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citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 2 of the Act
  • Section 3 reads: The superintendence of the police throughout a general police district shall vest in and shall be exercised by the State Government to which such district is subordinate; Section 3, Police Act 5 of 1861
  • The Act of 1861
  • Section 7 of the Act, Article 311 of the Constitution
  • Police Act and the Rules made thereunder
  • Section 241 of the Government of India Act, 1935
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Section 3 of the Act
  • Section 4 of the Police Act 5 of 1861
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Cites
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 2 of the Act
  • Section 3 reads: The superintendence of the police throughout a general police district shall vest in and shall be exercised by the State Government to which such district is subordinate; Section 3, Police Act 5 of 1861
  • The Act of 1861
  • Section 7 of the Act, Article 311 of the Constitution
  • Police Act and the Rules made thereunder
  • Section 241 of the Government of India Act, 1935
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Section 3 of the Act
  • Section 4 of the Police Act 5 of 1861
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The respondent, originally appointed as a Sub-Inspector of Police in pre-partition Sind, was posted to Police Station Daryaganj, Delhi, in 1949. A departmental enquiry on a charge of accepting a bribe was conducted that year by Shri Diwanchand Bhatia, who had retired as Deputy Superintendent of Police but was immediately re-employed as Deputy Superintendent of Police (Enforcement). On 6 December 1949, Shri Jagannath, Superintendent of Police, City, Delhi, dismissed the respondent from service.

On 12 January 1954 the respondent filed a civil suit challenging the dismissal. The Subordinate Judge decreed the suit, holding both the enquiry officer and the dismissing authority incompetent. The Additional District Judge, Delhi, and a Single Judge of the Punjab High Court (in Second Appeal) substantially affirmed that decree; a Letters Patent Appeal was summarily dismissed on 11 April 1963. The Union of India obtained special leave to appeal to the Supreme Court, leading to the present decision.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the departmental enquiry was vitiated because the enquiry officer, Shri Diwanchand Bhatia, was allegedly not a “police officer”.
  2. Whether the dismissal order was invalid because Shri Jagannath, though a Superintendent of Police, was not designated a “District Superintendent of Police”.
  3. Whether non-compliance with Rule 16-38 of the Punjab Police Rules rendered the dismissal void.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant’s Arguments (Union of India)

  • “Superintendent of Police” in the Punjab Police Rules is synonymous with “District Superintendent of Police” under the Police Act, 1861; hence Shri Jagannath was competent to dismiss a Sub-Inspector.
  • Rule 16.24 permits an enquiry by “such superior officer as the Superintendent may direct”; a Deputy Superintendent is superior to a Sub-Inspector, and Shri Bhatia remained a police officer during re-employment.
  • Rule 16-38 was in fact followed: after a prima facie case was found, the matter was referred to the District Magistrate, who directed a departmental enquiry.

Respondent’s Arguments (Dismissed Sub-Inspector)

  • Shri Jagannath lacked authority because he was not a “District Superintendent of Police”.
  • Shri Bhatia had retired and, when re-employed in the Enforcement Department, ceased to be a police officer, making the enquiry unlawful.
  • Rule 16-38 is mandatory; there was no proof that the District Magistrate was informed or that he sanctioned a departmental enquiry.
  • Reliance was placed on State of Uttar Pradesh v. Babu Ram and Delhi Administration v. Chanan Shah to argue that strict compliance with the Punjab Police Rules is essential.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
State of Uttar Pradesh v. Babu Ram (1961 2 SCR 579) Police Act and Rules constitute a self-contained code; dismissal requires strict adherence to the Rules. The Court accepted the self-contained code principle but found that the relevant Rules had been complied with on the evidence before it.
Delhi Administration v. Chanan Shah (Civil Appeal No. 277/1966) Even if Rule 16-38 is directory, substantial compliance is necessary. The Court distinguished the present facts, holding that there was sufficient evidence of compliance with Rule 16-38.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Competence of the Dismissing Authority: The Police Act, 1861 uses the term “District Superintendent of Police”, whereas the Punjab Police Rules, 1934 employ “Superintendent of Police”. After examining the statutory framework and historical expansion of the police force, the Court held the two designations interchangeable. Evidence showed that Shri Jagannath was Superintendent of Police, City, Delhi, with jurisdiction over the respondent’s station; he therefore possessed power under Rule 16.1 to dismiss a Sub-Inspector.

Validity of the Enquiry Officer: Rule 16.24 permits an enquiry to be conducted by “such superior officer as the Superintendent may direct”. Shri Bhatia, though formally retired, was immediately re-employed as Deputy Superintendent of Police (Enforcement) and was therefore still a police officer superior to the respondent. Documentary evidence (Exhibits D-4 and D-5) and Bhatia’s testimony confirmed his status and the fact that he conducted the enquiry at the Superintendent’s direction.

Compliance with Rule 16-38: The Court reviewed testimony that, after a preliminary enquiry, Bhatia sent the matter to the District Magistrate, who directed a departmental enquiry. Although the original enquiry file had been destroyed under Rule 12.35 before the suit was filed, the Court accepted Bhatia’s unchallenged testimony as proof of compliance. The trial court had framed no specific issue on this point, and there was no basis to disbelieve the evidence.

Having found the Rules harmonised with the Act, that the proper authorities acted within their powers, and that procedural requirements were met, the Court concluded that the dismissal was lawful.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL ALLOWED. The Supreme Court set aside the judgments of the lower courts and dismissed the respondent’s suit. In view of the condition attached to the grant of special leave, no order as to costs of the appeal was made, and prior cost orders were left undisturbed.

Implications: The decision clarifies that—within the Punjab Police framework—a Superintendent of Police may exercise the dismissal powers attributed to a District Superintendent under the Police Act, and that re-employed police officers may validly conduct departmental enquiries. The ruling affects the parties directly but does not announce new legal doctrine beyond aligning the Act with the Rules.

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    Union Of India v. Jagjit Singh .

    G.K Mitter, J.— This is an appeal by Special Leave from a judgment and order, dated April 11, 1963, of the Punjab High Court (Circuit Bench at Delhi), in a Letters Patent Appeal which summarily dismissed the appeal preferred by the appellant from a judgment and order in a Second Appeal upholding the decree in favour of the respondent passed by the Additional District Judge, Delhi.

    2. The questions canvassed in this appeal were: whether the dismissal of the respondent from service in the police force was illegal on the ground that the officer entrusted with the departmental enquiry against the respondent was not a police officer; secondly, whether the order of dismissal passed by Shri Jagannath was invalid because he was not a District Superintendent of Police; and thirdly, whether the dismissal was void on account of non-compliance with the provisions of Rule 16-38 of the Punjab Police Rules.

    3. In order to appreciate the points raised, it is necessary to state the following relevant facts. The respondent had been appointed a Sub-Inspector of Police by the Inspector-General of Police in Sind before the partition of India and was thereafter posted in Delhi by the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Delhi, after his migration to India. In the year 1949, he was posted as Sub-Inspector of Police in Police Station, Daryagunj, Delhi. A departmental enquiry was launched against him on the charge of acceptance of bribe in connection with a criminal case in the same year. The officer entrusted with the enquiry was one Diwanchand Bhatia who was employed up to April 1949, as a Deputy Superintendent of Police in the City of Delhi. He retired from service in that month but was re-employed from the date of retirement as a Deputy Superintendent of Police (Enforcement Department). The enquiry against the respondent had taken place after the retirement of the said Diwanchand but during the period of his re-employment. The respondent was found guilty of the charge and was dismissed from service by the order, dated December 6, 1949, passed by one Jagannath, a Superintendent of Police in the Delhi Police Force. The appellant filed a suit challenging his dismissal on the grounds already mentioned in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Delhi, on January 12, 1954. The dependent — Union of India filed its written statement disputing the contentions of the plaintiff. The Subordinate Judge framed several issues; the principal ones relate to the competency of Jagannath to pass the order of dismissal and of Diwanchand Bhatia to conduct the enquiry against the plaintiff. Finding in favour of the plaintiff on both the issues, he decreed the suit. This decree was upheld in appeal by the Additional District Judge, Delhi and in Second Appeal by a Single Judge of the Punjab High Court who modified the decree by an alteration in the figure of the salary claimed by the plaintiff but upholding his claim on the main issues. The letters patent appeal, as already stated, was dismissed summarily.

    4. The first contention on behalf of the appellant was that Jagannath who was functioning as a Superintendent of Police but not designated as a District Superintendent of Police was quite competent to pass the order of dismissal against the respondent. Under Section 4 of the Police Act 5 of 1861, an Act for the regulation of Police:

    “The administration of the police throughout a general police district shall be vested in an officer to be styled the Inspector General of Police, and in such Deputy Inspectors General and Assistant Inspectors General as to the State Government shall deem fit.
    The administration of the police throughout the local jurisdiction of the Magistrate of the district shall, under the general control and direction of such Magistrate, be vested in a District Superintendent and such Assistant District Superintendent as the State Government shall consider necessary.”
    Section 3 reads:
    “The superintendence of the police throughout a general police district shall vest in and shall be exercised by the State Government to which such district is subordinate; and except as authorised under the provisions of this Act, no person, officer or Court shall be empowered by the State Government to supersede or control any police functionary.”

    Section 7 provides for the appointment, dismissal etc. of inferior officers. The relevant portion thereof reads:

    “Subject to the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution, and to such rules as the State Government may from time to time make under this Act, the Inspector General, Deputy Inspectors-General, Assistant Inspectors-General and District Superintendents of Police may at any time dismiss, suspend or reduce any police officer of the subordinate rank whom they shall think remiss or negligent in the discharge of his duty or unfit for the same,....”

    The difference between the texts of the sections, after coming into force of the Constitution and that before January 1950, is immaterial for our purpose. The interpretation clause is Section 1 under which (a) “police” shall include all persons who shall be enrolled under this Act; (b) the words “general police-district” shall embrace any presidency (State) or place, or any part of any presidency (State) or place, in which this Act shall be ordered to take effect; (c) “District Superintendent” and “District Superintendent of Police” shall include any Assistant District Superintendent or other person appointed by general or special order of the State Government to perform all or any of the duties of a District Superintendent of Police under this Act in any district; and (d) “Magistrate of the district” shall mean the chief officer charged with the executive administration of a district and exercising the powers of a Magistrate, by whatever designation the Chief officer charged with such executive administration is styled. Under Section 2 of the Act the entire police establishment under a State Government shall, for the purposes of this Act, be deemed to be one police force, and shall be formally enrolled; and shall consist of such number of officers and men, and shall be constituted in such manner as shall from time to time be ordered by the State Government.

    5. It is to be noted that the words “Superintendent of Police” do not occur anywhere in the Act. In the Act this expression is always prefixed by the words “District” or “Assistant District”. Under Rule 1.1 of the Punjab Police Rules, 1934, framed under the Police Act, the Punjab was divided into general police districts viz. the Provincial Police District and Railway police district and all ranks of police employed in the Province were appointed or enrolled under Section 2 of the Act. Rule 1.2 shows that the responsibility for the command of the police force, its recruitment, discipline, internal economy and administration throughout the general police districts vested in the Inspector General of Police who was to be assisted in the control and administration of the police force by such number of Deputy Inspectors General and Assistant Inspectors-General as the Provincial Government might from time to time appoint. Rule 1.4 gave the administrative division of the police force. Rule 1.6 gives the functions of the Deputy Inspectors General of Police and lays down that in the exercise of such responsibility they were to interfere as little as possible with the executive authority of the Superintendents under them. Under Rule 1.8:

    “The Superintendent of Police is the executive head of the district police force. He is directly responsible for the matters relating to its internal economy, training and management, and for the maintenance of its discipline and the efficient performance of all its duties.
    In every district there shall be one or more Superintendents and such number of Assistant Superintendents, Deputy Superintendents, Inspectors, Sergeants, Sub-Inspectors, Assistant Sub-Inspectors, Head Constables and Constables as the Provincial Government may direct.”

    6. The important thing to note in this connection is that the expression “District Superintendent of Police” is not used in the rules and the last-mentioned rule shows that it was possible to have more than one Superintendent of Police in a district.

    7. Chapter XII of the Rules deals with appointments and enrolments in the police force. Rule 12.1 contains a table summarising the directions given by the Provincial Government under clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 241 of the Government of India Act, 1935, in regard to the authorities competent to make appointments to the non-gazetted ranks. In respect of sub-inspectors the authority to whom the power of appointment is delegated is:

    “Superintendents of Police and Deputy Superintendent (Administrative), Government Railway Police and Assistant Superintendent, Government Railway Police.”

    This authority is given full powers subject to rules governing the conditions of service as defined in the Police Rules.

    8. Chapter XVI deals with punishments and sub-rule (1) of Rule 16.1 of this Chapter lays down that no police officer shall be departmentally punished otherwise than as provided in these rules. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 16.1 gives a table showing the departmental punishments which can be inflicted and the authorities competent to inflict the same. The table shows that the order of dismissal of a Sub-Inspector can be passed by a Superintendent of Police and Deputy Superintendent (Administrative), Government Railway Police.

    9. The question therefore arises whether the words “Superintendent of Police” in the Rules and the words “District Superintendent of Police” in the Act refer to one and the same authority, or whether there is any distinction or difference between the two. In our opinion, there is none. Section 4 of the Police Act shows that the administration of police throughout the local jurisdiction of the Magistrate of the district under the general control and direction of such Magistrate is to be vested in a District Superintendent. It is common knowledge that the police force expanded very considerably in between the year 1861, when the Act was passed and the year 1934 when the Rules were framed and a Magisterial district was divided into smaller areas for the purpose of better enforcement of law and order and a Superintendent of Police was placed in charge of each such area. This finds support from the testimony of Abdul Rehman, DW 1, Superintendent of Police, CID Lucknow. He said that he was posted as Superintendent of Police at the headquarters at Delhi in 1950. According to him, the District Magistrate was in charge of the entire Delhi area including New Delhi, Old Delhi and rural areas. Further, the police officer in charge of the entire area was the Inspector General of Police and there were two Superintendents of Police, one for Delhi City and the other for New Delhi. Shri Jagannath was the Superintendent of Police, City and all the police stations of the city were under his charge. It is nobody's case that a Superintendent of Police is an authority inferior to that of a District Superintendent of Police, each Magisterial district having in many cases more than one Superintendent of Police. There is thus no incongruity between the Act and the Rules which have to be read together and as Jagannath, Superintendent of Police, was undoubtedly the Superintendent of Police, City of Delhi with jurisdiction over the police station, Faiz Bazar where the plaintiff was posted, he was competent to pass the order of dismissal on him.

    10. On the question of the competence of Diwanchand Bhatia, the relevant rule is Rule 16.24 in Chapter XVI of the Punjab Police Rules which lays down the procedure to be followed in departmental enquiries. Sub-rule (1) of Rule 16.24(1) provides that:

    “The police officer accused of misconduct shall be brought before an officer empowered to punish him, or such superior officer as the Superintendent may direct to conduct the enquiry.
    * * *”

    On behalf of the appellant it was contended before us that all that this rule requires was that the officer conducting the enquiry must be superior in status to the person against whom charges had been levelled and there can be no doubt that a Deputy Superintendent of Police was an officer superior to a Sub-Inspector of Police. According to Counsel it was really not necessary to consider whether he was also a police officer but on the facts of this case there can be no doubt that Diwanchand Bhatia was a police officer. Ext. D-5 is a certificate to the effect that Diwanchand Bhatia had on the forenoon of 28th April 1949, received charge of the office of the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Enforcement, Delhi with the designation “Officiating Deputy Superintendent of Police” Ex. D-4, the order of the Inspector General of Police, Delhi, dated June 6, 1949, shows that Diwanchand Bhatia was “posted to city vice Malik Bodh Raj, Deputy Superintendent of Police, who will take over charge as Deputy-Superintendent of Police, Enforcement”. There is also the oral testimony of Diwanchand Bhatia to the effect that he had taken over charge as shown in those documents and that he had conducted the enquiry against the respondent. It was sought to be argued before us by Counsel for the respondent that Diwanchand Bhatia, when he conducted the enquiry had already retired from the post of police officer and he was only re-employed in the Enforcement Department and this would not make him a police officer. We see no force in this contention as the Enforcement Department was still a police department and a Deputy Superintendent of Police (Enforcement) was still a Deputy Superintendent of Police. The word “enforcement” merely specifies the department to which he was attached and the order Ext. D-4 shows that he was to take over charge from Malik Bodh Raj who in turn was another Deputy Superintendent of Police.

    11. The third point canvassed before us does not seem to have engaged the attention of the courts hearing the matter although it was raised in the plaint. It was the plaintiff's case in para 6-A of the amended plaint that the departmental enquiry could only have been started after the taking of certain essential preliminary steps and that it was necessary for the police first to give immediate information to the District Magistrate of the alleged commission of a crime by the plaintiff and it was for that officer to decide whether the enquiry was to be conducted by a police officer or by a selected Magistrate First Class and that in his case the departmental enquiry had been started without following the above procedure. Although the plaint does not mention the rule in the Punjab Police Rules referred to by the plaintiff in para 6-A, there can be no doubt that the reference was to Rule 16.38 of Chapter XVI, sub-rules (1) and (2) whereof run as follows:

    “(1) Immediate information shall be given to the District Magistrate of any complaint received by the Superintendent of Police, which indicates the commission by a police officer of a criminal offence in connection with his official relations with the public. The District Magistrate will decide whether the investigation of the complaint shall be conducted by a police officer, or made over to a selected Magistrate having First Class powers.
    (2) When investigation of such a complaint establishes a prima facie case, a judicial prosecution shall normally follow; the matter shall be disposed of departmentally only if the District Magistrate so orders for reasons to be recorded. When it is decided to proceed departmentally the procedure prescribed in Rule 16.24 shall be followed. An officer found guilty on a charge of the nature referred to in this rule shall ordinarily be dismissed.
    (3)-(6) * * *”

    12. It was the contention of the respondent that there was no evidence to show compliance with the above rule. It was contended that the evidence on record was not sufficient for the purpose. Diwanchand Bhatia stated in his evidence in chief that he had received an application for making an enquiry against the plaintiff from Jagannath, Superintendent of Police, and that after making a preliminary enquiry when he found a prima facie case against the plaintiff he sent the same to the District Magistrate for approval. Thereupon the District Magistrate wrote that a departmental enquiry be made against the plaintiff and it was only following the direction of the District Magistrate that the enquiry was made. The Superintendent of Police, Jagannath, stated in his evidence in chief that he could not say whether the sanction of the District Magistrate had been obtained for the enquiry by Diwanchand Bhatia.

    13. Mr Anthony who argued on behalf of the respondent drew our attention to a judgment of this Court in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Babu Ram 1961-2 SCR 579 where it was observed that the Police Act and the Rules made thereunder constituted a self-contained Code providing for the appointment of police officers and prescribing the procedure for their removal. According to him no departure from the rules was possible and in order to justify a dismissal strict compliance with the rules was mandatory. Observations to a similar effect were also quoted from the judgment of this Court in Delhi Administration v. Chanan Shah Civil Appeal No. 277/1966. There what was said was:

    “It is not necessary to decide whether the provisions of Rule 16.38 of the Punjab Police Rules are mandatory or directory. Even assuming that the rule is directory, we find that there has been no substantial compliance with its provisions.”

    We do not think that the same can be said of the facts of this case. We see no reason to disbelieve the testimony of Diwanchand Bhatia. The learned trial Judge did not frame an issue on this point and Abdul Rehman, the Superintendent of Police, CID, who gave evidence in this case stated that the file relating to the departmental enquiry against the plaintiff had been destroyed under Police Rule 12.35 by his order. He also referred to the document Ext. D-2 which is an extract regarding the destruction of Panji Missals. The order seems to have been passed on 15th January, 1953, long before the institution of the plaintiff's suit. In the circumstances, we see no reason not to accept the evidence of Diwanchand Bhatia according to which Rule 16.38 of Chapter XVI had been complied with.

    14. In the result, the appeal is allowed, the judgment and order of the courts below set aside and the suit filed by the respondent dismissed. As the special leave was given in this case on condition that the appellant will in any event pay the costs of the respondent, we make no order as to costs of this appeal and do not think it necessary to disturb the previous order for costs.

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    Comments

    Union Of India v. Jagjit Singh .
    (Apr 1, 1969)