if it was not otherwise barred on that date, as there is no provision of law which permits the court to treat the plaint as filed on a date which is other than the date on which it was actually filed. So if the partnership firm is not registered on the date of institution of the suit, subsequent registration cannot validate the suit and the court cannot allow the suit to proceed.

    12. In ‘M/s. Shreeram Finance Corporation v. Yasin Khan & Ors.’, (1989) 3 SCC 476, in similar circumstances it was held:-

    “6. In the present case the suit filed by the appellants is clearly hit by the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 69 of the said Partnership Act, as on the date when the suit was filed, two of the partners shown as partners as per the relevant entries in the Register of Firms were not, in fact, partners, one new partner had come in and two minors had been admitted to the benefit of the partnership firm regarding which no notice was given to the Registrar of Firms. Thus, the persons suing, namely, the current partners as on the dale of the suit were not shown as partners in the Register of Firms. The result is that the suit was not maintainable in view of the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 69 of the said Partnership Act and the view taken by the trial court and confirmed by the High Court in this connection is correct. Although the plaint was amended on a later date that cannot save the suit. Reference has been made to some decisions in the judgment of the trial court; however, we do not find it necessary to refer to any of them as the position in law, in our opinion, is clear on a plain reading of subsection (2) of section 69 of the said Partnership Act.”

    13. Similarly, in ‘Delhi Development Authority v. Kochhar Construction Work & Anr.’, (1998) 8 SCC 559, a suit was instituted by an unregistered partnership firm, it has been held that from bare reading of Section 69(2) of the Act, it is clear that institution of the suit by an unregistered partnership firm against any third party is not valid unless firm is registered and the persons suing are or have been shown in the Register of Firms as partners of the firms. [Reliance was placed on M/s. Shreeram Finance Corporation's case (supra)].

    14. Appellate Court while rejecting the application of the appellant relied upon M/s. Raptakos Brett & Co. Ltd.'s case (supra). In the said case while expressing its opinion to the fate of a case if partnership is registered during the pendency of the suit, it observed that if pending the suit before decree is obtained, the plaintiff put its house in order and got itself registered, the defect in the earlier filing, which even though might result in treating the original suit as still born, would no longer survive if the suit is treated to be deemed to be instituted on the date on which registration is obtained. However, the Court did not express any final opinion on this question and also did not feel the necessity of referring the said question to the Larger Bench for reconsideration. In the said case, the Court was dealing with two aspects of the matter, firstly, enforcement of a contract against a third person and secondly, enforcement of a statutory right or a common law right. The Court did hold that as regards enforcement of a contract by a third party, the suit was barred under Section 69(2) of the Act. However, so far as it related to enforcement of a statutory right or a common law right it was maintainable.

    15. In the present case, respondent has sought enforcement of a contract against the appellant department and did not seek enforcement of any statutory right or common law right. This suit was admittedly filed by an unregistered partnership firm seeking a relief of injunction against the appellant department. There is no dispute that the suit was filed to enforce a right arising from the contract between the parties to the suit. Therefore, subsequent registration of the firm during pendency of the suit could not cure the inherent defect in filing the suit, filed by an unregistered firm in view of provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 69 of the Act. Trial Court committed an error in law by treating the suit having been filed on the date, when respondent firm got itself registered after filing of the suit.

    16. In ‘Haldiram Bhujiawala & Anr. v. Anand Kumar Deepak Kumar & Anr.’, (2000) 3 SCC 250, M/s. Raptakos Brett & Co. Ltd.'s case (supra) was considered by the Supreme Court and it was held:-

    “9. The question whether Section 69(2) is a bar to a suit filed by an unregistered firm even if a statutory right is being enforced or even if only a common law right is being enforced came up directly for consideration in this Court in M/s. Raptokas Brett Co. Ltd. v. Ganesh Property. In that case, Majmudar J. speaking for the Bench clearly expressed the view that Section 69(2) cannot bar the enforcement by way of a suit by an unregistered firm in respect of a statutory right or a common law right. On the facts of that case, it was held the right to evict a tenant upon expiry of the lease was not a right ‘arising from a contract’ but was a common law right or a statutory tight under the Transfer of Property Act. The fact that the plaint in that case referred to a lease and to Its expiry, made no difference. Hence, the said suit was held not barred. It appears to us that in that case the reference to the lease in the plaint was obviously treated as a historical fact. That case is therefore directly in point. Following the said judgment, it must be held in the present case too that a suit is not barred by Section 69(2) if a statutory right or a common law right is being enforced.”

    17. It was further observed:-

    “26. Further Section 69(2) is not attracted to any and every contract referred to in the plaint as the source of title to an asset owned by the firm. If the plaint referred to such a contract it could only be as a historical fact. For example, if the plaint filed by the unregistered firm refers to the source of the firm's title to a motor car and states that the plaintiff has purchased and received a Motor Car from a foreign buyer under a contract and that the defendant has unauthorisedly removed it from the plaintiff firm's possession, - it is clear that the relief for possession against defendant in the suit does not arise from any contract with defendant entered into in the course of plaintiff firms' business with defendants but is based on the alleged unauthorised removal of the vehicle from the plaintiff firm's custody by the defendant. In such a situation, the fact that the unregistered firm has purchased the vehicle from somebody else under a contract has absolutely no bearing on the right of the firm to sue the defendant for possession of the vehicle. Such a suit would be maintainable and Section 69(2) would not be a bar, even if the firm is unregistered on the date of suit. The position in the present case is not different.”

    18. In view of my observations and discussion as above, I hold that subsequent registration of a partnership firm during the pendency of the suit for enforcement of a contract against the appellant by an unregistered partnership firm was an inherent defect which could not be cured.

    19. Appeal is allowed. Judgment and decree of the First Appellate Court dated 6 February, 2008 is accordingly set aside and that of the Trial Court dated 14 August, 2002 is upheld. Under these circumstances, there are no orders as to costs.

    CM Nos. 10951/2008 (for stay) in RSA 178/2008 & 10983/2008(for stay) in RSA 180/2008

    20. With disposal of both the appeals, these applications have become infructuous. Hence, the same stand dismissed accordingly.

    (ARUNA SURESH)

    JUDGE

    MAY 10, 2010 sb

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    North Delhi Power Limited v. Jagdamba Gasket (India)
    (May 10, 2010)