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  • S. 30(2) of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 (for short the MRTU and PULP Act)
  • provisions of S. 30(2) of the MRTU & PULP Act, the Industrial Court
  • provision of S. 30(2) of the MRTU & PULP Act,
  • (1) of Sch. IV, S. 7 of the MRTU & PULP Act
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Citation Codes
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citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
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  • S. 30(2) of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 (for short the MRTU and PULP Act)
  • provisions of S. 30(2) of the MRTU & PULP Act, the Industrial Court
  • provision of S. 30(2) of the MRTU & PULP Act,
  • (1) of Sch. IV, S. 7 of the MRTU & PULP Act
Smart Summary

Case Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner challenged an interim order dated 14 February 1994 passed by the Industrial Court, Nagpur, on an application filed under S. 30(2) of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 (the MRTU & PULP Act). Respondent 2 (M.D. Jamunkar) had filed the S. 30(2) application seeking interim protection against termination during the pendency of his main complaint under S. 28 (Unfair Labour Practice No.1268 of 1993) in which he sought regularisation/permanency as an instructor in the fitter faculty.

Respondent 3 (the Divisional Social Welfare Officer) runs a Government Industrial Training Institute at Wardha for physically handicapped students. The contested facts include that respondent 3 had repeatedly appointed respondent 2 on temporary/stop-gap terms from December 1989 onwards (with multiple renewal orders up to 22 November 1994) for a post reserved for Scheduled Castes which required selection through the Regional Service Selection Board (respondent 4). An advertisement was issued on 24 April 1993 and the petitioner was selected by the Regional Selection Board on 27 August 1993.

Respondent 2 filed the unfair labour practice complaint on 27 September 1993 claiming entitlement to permanency having allegedly completed more than 240 days' continuous service. In January 1994 respondent 2 moved the Industrial Court under S. 30(2) for an interim direction restraining respondent 3 and the Institute principal from appointing the petitioner or terminating respondent 2's services pending the main complaint. The Industrial Court granted the interim restraint on 14 February 1994.

The petitioner challenged that interim order by way of writ petition. A learned Single Judge (Wahane, J.) allowed the writ on 27 April 1994 directing appointment of the petitioner. Respondent 2 obtained a Letters Patent Appeal (No. 101 of 1994) which the Division Bench allowed on 11 November 1994 setting aside the Single Judge's order on the limited ground that respondent 2 was not heard before delivery of the Single Judge's judgment; consequently the writ petition was restored for final hearing before the present Bench.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Industrial Court had jurisdiction under the MRTU & PULP Act (specifically under S. 30(2)) to entertain and grant interim relief restraining termination (or apprehended termination) of an employee's services when the complaint about termination falls within item (1) of Schedule IV and S. 7, which, it was contended, confers jurisdiction on the Labour Court.
  2. Whether an interim order under S. 30(2) of the MRTU & PULP Act can properly be used to restrain appointment of a person selected by the Regional Selection Board (thereby creating apprehension of termination for the incumbent) pending disposal of the main complaint.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner and State Respondents' Arguments (Sri Bagle and Sri Chowda)

  • Contended that the Industrial Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the S. 30(2) application insofar as it dealt with termination or apprehended termination of employment because such matters fall under S. 7 and item (1) of Schedule IV and must be litigated before the Labour Court.
  • Argued that no actual termination had occurred at the time of the S. 30(2) application and the interim relief was based on apprehension only; nonetheless, termination-related disputes are governed by the Labour Court's jurisdiction and the Industrial Court could not grant the restraint against termination.
  • Relied on authority (Ashok Vishnu Khate v. M.R. Bhope and an older Single Judge decision) to support the submission that jurisdiction over unfair labour practices leading to dismissal/discharge is for the Labour Court.

Respondent 2's Arguments (Sri Choudhari)

  • Maintained that the main complaint was for regularisation (a remedy within the competence of the Industrial Court) and that ancillary or interim relief connected to that main complaint could properly be granted by the Industrial Court under S. 30(2).
  • Contended that S. 30(2) gives the Industrial Court power to pass such orders as it deems just and proper pending final decision, and that an interim direction not to terminate services (in a case of apprehended termination) is within that discretionary power.
  • Asserted that the issue of apprehended termination being covered by item (1) of Schedule IV was already addressed by the Division Bench in Ashok Vishnu Khate, and thus the Industrial Court's interim order was permissible.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Ashok Vishnu Khate v. M.R. Bhope, Judge, Labour Court [1992 (2) L.L.N 191] The Division Bench held that the expression "engaged in or engaging in any unfair labour practice" (Sub-sec. (1) of S. 28 and item (1) of Sch. IV) is wide enough to cover employer practices which will lead to dismissal; a complaint may be entertained before an actual discharge/dismissal occurs. The unfair labour practice precedes the order of discharge/dismissal and the Labour Court has jurisdiction to entertain such complaints when the employer is engaging in practices which will lead to discharge/dismissal. The court relied on this authority to support the proposition that apprehended termination is covered by item (1) of Schedule IV and thus falls within the Labour Court's jurisdiction under S. 7, limiting the Industrial Court's competence to grant interim relief in relation to termination.
Maharashtra State Electricity Board v. Inder Shah Shamroa Almaram (Writ Petition No. 1314 of 1980), decided 24 September 1980 (Deshpande, J.) The Single Judge explained the scope of interim relief under S. 30(2): it can include directions to temporarily withdraw the practice complained of pending final decision. However, where the dispute falls within item (1) of Sch. IV (termination/discharge), jurisdiction to try that dispute is with the Labour Court; the Industrial Court has no jurisdiction even to grant interim relief to direct withdrawal of orders of termination in such circumstances. The court relied on this authority to hold that if the Industrial Court has no jurisdiction to give a final direction regarding termination, it similarly cannot entertain or grant interim relief on that topic under S. 30(2).

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court addressed the central jurisdictional question: whether the Industrial Court could grant interim relief under S. 30(2) in relation to termination (or apprehended termination) when the substance of the complaint concerned unfair labour practices described in item (1) of Schedule IV.

The court reviewed the parties' submissions. Petitioner's counsel and the Assistant Government Pleader argued that the impugned interim order restraining termination concerned a matter governed by S. 7 and item (1) of Schedule IV and therefore lay within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Labour Court. Respondent 2's counsel argued that the Industrial Court could grant ancillary interim relief under S. 30(2) while the main complaint (for regularisation) was pending.

The court relied on the Division Bench decision in Ashok Vishnu Khate which construed item (1) of Schedule IV and held that complaints alleging employer practices that will lead to dismissal or discharge can be entertained by the Labour Court even before actual dismissal occurs. The court quoted the Ashok Vishnu Khate reasoning that the unfair labour practice precedes discharge/dismissal and that the Labour Court's jurisdiction is not ousted by waiting until a final act of dismissal.

The court also relied on the Single Judge decision in the MSEB case which explained the limits of S. 30(2) interim relief: where the dispute falls within item (1) of Schedule IV the Industrial Court does not have jurisdiction to grant interim or final relief in relation to termination and such matters must be filed in the Labour Court.

On this basis the court concluded that, because apprehended termination of the complainant is covered by item (1) of Schedule IV and S. 7 gives jurisdiction in such matters to the Labour Court, the Industrial Court could not validly have passed the interim order dated 14 February 1994 in relation to termination. Consequently, the impugned order was held to be without jurisdiction.

The court also noted factual contentions that were disputed (for example whether there was one post or two) but declined to resolve those factual questions at this stage, treating them as matters to be dealt with through the proper process. The court addressed practical consequences (appointment and continuity of service) and fashioned a limited schedule to allow respondent 2 to move the Labour Court regarding termination if he chose to do so.

Holding and Implications

The impugned interim order of the Industrial Court dated 14 February 1994 is quashed and set aside.

Implications and consequential directions given by the court (as recorded in the opinion):

  • The part of the judgment setting aside the Industrial Court's order will remain suspended for a period of one month from the date of the judgment or until a suitable order is passed by the Labour Court, whichever is earlier, in case respondent 2 moves the Labour Court.
  • Respondent 2 is directed to move the Labour Court within two weeks from the date of the judgment; if he fails to do so, the suspension of the effect of the judgment will be automatically revoked after two weeks.
  • Respondent 3 (Divisional Social Welfare Officer, Nagpur Division) is directed to forthwith issue an order of appointment to the petitioner and allow him to join as instructor in the fitting section.
  • The court declined to displace disputed factual questions (e.g., number of posts) at this stage and invited the petitioner to make representations regarding continuity which respondent 3 is expected to consider promptly.
  • There shall be no order as to costs.

The decision applies established authority about jurisdictional demarcation between the Industrial Court and the Labour Court: termination/apprehended termination complaints falling within item (1) of Schedule IV and S. 7 are for the Labour Court, and the Industrial Court cannot grant interim relief in relation to termination when it lacks substantive jurisdiction. The opinion does not purport to lay down a new precedent; it applies and follows earlier authorities cited in the judgment.

    Dilip v. Industrial Court

    1. By the instant petition, the petitioner has challenged the order, dated 14 February 1994, passed by the Industrial Court, Nagpur, on the application filed under S. 30(2) of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 (for short the MRTU and PULP Act) by respondent 2 praying for an interim relief during pendency of his complaint under S. 28 of the MRTU and PULP Act, seeking regularisation of his services on the post of instructor in the faculty of fitter under respondent 3, the Divisional Social Welfare Officer. By this interim order, dated 14 February 1994, the Industrial Court had directed respondents 1 and 2 to the complaints, that is present respondent 3, the Divisional Social Welfare Officer, and the Principal of the Government Industrial Training Institute, Wardha, for the physically handicapped persons not to terminate the service of the complainant during the pendency of his main complaint.

    2. It is an undisputed fact that respondent 3 the Divisional Social Welfare Officer, runs the Government Industrial Training Institute at Wardha, for the physically handicapped students and there are some posts of instructor in composing, binding and fitting sections. It is claimed by respondent 3 that in the year 1989, there arose a need of filling in the posts of instructor in fitting section. As per respondent 3 (he post was reserved for scheduled castes and the same had to be filled in only through the recommendations from the Regional Service Selection Board, which is a lengthy process and takes some time for recruitment and further since (he requirement was somewhat urgent respondent 3 filled in that post by appointing present respondent 2 Sri M.D Jamunkar who belongs to OBC category and not to the scheduled castes category as a stop-gap arrangement temporarily and further on the condition that his service was liable to be terminated without prior intimation and notice on the selection and recommendation if made of the suitable candidates by the Regional Service Selection Board. The order of the appointment also specifically stated that the appointment was made for a period of six months only. Respondent 2's first appointment order on these terms is dated 6 December 1989. Respondent 2 subsequently was again appointed on similar terras by the orders, dated 1 June 1990, 5 August 1991, 8 August 1991, 1 November 1991, 6 January 1992, 19 May 1992, 17 February 1993, 14 May 1993, 18 October 1993 and 9 November 1993. The last order of appointment on these terms was dated 22 November 1994. Respondent 2 was appointed for a period of one month or till the selection was made by the Regional Selection Board, whichever, was the earlier. In the meanwhile respondent 3 undisputedly had sent a proposal to respondent 4 the Regional Selection Board to select a suitable candidate from the scheduled castes category to fill up the post of instructor in fitting section. The Regional Selection Board issued an advertisement accordingly on 24 April 1993. Since the post was shown as reserved for scheduled castes candidates, probably respondent 2 did not apply. Several other persons had also applied including the present petitioner. The petitioner was selected by the Regional Selection Board on 27 August 1993. Since respondent 2 was not in a position to get the employment because the post was reserved and further since according to him, he had completed more than 240 days of service continuously and without any break, he was entitled to be made permanent on the post of instructor in fitting section, he filled a complaint Unfair Labour Practice No. 1268 of 1993 under the MRTU & PULP Act before the Industrial Court. He claimed therein that he be made permanent on the post of instructor in the faculty of fitter and be given benefits of permanent employee, having completed 240 days of service. It is in this complaint which is dated 27 September 1993, respondent 2 in January 1994 filed an application under s. 30(2) of the mrtu & pulp act, alleging therein that the petitioner has been selected by respondent 1 the Divisional Social Welfare Officer present respondent 3 through the Regional Service Selection Board for appointment to the said post of instructor in lilting section and though respondent 2 Madan Jamunkar was then working on the said post since his initial appointment in the month of December 1989, instead of regularising the services of respondent 2, respondent 3 is likely to give appointment to present petitioner and as such direction should be issued to respondent 3 and the Principal of the Institute instructing them not to appoint fresh candidate in place of respondent 2 and not to terminate his services, to allow him to work as instructor in fitting section pending decision in the main complaint.

    3. It is on this application as aforesaid the Industrial Court has passed the order on 14 February 1994 directing respondent 3 and the Principal of the Institute not to terminate the services of respondent 2 the complainant during the pendency of the main petition.

    4. The aforesaid interim order of the Industrial Court, dated 14 February 1994 has been challenged in the instant writ petition. Earlier this petition was heard by my learned brother Sri Wahane B.U, J., which came to be allowed by the judgment, dated 27 April 1994. By this judgment it was directed that the petitioner be appointed as the instructor and the order to that effect be issued forthwith. Having taken into consideration that respondent 2 Jamunkar was working as the instructor since 1989, it was observed that if permissible under the rules he be continued either as the instructor if the post is vacant or in any other post to which he is eligible. Respondent 2 challenged this judgment of this Court, dated 27 April 1994, in Letters Patent Appeal No. 101 of 1994. The Letters Patent Appeal came to be decided by the Division Bench of this Court on 11 November 1994. The same was allowed setting aside the order of the learned Single Judge, dated 27 April 1994, only on the ground that the appellant present respondent 2 was not heard before delivery of the judgment, dated 27 April 1994, by the learned Single Judge. Resultanly, the writ petition was restored for final hearing. It is in these circumstances it has now come up for hearing before this Bench.

    5. Heard Sri Bagle learned counsel for the Petitioner, Sri Chowda learned Assistant Government Pleader for respondents 1, 3 and 4 and Sri Choudhari learned counsel for respondent 2. Several contentions have been raised by the counsel for the respective parties. It is, however, not necessary to go through all the questions raised by the learned counsel. One such question raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner Sri Bagle and also by Sri Chowda, learned Assistant Government Pleader, relates to very jurisdiction of the Industrial Court in entertaining the application under s. 30(2) of the mrtu & pulp act, dealing with and granting relief in relation to the termination of the services of the complainant. In their submissions (here was no actual termination effected as per the complainant till filing of the application under s. 30(2) of the mrtu & pulp act and the relief sought by the applicant under s. 30(2) of the mrtu & pulp act was apparently on the basis of the apprehension of the termination which in turn was based on selection of the petitioner for the post of the fitter and likelihood of issuance of his order of appointment. The termination or apprehended termination whatever it may be in the submission of the learned counsel is a matter governed by provisions of S. 7 of the said Act. The complaints relating to unfair labour practices described in item (1) of Sch. IV have to be decided by the Labour Court. In the submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned assistant Government Pleader, the impugned order since dealt with the termination and restrained concerned authority from terminating the services of the complainant during the pendency of the main complaint, the impugned order has to be held as without jurisdiction and on this short point alone it has to be quashed and set aside. Reliance is placed in this behalf on the two decisions of this Court, one is rendered by the Division Bench reported in Ashok Vishnu Khate v. M.R Bhope, Judge, Labour Court [1992 (2) L.L.N 191], and the another one is of Single Judge of this Court in Writ Petition No. 1314 of 1980, decided on 24 September 1980 by Deshpande, J.

    6. In reply Sri Choudhari learned counsel for respondent 2 contended (hat the basic complaint filed by respondent 2 was for seeking for regularlsation in employment. While claiming such relief which undisputedly was within the jurisdiction of the Industrial Court, if some ancillary relief is to be claimed it could be claimed before the Industrial Court itself where the main complaint was pending for disposal and the Industrial Court certainly has got a power to deal with the and decide such claim for ancillary relief, though, strictly, it may not come within its jurisdiction. In the submissions of Sri Choudhari, having regard to provisions of s. 30(2) of the mrtu & pulp act, the Industrial Court has jurisdiction to pass such orders as it deems just and proper, pending final decision. The Industrial Court exercising jurisdiction under this provision of s. 30(2) of the mrtu & pulp act, since in its discretion has issued the order under challenge, which again is mere interim nature, this Court should not interfere with the same, more so, as the provisions incorporated under s. 30(2) of the mrtu & pulp act, indicates that the Industrial Court has got jurisdiction to pass the order of the nature which has been passed by it in the instant matter. Undisputedly when the complaint under s. 28 of the mrtu & pulp act was filed before the Industrial Court by respondent 2, the complainant was in service of respondent 3. As aforesaid his complaint was regarding apprehended termination and, therefore, a relief of direction not to terminate the services was also sought and by filing an application under s. 30(2) of the mrtu & pulp act an interim relief in this behalf was also asked. This is, therefore, a case of the apprehended termination. The question as to whether such type of termination falls in item (1) of Sch. IV of the MRTU & PULP Act, in fact is no more res integra. The Division Bench of this Court in the decision reported in Ashok Vishnu Kate v. M.R Bhope, Judge, Labour Court [1992 (2) L.L.N 191] (vide supra), has held that, in Para. 9, at pages 196 and 197:

    “……the expression ‘engaged in or engaging in any unfair labour practice’ in Sub-sec. (1) of S. 28 is of wide ambit and would cover cases where an employer Ls engaging in practice which will lead to dismissal is of considerable merit. The Legislature very wisely did not use the expression ‘where any person has committed unfair labour practice ……..’Once the employer engages in unfair labour practice, then the employee can approach the Labour Court and it is not that the cause of action for complaint under item (1) of Sch. IV accrues only when the unfair labour practice of the employer ends with the order of discharge or dismissal…….. The expression used in item (1) of Sch. IV is to discharge or dismiss employees' and the word ‘to’ gives a clear indication that in case the employer indulges in unfair labour practice which leads to discharge or dismissal, then the employee can approach the Labour Court for redressal even before the order of discharge or dismissal is passed. ….. The use of infinitive to’ shows that the action of dismissal or discharge is not yet complete. The construction on item (1) of Sch. IV should be harmonious to achieve the object of the legislation…… Any construction which ousts the jurisdiction of the Labour Court to entertain the complaint of unfair labour practice should be avoided….. In no civilsed set up, and more so, in industrial disputes the employee can be told that you must suffer at the hands of the employer and the remedy is available only when the wrong is completed ……”

    The Division Bench has further held that, in Para. 8, at page 196:

    “….The unfair labour practices contemplated by item (1) are not mere discharge or dismissal, but discharge or dismissal by adopting the practices which are set out in the item. Therefore, the unfair labour practice precedes the actual order of discharge or dismissal of the employee. The order of discharge or dismissal is merely the culmination of the unfair labour practice indulged in by the employer. The provisions of the Act were enacted not only merely to provide for remedy or to penalise the employer for indulging in unfair labour practices but also to provide machinery for prevention of unfair labour practices……… If unfair labour practice comes into existence only when an employee is discharged or dismissed from employment would lead to very unusual results. An employer may openly indulge in unfair labour practice ………by resorting to methods which are set out in items (1)(a) to (1)(f) and inspite of this unfair practice the employee will have no remedy unless and until the employee is discharged or dismissed ……An employee on discharge or dismissal would lose the employment and the source of livelihood and may subsequently get relief after passage of several years. The employee is, therefore certainly entitled to approach the Labour Court and the Labour Court has jurisdiction to entertain the complaint when the employee alleges that the employer is indulging in unfair labour practice set out in item (1) of Sch IV with a view to discharge or dismiss the employee.”

    7. Once it is found that the apprehended termination of an employee is covered by item (1) of sch. iv, s. 7 of the mrtu & pulp act comes into play and the matter has to be taken to the labour Court for redressal of the employee's grievances. In another matter the learned Single Judge of this Court in Writ Petition No. 1314 of 1980 Maharashtra State Electricity Board v. Inder Shah Shamroa Almaram decided on 24 September 1980 was dealing with the complaint in relation to item (5) of Sch. IV of the MRTU & PULP Act, wherein a relief to make them permanent was claimed. During the pendency of this complaint the services of the concerned employees were terminated. Immediately, thereafter the complainants had moved the Industrial Court under s. 30(2) of the mrtu & pulp act for the interim relief. By the application under s. 30(2) of the mrtu & pulp act a direction was sought for temporarily withdrawing order of the termination pending their complaint before the Industrial Court. It is in this background this Court dealt with the jurisdiction of the Industrial Court in the matter of grant of relief under s. 30(2) of the mrtu & pulp act. As regards the termination this Court held that:

    “The interim relief to be granted under S. 30(2) of the Act relates to the interim relief including directions to the person to withdraw temporarily the practice complained of pending final decision. Now, in the complaint before the Industrial Court, unfair practice complained of was the continuance of the employees on temporary basis with the object of depriving them of status and privileges of the permanent employees. So within the scope of this complaint, relief which is now claim, i.e, direction to the Board to temporarily withdraw order of termination of service does not fall. For that purpose separate complaint ought to have been filed in the Labour Court. If the jurisdiction were with the Industrial Court itself, perhaps I would not have interfered with the order of the Industrial Court only on account of technical reasons, of not fifing separate applications, but when the dispute falls within the ambit of item (1) of Sch. IV of the Act, the jurisdiction to try that dispute changes from the Industrial Court to Labour Court and the Industrial Court has no jurisdiction to grant the relief of directing the Board to withdraw the orders of termination of service. If the Industrial Court had no jurisdiction to direct the Board to withdraw the order of termination of service permanently the Industrial Court had no jurisdiction even to grant interim relief.”

    7A. There is no dispute that the jurisdiction to try the dispute as regards the termination is with the Labour Court, having regard to the provisions of S. 7 of the MRTU & PULP Act. This Court has already held and 1 concur with the same that if the Industrial Court has no jurisdiction to give any direction in the matter of termination, it cannot have any jurisdiction even to grant interim relief in relation to that. The instant one is a case where a direction in the matter of termination was sought in the complaint and an interim relief was also sought in relation to that. Since, it is for the Labour Court to entertain the complaint in relation to the termination, the Industrial Court could not have passed any order even at the time of final disposal of the complaint as regards the termination. Resultantly, it could not have granted any relief by way of the interim order under s. 30(2) of the mrtu & pulp act in relation to the termination of the complainant's services. The impugned order passed by the Industrial Court in the instant matter, therefore, has to he held as being without jurisdiction and, therefore, it is liable to be quashed and set aside.

    8. Sri Choudhari learned counsel for respondent 2 in the view 1 have taken as above submitted that though the petitioner after decision in the instant petition rendered earlier by my learned brother Wahane J., on 27 April 1994 was appointed as instructor in May 1994 after the decision in the Letters Patent Appeal No. 101 of 1994, his services came to be terminated from 3 January 1995 and respondent 2 has been again appointed with effect from the date he was terminated by the order, dated 22 November 1994 by respondent 3 and as such it is respondent 2 who is presently working as instructor in the faculty of fitter. Sri Choudhari then submitted that in the view taken by this Court respondent 2 intends to file complaint before the Labour Court as regards the termination aspect, which will take at least a period of one month and as such, part of this Court's order in so far as respondent 2 is concerned should be kept suspended for a period of one month from today or in case the Labour Court passes any suitable order earlier to that till that period. The request as made in the facts and circumstances of the case cannot be said to be totally unjustified.

    9. Sri Bugle learned counsel for the petitioner, however contended that though he was appointed as aforesaid, after the decision, dated 27 April 1994, in this petition in May 1994; he has been terminated by the order, dated 22 November 1994 and he is no more in service. Sri Bagale submitted that though selected he was not appointed immediately because of the interim order passed by the Industrial Court which has been found to be without jurisdiction. In fact in the submissions of Sri Bagale, the Industrial Court itself in the order under challenge has observed that prima facie the complainant has shown that there were two posts of instructor and there was sufficient work available with respondents 1 and 2 and it was, therefore, not necessary to postpone the appointment of the petitioner on the post of instructor litter. Sri Chowda, the learned Assistant Government Pleader, questioned the correctness of these observations by the Industrial Court. Whether there is one post or two posts this is a disputed question of fact and need not be gone into at this stage. The fact remains that the petitioner has been selected by the Regional Selection Board and the petitioner has become entitled for getting appointment to the post. Even as per the say of respondent 3, respondent 2 is not entitled to the post. It is in this background, it would be in the fitness of things that despite the pendency of the complaint, the petitioner is required to be given an appointment. In fact, this Court by the order, dated 27 April 1994, had already directed respondent 3 to issue the appointment order to the petitioner and to allow him to join as instructor in fitting section and it was in compliance with this order the petitioner was given an appointment in May 1994 though this order now stands set aside in Letters Patent Appeal. In the submission of Sri Bagale the decision has been set aside only on the technical ground of not giving hearing to respondent 2. Even otherwise, he submitted that since the impugned order has been found to be without jurisdiction, the petitioner is entitled to get continuity on the basis of his appointment as instructor in fitting section in the month of May 1994. However, it would not be proper to go into this aspect of the matter at least at this stage. It is however, clear that since the order of the industrial Court it is also the case of respondent 3 that respondent 2 is not entitled for permanency and held no legal right to continue in the service, the petitioner is entitled to be appointed immediately on the post of instructor in fitting section. In so far as the continuity aspect is concerned, it is made clear that the petitioner may make suitable representation in this behalf to respondent 3, who it is hoped will consider it at the earliest taking into account the facts and circumstances of the matter.

    10. It is in this view of the matter, the instant petition stands allowed. The impugned order passed by the Industrial Court is hereby quashed and set aside. The part of the instant judgment in so far as it sets aside the order of the Industrial Court will remain suspended for a period of one month from today or till passing of the suitable order by the Labour Court whichever is earlier in case respondent 2 moves that Labour Court. Respondent 2 shall move the Labour Court within two weeks from today failing which the order regarding suspension of the part of the judgment of this Court will stand automatically revoked after a period of two weeks from today. Respondent 3 Divisional Social Welfare Officer, Nagpur Division, Nagpur, shall forthwith issue order of appointment to the petitioner and allow him to join on the post of instructor in fitting section. At this stage Sri Chowda learned Assistant Government Pleader submitted that there cannot be any direction in the matter of giving appointment to the petitioner in the instant petition. In the order, dated 27 April 1994, passed by this Court in this very petition, though, it was later on set aside in the Letters Patent Appeal on different grounds such direction, in fact, had been issued and that too it appears on the concession given by the learned Government Pleader appearing before the Court. This direction was not even challenged by respondent 3 by filing letters patent appeal and was accepted. I am, therefore, not inclined to consider and decide this aspect of the matter in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case. Rule is made absolute in the above terms. There shall be no order as to costs.

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    Dilip v. Industrial Court
    (Jun 20, 1995)