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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The respondent (plaintiff in the trial court) filed a suit through her attorney for possession, recovery of rent, mesne profits and permanent injunction in respect of an L-shape shop described as H-16/95, Gali No. 2, Tank Road, Karol Bagh, New Delhi-110005 (the "suit premises"). The respondent alleged she was the owner and that the appellant had been inducted as a month-to-month tenant at a monthly rent of Rs. 25,000/-. The respondent alleged rent was not paid from January 2010 and that she terminated the tenancy by serving a legal notice asking the appellant to vacate within 15 days; the appellant did not deliver possession, prompting the suit.

The appellant filed a written statement raising preliminary objections and disputing identity/ownership of the suit premises, denying service of the termination notice and asserting prior payments and renovation expenses; he also relied on an earlier suit he had filed for permanent injunction in which, according to the appellant, a court statement had been made that he would not be dispossessed.

On an application under Order 12 Rule 6 CPC, the Trial Court on 11 April 2014 passed a preliminary decree of possession directing the appellant to hand over possession of the described shop to the respondent within 60 days. The appellant appealed to this Court (RFA 272/2014). The caveat (Caveat 576/2014) was discharged because the caveator had appeared.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Trial Court was justified in passing a preliminary decree of possession under Order 12 Rule 6 CPC based on admissions and the material on record.
  2. Whether the respondent was correctly identified as the owner of the suit premises and whether the identity of the premises was in dispute such that a trial was required.
  3. Whether the tenancy stood terminated by service of the legal notice (or, alternatively, by filing of the suit and service of summons) under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act.
  4. Whether the appellant (tenant) is estopped from challenging the landlord's title under Section 116 of the Evidence Act, 1872.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The appellant contended the respondent was not the owner of the suit premises because the property description in the respondent's power of attorney and pleadings (H-95.A-1) differed from the premises in the appellant's possession (H-16/95).
  • Identity of the suit property was said to be in dispute and thus not suitable for summary disposal under Order 12 Rule 6 CPC; therefore a trial was required.
  • There was no unequivocal, clear admission by the appellant about the tenancy that would permit a judgment on admission under Order 12 Rule 6 CPC.
  • The appellant denied service of the legal notice terminating tenancy and alleged other facts such as prior payment of rent and expenditure on renovation; no written rent agreement existed.

Respondent's Position

  • The respondent alleged ownership of the suit premises and that the appellant was a monthly tenant who defaulted in rent from January 2010.
  • The respondent asserted she had validly terminated the tenancy by serving a legal notice (legal notice dated 18 March 2013 was placed on record) and claimed the appellant failed to vacate.
  • The respondent sought a preliminary decree of possession under Order 12 Rule 6 CPC and filed the relevant application which resulted in the Trial Court's order dated 11 April 2014.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Anar Devi (Smt) v. Nathu Ram. (1994) 4 SCC 250. Support for the principle under Section 116 of the Evidence Act that a tenant is estopped from challenging the title of the landlord from the commencement of tenancy. The court relied on this authority to hold that the appellant, having admitted tenancy in earlier proceedings, could not challenge the respondent's ownership; therefore the tenant was estopped from disputing title.
Payal Vision Limited v. Radhika Choudhary. (2012) 11 SCC 405. Explains that in suits for recovery of possession from a tenant not protected by Rent Control law, the plaintiff need only establish landlord-tenant relationship and termination of tenancy (Section 106, Transfer of Property Act); if these are not in dispute a decree under Order 12 Rule 6 CPC is permissible. The court applied this principle to conclude that since the landlord-tenant relationship and termination were not in dispute on the material, the Trial Court could pass a decree under Order 12 Rule 6 CPC without a full trial.
Medan and Co. v. Jaivir Chand AIR 1989 SC 630 Support for presumption of receipt of documents sent by post where they were not returned undelivered, invoking Section 27 of the General Clauses Act. The court used this authority to treat the speed post dispatch of the legal notice (which was not returned) as presumptively received by the appellant, supporting validity of termination by notice.
Nopay Investment (P) Ltd. v. Santokh Singh (HUF) Holds that the tenancy stands terminated under general law on the filing of a suit for eviction. The court observed that even if the legal notice had not been received, filing of the suit and service of summons would terminate the tenancy under the cited authority, supporting the Trial Court's decree.
Jeevan Diesel and Electricals Ltd. v. Jasbir Singh Chadha (HUF) Explains that service of summons with documents (including notice) and the expiry of the notice period thereafter can be treated as termination; also permits taking notice of subsequent events under Order 7 Rule 7 CPC. The court cited and quoted this decision to show that once summons and documents were served, the tenant would be deemed to have received the notice and the post-notice period expired, validating termination and possession decree.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court first rejected the appellant's contention that identity of the suit property and ownership were in dispute. The record showed no real controversy about identification: the appellant himself had previously pleaded that the premises H-16/95 is also known as H-95A-1 (quotation from para 9 of the appellant's earlier plaint was noted). That earlier pleading also contained an admission that the appellant had been inducted as a tenant at Rs. 25,000 per month by the respondent.

Given the appellant's prior admission of tenancy, the Court held the appellant could not challenge the respondent's title because a tenant is estopped from disputing landlord's title from the commencement of tenancy (relying on Section 116 Evidence Act and Anar Devi). The Court then applied the ratio of Payal Vision Limited v. Radhika Choudhary: where landlord-tenant relationship and termination of tenancy are not in dispute, a decree under Order 12 Rule 6 CPC can be passed.

On service of the termination notice, the Court noted the legal notice dated 18 March 2013 had been placed on the trial court record, the address was not disputed and the notice sent by speed post was not returned undelivered; invoking Section 27 of the General Clauses Act and Medan and Co. v. Jaivir Chand, the Court presumed receipt by the appellant. The Court further observed that, even if actual receipt of the notice were disputed, filing of the suit and service of summons itself terminates the tenancy under the authorities cited (Nopay Investment and Jeevan Diesel), and the appellant could not claim the tenancy subsisted.

On the combined view of admitted tenancy, presumed or effective termination and applicable precedent, the Court found the Trial Court rightly exercised its power under Order 12 Rule 6 CPC to pass a preliminary decree of possession without a full trial.

Holding and Implications

DISMISSED — The appeal was dismissed. The Trial Court's preliminary decree of possession passed under Order 12 Rule 6 CPC was upheld, and the miscellaneous application was disposed of as infructuous.

Implications: The direct effect is that the preliminary decree for possession in favour of the respondent stands and the appellant remains obliged to deliver possession as ordered by the Trial Court. The opinion does not announce any broader or novel precedent beyond applying established authorities on tenant estoppel, presumed receipt of posted notices, and the circumstances in which Order 12 Rule 6 CPC may be invoked.

    Mr. Om Prakash Arora v. Smt. Archana Lall

    A.K PATHAK, J. (ORAL)

    Caveat 576/2014

    Since caveator has put in appearance caveat is discharged.

    RFA 272/2014

    1. Respondent filed the suit through her Attorney-Shri Sunil Kumar Soni against the appellant, for possession, recovery of rent, mesne profit and permanent injunction before the trial court. It is alleged in the plaint that respondent was owner of L-shape shop bearing no. H-16/95, Gali No. 2, Tank Road, Karol Bagh, New Delhi-110005 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘suit premises); more particularly shown in red colour in the site plan attached with the plaint. Appellant was inducted as tenant in the suit premises, on a monthly rent of Rs. 25,000/-. Appellant defaulted in making payment of rent. He did not pay any rent with effect from January, 2010 in spite of requests of the respondent. Tenancy of suit premises was on month to month basis commencing from 1st day of each calendar month and ending on the last day of same month. Respondent terminated the tenancy vide legal notice served on the appellant; whereby appellant was asked to vacate the suit premises within 15 days from the date of receipt of said notice. Despite receipt of legal notice appellant did not deliver possession of the suit premises, hence the suit.

    2. In the written statement appellant took various preliminary objections. On merits it was stated that respondent had claimed herself to be owner of entire upper ground floor without roof rights in respect of property bearing no. H-95.A-1, Gali No. 2 situated at Gobind Garh, Tank Road, Karol Bagh, New Delhi, whereas, premises in occupation of appellant was one portion of the ground floor of the shop bearing no. H-16/95, Gali No. 2, Tank Road, Karol Bagh, New Delhi. Even Power of Attorney executed by the respondent in favour of Shri Sunil Kumar Soni was in respect of property bearing no. H-95.A-1, Gali No. 2 situated at Gobind Garh, Tank Road, Karol Bagh, New Delhi; whereas number of suit premises was H-16/95, Gali No. 2, Tank Road, Karol Bagh, New Delhi. Appellant had earlier filed a suit against the respondent for permanent injunction wherein, in para 10 of the plaint, it was stated that despite having paid the rent regularly respondent did not issue any rent receipt. Rent upto July, 2010 had already been paid. Respondent was trying to dispossess the appellant from the suit premises bearing no. H-16/95, Gali No. 2, Tank Road, Karol Bagh, New Delhi therefore, appellant filed a suit for injunction against the respondent. In the said suit, respondent no. 2, namely, Shri S.K Soni and respondent no. 3, namely, Rajender Ashija @ Babu Ashija made a joint statement in the court of Senior Civil Judge, Delhi to the effect that they will not dispossess the appellant from the property bearing no. H-16/95, Gali No. 2, Tank Road, Karol Bagh, New Delhi. In view of the said statement suit was withdrawn by the appellant. Appellant had spent Rs. 5-6 lacs on renovation of the suit premises. No written rent agreement was executed containing the terms of tenancy between the parties. It was further stated in para 8 of the written statement that appellant had wrongly terminated the tenancy on the basis of wrong and concocted facts. It was further alleged that no legal notice was served on the appellant.

    3. On an application filed by the respondent under Order 12 Rule 6 CPC Trial Court, vide order dated 11th April, 2014, has passed a preliminary decree of possession in respect of the suit premises and has directed the appellant to hand over the possession of L-shape shop bearing no. H-16/95, Gali No. 2, Tank Road, Karol Bagh, New Delhi - 110005, front area from shutter measuring 9′ × 11′.3″ and on the back side measuring 17′9″+18′.3″ × 37′ × 3″ as shown in red colour in the site plan to the respondent within 60 days from the date of said order.

    4. That is how the appellant is before this Court by way of present appeal.

    5. Learned senior counsel for the appellant has vehemently contended that respondent was not the owner of suit premises, inasmuch as suit premises is different than the property in possession of the appellant. In the General Power of Attorney dated 3rd May, 2010 respondent has given the address of suit property as H-95.A-1, Gali No. 2 situated at Gobind Garh, Tank Road, Karol Bagh, New Delhi, however, in the suit respondent was claiming ownership in respect of premises bearing no. H-16/95, Gali No. 2, Tank Road, Karol Bagh, New Delhi - 110005. In nutshell it is contended that identity of the suit property was itself in dispute besides the ownership which could be resolved only after trial. There was no unequivocal and clear admission about the tenancy by the appellant thus, no judgment on admission could have been passed under Order 12 Rule 6 CPC.

    6. I do not find any force in the above contentions of learned senior counsel for the appellant. A perusal of record shows that there is no controversy with regard to identification of shop under the tenancy of appellant. Appellant has admitted that prior to filing of the suit by the respondent he had filed a suit for permanent injunction. Copy of the plaint has been placed on record and a perusal thereof makes it clear that premises bearing no. H-16/95, Gali No. 2, Tank Road, Karol Bagh, New Delhi - 110005 is also known as premises bearing no. H-95.A-1, Gali No. 2 situated at Gobind Garh, Tank Road, Karol Bagh, New Delhi. In para 9 of the plaint appellant has stated as under:-

    “… besides the plaintiff also paid electricity bills as per the electricity meter in the name of the defendant no. 1 installed at premises no. H-16/95, Gali No. 2, Tank Road, New Delhi - 110005 also known as shop in H-95A-1 in Gali No. 2, Tank Road, Karol Bagh, New Delhi - 110005……”

    7. In the said suit appellant has categorically admitted that he was inducted as a tenant on a monthly rent of Rs. 25,000/- by the respondent, who was the owner of the suit premises. This fact has been alleged by him in para 1 of the plaint in the said suit. Having admitted that he was a tenant of respondent he cannot be permitted to challenge the ownership of the respondent. It is trite law that a tenant is estopped from challenging the title of the landlord, from the date of commencement of tenancy under Section 116 of the Evidence Act, 1872. Reference in this regard be made to Anar Devi (Smt) v. Nathu Ram. (1994) 4 SCC 250.

    8. In Payal Vision Limited v. Radhika Choudhary. (2012) 11 SCC 405, reliance whereupon has been placed, it has been held thus “in a suit for recovery of possession from a tenant whose tenancy is not protected under the provisions of the Rent Control Act, all that is required to be established by the plaintiff landlord is the existence of the jural relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties and the termination of the tenancy either by lapse of time or by notice served by the landlord under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. So long as these two aspects are not in dispute the court can pass a decree in terms of Order 12 Rule 6 CPC”. The relationship of landlord and tenant is not in dispute for the reasons as aforesaid. Appellant has made an attempt to confuse the issue by taking a plea that suit property is different than what had been let out to him. However, this fact is belied from the averments made in the suit for permanent injunction filed by him.

    9. As regards service of notice is concerned, respondent has specifically averred in the plaint that notice of termination of tenancy was served on the appellant. Legal notice dated 18 March, 2013 was placed on record of trial court. Address of the appellant has correctly been mentioned therein and is not in dispute. Even denial regarding receipt of notice in the written statement is vague, inasmuch as shifting stand has been taken. On the one hand it is stated that tenancy was wrongly terminated on the other it was denied that notice was received. Notice was sent through speed post and was not received back undelivered, thus, under Section 27 of the General Clauses Act, it can be presumed that same was received by the addressee, that is, appellant. Reliance is placed on Medan and Co. v. Jaivir Chand AIR 1989 SC 630. Even otherwise, filing of suit and service of summons on the appellant itself amounts to termination of tenancy.

    10. In Nopay Investment (P) Ltd. v. Santokh Singh (HUF) Apex court has held that the tenancy would stand terminated under general law on filing of a suit for eviction. Accordingly, I am of the view that even assuming the notice of termination was not served upon the appellant the tenancy would stand terminated on filing of the suit and service of summons on the appellant. In Jeevan Diesel and Electricals Ltd. v. Jasbir Singh Chadha (HUF) it has been held as under:-

    “Another reason for rejecting the argument that the tenancy would not be terminated by the legal notice Ex.PW1/3 is that the Respondents/Plaintiffs admittedly filed a copy of this notice alongwith the suit way back in the year 2007. Once the summons in the suit alongwith documents were served upon the Appellant/tenant, the Appellant/tenant would obviously have received such notice. Even if we take this date when the Appellant/tenant received a copy of the notice when served with the documents in the suit, once again, the period of 15 days has expired thereafter and keeping the legislative intendment of amended Section 106 in view, the Appellant therefore cannot argue that the tenancy is not terminated and he did not get a period of 15 days to vacate the premises. I am in view of this position consequently entitled to take notice of subsequent events under Order 7 Rule 7 CPC, and taking notice of the subsequent events of the expiry of 15 days after receipt of a copy of the notice alongwith documents in the suit, I hold that the tenancy has been validly terminated, and as on date, the Appellant/tenant has no right to stay in the premises and consequently the decree for possession was rightly passed by the trial Court”.

    11. For the foregoing reasons, appeal is dismissed. Miscellaneous application is disposed of as infructuous.

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    Comments

    Mr. Om Prakash Arora v. Smt. Archana Lall
    (Jul 14, 2014)