1. The petitioner was employed as folding master with respondent 1, mills from October 1953 onwards. The petitioner retired after attaining age of superannuation on 30 August, 1973. The petitioner is entitled to an amount of gratuity and on 18 September, 1973, the petitioner claims that he approached the employer for the amount of gratuity to be determined under the settlements arrived at between the employer and the union on 10 June and 1 July, 1970. The petitioner claims that he was entitled to an amount of Rs. 11,400 as fifteen months' basic salary at the rate of Rs. 760 and Rs. 2,850 as an additional amount at the rate of 25 per cent, making the total of Rs. 14,250. There is some dispute as to whether the petitioner had approached the employer in the year 1973. The petitioner ultimately filed an application on 4 November, 1976, before the Controlling Authority under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, that is the Sixth Labour Court, Bombay. The petitioner claims the amount of Rs. 14,250 as admissible to him under the two settlements and also prayed that the delay in filing the application if any be condoned as the petitioner was making efforts to secure the amount of gratuity by approaching the employer. The petitioner also claims that there was some dispute, in relation to the room in his occupation, with the employer, and the employer was declining to pay the amount of gratuity unless the premises were vacated.
2. Respondent 1 resisted the application by written statement, dated 9 March, 1977, on the ground that the application was barred by law of limitation and there was no sufficient reason to condone the delay. The employer also claimed that the petitioner was not an employee within the meaning of Payment of Gratuity Act as the was employed in the managerial or administrative capacity. Respondent 1 also challenged jurisdiction of the Controlling Authority to entertain the application for grant of gratuity based on settlements. The employer did not challenge the fact of settlements or the quantum of amount claimed by the petitioner. The parties led evidence before the Controlling Authority and by an order, dated 15 May, 1980, the Authority directed the employer to pay an amount of Rs. 8,457.50 towards the gratuity. The authority came to the conclusion that the application, though beyond the period of limitation can be entertained because the petitioner has made out a sufficient ground for condonation of delay. The authority also held that the petitioner was not appointed in any managerial or administrative capacity and was entitled to the amount of gratuity. The authority felt that the amount of gratuity, which would be awarded to the petitioner is only one according to rates fixed under the Act and the claim of the petitioner for higher amount as permissible under the terms of settlements will have to be left for determination in the proceedings under S. 33-C(2), Industrial Disputes Act.
3. The petitioner and respondent 1 preferred cross appeals before the Appellate Authority and the Appellate Authority by order, dated 10 September, 1980, allowed the appeal preferred by the employer and dismissed the entire claim of the petitioner. The Appellate Authority held that the application filed by the petitioner was barred by limitation and there was no reason to condone the delay as the explanation for delay was not satisfactory. The Appellate Authority also held that the claim for higher rate of gratuity based on terms of settlement could not have been entertained by the authority and higher amount of gratuity could be claimed only in the proceedings under S. 33-C(2), Industrial Disputes Act. The orders passed by the two authorities below are under challenge in this petition filed under Art. 226 of the Constitution.
4. Miss Pradhan, learned counsel appearing in support of the petition, submitted that the Appellate Authority was clearly in error in holding that the. Controlling Authority should not have entertained the application on the ground of limitation. The learned counsel submitted that the material brought on record was more than enough to condone the delay in filing the application and the discretion exercised by the Controlling Authority should not have been interfered by the Appellate Authority. It was further urged that the conclusion recorded by the two authorities below that the authority under the Gratuity Act can entertain the application only for the amount of gratuity which is payable under the Act, and the employee has to approach the Industrial Court under S. 33-C for higher amount admissible under the settlements is clearly erroneous. Sri Boghani, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents, not only supported the decision of the Appellate Authority, but in addition argued that the petitioner should not be granted any relief as the petitioner has come to this Court with unclean hands.
5. The submission of Sri Boghani that the petition should not be entertained as the petitioner has come to the Court with unclean hands cannot be accepted. The learned counsel submitted that the petitioner is in occupation of the premises belonging to the employer and which were allotted to him while he was in employment. The learned counsel relied upon the agreement signed by the petitioner while securing the possession of the premises on 13 January, 1967, and submitted that in spite of the retirement, the petitioner has declined to vacate the premiss and has raised a false claim of tenancy driving the employer to institute proceeding for eviction in the Court of Small Causes. Sri Boghani, submits that the petitioner not only sat tight over the premises, but has not paid a single paisa to the employer for his wrongful occupation right from the year 1973 onwards. Sri Boghani submits that in view of the conduct of the petitioner he should not be granted any relief in these proceedings. The contention cannot be accepted because the right to the amount of gratuity is not circumscribed or made dependent on the conduct of the employee subsequent to the date of his retirement. A right to secure gratuity amount cannot be defeated or cannot be used as lever by the employer for securing back possession of the premises from the petitioner. It is not permissible under the Payment of Gratuity Act to withhold the amount for any reason, and in my judgment even though the conduct of the petitioner in holding back possession of the premises is not very praiseworthy still that is not a sufficient reason to deprive him of the right to gratuity. I put my displeasure to the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and on taking instructions, Miss Pradhan, stated that the petitioner is willing to give an undertaking to this Court that he would vacate the premises and hand over vacant and peaceful possession to the employer within a period of three months from the date of receipt of gratuity amount, if so ordered. Miss Pradhan stated that the petitioner is willing to file an undertaking in this Court to that effect. In these circumstances, it would not be proper to deprive the petitioner of the right to claim gratuity.
6. Sri Boghani then submitted that the finding recorded the by Appellate Authority that the application was barred by limitation and there was no occasion to condone the delay should not be disturbed. In my judgment, the Appellate Authority should not have interfered with the discretionary powers exercised by the Controlling Authority in condoning the delay. Section 7, Gratuity Act, requires a person entitled to the payment of gratuity to send a written application to the employer within such time as may be prescribed. Rule 7, Payment of Gratuity (Maharashtra) Rules, 1972, provides that the employee entiled to the gratuity shall apply ordinarily within thirty days from the date the gratuity becomes payable. It is undoubtedly true that the petitioner had applied on 4 November, 1976, which is long after the expiry of period of thirty days from the date when the right to gratuity accrued. Sub-rule (5) of rule 7 empowers the authority to condone the delay and further issues a fiat that no claim for gratuity shall be invalid merely because the claimant failed to present his application within the specified period. This rule leaves no manner of doubt that the Legislature intended that the claim or application for gratuity by an employee should not be defeated on technical consideration and the authority should be very liberal in condoning the delay. The Controlling Authority relying upon this provision had thought it fit to condone the delay in presenting the application, and in my judgment the Appellate Authority should have been very very slow in disturbing the exercise of the jurisdiction. The Appellate Authority felt that the explanation given by the petitioner that he did not file the application because of the insistence of the employer that the amount would be paid only after he vacates the premises was not acceptable or believable. It is difficult to see any reason why the word of the petitioner on this count should be turned down. The Appellate Authority should have borne in mind that an employee has served faithfully for over twenty years and the right of gratuity should not be declined merely on technical consideration. In my judgment, the petitioner has made out a sufficient case for condonation of delay and the Appelate Authority was clearly in error in holding that the application was barred by limitation.
7. Miss Pradhan submitted that the two authorities below were clearly in error in concluding that the Controlling Authority under the Payment of Gratuity Act can entertain the application for grant of only that amount which is permissible under the Act and the claim for higher amount of gratuity under the settlements had to be left for determination by the Industrial Courts under S. 33-C, Industrial Disputes Act. I find considerable merit in the submission of the learned counsel. Section 4 of the Act provides for payment of gratuity and Sub-sec. (5) of S. 4 provides that nothing in the section shall affect the right of an employee to receive better terms of gratuity under any award or agreement or contract with the employer. The question which requires determination is whether the Controlling Authority under the Act can entertain the application for grant of gratuity at a rate which is agreed between the employer and the employee under an agreement, award or settlement. Sri Boghani submitted that the Controlling Authority is entitled to award only that amount of gratuity which is permissible under the Act, and has no right or jurisdiction to look to or consider any settlement, award or agreement between the employer and the employees. The submission is misconceived and cannot be accepted for several reasons. In the first instance, as laid down by the Supreme Court in a decision reported in State of Punjab v. Labour Court, Jullundur, [1980—I L.L.N 39], the Gratuity Act is a self-contained code incorporating all the essential provisions relating to the payment of gratuity which can be claimed under the Act and its provisions impliedly exclude recourse to any other statute for that purpose. In the case before the Supreme Court a claim for gratuity was made in an application under S. 33-C(2), Industrial Disputes Act, and the Supreme Court held that the Industrial Disputes Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the claim. Sri Boghani submits that in the case before the Supreme Court the claim was based solely upon the provisions of the Act and the claim was not in accordance with the settlement between the employer and the employees. It was urged that though it is undoubtedly true, as laid down by the Supreme Court that the claim under the Act has to be filed before the competent authority under the Act the claim which is independently of the Act and based upon any settlement or award must be referred to the Industrial Court. In my judgment, the submission is not correct. The right to claim gratuity is conferred under the Act and what is done by the settlement or an award is merely to vary the rate of amount of gratuity. The settlement between the parties in the present case does not create a fresh right to claim gratuity, but the right is conferred by a statutory provision. The Act prescribes certain rate of amount of gratuity and what the parties did under the settlement was to improve upon that rate. It is difficult to comprehend that the petitioner could not approach the authority for enforcing his right to get the gratuity and claim that the amount should be determined not in accordance with the rate prescribed by the Act, but in accordance with the settlement. The appellate authority has overlooked the distinction between “right to claim gratuity” and the “rate at which it is to be granted”. If this distinction was borne in mind, then the authorities below would not have declined to grant the entire amount of gratuity claimed by the petitioner on the ground that the higher amount is permissible only on application under S. 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The reliance by Miss Pradhan in this connection on the decision of the Calcutta High Court reported in Eastern Coal Fields, Ltd. v. Regional Labour Commissioner (Central), [1982—I L.L.N 508], is very appropriate. The learned Judge held that the application for a gratuity amount to be determined in accordance with settlement is permissible before the Controlling Authority, and I am in respectful agreement with the conclusion of the learned Judge. It is necessary that the Court should construe the beneficial legislation like the Payment of Gratuity Act in a manner which would advance the cause of justice. It would not serve any purpose, much less would be advantageous to the employer by driving the employee to file two separate proceedings, one before the Controling Authority under the Act and another before the Industrial Court. In my judgment, the conclusions of the two authorities below on this aspect are clearly erroneous. The employer has not disputed the quantum of amount claimed by the petitioner and it is necessary to grant the said amount in these proceedings.
8. Accordingly, the petition suceceds and the order, dated 15 May, 1980, passed by the Controlling Authority, and order, dated 10 September, 1980, by Appellate Authority are set aside and it is directed that respondent-mills shall deposit before the Controlling Authority an amount of Rs. 14,250 being the amount of gratuity payable to the petitioner within one month from today. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.
9. The petitioner has filed an undertaking in writing to vacate the premises and hand over vacant and peaceful possession to the employer within a period of three months from the date of receipt of the gratuity amount. The undertaking filed by the petitioner who is present in Court is accepted and taken on record and marked “X”.