Chopra, J.:— The identical question of law involved in the marginally noted petitions is whether retrospective effect is to be given to the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction (Amendment) Act, 1956, so as to make it applicable to the pending actions. The amending Act came into force on 24th September, 1956, and its section 2 in addition to certain other changes in the other sub-clauses substituted the following in place of sub-clause (iii) of section 13(3)(a) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act No. III of 1949 (hereinafter to be referred as the Act):—

“In the case of any building or rented land, if he requires it to carry out any building work at the instance of the Government or local authority or any Improvement Trust under some improvement or development scheme or if it has become unsafe or unfit for the human habitation.”

2. The sub-clause (iii) of section 13(3)(a) prior to the amendment reads:—

“In the case of any building, if he requires it for the re-erection of that building, or for its replacement by another building, or for the erection of other buildings.”

3. The effect of the amendment is that while previously a landlord, if he required the building for re-erection or replacement, could apply to the Controller for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building, after the amendment the landlord can apply to the Controller for possession of the building only if he requires it to carry out any building work at the instance of the Government or local authority. There can be no doubt that the amendment shall apply to an application for possession presented by a landlord after the commencement of Act 29 of 1956. The question, however, is whether the amendment also applies to pending proceedings, which may fall under any of the following categories:—

1. An application presented by the landlord under section 13 of the Act prior to 24th September, 1956, and pending disposal before the Controller.

2. An appeal, revision or writ petition questioning the validity of an order passed by the Controller under section 13 of the Act before its amendment, pending decision by the appellate or revisional Court or Court exercising power of superintendence.

3. An execution proceeding pending in the Court of first instance or before an appellate Court relating to the execution of an order for ejectment made under the Act prior to its amendment in 1956.

4. Section 4 of the Punjab General Clauses Act, which has direct bearing on the point in question, says:—

“Where this Act or any Punjab Act repeals any enactment then, unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not—

(a) revive anything not in force or existing at the time at which the repeal takes effect; or

(b) affect the previous operation of any enactment so repealed or anything duly done or suffered thereunder; or

(c) affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under any enactment so repealed; or

(d) affect any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred in respect of any offence committed against any enactment so repealed; or

(e) affect any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture or punishment as aforesaid;

and any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced, and any such penalty, forfeiture or punishment may be imposed as if the Repealing Act had not been passed.”

5. Whenever there is repeal of an enactment the consequences laid down in this section will follow unless, as the section itself says, a different intention appears. In the case of a simple repeal there is scarcely any room for expression of a contrary opinion. But when the repeal is followed by a fresh legislation on the same subject, the Court would undoubtedly have to look to the provisions of the new Act, but only for the purpose of determining whether they indicate a different intention. The line of enquiry in such cases would be, not whether the new Act expressly keeps alive old rights and liabilities, but whether it manifests an intention to destroy them. Section 4 of the Punjab General Clauses Act will, therefore, apply to this case of repeal and a simultaneous enactment unless a contrary intention can be gathered from the new enactment. (State Of Punjab v. Mohar Singh, Son Of Pratap Singh . A.I.R 1955 S.C 84.).

6. On behalf of the landlords, it is contended that as provided by section 4 of the General Clauses Act and according to the rule laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court, the new legislation does not take away the rights and privileges acquired by the landlord and the obligations incurred by the tenant under the earlier enactment and, therefore, the pending proceedings ought to be decided according to the law obtaining at the time the actions were commenced. According to the landlords, they had acquired the right to evict their tenants if they required the building for its re-erection or for its replacement by another building at the time the application for eviction was submitted to the Controller and this right had not been expressly or by necessary implication taken away by the new legislation. It is stressed that a statute, unless it be a statute dealing with procedural matters only, should be presumed to be prospective and construed as having no retrospective operation.

7. On the other hand, the tenants case is that a pending litigation is always to be decided according to the law existing at the time of its final decision, and an appeal being in the nature of rehearing of the case the appellate Court also is competent to take into account legislative changes since the decision under appeal was given and its powers are not confined only to see whether the lower Court's decision was correct according to the law as it stood at the time when its decision was given. (Lachmeshwar Prasad v. Keshawar Lal . A.I.R 1941 F.C 5.). When a subsequent Act Amends an earlier one in such a way as to incorporate itself, or a part of itself, into the earlier, then the earlier Act must thereafter be read and construed (except where that would lead to repugnancy, inconsistency or absurdity) as if the altered words had been written into the earlier Act with pen and ink and the old words scored out so that thereafter there is no need to refer to the amending Act at all (Shamrao V. Parulekar v. District Magistrate, Thana . A.I.R 1952 S.C 324.). It is, therefore, submitted that after the amendment in 1956 the words “this section” in Sub-section (1) of section 13 of the Act shall be construed to mean the section as amended. Section 13(1) of the Act says:—

“A tenant in possession of a building or rented land shall not be evicted therefrom in execution of a decree passed before or after the commencement of this Act or otherwise and whether before or after the termination of the tenancy, except in accordance with the provisions of this section.”

8. The argument is that after the amendment a tenant in possession of a building shall not be evicted therefrom unless the conditions laid down by the section, as amended, are satisfied and that the requirements of the law shall apply to every pending proceeding so long as the tenant has not been aerially evicted.

9. Undoubtedly, Act 29 of 1956 relates to substantive law and not merely to procedural matters. It further curtails the already truncated right of the landlord to evict his tenant. The right of a landlord to recover possession of his property from the tenant is certainly a substantive right. The rule of interpretation for the application of an amendment of a substantive law to the pending actions has recently been considered in detail and determined in two Full Bench decisions of this Court, of which I was a member. In Colonel His Highness Raja Sir Harindar Singh Brar Bans Bahadur v. The State of Punjab . 1957 59 P.L.R 386., the question referred to the Full Bench was whether compensation in respect of property acquired under the provisions of East Punjab Requisitioning of Immovable Property (Temporary Powers) Act, 1948, should be paid as provided by the said Act or under the Punjab Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1953, which repealed the earlier Act and provided a different mode for determining the amount of compensation. It was held that when law is altered during the pendency of an action the rights of the parties are decided according to the law as it existed when the action was taken, unless the new statute shows a clear intention to vary such rights. The Court is not to see whether there is an express provision permitting the continuance of pending proceedings but whether there is any clear indication against the continuance of pending proceedings to their normal termination. The argument in favour of the application of the repealing enactment to the acquisitions made under the old Act was repelled by My Lord the Chief Justice saying:—

“The argument appears to ignore the fact that although the Constitution of India does not prohibit the passage of ex post facto laws which have the effect of disturbing or destroying vested rights, it is a fundamental rule of English Law that do statute shall be construed to have a retrospective operation unless such a construction appears very clearly in the terms of the Act or is distinctly expressed and clearly and necessarily implied by the language used by the Legislature. This is particularly so when a statute impairs vested rights or the legality of past transactions or the obligation of contract. Such rights cannot be taken away by implication. ‘In order to take away the right’ observed Lord Watson in Western Counties Railway v. Windsor . 1882 7 A.C 178, 179., it is not sufficient to show that the thing sanctioned by the Act, if done, will of sheer physical necessity put an end to the right, it must also be shown that the Legislature have authorised the thing to be done at all events and irrespective of its possible interference with existing rights.”

10. In the second case Pt. Ram Parkash v. Shrimati Savitri Devi . 1957 59 P.L.R 549., the question was whether the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, was intended to operate retrospectively so as to deprive the husbands of the rights acquired by them before its enactment. It was observed that every statute which takes away or impairs a vested right acquired under the existing law or creates a new obligation, imposes a new duty or attaches a new disability in respect of transactions or considerations already past, must be deemed to be prospective. The statute would operate retrospectively only when the intent that it should so operate clearly appears from a consideration of the terms thereof, which unequivocally give the Statute a retrospective operation or imperatively require such a construction or negative the idea that it is to apply only to future cases. Emphasising the general rule of interpretation Hon'ble the Chief Justice again observes that a statute should not be given retrospective operation unless its words are so clear, strong and imperative that no other meaning can be annexed to them, or unless the intention of the Legislature could not be otherwise satisfied, particularly where retrospective operation would alter the ore-existing situation of parties or affect or interfere with their antecedent rights.

11. If two interpretations are possible, it is the duty of Court to accept the one which is more reasonable, more consistent with ordinary practice and less likely to produce impracticable or absurd results, Vested rights should not be presumed to be affected and rights of parties to an action should ordinarily be determined according to the law as it stood at the date of commencement of the action. United Provinces v. Mt. Atiga Begum . A.I.R 1941 F.C 16.. It is correct that the intention to give retrospective operation to a statute so as to make it applicable to pending actions need not be stated in express terms, necessary implication also is a recognised mode of expression. The freedom of Legislature to express its minds in any form cannot be restricted. But where any such intention is suggested, the Courts always insist on there being a clear, adequate and unequivocal expression of the intention, which should not be easy to mistake. The matter is one of construction and if upon a construction of the enactment it is absolutely apparent that it was the intention of the Legislature that provisions of the Act should apply to pending cases, they have to be so applied.

12. It is also true that social legislations, as the present one is, are generally intended to be retrospective in operation. But that would always depend upon the indication of such intention, expressly or by necessary intendment, in a particular statute. The mere fact that the object of a legislation is to eradicate some evil or to introduce a social reform cannot be regarded as a clear or sufficient indication of the intention to make the statute retrospective. You have to look to the provisions of the statute itself and judge the intention from the language used.

13. It is in the light of these well recognised rules of interpretation that we have now to look to the provisions of the statute in question. Act 29 of 1956 does not contain anything in express terms to give it a retrospective effect or to make it applicable to pending actions. It is also common ground between the parties that there is nothing in the amending Act itself from which the intention to give retrospective operation to the amendment may be implied. As already noticed, the contention is that retrospective effect to the amendment is giver by Sub-section (1) of section 13, for the phrase “this section” in this sub-section is to be read as the amended section after the amendment, the result being that a tenant, after the coming into force of the amendment, shall not be liable to be evicted except under the circumstances or on the fulfilment of the conditions mentioned in the amended section. The question would thus rest on the interpretation to be placed upon and the effect to be given to the phrase “except in accordance with the provisions of this section” in the sub-section. It may here be useful to examine briefly the historical background.

14. The first legislation on the subject was passed in the United Punjab in 1341. The Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1941 merely imposed limitations on the powers of the landlord to claim rent in excess of the “standard rent” or to eject the tenant so long as the tenant was willing and ready to pay the rent admissible under the Act. Jurisdiction of civil Courts to determine these questions was not excluded and decrees passed by civil Courts continued to be executable as before. Before the expiration of the extended life of this Act, the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act VI of 1947 was promulgated. This Act, for the first time, constituted a special tribunal for determining disputes between landlords and tenants and introduced a radical change in the administration of the Rent Cortrol Law. Section 13(1) of the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1947, laid down:—

“A tenant in possession of a building or rented land shall not be evicted therefrom in execution of a decree passed before or after the commencement of this Act or otherwise and whether before or after the termination of the tenancy, except in accordance with the provisions of this section.”

15. Sub-sections (2) and (3) of section 13 enumerated the circumstances under which a landlord could apply to the Controller for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the leased premises. The Controller, if satisfied that any of those circumstances existed, was to make an order directing the tenant to deliver possession of the building to the landlord. Section 17 of this Act provided for the execution of the Controller's order by a civil Court having jurisdiction in the area as if it were a decree of that Court. The law did not prohibit the institution of a suit for possession by the landlord or the civil Court to pass a decree for possession against the tenant. Even though a civil Court could pass a decree for possession, the decree was not capable of being executed by the Court. A decree obtained prior to the coming into force of this Act was also made, in express terms, unexecutable. Thenceforth, it was the order of a Controller alone that could be executed. This intention of the Legislature was made clear by use of the phrase “except in accordance with the provisions of this section”. The intention unmistakably was to withdraw the executability of a decree passed by a civil Court whether before or after the commencement of Act, 1947. The phrase “except in accordance with the provisions of this section” was meant to impress that thenceforth the only forum for the landlord to obtain an executable order of eviction was the special tribunal (Controller) established under that Act.

16. In 1948, certain amendments were made in the Act of 1947, but sub-section (i) was left unamended. Act of 1947 was repealed and its place was taken by the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949, which came into force on 25th March, 1949. Sub-section (1) of section 13 of Act, 1949, as originally enacted, was substantially the same, it stated:—

“A tenant in possession of a building or rented land shall not be evicted therefrom in execution of a decree passed before or after the commencement of this Act or otherwise and whether before or after the termination of the tenancy, except in accordance with the provisions of this section.”

17. The question then arose whether an order of eviction passed by the Controller under section 13 of Act of 1947 was covered by the only exception provided in section 13(1) of the Act and was executable under section 17 of the Act. In other words, whether the eviction of a tenant in execution of such an order would be “in accordance with the provisions of this section”. Obviously, “this section” meant section 13 of the repealing Act of 1949. Answer to the question in the negative would have created anomalies and resulted in absurdities.

18. In Amar Nath v. Nathoo Ram . A.I.R 1951 Punj. 329. my learned brother Bhandari, J. (as he then was) saved the ridiculous situation by taking recourse to section 22 of the Punjab General Clauses Act and held that an order passed by the Controller in exercise of the powers conferred upon him by Act VI of 1947 must be deemed to be an order passed by him in exercise of the powers conferred upon him by the Act of 1949. It, was after this decision that section 13(1) of the Act was amended and another exception “or in pursuance of an order made under section 13 of the Punjab Urban Kent Restriction Act, 1947, as subsequently amended” was introduced. This was done by section 2 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction (Amendment) Ordinance No. 6 of 1950, published in Punjab Gazette dated 30th May, 1950. The section further provided that the amendment shall be deemed to have been made since the commencement of the Act.

19. If the interpretation sought to be placed by the tenants be accepted, the result would be that an order of ejectment passed by the Controller under section 13(3)(a) of the Act, before its amendment in 1956, shall not be executable, although an order under the identical provisions of Act, 1947 shall be regarded as valid and capable of being executed. The absurdity is self-evident and such a result would never have been intended.

20. Sub-sections (2) and (3) of section 13 of the Act lay down the procedure to be followed where a landlord seeks the eviction of his tenant and state the grounds on which the landlord may apply to the Controller for an order of eviction and the circumstances under which the Controller may pass an order for eviction. The sub-sections do not deal with the actual eviction of the tenant. “Evict” literally means “to dispossess by law or expel by legal process”. Eviction consists in physical act of throwing out the tenant from the building which he is occupying. One of the methods of such eviction is by the process of execution of a decree for possession. Sub-section (1) of section 13 makes it clear that this method stands prohibited and that the only permissible method will be to obtain an order of eviction from the Controller as provided by the section. The order passed by the Controller can be executed and actual eviction obtained as provided by section 17 of the Act. The phrase “in accordance with the provisions of this section”, in my opinion, only means “in the method or mode provided by the section,” that is, by means of obtaining an order for eviction from the Controller. What the sub-section provides is that the eviction shall not take place except “in accordance with the provisions of this section.” This may legitimately be construed to mean that the eviction shall take place only in the manner provided by the section. In other words, it is not the order of eviction that is required to be “in accordance with the provisions” of the section, but the eviction is required to take place as provided by the section.

21. Sub-sections (2) and (3) of section 13 only say that a landlord may apply to the Controller for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession, if the circumstances mentioned in the sub-sections exist. For instance, before the amendment of 1956, a landlord could apply to the Controller for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession, in the case of any building, if he required the building for its re-erection. The amendment says that he can so apply only if he requires the building to carry out any building work at the instance of the Government or local authority. It clearly means that the amendment is to apply only to future applications for ejectment and not to those which have already been presented or in which an order has already been made. In the absence of anything to the contrary, in express terms or by necessary implication, the amendment shall have to be regarded as prospective. Sub-section (1) of section 13 is no doubt pronouncedly retrospective in its operation so far as the executability of a decree is concerned, it is expressly made applicable even to decrees passed before the Act came into foree. No such intention is expressed in sub-sections (2) and (3) of the section. That the Legislature had demonstrated an intention to enact retrospectively to a certain extent is not sufficient to warrant a retrospective operation carried beyond the meaning of the terms used strictly construed. (Craies on Interpretation of Statutes, page 360).

22. It is perfectly true that whenever an amended Act has to be applied subsequent to the date of the amendment the various unamended provisions of the Act have to be read along with the amended provision as though they are part of it. This is for the purpose of determining what the meaning of any particular provision of the Act as amended is, whether it is in the unamended part or in the amended part. The result is that “this section” in section 13(1), subsequent to the date of the amendment, is to be read as the section as amended. But this is not the same thing as saying that the amendment itself must be taken to have been in existence as from the date of the earlier Act. That would be imputing to the amendment retrospective operation which could only be done if such retrospective operation is given by the amending Act either expressly or by necessary implication. (Shri Ram Narain v. Simla Banking & Industrial Co. Limited . A.I.R 1956 S.C 614.).

23. In applications presented after the amendment, the Controller must necessarily take notice of the amendment in the provisions of the section and of the new circumstances which the landlord is required to establish for obtaining the eviction of his tenant. But as I look at it the mere use of the phrase “except in accordance with the provisions of this section” in Sub-section (1) of section 13 does not unequivocally and unmistakably express the intention of the legislature to give retrospective operation to all and every subsequent amendments to the rest of the provisions of the section and to take away vested rights of the parties to a litigation already commenced. “Vested right” is the power to do certain actions or possess certain things lawfully, and is substantially a property right, which may be created by common law, by statute, or by contract. There is a vested right in an accrued cause of action or in a defence to a cause of action. Right of a landlord to apply for and obtain an order of eviction of his tenant is certainly a right in property and a vested right.

24. Where two interpretations may be possible, the Courts have always leaned in favour of interpreting every substantive law to be prospective. Section 18 of the Gaming Act, 8 and 9 Vict. C. 109 was in the following terms:—

“And be it enacted, that all contracts or agreements, whether by parol or in writing, by way of gaming or wagering, shall be null and void; and that no suit shall be brought or maintained in any Court of law or equity for recovering any sum of money or valuable thing alleged to be won upon any wager, or which shall have been deposited in the hands of any person to abide the event on which any wager shall have been made.”

25. The question arose whether the pre-emptory inhibition against the institution of maintenance of any suit in any Court of law or equity for recovering any sura of money on the baits of a wagering contract would apply to suits instituted before and pending at the time of the commencement of the statute. Dealing with the question Parke, J. in Moon v. Durden . 1848 2 Exch. 22. observes:—

“It seems a strong thing to hold, that the Legislature could have meant that a party who, under a contract made prior to the Act, had as perfect a title to recover a sum of money, as he had to any of his personal property, should be totally deprived of it without compensation. It is a still stronger thing to hold, that, it he has already commenced an action with an undoubted right to recover his debt and costs, he should not only forfeit both, but also be liable, as he would in the ordinary course of a suit, to pay the costs of his adversary, by being obliged to discontinue, or be non-prossed, or have his judgment arrested. These considerations afford a stong reason for limiting the operation of the words of this section, and holding that they apply to future contracts, and actions on such future contracts only at all events, to future actions only, if any distinction can be made in the degrees of apparent injustice.

The enactment, ‘that all contracts or agreements, by way of gaming or wagering, shall be null and void,’ if it stood by itself ought most clearly to be construed as applicable to future contracts and agreements only, by virtue of the rule of construction to which I have adverted, and the apparent injustice of putting an end to a vested right. So, if the next part stood alone, it would, I think, though not so clearly, be construed, for the same reason, to apply to future actions only; and the clause, to avoid the injustice which would otherwise be inflicted on a plaintiff, should be construed to mean, not that an action already brought should not be maintained, but that no action should afterwards be brought, or, if brought, maintained; and the absence of any provisions that the costs of an existing action should be paid by a defendant, in my mind, strongly favours that construction. The union of the two clauses together does not appears to me to make any difference. The latter clause is surplusage, so far as it relates to bringing actions, whether we construe the former to apply to future or existing contracts; and the only observation that can be made is, that in one mode of construing the enactment the word ‘maintained’ is inoperative, in the other it is not. It is redundant, unless it applies to the maintenance of an existing action; but this circumstance of mere redundancy does not appear to me to be sufficient to shew, that the Legislature meant to do so unjust a thing as to prevent the maintenance of an existing well-founded action. I think it best to abide by the sound rule of construction above referred to notwithstanding the conjectures as to the real intention of the legislature, which the nature of the subject occasions I therefore hold that, at all events, this action is maintainable, and am disposed to say that the clause affects none but future wagers; and, consequently, that the plaintiff is entitled to our judgment.”

26. Even at the risk of declaring the second clause “or maintained” as redundant, three of the four eminent Judges who decided the case did not agree to apply the statute to a pending action.

27. Section 4 of the Trade Disputes Act, 1906, provided inter alia that an action against a Trade Union “shall not be entertained by any Court.” The Court of Appeal in Smithies v. National Association of Operative Plasturers . 1909 1 K.B 310., took the view that, that section was not intended to be retrospective so as to apply to the suits already instituted. This decision was followed in Beadling v. Goll . 1922 39 T.L.R 128., a case under the Gaming Act, 1922. This Act received the Royal Assent on 20th July, 1922. Section 1 of the Act provided that no action for the recovery of money under section 2 of the Gamine Act, 1835, “shall be entertained in any Court.” The actions in question had been commenced in December, 1921, and decided on the 28th July, 1922. Effect to the new Act was given and the suits dismissed. The dismissal was set aside on appeal and it was held that the provision in section 1 of the Gaming Act, 1922, that no action for the recovery of money under section 2 of the Gaming Act, 1835, shall be entertained in any Court, is not retrospective in regard to actions which had commenced before the passing of the Act and in which judgment had not been given when the Act came into force. As regards the defective drafting Lord Justice Scrutton is reported to have observed:—

“It was a pity that Parliament and those who advised Parliament did not see that the matter was made clear * * *.

It was a great pity that legislation was carried on in this way on a point which any lawyer must have foreseen would arise and on which the wording of the Act was left in deliberate obscurity.”

28. The same can certainly be said in respect of the provisions of the enactment in question.

29. Henshall v. Porter . 1923 2 K.B 193., is another case under the Gaming Act, 1922. Here, the plaintiff, after the Act came into force, issued a writ in respect of causes of action which had arisen before that Act came into force. The prohibitory provision that no action “shall be entertained in any Court” was not regarded as sufficient indication of the Act being retrospective, and it was held that plaintiffs' cause of action, vested in him before the Act of 1922 came into force, was not divested on the Act coming into force and that he was entitled to recover. The force of the general rule of interpretation was impressed by Mc. Cardie, J. in the following terms:—

“In my opinion the Act of 1922 must be considered in the light of settled, recognised and beneficent rule of law that existing rights are not to be deemed to be destroyed by a statute unless there be express words or the plainest implication to that effect. I need not cite the overwhelming body of authority as to this; many of the decisions and text books are quoted in Bowling v. Camp . 39 T.L.R 31.. I see nothing in the Act of 1922 which compells me to give it a retrospective operation. Take the broad facts here. On July, 20th 1922, the plaintiff possessed fully accrued rights under the Act of 1835. The defendant then owed him statutory debts: see Cohen v. Hall . 1922 2 K.B 37.. These debts constituted preperty in the fullest sense of the words. Can it justly be said that on July 20th 1922, that property was wholly destroyed by an ambiguously worded Act of Parliament? In my opinion the answer is No. It should, I Venture to think, be remembered that in many cases the statutory debts under the Act of 1835 may have been assigned for value or may have been mortgaged to secure advances.”

30. In Gillmore v. Shooter . 1677 2 Mod. 310., the point arose on the Statute of Frauds (29 Car. 2, C. 3), which was passed in 1676. Section 4 of this Act provided that “no action shall be brought” in certain cases without a writing testifying the promise. Before that statute became law a cause of action accrued to the plaintiff, but he had no writing in support. After the statute was passed he commenced his action. It was held that the words “no action shall be brought” did not debar his claim, for “it could not be presumed that the Act had a retrospect to take away an action to which the plaintiff was then entitled.”

31. In Thistelton v. Frewer . 1862 L.J Ex. 230., during the pendency of an action the Medical Act (21 and 22 Vict. C. 90) was passed and its section 32 enacted that after 1st January, 1861, no person shall be entitled to recover any charge in any Court of law for any medical or surgical advice, attendance etc., unless he could prove upon the trial that he was registered under that Act. The plaintiff in the aforesaid action was not registered under that Act and his suit although instituted before 1st January, 1861, came up for trial subsequent to that date. It was held that the plaintiff's right to the recovery of the amount claimed by him could not be affected by the Act that came into force after he had instituted the suit. I see no substantial difference between the provisions “no person shall be entitled to recover any charge” and “no landlord shall be entitled to evict a tenant.” The rule of interpretation as laid down in some of these English decisions has received the express approval of their Lordships of the Federal Court United Provinces v. Mst. Atiga Begum.

32. A subsequent amendment in law was not held to take away the right of appeal or revision against the decision in a pending case in Keshoram Poddar v. Nundu Lal Mallick . A.I.R 1927 P.C 97. and Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. v. Income tax Commissioner, Delhi . A.I.R 1927 P.C 242. and Kartar Singh v. Hassanand . A.I.R 1948 Sind. 86..

33. In C.M Moothaliondam Chetty v. G. Venkatesan Chetti . A.I.R 1945 Mad. 386. and Thelepurath Madhavakurup v. K. Muhammad Sukri . A.I.R 1949 Mad. 367., the question arose whether section 8(1) and (2) of the amended Rent Control Order (which was almost in similar terms as section 13 of the Act) should be so construed as to have retrospective operation and affect the rights of the parties in a pending litigation. In the first of these cases a decree for ejectment of the tenant was obtained prior to the amendment, and in the second the decree was passed after the amendment had come into force but in a suit instituted before the amendment. Objection to the executability of the decree on the score of the amendment was ruled out because the amendment was not held to be retrospective. In the tatter case Panchapagesa Sastri, J. followed the earlier decision and observed.—

“If there had been no amendment in the interval, the landlord, who had a right to obtain an executable decree in ejectment when the suit was instituted, could have taken out execution proceedings and obtained delivery of possession from the tenant in due course of execution of the decree which he had obtained in the suit. Such a right could not be a mere matter of procedure which could be taken away by the amended provisions of the new order unless there id any clear indication that the amended order should apply so as to take away even existing rights of a substantive character, rights which had accrued prior to the coming into force of the new amendment, and indeed, rights for the enforcement of which an action had been instituted in the civil Court. Section 8(1) no doubt is very wide in its terms and operates to prevent a tenant from being evicted, ‘whether in execution of a decree or otherwise and whether before or after the termination of the tenancy’. The advocate for the respondent strenuously contends that these words are by themselves sufficient to indicate that the Legislature meant to take away pre-existing rights. He lays particular stress on the words ‘whether in execution of a decree or otherwise.’ It is however possible to give a meaning to these words without necessarily construing the section as taking away the rights of parties in an action instituted before the amendment came into force.”

34. It is correct that section 13(1) of the Act expressly makes its provisions applicable to decrees, whether passed before or after the commencement of the Act. But that is immaterial so far as the ratio decidendi of the above decisions is concerned.

35. Reference may usefully be made to a Full Bench decision of the Lahore High Court in Peoples Bank of Northern India Ltd. v. Wahid Bux . A.I.R 1943 Lah. 170 in which the question arose whether retrospective effect was to be given to section 35 of the Punjab Ralief of Indebtedness Act No. 12 of 1940, so as to make it applicable to the pending execution applications. The section amended section 60 of the Code of Civil Procedure and exempted from “attachment or sale” one main residential house belonging to a judgment-debtor other than an agriculturist and which was occupied by him. In this case, the Official Liquidator had obtained a payment order and in execution thereof had got a house of the judgment-debtor attached before the coming into force of Act 12 of 1940. After this Act came into force, the judgment-debtor made an application for release of his residential house from attachment. The objection was allowed and the learned Single Judge of the High Court ordered that the house under attachment should be released. The Letters Patent appeal was referred to the Full Bench and it was held—

“Exempting property from sale is not a mere matter of procedure. It is a matter affecting the rights of the decree holder and the obligations of the judgment debtor. Act 12 of 1940 has thus taken away a substantive or vested right in the decree-holder who had attached property before the Act came into force. Since there is no express provision in the Act which makes section 35 retrospective and since there is nothing in the wording of section 35 which compels a Court to hold that it was intended to have a retrospective effect, the section is not retrospective and does not apply to the execution proceedings pending at the time the Act come into force where attachment had already been effected.”

36. It was contended that the use of the word “or” in the phrase “shall not be liable to attachment or sale” makes it clear that the Legislature had in mind cases where the attachment might have taken place but the sale had not, before the Act came into force. It meant to say that the property would not be sold but the attachment, which was validly made, would have to be subsisted presumably for all times. Refuting the argument Harries, C.J observes—

“I am unable to place such a construction upon these words. It appears to me that on the plain meaning of the section, the intention of the Legislature was to exempt all property in future from attachment and sale following such attachment. It was never the intention to exempt property already attached from the consequences of such attachment, namely, sale. In my view every word in section 35 of Act 12 of 1940 can be given full weight without giving that section retrospective effect. To hold that the section applies not to pending proceedings after attachment does no violence whatsoever to the terms of the section, but on the contrary gives full effect to the words used. That being so, I am bound to hold that the section is not retrospective and does not apply to execution proceedings pending at the time the Act came into force where attachment had already been effected.”

37. In Mohd. Amir Khan v. M. Mohd. Khalil . A.I.R 1947 Lah. 180., during the pendency of a suit for ejectment of the tenant and for recovery of the arrears of rent, the following notification under the Defence of India Rules was issued:—

“No tenant or sub-tenant shall be evicted from any such accommodation so long as he pays and is ready and willing to pay rent according to the terms of the tenancy and subject to the limit fixed in the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act and otherwise in the opinion of the District Magistrate, Sargodha, conducts himself as a good tenant both as regards personal conduct and reasonable care of the property.”

38. The trial Court as well as the first appellate Court gave effect to the notification and dismissed the suit. On second appeal to the High Court it was held—

“There was absolutely nothing in the notification to show that it was intended to have a retrospective operation. If the notification were fatal to the continuance of the suit, the plaintiff, on the dismissal of his suit, might be made liable for the defendant's costs and this by itself was a very weighty consideration for holding that the notification was not intended to have retrospective operation so as to affect pending actions. Hence, as the plaintiff, at the time the suit was instituted, had a complete and indefeasible right to maintain the suit which was properly filed, the notification could not be relied on in bar of the suit.”

39. Dealing directly with the point is a decision of G.D Khosla, J. in Hari Ram v. Mangoo Ram . 1957 59 P.L.R 94.. In this case, the landlord of the premises in dispute made an application for eviction of his tenant on the ground that he required the building for reconstruction and he was, therefore, entitled to apply for an order directing the tenant to put him in possession under the provision of section 13(3)(a)(iii) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949. It was found by the Rent Controller and also by the Appellate Authority that the land lord did in fact require the premises for reconstruction and that he bona fide intended to rebuild them. The order of eviction was challenged in the High Court in a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution on the ground that the amending Act No. 29 of 1956, which had come into force in the meantime, gave protection to the tenant from ejectment inasmuch as the landlord was not required to carry out the building work at the instance of the Government or any local authority as provided by section 2 of the new Act. The question whether the provisions of section 2 of the Punjab Act 29 of 1956 give any protection to a tenant against whom an order of eviction was applied for and passed before this Act came into force, was answered in the negative and the writ petition dismissed. The learned Judge observes—

“There is no doubt that the laws relating to tenancy are intended for the protection of tenants. At the same time they do retain certain rights possessed by landlords. One of the rights which the landlord has is to apply for the eviction of his tenant and obtain possession of his premises. This right has been considerably curtailed by the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act. The right has been further curtailed by Punjab Act 29 of 1956 but the amendment clearly relates to substantive law and not to procedural law. It does not deprive the landlord of his right, however, truncated and attenuated that right was, with retrospective effect, and where a landlord has under the old Act of 1949 applied for eviction and obtained an order thereon, he will be entitled to enforce that order despite any subsequent amendment which ourtails his right still further.”

40. As regards the retrospective effect of the amending Act, he further observes—

“The amending Act does not say that the tenant will be entitled to retain possession of the premises in his occupation unless these premises are unsafe and have to be rebuilt at the instance of the Government or a local authority. What the Act says is that the landlord may in future apply for ejectment on the ground of rebuilding only if certain conditions are satisfied. This amounts not so much to giving protection to the tenant as to curtailment of the landlord's rights. The deprivation of the landlord's right or its curtailment may result in increased protection to the tenant, but the terms in which the amending Act is phrased relates rather to the right of the landlord than to the right of the tenant and therefore it seems to me that the amending Act does not affect the validity of the order passed in this case. The order was good under the old law and must now be given effect to.”

41. The conclusion was arrived at upon a consideration of the amending Act itself without reference to the provisions of section 13(1) of the Act. That aspect of the matter was not placed before the learned Judge and, therefore, was not considered.

42. Another case of this Court which involved an identical point is Motia Wanti v. Sardha Ram . C.R No. 92 of 1956., decided by My Lord the Chief Justice on 20th January, 1957. Here, too, the landlord had applied for securing eviction of his tenant on the ground that she required the building for re-erection and for its replacement by another building. The Rent Controller ordered the eviction of the tenant but the District Judge, on appeal, came to a contrary conclusion and dismissed the application. The landlord went in revision to the High Court and a prayer for interference under Article 227 of the Constitution was also made. The tenant opposed the petition, taking his stand on the amendment of law in 1956, which had come into force in the meantime. Mr. Shamair Chand, learned counsel for the landlord, did not dispute the retrospective operation of the amendment. On the other hand, the counsel conceded that because of the subsequent change in law the landlord was no longer entitled to secure the eviction of her tenant on the grounds mentioned by her in the original application. He prayed for the case to be remanded to the trial Court for determining whether the house in question had become unsafe or unfit for human habitation, as required by the amended provision. The prayer was refused because no such ground was taken up in the original application for ejectment. It was in these circumstances that the following observation, reliance on which is being placed on behalf of the tenants, was made by My Lord the Chief Justice:—

“The changes introduced by the new provision are substantial and it is no longer open to a landlord to secure the eviction of his tenant on the ground only that he requires the building for purposes of re-erection of the building or for its replacement by another building. The eviction can be secured if and only if he complies with the provision of law which is now in force. In other words, eviction can be secured if the landlord complies with the provisions of clause (iii) as substituted by Punjab Act 29 of 1956.”

43. Certainly the conclusion was in consonance with the law as it existed on the date of the decision, the retroactivity of which was not disputed. The decision cannot, therefore, be regarded as authority on the point in question, which was neither considered nor decided.

44. Another decision relied upon by learned counsel for the tenants is also of no help to them. In that case, Korah Punnen v. Parameswara Kurup Vasudeva . A.I.R 1956 Trav. Co. 1., a compromise decree for possession of the leased premises passed against a tenant by a civil Court was sought to be executed after the coming into force of the Rent Control Order, 1950. The Order required that before a tenant is sought to be evicted on the ground of denial of title of the landlord there should be a decision of the Rent Controller that the denial was not bona fide, before the civil Court can pass a decree for eviction on that ground, or there should be an order by the Rent Controller for eviction of the tenant on that ground. On behalf of the landlord it was argued that after the date of the compromise decree the defendants were only in the position of licensees and not tenants and that, therefore, they were not entitled to the benefit under the Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Order. The argument was repelled and it was held—

“Whatever may be the nature of the decree, eviction of a tenant in execution of the decree is prohibited under clause 9(i) of the Order except in certain specified cases. Since the provision contained in the clause is mandatory, and consent and compromise decrees are not exempted from the ambit of the clause, the Court is debarred from evicting tenants in execution of compromise or consent decrees also except in accordance with the provisions of the clause. It is a case of the Court having no jurisdiction to execute the decree for eviction by reason of the statutory prohibition and therefore, there is no scope for the application of the doctrine of waiver.”

45. Obviously, this was a case of execution of a decree for possession passed by a civil Court, which was expressly prohibited by the Rent Control Order.

46. Certain observations of Basheer Ahmed Sayeed, J. in B.A Woodman v. Mrs. Regina Rajan . A.I.R 1953 Mad. 378., appear to support the tenants' case, but as the judgment would show they were based upon the specific provisions of the amending Act No. 8 of 1951. In this case, the landlady had obtained an order for eviction from the Rent Controller on 7th September, 1960. She took out execution of this order in the City Civil Court as provided by the Act under which the order was made. Before actual eviction could take place the amending Act came into force on 1st May, 1951. The tenant then put in a petition for cancellation of the warrant for possession on the ground that no order of eviction should be passed against him by virtue of the amended provisions. The prayer was refused and the tenant went in revision to the High Court Section 12(b) of Act of 1951 gave the High Court and the District Judge power to revise, on the application of any aggrieved party, any order passed or proceeding taken by the authority, either the Rent Controller or the executing authority. An Explanation was appended to this section which extended the jurisdiction of the High Court and the District Judge also to orders passed on proceedings taken at any time within six months before the commencement of the amending Act of 1951. Section 21 of Act, 1951 stated inter alia that any rule or order made or any action or proceeding taken under the old Act shall be deemed to be a rule or order trade or action or proceeding taken under the corresponding provisions of the amending Act. The effect of these provisions read with section 24 of the old Act was that any application on made, appeal preferred or other proceeding instituted under the old Act and pending at the commencement of Act of 1951 was to be disposed of as if Act of 1951 had been in force at the time when such application, appeal or proceeding was made, preferred or instituted. In was in view of these provisions that the learned Judge revised and set aside the eviction order dated 7th September, 1950 passed by the Rent Controller and quashed the proceedings pending before the City Civil Judge.

47. For all these reasons, it can not be said that there is no escape from the conclusion that the use of the words “except in accordance with the provisions of this section” in Sub-section (1) of section 13 of the Act was intended to give retrospective operation to all and every subsequent amendment of the provisions of the section. In that view of the matter, the amendment of clause (a) of sub-section (3) of section 13 of the Act by Act 29 of 1956 shall have no application to the proceedings for an order of eviction instituted under section 13(3)(a) of the Act prior to the coming into force of Act 29 of 1956 whether they be pending decision in the original or appellate Court or Court of revision or superintendence, nor to the proceedings seeking execution of an order of eviction made under section 13(3)(a) of the Act prior to its amendment in 1956.

48. Now coming to the individual cases. In Civil Revision 67 of 1957, the application for eviction presented by the landlord was allowed by the Controller on 10th April, 1956, and the tenant's appeal against that order was dismissed by the District Judge on 1st February, 1957. Objection based upon the amendment is raised for the first time in this petition for revision preferred by the tenant. No other point is being urged, the petition is consequently dismissed.

49. In Civil Revision 243 of 1957, an eviction order was made on 8th October, 1954, and it was sought to be executed in the Court of Sub-Judge, Ludhiana. The tenant took objection to the execution alleging that a fresh lease was granted to him by the landlord after the passing of the order for eviction. The objection did not find favour with the Controller, and the tenant's appeal was dismissed by the District Judge. The only point urged in this petition for revision is that the tenant is not liable to be ejected because of the subsequent amendment in law. The petition is dismissed.

50. In Civil Revision 644 of 1957, the amendment came into force during the pendency of the application for eviction before the Controller. Effect to the amendment was given and the landlord's application was dismissed. District Judge concurred with the finding and the dismissed the appeal. This is a petition for revision preferred by the landlord. It shall have to be accepted and the order of the Controller and that of the District Judge set aside. I order accordingly. The cases shall now go back to the Controller for its fresh decision in accordance with law.

51. In Civil Revision 101 of 1957, an order of ejectment of the tenant was made by the Controller on 1st October, 1956. The tenant filed an appeal in the Court of District Judge, Rohtak and took his stand on the amended law. The learned District Judge over ruled the objection and dismissed the appeal. In this petition for revision preferred by the tenant no other point is being passed. The petition is, therefore dismissed.

52. In Civil Revisions 76 and 77 of 1957. The amendment came into force during the pendency of the applications for eviction of the tenants. Effect to the amendment was given and the applications were dismissed. On appeal the learned District Judge, Amritsar, was of opinion that the amendment could have no retrospective effect and, therefore, it did not apply to the applications which were presented before the amendment came into force. He allowed the appeals and remanded the cases to the Controller for decision on merits. These are petitions for revision presented by the tenants. No other point except the application of the amended law is involved in the cases. The petitions are consequently rejected.

53. In Civil Miscellaneous 791 of 1956, an application presented by the landlord for eviction of his tenant was rejected by the Controller, holding that the prayer was not bona fide. On 4th July, 1956, the landlords appeal was accepted by District Judge. Ludhiana, and an order for eviction was passed. This petition under Article 227 of the Constitution was presented by the tenant on 24th August, 1956. Objection on the basis of the amended law was raised for the first time during arguments. No other point is being pressed. This petition also is, therefore, dismissed. In view of the point of law involved, the parties to all these cases are left to bear their own costs.

54. Bhandari, C.J:— I agree.

55. Order accordingly.