Order
1. Leave granted.
2. These appeals are directed against the order made on 26-9-2000 in certain proceedings before the High Court of Calcutta to the effect that possession of certain premises shall be handed over within a particular date. Premises No. 4, Pretoria Street, Calcutta consisting of a two-storey building and the entire vacant lands appurtenant to the said premises were requisitioned under the West Bengal Premises Requisition & Control (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1947 on 30-1-1959. By an order made in a writ petition on 3-8-1984 the learned Single Judge of the High Court directed release of the vacant land at the back of the said premises immediately and further granted liberty to acquire the building within a period of six months. An appeal filed against the said order was disposed of by stating that the acquisition could only be for some public purpose and, if so, the respondents would be at liberty to challenge the same. On 25-4-1986 Writ Petition CR No. 5014 (W) of 1986 was filed in which an interim order was passed not to serve the notice for acquisition of the land without leave of the Court which was vacated on 1-8-1986. By an order made on 25-7-1986 the rear portion of the premises was ordered to be derequisitioned. In terms of the order made by the Court an order was made by the Government on 31-5-1986 for requisition of the land under West Bengal Act 2 of 1948 in respect of building and the permitted area and formal possession was taken on 3-8-1986. The requisition was challenged in Writ Petition No. 8407 (W) of 1987 which was allowed and the order of requisition and the notification issued under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”) published on 16-8-1986 were quashed. The Government filed an appeal FMAT No. 2224 of 1987. The Division Bench allowed the said appeal and upheld the notification issued under Section 4(1)(a) of the Act. Pursuant to the said order made by the High Court possession of the vacant land was delivered on 2-5-1991 and the special leave petition filed against the said order was dismissed. Thereafter, notices under Section 5 of the Act were issued which were quashed by an order made by the High Court in Matter No. 3798 of 1992 on 18-8-1993. On an application filed by the State, the said order was modified by stating that the said order would not prevent the respondents from issuing fresh notice in accordance with law for acquisition of the property within a period of six months. Again a notification was issued on 13-12-1994 under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1994 which was published in the Gazette on 21-12-1994. Hearing of the objections and local inspection had been held under Section 5-A of the Act on 21-2-1995 and 20-3-1995. Declaration under Section 6 of the Act was published in the Extraordinary Gazette and in two local dailies. A writ petition was moved challenging the notification dated 13-12-1994 issued under Section 4 of the Act and an interim order was granted by the High Court and further proceedings were stayed. Thereafter the said writ petition was allowed by the High Court quashing the notifications by holding that the property could be acquired after delivery of possession. An appeal FMAT No. 6 of 1997 was filed against the said order and an interim order thereto having been refused, contempt proceedings were initiated against the appellants and in the proceedings the impugned order has been passed.
3. It is the stand of the respondents that in identical circumstances this Court in Kumar Malaji v. Commr. of Police CA No. 1433 of 1999 decided on 12-3-1999, had passed an order similar to the one made under appeal. This Court held so, because the premises having been released in the year 1992 no steps were taken by the Government for acquisition of the premises till May 1998 when the judgment was about to be delivered and in the interregnum neither possession was given nor was compensation paid to the owner of the premises. In those circumstances, it was held that the respondents thereto must deliver vacant possession of the premises in question to the appellants therein and the proceedings under the Act had not been completed in those cases and only a notification under Section 4 of the Act was issued and acquisition proceedings had not reached a stage where possession could either be claimed or retained by the acquisition authority. In those circumstances, the authorities were held bound to hand over the possession of the premises to the owners and the period fixed by the High Court also had elapsed. Therefore, this Court directed that the respondents in those cases had to hand over immediate possession.
4. But in the present case, from the narration of facts made by us, it is clear that various steps are being taken by the appellants to acquire the land in question which is interrupted by one or the other proceedings before the courts. It is no doubt true that by mere issue of a notification under Section 4 or Section 6 of the Act possession cannot be retained and unless steps under Section 17 of the Act are taken or if the premises have been held pursuant to requisition under the relevant enactments, the same could be shown. The High Court had allowed the writ petition on the ground that acquisition can be done only after delivery of possession and not before. The same is the subject-matter in appeal FMAT No. 6 of 1997. Therefore, it would not be appropriate for us to pronounce upon the correctness of that order or otherwise. When the very fact as to delivery of possession itself is under challenge in the appeal FMAT No. 6 of 1997, it may not have been appropriate for the High Court to have either refused to grant the stay on 3-1-1997 or 18-1-1997 or much later to have passed the order in terms of the impugned order. On the totality of the circumstances, we are of the view that appropriate adjustments could have been made during the pendency of the appeal by giving appropriate directions either for payment of compensation within a particular period or to pay damages for possession of the property during the relevant period. In that view of the matter, we do not think, the decision referred to by the learned counsel for the respondents has any application in the present case.
5. We, therefore, direct that status quo shall be maintained until disposal of the appeal FMAT No. 6 of 1997. It is, however, open to the High Court to make an appropriate interim order not inconsistent with this order made by us to the effect of protecting interest of the owners of the land. It would be appropriate for the High Court to dispose of appeal within six months from today. Appeals stand disposed of accordingly.