West, J.:— No cases have been cited from either the English or the Indian reports which are in point. Slander of A as a ground of action by B would lead to infinite litigation. I must find on the first issue in the negative, and dismiss the suit with costs.
The cases which approach most nearly to the present case are those of a husband joining his wife in suing for defamation, and those of a partner in a firm suing for a slander whereby other members are affected as well as himself. In the case of a husband and wife, the husband sues on account merely of the legal identity subsisting between him and his wife, which identity might also perhaps be considered as necessitating or, at any rate, justifying a similar course under the Hindu law. But the husband does not sue for hospitality denied to himself or other injury sustained by himself through the slanderous imputation cast on his wife. It is for the injury to the person slandered that the action lies, not for any remote injury, however palpable this in practice may be. It is not deemed a necessary or reasonable consequence that the husband should be even socially punished for misconduct imputed only to his wife. In the case of persons less closely connected, the reason is still stronger. It is not a reasonable consequence of a slander of one of two cousins that the other should be refused credit or hospitality, and the slanderer, therefore, is not answerable for such a refusal.
In the case of partners, the one slandered—and, when there are more than one slandered, each of them—may apparently bring his action for the separable injury to himself, but not for the injury to the other. Otherwise, each member of a firm might bring as many suits for a general slander of it as the firm had members.
In India, the only reported case brought to my notice, which was that of a brother suing for defamation of his sister, is against the sufficiency of the cause of action here. The case is not really in point either way. What is important is, that when caste disputes are so frequent and injurious imputations so common, there should be no example forthcoming of a suit maintained by one member, even of a joint family, for defamation of another.
Here the person defamed was dead, and what was said was that, he being “patit” or impure, those who paid him funeral honours would be fined by the caste. This implied a caste condemnation as the ground for degradation and its consequences. The exclusion from hospitality and use of caste property was not the proper and reasonable consequence of a mere menace of such condemnation. The injury, if any, inflicted has apparently been by those who exclude the plaintiff without reason, not by those who said that in certain circumstances he and others might or would be excluded from caste benefits and privileges.
Attorneys for the plaintiff.— Messrs. Tobin and Roughton.
Attorneys for the defendants.— Messrs. Jefferson, Bhaishanker and Dinshah.