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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion by S. Rangarajan, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner claimed appointment as a Constable on 23-1-1959 and confirmation on 1-8-1964. He was placed on List "C" (Clerical) and promoted to officiate as Head Constable (Ministerial) effective 16-5-1964 with special pay, according to documents annexed to the petition and admissions in the respondent's affidavit.

During the Delhi Police agitation of April 1967 the petitioner was suspended with effect from 13-4-1967 for allegedly leaving his office without permission and inciting other staff to stop work and join a strike. A departmental inquiry was conducted; an enquiry report found the petitioner guilty of grave misconduct and, on 31-10-1967, the Superintendent of Police dismissed him. The dismissal was appealed and the appeal and subsequent representations were rejected. The petitioner filed the present Writ Petition under Articles 226/227 on 6-3-1969. By order of the Lt. Governor dated 15-4-1971 the dismissal of the petitioner (and others) was converted into "removal".

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the disciplinary proceedings and dismissal (and subsequent conversion into removal) were invalid because the petitioner had been promoted/appointed to the rank of Head Constable by an authority superior in rank to the Superintendent of Police who dismissed him, thereby engaging Article 311(1) of the Constitution.
  2. Whether the departmental inquiry was vitiated for failure to comply with Rules 16.24 (personal hearing and procedure) and related provisions of the Punjab Police Rules (Vol. II), including alleged failures to supply documents and permit effective cross-examination.
  3. Whether Rule 16.38 (requiring reference to the District Magistrate where a police officer is alleged to have committed a criminal offence in relation to official relations with the public) applied and, if so, whether non-compliance with it required quashing of the departmental proceedings.
  4. Whether there was discriminatory/selective treatment in referring or not referring identical cases to the District Magistrate (invoking Article 14 concerns) and whether such discrimination undermined the departmental action.
  5. Whether the Lt. Governor had lawful authority to convert the dismissal into removal and whether that conversion was effective.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The petitioner contended he was promoted to Head Constable by the Deputy Inspector General of Police (and related orders indicate Inspector General involvement) and therefore could not lawfully be dismissed by a Superintendent of Police subordinate in rank under Article 311(1).
  • Rule 16.38 procedures were not followed: the Department did not put the petitioner's case before the District Magistrate for decision whether to prosecute or proceed departmentally, whereas an identical case (Kishan Chand) had been referred and prosecuted; this showed discriminatory treatment.
  • The departmental inquiry breached procedural fairness (Rule 16.24 and Rule 16.14(ix)): the petitioner was not given a last personal hearing before the punishing authority, copies of some depositions/preliminary enquiry report were not supplied, and some defence witnesses listed were not examined without explanation.
  • The officer who conducted the preliminary inquiry was examined as a witness without prior notice and without supplying his earlier report, impeding effective cross-examination.
  • The conversion of dismissal into removal by the Lt. Governor was challenged as unauthorized and therefore ineffective.
  • Selective enforcement and discrimination (compared to Kishan Chand and others) raised Article 14 issues and indicated unfairness in departmental decision-making.

Respondents' Arguments

  • The respondents (Inspector General of Police) denied that the petitioner was initially appointed by the D.I.G., though they admitted the facts relating to his promotion and special pay; they argued the promotion order bearing the Assistant Inspector General's signature should be read as action by an officer not higher than the Superintendent of Police because the Assistant Inspector General functioned on behalf of the Inspector General and was himself in the cadre of a Superintendent of Police.
  • On Rule 16.38 the respondents argued the facts against the petitioner did not indicate commission of a criminal offence in relation to the police officer's relations with the public, and thus the rule was inapplicable.
  • On discrimination the respondents submitted that differential treatment alone was not a ground for challenge unless Article 14 was engaged, and that executive instructions are not "law" for Article 14 purposes.
  • The respondents relied upon precedent (Union of India v. Ram Kishan and Union of India v. Jagjit Singh) to support the proposition that a Superintendent of Police (Traffic) could be competent to dismiss a Constable in Delhi.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Bachubha Ramsinhji v. Shivlal (Vol. 6, 1971 (2) S.L.R 588) That promotion to a higher post (Constable to Head Constable) may amount to a fresh appointment, and thus the appointing authority's rank matters for dismissal under Article 311. The Court relied on this principle to consider whether promotion of the petitioner amounted to a fresh appointment by an authority superior in rank to the Superintendent who dismissed him.
N. Somasunaaram v. State of Madras (A.I.R 1956 Madras 419) That a person actually appointed by a D.I.G. could not be dismissed by an officer inferior in rank to the D.I.G. Referenced to support the proposition that actual appointing authority's rank determines who can dismiss under Article 311 principles.
Delhi Transport Undertaking v. B.B.L. Hajelay (1972 S.L.R 787) Clarification that for Article 311 the relevant subordination is of "rank" and not merely "functions"; status of employee and status of adjudicating authority are material. Applied to explain that the Court must look to the rank/status of the authority who promoted/appointed the petitioner when assessing whether a subordinate could dismiss him.
Union of India v. Ram Kishan ((1971) 2 SCC 349 : A.I.R 1971 S.C 1402) Authority that a Superintendent of Police (Traffic) was competent to dismiss a Foot Constable in Delhi; Supreme Court precedent on competence of SP (Traffic) in Delhi. The respondents relied on this decision, but the Court reviewed the context (including administrative orders vesting SPs in Delhi with District SP powers) when considering competence to dismiss.
Union of India v. Jagjit Singh ((1969) 2 SCC 108 : A.I.R 1970 S.C 122) Earlier Supreme Court authority followed in Ram Kishan regarding competence of a Superintendent of Police to dismiss a constable; interpreted Police Act and Rules together. Referred to illustrate that in some circumstances an SP may have competence, but the Court examined the factual basis and the rank/status of the appointing authority in the present case.
D.P. Joshi v. State of Madhya Pradesh (A.I.R 1955 S.C 334) Reference on Article 14 that something amounting to "law" within Article 14 must be violated to attract equal protection jurisprudence (as cited by the Court). Used in discussion of discrimination/selective enforcement and whether Rule 16.38 or executive instructions could engage Article 14 protection.
The General Manager, South Central Railway v. A.V.R. Siddhanti (1974 1 S.L.R 597) Noted in the opinion as presenting a somewhat contrary view to D.P. Joshi on the law/Article 14 issue. Referenced to indicate that there are differing views on what constitutes "law" for Article 14 analysis; Court noted the divergence but did not base final decision on this point.
Jug Raj Singh v. The Delhi Administration (1970 S.L.R 400) Treatment of documents to be supplied to delinquent officer and classification of documents into those relied upon by the enquiry officer and those required for effective defence and cross-examination. Relied upon to highlight requirements of natural justice regarding supply of prosecution documents and effective cross-examination; used in assessing fairness of the departmental enquiry.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court conducted a step-by-step examination confined to the material facts and the applicable rules and precedents in the record.

1. Who Promoted the Petitioner: The Court focused on whether the petitioner was promoted to Head Constable by an officer higher in rank than the Superintendent of Police who later dismissed him. The return admitted the assertions about promotion and material files produced showed that the Inspector General of Police had directed a special test and that the Assistant Inspector General's order of 21-3-1964 placed the petitioner on List C for promotion. The Character Roll recorded promotion on 16-5-1964, although it did not specify who signed for the Superintendent of Police. The Court considered administrative orders vesting Superintendents of Police in Delhi with powers of District Superintendents (per an order of 19-9-1963 published 3-10-1963) and concluded that, on the facts, the petitioner had been promoted by an officer higher in rank than the Superintendent of Police. The Court emphasized that the appointing authority's actual rank/status, not merely who could have appointed, is material under Article 311.

2. Article 311 Analysis: Applying the principles in precedents (including Bachubha Ramsinhji, N. Somasunaaram and Delhi Transport Undertaking), the Court observed that where a promotion amounts to a fresh appointment by a higher authority, an officer subordinate in rank cannot validly dismiss the promoted employee. The Court therefore analyzed whether the disciplinary proceedings initiated and concluded by the Superintendent of Police were vitiated by the fact that the petitioner had been promoted by a superior authority.

3. Rule 16.38 (Reference to District Magistrate): The Court examined whether the charge against the petitioner should have been referred to the District Magistrate because the alleged misconduct (incitement to disaffection/inducing police to withhold service) could amount to a criminal offence under the Police (Incitement to Disaffection) Act, 1922. The Court observed an analogous case (Kishan Chand) had been referred to the District Magistrate for orders and that in the petitioner's case no such reference was made. The Court found this selective treatment problematic: if identical allegations were put to the District Magistrate in one case but not in another, it indicated discriminatory treatment. The Court did not have to decide, for the purpose of the petition, the abstract question whether incitement to the police necessarily occurred in relation to "official relations with the public"; rather, the failure to make a uniform referral in similar cases suggested discrimination and undermined departmental action.

4. Fairness of the Inquiry (Rules 16.24 and 16.14(ix) and related provisions): The Court scrutinized the conduct of the departmental inquiry and found multiple shortcomings:

  • The petitioner was not given the last and final opportunity of a personal hearing before the punishing authority as required by the rules.
  • Copies of certain documents (notably the preliminary inquiry report and some statements) were not supplied to the petitioner; the officer who conducted the preliminary inquiry was examined as a witness without prior notice and without the earlier report being provided.
  • Only seven of twelve defence witnesses were examined, without any reasons recorded for excluding the others; some parts of the preliminary report suggested "secret inquiries" whose basis was not disclosed.
  • There was evidence that the issuance of the show cause notice and its checking involved the same officers who conducted the inquiry, suggesting a mechanical or non-independent process rather than an independent assessment by the punishing authority.
The Court referenced principles explained in Jug Raj Singh and other authorities on the requirement to supply documents relied upon and to allow effective cross-examination; on this basis the enquiry failed to meet standards of fairness mandated by Article 311.

5. Discrimination and Article 14: The Court noted the petitioner's complaint of discriminatory treatment compared with Kishan Chand and others. While there is discussion in the opinion about whether executive instructions are "law" under Article 14, the Court concluded it need not resolve that broader question because the inquiry and punishment had to be quashed for the procedural infirmities and selective application of Rule 16.38.

6. Conversion of Dismissal into Removal: The petitioner argued the Lt. Governor was not empowered to order removal and hence the conversion was invalid. The Court observed the contention but found it unnecessary to decide that issue because it was quashing the departmental proceedings that produced the dismissal and removal.

7. Conclusion of Analysis: Having found that (a) the petitioner was effectively promoted by an authority higher in rank than the punishing authority, and (b) that the departmental inquiry was procedurally unfair and selectively applied, the Court concluded that the disciplinary proceedings and resultant orders were vitiated.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: The writ petition is accepted; the departmental proceedings initiated and held against the petitioner resulting in his dismissal and subsequent conversion into removal are quashed.

Implications and direct consequences:

  • The departmental inquiry and all consequential orders (dismissal first and removal later) were quashed by the Court.
  • The Court made no order as to costs.
  • The decision's immediate effect is to nullify the disciplinary outcome against the petitioner; the opinion does not purport to lay down a new rule of general application beyond the particular legal analysis applied to the facts before the Court.

The Court emphasized that its decision rested on the admitted facts in the record (promotion by an officer higher in rank, procedural failures in the departmental inquiry, and selective referral under Rule 16.38) and on established legal principles regarding Article 311 and rules of natural justice. The opinion does not characterize the matter as creating new precedent beyond applying these principles to the facts of the case.

Source: Opinion of S. Rangarajan, J., as provided. This summary is based exclusively on the content of the provided opinion and does not add or infer facts beyond that text.

    Ram Karan (Petitioner) v. Union Of India And Others (S).

    S. Rangarajan, J.:— The petitioner claims to have been appointed on 23-1-1959, as Constable in the Delhi Police by the Deputy inspector Genera of Police, vide his appointment certificate (copy of which is annexare A to the petition). He was confirmed on 1-8-1964, after having qualified is the Departmental. Test he was brought on the list ‘G’ (Clerical) for promotion to the rank of Head Constable w.e.f, 21-3-1964. It is further alleged that as approved and the Deputy Inspector General of Police (D.I.G) and intimated by the Assistant Inspector General of Public the petitioner was promoted to officiate as Head Constable (Ministerial), and granted special pay of Rs. 20/- w.e.f, 16-5-1964 (copies of which are Annexure B and C to the petition).

    2. It was denied in the affidavit by Shri B.R Rajgopal, Inspector General of Police, filed in opposition to this Writ Petition, that the appointment of the petitioner as Constable of Police was made by the D.I.G of Public but the further facts stated about his promotion (by the D.I.G) as Head Constable and being granted special pay were admitted in the said return. It is also claimed by the petitioner that there was not even a single had or adverse entry against him but, on the contrary, he earned 27 Commendation Certificates during his service period of about 9 years in the Delhi Police Department. Sometime in 1965 sanction had been granted by the Central Government to form the Delhi Police Non-Gazetted Karamchari Sangh. A Commission was also pet up under the Chairmanship of Shri G.D Khosla, retired Chief Justice of the High Court of Punjab, to investigate and report on the grievances of Delhi Police. It was alleged that the Government, which was not reconciled to the formation of the Singh, wanted to bring down the Sangh by dismissing the leaders of the Sangh who were serving on the Executive Committee and arresting and terminating the services of hundreds of other Police men who were active members of the Sangh during the Delhi Police agitation of April, 1967.

    3. It is needless to set out any further details pertaining to the above aspect; we may notice straightaway the circumstances which led to the petitioner's suspension, with effect from 13-4-1967, for absenting himself from duty without permission, instigating the other Police staff at Vikas Bhavan and Tilak Marg to stop their work and to join the illegal strike of Police men in Delhi. The charge against the petitioner was that while working in the Accounts Branch Traffic Police he left his office (Vikas Bhavan) at about 11-30 A.M on 15-4-1967 without permission, came to the English Office of the Traffic Superintendent (at Tilak Marg) and incited the staff present in the office to stop work and pin the Police strikers before the residence of the Home Minister of India. He uttered some words of instigation in Hindi which when translated would read as follows:

    “It is shameful for you. The work cannot be carried out without you. Stop the work and accompany us to the residence of the Home Minister and participate in the strike. Service of Rs. 200/250 can be made available anywhere”

    4. According to the petitioner he went to the English Office of the Traffic Headquarters. Tilak Marg at 12 Noon for official work, namely, delivering papers for typing to Kulwant Singh (a Typist who was examined, as his defence witness) and after doing so he returned to his seat in the Accounts Branch (Vikas Bhavan) of the Traffic Police. He was attending office regularly as usual on all the days when the so-called agitation of the Delhi Police was being carried on. He was surprised when he reached order of suspension, of which he was only told verbally a couple of days later, no copy of the same having been served on him. The petitioner's case is that he was victimised by the charge, to the said effect, being framed against him. An inquiry was conducted by the Enquiry Officer and the petitioner was dismissed by the Superintendent of Police by order dated 31-10-1967 (copy of which is Annexuie Z-8 to the petition.)

    5. What happened prior to the framing of the charge and the manner in which the enquiry was conducted may be noticed at this stage. There was a preliminary inquiry which was conducted by Shri Balkishan Jarith (Traffic Inspector. Accidents), as ordered by the Superintendent of Police (Traffic) and he submitted a report prior to the framing of the charge. A copy of the said report was not given to the petitioner but Shri Jarith was examined as a witness in the departmental inquiry without even disclosing earlier that he was going to be examined as a witness and without a copy of his earlier statement report being given to the petitioner. On perusal of the said report the petitioner was suspended on 16-4-1967.

    6. A charge was framed against him by Shri Baldev Raj Dutt (Traffic Inspector. South) on 29-5-1967 to which the petitioner pleaded not guilty on 30-5-1967. The petitioner also submitted on 1-6-1967, a list of 12 defence witnesses of whom only 7 were examined at the enquiry, no reason having been given for not examining the rest the persons examined for the Department at the said enquiry were Sarvashri H.C Harbans Lal, ASI Om Parkash, S.I Brij Mohan—all working at the Traffic Office, Tilak Marg and S.I Ved Parkash in addition to the above said Balkishan Jarith, Traffic Inspector. The preliminary enquiry report refers to some others baling been, examined—but “secretly”. The report which Shri Harbans Lal is alleged to have written concerning this incident was also not proved in the departmental enquiry.

    7. The Enquiry Officer Shri Baldev Raj Detta. D.S.P Traffic submitted his report finding that the petitioner had left his office at Vikas Bbavan at about 11-30 A.M without prior permission and incited the other staff present in the Traffic office at Tilak Marg, New Delhi to stop the Government work and join the Police strikers before the residence of the Home Minister of India. The Superintendent of Police (Shri M.D Dittia) accepted his report substantially but observed that “the charge against him (the petitioner) is not of his absence but of his grave misconduct in inciting other Police Staff to stop work and join the police strike in front of the Home Minister's residence.” He then issued a show came notice by his order dated 18-8-1967 (copy of which is Annexure Z-3 to the petition) as to why be should not be dismissed from service. It is seen from copy of the show cause notice in the concerned file that Shri M.D Dittia had endorsed on 19-8-1967 as follows;

    “Pl. check thoroughly today before noon.”

    8. In reply to the feme the Enquiry Officer (Shri Baldev Raj Datta) had endorsed as follows on the same show cause notice:

    “As desired I have checked the show cause notice.”

    9. It is worth recalling that the words of incitement, said to have been uttered by the petitioner which were set out in the charge, were rejected wholesale in the show cause notice also despite the witnesses who were examined at the preliminary inquiry, having given somewhat different versions regarding she same. This would offer some indication of the mechanical way in which not only she Enquiry Officer (Shri Baldev Raj Datta) had drawn up his report, but also the Superintendent, Traffic (Shri M.D Dittia) had.

    10. The petitioner wanted that before he could reply to the show cause notice he should be given copies of the depositions of the witnesses examined at the inquiry and that he should be heard in persoa. But the filial order dismissing the petitioner was not passed after giving the petitioner last and final opportunity of a personal hearing as required by Rule 16.24(1)(ix) of Punjab Police Rules, 1934 (Vol. II). The petitioner's request to giant such an opportunity was not conceded.

    11. Against the order of dismissal the petitioner filed an appeal which was dismissed by the D.I.G of Police by his order dated 25-3-1968 (Anrexure Z-10), his revision petition to the Inspector General of Police filed representation to the Lt. Governor of Delhi were rejected vide their orders dated 15-5-1968 and 30-11-1968, respective). The present Writ Petition was filed on 6-3-1969. In accordance with the order of the Lt. Governor dated 15-4-1971 the dismissal of the petitioner fetid 58 others was convened into “removal” which relieved them from the consequences of not being eligible for Government service.

    12. Shri Sital A.K Dar, learned counsel for the petitioner, as usual with him when be appears in such cases, raised a plethora of points and a considerable amount of time was spent by him canvassing them all. It seems sufficient, however, to discuss a few alone which seem crucial and may help to decide this petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution.

    13. An appreciable amount of time was spent by Shri Sital Dar in trying to make out that the petitioner's appointment as Constable was made by the D.I.G of Police by order dated 23-1-1959 (copy of which is Anntxure A to the petition). But it seems needless to canvass the question who appointed the petitioner initial as a Constable because what is material now is by whole he was promoted and whether disciplinary proceedings resulting in his dismissal first, and removal later, had been initiated by the authority who promoted him of by one having a lower rank.

    14. It seems well established that what is material for the purpose of Article 311(1) of the Constitution is who actually appointed, not the competent authority who could have appointed the person concerned. Another relevant question is whether promotion amounts to a fresh appointment. Divan, J., speaking for the Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in Bachubha Ramsinhji v. Shivlal (Vol. 6, 1971 (2) S.L.R 588) appalled the contention that when a Console was promoted as a Head Constable there was no fresh appointment in that cadre: he found that the promotion of a Constable to a Head Constable amounted to a fresh order of appointment. Since the appointment of the person concerted in that case, as Constable, was made by the D.I.G, it was held that he could not have been dismissed from service by an officer subordinate rank to that of the D.I.G because in law no officer could be dismissed an officer subordinate in rank to the officer who actually appoints. Reference was also made therein to the decision of the Madras High Court in N. Somasunaaram v. State of Madras (A.I.R 1956 Madras 419) which had held that a person who had been actually appointed by the D.I.G of Police (despite it being possible for an officer of lower rank to have appointed him) could not be dismissed by a person in rank inferior to that of the D.I.G of Police. It was explained by Palekar, J. speaking for the Supreme Court in The Management of Delhi Transport Undertaking v. B.B.L Hajelay (1972 S.L.R 787) that what is involved in matters of appointment and removal for the purpose of Article 311 of the Constitution is the status and rank of the employee and the status and rank of the authority taking action; the subordination is of “rank” and not of “functions”. The petitioner having been dismissed as a result of departmental proceedings initiated by the Superintendent of Police it has to be seen whether the proceedings (dismissal first and conversion into removal later) are vitiated by reason of the petitioner having been promoted (appointed) as Head Constable by an officer superior in status and rank to that of the Superintendent of Police who alone passed the order of dismissal in this case.

    15. The position, according to the Punjab Police Rules (Vol. II Rule 12.1), concerning appointments and enrolments vis-a-vis Head Constables, is that the power of appointment has been delegated to the officers mentioned in the table, summarising the directions given by the Provincial Government under clause (b) of sub-section 1 of section 241 of the Government of India Act, 1933 in this regard: Superintendents of Police and Deputy Superintendent (Administrative) Government Railway Police, Assistant Superintendent, Government Railway Police, Deputy Superintendents incharge of Railway Police Sub-divisions, Senior Assistant Superintendent of Police, Lahore and Officers incharge Recruits Training Centres; the correction slip, issued on 19-6-1958, does not matter for the present case.

    16. Passing over the details of the petitioner's appointment as a Constable and even of his confirmation, as not being material for the purpose of the present case, close attention has to be paid to the manner in which he was promoted as Head Constable and by whom he was so promoted because on the decision of that question would depend whether he ought to have been dismissed not by the Superintendent of Police but by an official superior to him the petitioner, according to this petition—it is worth emphasizing by way of repetition—was promoted to officiate as Head Constable (Ministerial) as approved and ordered by the Deputy Inspector General of Police (D.I.G) and as intimated by the Assistant Inspector General of Police: this averment was specifically admitted in the affidavit of Shri B.R Rajgopal, Inspector General of Police filed in opposition to this writ petition. It was stated before me earlier, during the course of argument, that the file was not available, but the file (No. XIII/47 Special P. IV on the subject of “Maintenance of Common Seniority list C for English Office and Accounts Branch” page 4 of the office of the Superintendent of Police, Delhi) was produced accompanied by a statement in writing, made on behalf of the Superintendent of Police, Traffic, New Delhi and addressed to Shri Harish Chandra, Central Government Standing Counsel as follows: “I am sending herewith the file containing the original orders and office note of the orders mentioned therein except order No. 10019-9-/Est-C.P.O, dated 15-5-1964, which has since been destroyed”. A perusal of the said file (p. 33) shows that Shri B.B Banerji, Inspector General of Police. Delhi had by his order dated 31-12-1963, directed that soma of the Constables of the executive cadre performing ministerial duties, who had failed in the test for promotion to List C held in December, 1961 and hence could not be considered for promotion to the rank of Head Constable in the ministerial cadre, should be given another chance to qualify for promotion for being posted against the additional posts in that rank which had been sanctioned by Government; it had been decided to hold a special tests for them on 14th and 15th January, 1964 according to the syllabus previously laid out and that the successful candidates would be brought on promotion to List C and promoted to the rank of Head Constable against the existing vacancies; these persons would., however, be junior to those who were already on the said list. This test was to be confined to those who had failed in the previous test whose names had been announced. The petitioner's, name was mentioned at Serial No. 75 in that list. It is also seen from the said file that the programme of the test (was also communicated) to be held on 14th and 15th January, 1964. By an order of the Assistant Inspector General of Police, Delhi (Shri Krishan Kumar) dated 21-3-1964 the petitioner was included (at Serial No. 28) among those who had qualified in the departmental test and was one of those brought on List C (Clerical) for promotion to the rank of Head Constable with effect from 21-3-1964 Copies of the same were forwarded to all Superintendents of Police including various persons named by designation. There has been no specific order in relation to the petitioner which appears to have been passed promoting him as Head Constable (Ministerial) by the Superintendent of Police. The Character Roll of the petitioner which was also produced for perusal shows that the petitioner was promoted as Head Constable (Ministerial) on 16-5-1964, column 5 of which contains a heading “Full signature of Superintendent of Police” and some one has signed for Superintendent of Police, Traffic. The Character Roll does not reveal by whom the petitioner was promoted as Head Constable (Ministerial).

    17. It was contended on behalf of the respondents, despite the admission in the return that the Assistant Inspector General of Police (Shri Krishan Kumar) had signed the order stating that the petitioner, among others, had been brought to List C. (Clerical) for promotion to rank of Head Constable with effect from 21-3-1964 and since the Assistant Inspector General of Police was none other than a Superintendent of Police the promotion of the petitioner, among others, should be deemed to have been made by one who was not superior in rank than the Superintendent of Police, it is well known that the Assistant Inspector General of Police functions on behalf of the. Inspector General of Police the said order dated 21-3-1964 is relatable to and has to be read in conjunction with the previous order of the Inspector Geo era of Police, dated 21-12-1963 who had directed that a test should be held for promoting Head Constables against existing vacancies. The Assistant Inspector General of Police, therefore, was acting only on behalf of the Inspector General of Police, not as Superintendent of Police, since he was only carrying out the orders previously passed by the Inspector General Shri Banerji).

    18. Apart from these considerations Mr. Sital A.K Dar brought to my notice the fact that after a separate police force was established in Delhi the Superintendents of Police who were functioning in Delhi were not having the same power as the District Superintendents of Police who were posted incharge of districts in the State of Punjab. This lacuna, as it was then believed to exist, was sought to be rectified by a publication in the Delhi official gazette on October 3, 1963 of an order of the Delhi Administration dated 19th September, 1963 (copy of which is Annexure Z-18 to the rejoinder;. The Chief Commissioner, Delhi, in pursuance of Section 1 of the Police Act, 1861 (5 of 1861) appointed certain specified Superintendents of Police working in Delhi, including the Superintendent of Police (Traffic) with whom atone we are now concerned in this case, “to exercise all the powers and perform all the duties of the District Superintendent of Police under the said Act in the Union Territory of Delhi”. In the light of this feature it is possible to appreciate why no Superintendent of Police ordered the promotion of concerned Constables as Head Constables.

    19. Shri Harish Chandra, learned counsel for the Union of India, could really derive no assistance in this respect from the decision in the Union Of India v. Ram Kishan ((1971) 2 SCC 349 : A.I.R 1971 S.C 1402) where Sikri, C.J, speaking for the Supreme Court, followed an earlier decision of the same Court in Union Of India v. Jagjit Singh ((1969) 2 SCC 108 : A.I.R 1970 S.C 122) for the position that a Superintendent of Police (Traffic) was competent to dismiss a Foot Constable despite his not being a District Superintendent of Police. In the latter case, Mitter, J., speaking for the Supreme Court painted out that there was no incongruity between the Police Act and the Punjab Police Rules, which had to be read together; in that case the Superintendent of Police of the city of Delhi with jurisdiction over the Police Station where the dismissed Constable was posted, was held entitled to pass the order of dismissal on him. Though this question lm been settled in the above said manner by the Supreme Court by its earlier decision dated 1-4-1969 the question appears to have been raised previously with reference to the Police force in Delhi that the Superintendent of Police functioning at Delhi did not have the same power as a District Superintendent of Police in Punjab. In view of this perceived difficulty the Chief Commissioner of Delhi seems to have vested the Superintendent of Police, Traffic, among other Superintendents serving at Delhi, to exercise all the powers and perform all the duties of District Superintendent of Police under the said Act in the Union Territory of Delhi. The petitioner has also annexed along with his additional rejoinder affidavit dated 25-2-1975 a copy of the order passed in Revision Petition of H.C Badri Nath No. 40/662 which was quashed by the Inspector General of Police on the ground that the Superintendent of Police was not the District Superintendent of Police and owing to his not being the District Superintendent of Police could not classify the confidential reports of the Police officers concerned (Annexure Z-29). Reference was made therein to a decision of the Punjab High Court, which decision, however, has not been made available to me. It seems likely that in this case the Inspector General of Police Shri B.B Banerji felt the need to intervene in order to give general directions regarding the promotion to the rank of Head Constables of those working in the clerical sphere. It is seen that the promotion of the petitioner as a Head Constable also consequently took place under the orders of the inspector General of Police himself. Whether it was the Deputy Inspector General of Police, as mentioned in the petition who appointed the petitioner, or whether it was even the Inspector General of Police himself who did this, it is clear that the petitioner was promoted by an officer higher in rank than a Superintendent of Police the mere fact that an Assistant, who merely carried out the orders of the Inspector General of Police, had signed the order pertaining to the petitioner's promotion as Head Constable Cannot make it a promotion made by a Superintendent of Police merely on the ground that the Assistant Inspector General of Police, working as the I.G's assistant, is also a Superintendent of Police. He was not making the said promotion in his rank or status or even exercising functions is Superintendent of Police. On account of the above-noted features relating to the petitioner's promotion it is small wonder that both the petitioner as well as the Police Department experienced difficulty in the matter of making a precise plea concerning it. In these circumstances Shri Sital A.K Dar argued that the petitioner was promoted as Head Constable by the Inspector General of Police himself and that lie could not have been dismissed by one subordinate in rank to him. The argument of Shri Dar seems to have force in the light of the facts noticed above.

    20. In the above view no other aspect would really fall for consideration in this Writ Petition though Shri Dar has argued a plethora of points. Without referring to all of them I may probably refer to a few only of his more important contentions which seem to have force.

    21. Shri Dar relied upon Rule 16.38 and claimed that the same has been violated in the petitioner's case. Rule 16.38(1) and (2) alone are relevant and may be read:

    “16.38(1) Immediate information shall be given to the District Magistrate of any complaint received by the Superintendent of Police, which Indicates the commission by a police officer of a criminal offence in connection with his of official relations with the public. The District Magistrate will decide whether the investigation of the complaint shall be conducted by a police officer, or made over to a selected Magistrate having 1st class powers.

    (2) When investigation of such a complaint establishes a prima facie case a judicial prosecution shall normally follow; the matter shall be disposed of departmental only if the District Magistrate 90 orders for reasons to be recorded. When it is decided to proceed departmentally the procedure prescribed in rule 16.24 shall be followed. An officer found guilty on a charge of the nature referred to in this rule shall ordinarily be dismissed.”

    22. It was not disputed before me that if the present case fell within Rule 16.38 then the same not having been complied with the departmental inquiry made without getting the specific orders of the District Magistrate according to Rule 16.38 would have to be quashed for that reason alone. Shri Harish Chandra, however, lays stress on the fact that in the present case the facts alleged against him did not indicate the commission by a police officer of a criminal offence in connect job with his official relations with the public. Reliance was placed by the petitioner on the Police (Incitement to Disaffection) Act, 1922 (Act XXII of 1922) which makes it a criminal offence punishable under section 3 thereof. Any member of the Police force who induces or attempts to induce, or does any act which he knows is likely to induce any member of a police force to withhold his service or to commit a breach of discipline shall be punishable with imprisonment which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to two hundred rupees, or with both. The expression “disaffection”, which has not been defined in this Act, has not been defined in the Indian Penal Code either. But section 124A, Explanation I, of the Indian penal Code states that “disaffection” includes disloyalty and all feelings of enmity.

    23. The point raised by Shri Harish Chandra that creating disaffection among members of the police force is not a criminal offence committed in relation to the police officer's relations with the public and that for the purpose of Rule 16.38 the facts alleged against the police officer should not merely amount to a criminal offence but it should also include his official relations with the public.

    24. In answer to this contention Shri Dar relies upon Annexure Z-9, which is a copy of the complaint made by the District Magistrate, Delhi in the court of Shri Jag Mohan, Magistrate 1st Class, New Delhi against Constable Kishan Chand in identical circumstances. The accusation was that while he was working in the office of the Superintendent of police, Traffic, New Delhi on 14-4-1967 at about 4.10 p.m Kishan Chand went round the office of the Superintendent of Police, Traffic, incited and induced the other members of the Police Force working in the said force to withhold their services addressing words of similar kind to them. It was stated that Kishan Chand had thus committed an offence punishable under section 3 of the Police (Incitement to Disaffection) Act, 1922, It was, therefore, prayed that the accused may be summoned, tried and punished, according to law for the commission of the aforesaid offence. This is in obvious instance where the Police Constable in that case was prosecuted, in relation to an identical charge, but the District, Magistrate was not moved in the case of the petitioner for him to express his mind as to whether the petitioner should be prosecuted or not. It seems plain that if it had been referred to the District Magistrate he would have launched a prosecution against him for (if he did not but ordered a departmental enquiry against the petitioner) he would have had to support that course by reasons in writing; he could not have launched a prosecution in the case of Kishan Chand but ordered a departmental enquiry alone against the petitioner. It is thus apparent that if a reference had been made to she District Magistrate in the petitioner's case also by the Department the District Magistrate might have, in similar terms without discriminating against the petitioner, ordered his prosecution and there could have been no departmental action. Averment to this effect of the petitioner being discriminated against was made in paragraph 27 of the amended plaint which was pleaded to be not only against the Punjab Police Rules and the Police Act but also violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.

    25. In the return filed by the Inspector General of Police it was claimed that the case of Kishan Chand was different from that of the petitioner because he had joined the strikers outside the bungalow of the Home Minister and was arrested there bus the petitioner had instigated other office staff at Vikas Bhavan and Tilak Marg alone to join the strike and he had also not been arrested at the bungalow of the Home Minister as Kishan Chand was. The place of his arrest would not, however, seem to matter. What the return overlooks is that it would have been for the District Magistrate to say so and not for the Investor General of Police to say so—in his return. In addition, perusal of Annexure Z-9 does not show that Kishan Chand was prosecuted for either inciting any before she Home Minister's residence or because of his being arrested there. There has been no explanation at all why the petitioner's case was not put up before the District Magistrate when the case of Kishan Chand was duly put up, the mere fast of his arrest or his having incited the Police force demonstrating before the Home Minister's residence would not make any distinction is principle. If in the case of Kishan Chand it was a case of his allegedly committing a criminal offence, on identically the same accusation against the petitioner and in exactly similar terms and his case was pul up before the District Magistrate under Rule 16.38 for his orders, the case against the petitioner also had to be similarly put up; in officer words, the Police Department cannot pick and choose at its sweet will, the kind of cases which they would put up under Rule 16.38 to the District Magistrate for his orders when accusations were identically the same. Such a course, if permitted is likely to greatly undermine the confidence of the police force in their official superiors.

    26. It seems needless, therefore, for the purpose of this petition to canvas the question whether inciting members of the police force to join the strike would amount to misconduct of a police officer in his official relations with the public. There seems to have been discrimination against the petitioner if one compares it with what happened in the case of Kishan Chand. This discrimination acquires greater significance in the light of Shri Dar's statement at the bar that the case against Kishan Chand was subsequently withdrawn and there has been no departmental action against him. Probably, while cases which were pending in court were withdrawn cases in which mere departmental action had been taken stood on a different footing. As a matter of policy the police officials who had been dismissed for creating such disaffection among members of the police force were treated leniently and were given she benefit of removal from service so that their chance of re-employment Could not be jeopardised; it is stated that they were also re-considered sympathetically for re-employment.

    27. Even in the view that in order to attract the applicability of Article 14 something amounting to law within the meaning of Article is must be violated (vide D.P Joshi v. State of Madhya Pradesh, A.I.R 1955 S.C 334. See however The General Manager, South Central Railway v. A.V.R Siddhanti, 1974 1 S.L.R 597, for a somewhat contrary view), Role 16.3 would be such a law since it is not disputed that the Rules have statutory force.

    28. The problem of selective enforcement which faces the Police administration in its day-to-day tasks is a rather difficult and challenging one; it should not be made still more difficult by permitting or encouraging such discriminatory treatment especially with reference to those belonging to the force. Being a force where the utmost discipline has to be maintained this result can hopefully be ensured by combining the utmost rigour in the maintenance of discipline with the fairness that is also needed in the matter of dealing with the members of the force. In any case, serious lapses from standard? of common fairness are likely to be self-defeating exercises.

    29. Shri Dar attacked the validity of the departmental enquiry regarding the manner in which it was conducted. It is needless to be detained by his complaint that the petitioner was nos give a copies of the statements of the prosecution and defence witnesses before he was asked to submit his reply to the final show cause notice; this is of much less a significant in the present case. Shu Dar relied upon a number of other features which show that the enquiry was not a fair one.

    30. There is a noting in the file by Shri Baldev Raj Dutt (Traffic Inspector, South) that he had, as desired by Shri M.D Dittia (S.P Traffic), before the issue of the show cause notice following the inquiry, checked the file thoroughly and before the show cause notice was approved by Shrj Dittia, who was supposed to make up his mind, after perusing the inquiry report and the records pertaining thereto, whether a show cause notice should be issued to the petitioner as to why he should not be dismissed from service. Surely he was not to be agisted in this respect by the very officer who made the inquiry; Shri Dittia had in the very nature of things to coma to an independent conclusion as to whether he agreed with the Enquiry Officer or not. In this context the failure to give an opportunity to the petitioner as required by Rule 16.24(ix) assumes even mora significance.

    31. The relevant portion of the said Rule 16.14(ix)) reads as follows:

    Before an order of dismissal or reduction in rank is passed, the officer to be punished shall be produced before the officer empowered to punish him, and shall be informed of the charges proved against him, and called upon to show cause why an order of dismissal or reduction in rank should not be passed. Any representation that he may make shall be recorded shall form part of the record of the cage, and shell be takes into consideration by the office; empowered to punish him before the final order is passed:

    Provided that if, owing to the complicated nature of the case or other sufficient reason to be recorded, the officer empowered to impose the punishment considers this procedure in appropriate, he may inform the officer to be punished in writing of the charges proved against him, and call upon him to show cause in writing why an order of dismissal or reduction in rank should not be passed. Any written representation received shall be placed on the record of the case and taken into considerations before the final order in passed.”

    32. In support of this position the petitioner had also annexed the has also referred to other instances) a copy of the order of the inspector General of Police (Annexure z-19) in Revision Petition filed by H.C Vinodi Lal where an order of reduction in rank, passed on the ground of his having contracted a second marriage during the life-time of his first wife, was quashed on the ground that Sole 16.24 (i)(viii) a similar rule which applied to his ease—which required that he should be called upon to appear before the punishing authority and be informed of such punishment being awarded upon him, was not observed. The order of punishment was quashed and fresh orders were directed to be made on the merits of the case from that stage onwards. The rule itself is quite clear; it has been explained and affirmed in the circular Issued by the Inspector General of Police on 30-5-1971 (copy of which is Annexure z-17) drawing attention to the need for the delinquent officer to be produced before the punishing authority before punishment is awarded. There has been a failure to comely with it in the present case; it is unfortunate that inspite of the petition?? asking for a personal hearing he was not granted case. In the view that the enquiry itself has to be quashed from the commencement the need to quash the same from a later stage assumes secondary importance and hence may not have to be discussed further. None the less, reference has been made to this aspect in order to show that in no view of the matter could the punishment of dismissal, as it was originally passed, be justified.)

    33. There has also been in omission in this case to inform the petitioner that the officer who conducted the preliminary inquiry (Shri Balkishan ???) was going to be examined as a witness in the departmental proceedings against him. If such examination was intended a copy of his report should in all fairness have been made available to the petitioner. Only then he could cross-examine the officer who conducted the preliminary inquiry; effectively, after studying the report. It is needless for the purpose of this case to canvas the abstract question as to whether the omission to supply a preliminary report which, however, does not appear to be one of the specific requirements of the concerned rules, would itself vitiate the inquiry in all circumstances. My observations are confined to a case where the said officer who conducts the preliminary enquiry is examined as a witness.

    34. The documents which have to be supplied under the rules were considered elaborately by V.S Deshpande, J. in Jug Raj Singh v. The Delhi Administration (1970 S.L.R 400). There is no need, therefore, for me to discuss the legal requirements at any length. It may be sufficient to notice that V.S Deshpande, J. classified them into two heads: (1) those which the enquiry Officer relies upon, namely, to be used by the prosecution agency, to prove the charges against the public servant, and (2) those which, even if nos relied upon by the Enquiry Officer to support the charges against the petitioner are nevertheless required by the petitioner in his offence. It is in ibis context that Deshpande, J. referred to the principle of natural justice ensuring a right of effective cross-examination to the delinquent officer. The factual position is this case may now be examined in the above light.

    35. There are some corrections in the report dated 16-4-1967, which appear to be rathe? significant, from the petitioner's point of view. The report in so far as it ??? to this aspect read as follows:

    “Enquiries from ASI/AAG Sat Pal and ASI/Stationery clerk Dhana Ram have also supported the allegations against H.C Ram Karan” etc.

    36. As collected (by way of interleniation by mark of different lighter ink) it reads as follows:

    “Secret inquiries from ASI/AAG Sat Pal and ASI/Stationery Clerk Dhana Ram have been made who have also supported the allegations against H.C Ram Karan” etc. (the words which appear by way of interleniation have been underlined).

    37. It is worth recalling that the only statements which have been recorded in writing by Shri Balkishan Jarith, the officer who conducted the preliminary enquiry and which had been appended along with his report concerning preliminary inquiry (called the findings) me those of Head Clerk Harbans Lal. Om Parkash ASI/HAE and Brij Mohan SI/SSC/SSA. The statements of Sat ??? of Dhana Ram were not appended to the report concerning the preliminary inquiry, hence they were not naturally supplied to the petitioner. If a copy of the said report had been made available to the petitioner he would have been able to question Shri Jarith when he was examined concerning the kind of inquiries that were made by him, whether he made any secret inquiries as it appears from the report (as corrected) No ??? by the said rule. The reasons why their statements were not recorded and what need there was to make any inquiries of them secretly have not even been explained. The report mentions that on bearing the incitement offered by the petitioner Constable Mam Chand working in the English Office left with him. Mam Chand is not said to be one of the persons from whom any statement was recorded by Shri Jarith, Mam Chand was however, examined as a witness for the defence and he supported the petitioner. This may be contrasted with the reference specifically made in the report to ASI Om Parkash who was working as HAE to Brij Mohan working as SSC/SSE and H.C Hat bans Lal having witnessed what happened (their statements were duly recorded and copies of the same alone were furnished to the petitioner). No wonder in the absence of a copy of the report, the petitioner did not put any question in cross-examination to Shri Jarith with reference to any of these aspects.

    38. Rule 16.24(viii) which deals with how a preliminary investigation may be conduced may be read:

    “16.24(viii). Nothing in the foregoing rule shall debar a Superintendent of Police from making or causing to be made a preliminary investigation into the conduct of a suspected officer. Such an enquiry is not infrequently necessary to ascertain the can and degree of misconduct which is to be formally enquired into the suspected police officer may or may not be present he such preliminary enquiry as ordered by the Superintendent of police or other gazetted officer initiating the investigation but shall not cross-examine witnesses. The file of such a preliminary investigation shall form no part of the formal departmental record, but statements therefrom may be brought to the formal departmental record when the witnesses are no longer available in the circumstances detailed in clause (iii) above. All statements recorded during a preliminary investigation should be signed by the person a making them and attested by the officer recording them.”

    39. The object of Baking & preliminary investigation is to ascertain the nature and degree of misconduct which had to be formally or quired into. This record of preliminary investigation is no doubt not to be a part of the formal departmental record. There does not seem to be scope, however, for any ??? enquiry such as what Shri Jarith says, in the report, he made. This appoint unity given of the delinquent is prim a facie inconsistent with any motion of secrecy for the delinquent can be present if he likes, though it is not obligatory on his part to be present. It seems difficult to agree with the contention that he could be present only when it was so ordered by the Superintendent of Police or other gazetted officer initiating the investigation. Those words apply to only the enquiry, which is to be conducted when so ordered but not to the presence of the delinquent at such enqury. If the Superintendent of Police or other officer is given the option of allowing the delinquent to be present or not present it is possible that the very purpose of enabling his presence during such enquiries is likely to be unfulfilled in many cases.

    40. Rule 16.24(v) provides that the enquiring officer “shall record the statements of those defence witnesses whom he decides to admit in the presence of the accused, who shall be allowed to address questions to them, the answers to which shall be recorded” etc. Fairness would require Some reasons to be given why some alone among the witnesses in the list of defence witnesses are examined while the examination of others is not permitted. In the present case, by merely looking at that list, one is unable to find anything to distinguish between those who were examined and those who were not, even making allowances for the enquiring officer's anxiety not to duplicate witnesses. There is no means of knowing the considerations which prevailed with the enquiring officer in the present case in the matter of only recording the statements of only force but not of all witnesses required to be examined in his behalf by the delinquent officers.

    41. All these individually and cumulatively did have an impact on the fairness of the enquiry. It is of extreme importance that such departmental inquiries in which the servants of the State are likely to meet with even major penalties should be punched after a full and fair inquiry, the enquiring officer and others concerned with such enquiries should be careful and avoid giving an impression of unfairness in anything which they do or all to do.

    42. Judged even by the barest standards of fairness and even without resorting to stricter standards it seems to me that the inquiry in this particular case has failed to measure up to the quality of fairness which is invariably associated with such departmental inquiries. What is guaranteed by Article 311 of the Constitution is not a mere enquiry, regardless of fairness, but one which is fair and adequate.

    43. It is finally contended by Mr. Dar that the sentence of dismissal which was finally passed on the petitioner had been set aside by the Lt. Governor who merely ordered his removal and that the Lt. Governor was not an officer empowered to remove him. In the result, claimed Mr. Dar, while the dismissal order had been set aside the order of removal could not take effect, as having been made by one who had no power to order removal. It was also further contended that persons like the petitioner had been discriminated against by reason of some of them being employed and the others not and that different legal consequences have thus ensued to different persons who were placed similarly like the petitioner by virtue of the executive instructions issued in this behalf.

    44. It was contended for the respondents on the other hand, that discrimination could not be a ground of challenge except under Article 14 of the Constitution and executive instructions are not law for this purpose. Reference has already been made to the differing views that have been expressed on this aspect but it seems needless to go into this aspect for the purpose of this case in the view that the entire departmental enquiry conducted against the petitioner and the punishment meted out to him as a consequence of it have to be quashed.

    45. In the result the writ petition is accepted and the departmental proceedings initiated and held against the petitioner resulting in his dismissal first and removal later are all quashed. In the circumstances I make no order as to costs.

    46. Petition accepted.

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    Ram Karan (Petitioner) v. Union Of India And Others (S).
    (Apr 8, 1975)