Sanjay Kishan Kaul, J.:— The respondent-landlord filed a petition for eviction against the petitioner-tenant 10 years ago on grounds of personal requirement under the provisions of Section 14 (1) (e) r/w Section 24-B of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as the said Act). The tenanted premises consist of first and the second floor of House No. 5/22 B, Roop Nagar, Delhi which were let out with effect from 01-10-1970 to the petitioner through its partner Mr. S.M Kapoor (now deceased) vide lease deed dated 01-10-1970 and comprise of three bed rooms with attached bath rooms, dining room, prayer room and drawing room and two verandahs, on the first floor of the premises besides store, kitchen, pantry along with two rooms, bath, latrine and open terrace on the second floor as per site plan Ex AW1/1.

2. The case of the respondent was that the entire property was owned by his deceased father and after the demise of the father, the respondent and his elder brother Sh. K.K Singh became the owner of the entire property in equal share. On 15-06-1989 an oral partition was agreed upon in terms whereof the tenanted portion along with the garage and two outhouses above the garage came to the exclusive share of the respondent while the entire ground floor portion along with open lawn on the ground floor and another garage came to the exclusive share of Sh. K.K Singh. It may be noticed that Sh. K.K Singh is gainfully employed in the United States of America The respondent at the moment is occupying the ground floor portion owned by Sh. K.K Singh.

3. The respondent stated that the tenanted premises had been let out for residential purposes vide the lease deed dated 01-10-1970 executed by the respondent in favour of the petitioner. Sh. K.K Singh had retired from his services in December, 1995 and wanted to have an abode in India vacant for him and thus the petitioner wanted to shift to his portion of the property which was required bona fide by him.

4. The petition was contested by the petitioner Sh. Ravi Kapoor who has stated that the purpose of letting was residential-cum-commercial. All the necessary parties had not been impleaded including widow of late Sh. S.M Kapoor and the daughters who had also become tenants by operation of law. The bona fide requirement and the ownership of the respondent is disputed.

5. The matter went to trial and the Additional Rent Controller in terms of the impugned order dated 11-09-2000 allowed the eviction petition and granted six months time to the petitioner to vacate the tenanted premises. The petitioner aggrieved by the same filed the present revision petition which has been pending for the last five years largely on account of various adjournments sought on behalf of the petitioner.

6. The petitioner has also filed CM No. 12284/2004 to place on record the certified copy of the sale deed in respect of the property in question to show the absence of ownership of the respondent.

7. In order to appreciate the challenge to the impugned order, it is necessary to refer to the provisions of the Statute.

14. Protection of tenant against eviction.-1) Notwithstanding anything to be contrary contained in any other law or contract, no order or decree for the recovery of possession of any premises shall be made by any court of Controller in favour of the landlord against a tenant:

Provided that the Controller may, on an application made to him in the prescribed manner, make an order for the recovery of possession of the premises on one or more of the following grounds only, namely:

a) .......

b) .......

c) .......

d) .......

e) that the premises let for residential purposes are required bona fide by the landlord for occupation as a residence for himself or for any member of his family dependent on him, if he is the owner thereof, or for any person for whose benefit the premises are held and that the landlord or such person has no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation.

Explanation:- for the purposes of this clause, “premises let for residential purposes” include any premises which having been let for use as a residence are, without the consent of the landlord, used incidentally, for commercial or other purposes;

8. Insofar as the purpose of letting is concerned, there is no dispute that the lease deed refers to only residential use. The lease deed had been filed in the previous litigation between the parties where it had been held that the premises were let out for residential purposes and were to be used for residential purposes alone. In such a situation the petitioner can hardly be permitted to contend that the premises, are being used for commercial purposes with the consent of the landlord. In fact on a specific query. She counsel for the petitioner stated that the petitioner manufacturer ties and some part of the work is done in the tenanted premises. In the teeth of the lease agreement and the absence of any written consent, it can hardly be presumed that the permissible user of the premises was commercial.

9. Learned counsel for the petitioner sought to rely upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in A.N Kapoor (Smt) v. Pushpa Talwar (Smt). AIR 1992 SC 799. That was case of premises being let out for residential purposes but used regularly, right from the inception of the tenancy, for lodging paying guests and it was in those circumstances that the consent of the landlord for such user was presumed. This would have no application to the facts of the present case where the petitioner has been residing with his family and only claims that some work of his business is done in the premises.

10. The serious dispute raised was about the ownership of the respondent. This was so in view of the stand of the respondent that the property was originally owned by the father. There was subsequent oral partition. The respondent proved on record ExAW1/3 the wealth tax assessment for the year 1975-76 to substantiate that the tented premises was shown as a wealth of the respondent. The trial court records that there is not even a suggestion made in the cross examination of the respondent that the property does not belong to him or that ExAW1/3 does not truly depict the state of affairs regarding the suit property.

11. Learned counsel for the petitioner has primarily emphasised this aspect and seeks to contend that the terminology used in the Statute in reference to Section 14 (1) (e) of the said Act is ‘owner’ and not ‘landlord’. It is thus contended that the legislature itself envisaged something more than being a mere landlord.

12. It must be noticed at the inception itself that undisputedly the lease was executed by the respondent in favour of the petitioner in 1970 and the oral partition is stated to have occurred prior to that date in 1969. The petitioner thus cannot deny the landlord-tenant relationship but seeks to emphasize on the aspect of ownership. In fact the contention raised is that ExAW1/3 is of a subsequent year and not when the lease was created.

13. In order to support his contention, learned counsel for the petitioner referred to the judgment of the Apex Court in Smt. Shanti Sharma and Ors v. Smt. Ved Prabha and Ors; AIR 1987 Supreme Court 2028. The matter pertained to the said Act and as to the meaning of the expression ‘owner’ in Section 14 (1) (e) of the said Act. The relevant discussion in this behalf is in Para 14 which reads as under:

“The word ‘owner’ has not been defined in this Act and the word ‘owner’ has also not been defined in the transfer of Property Act. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant appears to be that ownership means absolute ownership in the land as well as of the structure standing thereupon. Ordinarily, the concept of ownership may be what is contended by the counsel for the appellant but in the modern context where it is more or less admitted that all lands belong to the State, the person who hold properties will only be lessees or the persons holding the land on some term from the Govt or the authorities constituted by the State and in this view of the matter it could not be thought of that the Legislature when it used the term ‘owner’ in the provision of Section 14(1)(e) it thought of ownership as absolute ownership. It must be presumed that the concept of ownership only will be as it is under stood at present. It could not be doubted that the term ‘owner’ has to understood in the context of the background of the law and what is contemplated in the scheme of the Act. This Act has been enacted for protection of the tenants. But at the same time it has provided that the landlord under certain circumstances will be entitled to eviction and bona fide requirement is one of such grounds on the basis of which landlords have been permitted to have eviction of a tenant. In this context, the phrase “owner' thereof has to be understood, and it is clear that what is contemplated is that where the person builds up his property and lets out to the tenant and subsequently needs it for his own use, he should be entitled to an order or decree for eviction, the only thing necessary for him to prove is bona fide requirement and that he is the owner thereof. In this context, what appears to be the meaning of the term ‘owner’ is vis-a-vis the tenant i.e the owner should be something more than the tenant. Admittedly in these cases where the plot of land is taken on lease the structure is built by the landlord and admittedly he is the owner of the structure. So far as the land is concerned he holds a long lease and in this view of the matter as against the tenant it could not be doubted that he will fall within the ambit of the meaning of the term “owner' as is contemplated under this section. This term came up for consideration before the Delhi High Court and it was also in reference to Section 14(1)(e) and it was held by the Delhi High Court in T.C Rekhi v. Smt. Usha Gujaral, 1971 Ren CJ 322 at p.326 as under:

“The word ‘owner’ as used in this clause has to be construed in the background of the purpose and object of enacting it. The use of the word ‘owner’ in tis clause seems to me to have been inspired by the definition of the word ‘landlord’ as contained in Section 2(e) of the Act which is wide enough to include a person receiving or entitled to receive the rent of any premises on account of or on behalf of or for the benefit of any other person. Construed in the context in which the word ‘owner’ is used in clause (e), it seems to me to include all persons in the position of Smt. Usha Gujaral who have taken a long lease of sites from the Government for the purpose of building houses thereon. The concept of ownership seems now to be eclipsed by its social and political significance and the idea of ownership in the case like the present is one of the better right to be in possession and to obtain it. To accede to the contention raised by Sh. Kapur would virtually nullity the effect of clause (e) and would render all such landlords remediless against tenants however badly they may need the premises for their own personal residence. I do not think such a result was intended by the Legislature and I repeal the appellant's contention. I consider it proper before passing on to the next challenge to point out that the word owner as used in clause (e) in Section 14(1) does not postulate absolute ownership in the sense that he has an absolutely unrestricted right to deal with the property as he likes. To describe some one as owner, and perhaps even as an absolute owner of property is to say two things: it is to assert that his title to the property is indisputable and that he has all the rights of ownership allowed by the legal system in question. Rights of ownership may, therefore, be limited by special provisions of law and include in those provisions such as are in force in New Delhi according to which citizens are granted long leases of sites for constructing buildings thereon. Now, the words of a statute, though normally construed in their ordinary meaning, may contain inherent restrictions due to their subject matter and object and the occasion on which and the circumstances with reference to which they are used. They call for construction in the light of their context rather than in what may be either their strict etymological sense or their popular meaning apart from the context (See Halsbury's laws of England Third Edition Vol. 36 para 893, p.394), the meaning of the word ‘owner’ in clause (e) is influenced and controlled by its context and the appellant's construction is unacceptable because it seems to be quite clearly contrary to the reasonable operation of the statutory provision.” (emphasis supplied)

14. A perusal of the aforesaid shows that the word ‘owner’ is not used by the Legislature in the context of an absolute owner. The Act is a protection for tenants and landlords are entitled to eviction in certain circumstances including for bona fide requirement. The Supreme Court thus observed that the phrase ‘owner’ appears to be used vis-a-vis a tenant and this would imply that the owner should be something more than the tenant. Once this test is satisfied a person claiming eviction has to only show his bona fide requirement. The Supreme Court has referred with approval to the observations of this court in T.C Rekhi v. Smt. Usha Gujaral 1971 Ren CJ 322 where it had been observed that the word ‘owner’ in the clause seems to have been inspired by the definition of the word ‘landlord’ as contained in Section 2(e) of the said Act which is wide enough to include a person receiving or entitled to receive the rent of any premises on account or on behalf or for the benefit of any other person. Thus the idea of ownership was held to be one of better right to be in possession than the tenant and to obtain it. The definition of landlord as given in Section 2(e) of the said Act is as under:

2. Definitions

In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires:

a)........

b) ......

c)........

d)........

e) “landlord” means a person who for the time being is receiving or is entitled to receive the rent of any premises whether on his own account or on account of or on behalf of for the benefit of any person or as a trustee, guardian or receiver for any other person or who would so receive the rent or be entitled to receive the rent, if the premises were let to a tenant;

15. In my considered view the aforesaid does not help the petitioner in any manner. In fact it goes against the petitioner since it has been held that the word ‘owner’ has to be understood in the context in which it has been used in the Statute.

16. It is not open for the petitioner as a tenant to get into an enquiry of the title of the property. This is not the scope of the eviction proceedings nor are the present proceedings a title suit. It is not a case where brother of the respondent or any other person and has been asserting any rights in respect of the tenanted premises. The premises were let out by the respondent and rents have been paid to the respondent.

17. A reference to the order of the Additional Rent Controller shows that in para 13 there is discussion of two other judgments laying down the same legal principle. The petitioner was inducted as a tenant by the respondent and respondent thus has a better title than the petitioner in the context of the observations made aforesaid. The petitioner in fact is estopped from challenging the title of the respondent in view of Section 116 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 which reads as under:

“116. Estoppel of tenant; and of licensee of person in possession -

No tenant of immoveable property, or person claiming through such tenant, shall, during the continuance of the tenancy, be permitted to deny that the landlord of such tenant had, at the beginning of the tenancy, a title to such immovable property; and no person who came upon any immovable property by the licence of the person in possession thereof, shall be permitted to deny that such person had a title to such possession at the time when such licence was given.”

18. The production of the sale deed dated 07-09-1976 executed by the DDA in favour of the brother of the respondent also does not help the respondent. It is the case of the respondent that the property was owned by their father though purchased in the name of Sh. K.K Singh. Interestingly the respondent even signed that document on behalf of his brother as attorney. The plea of the petitioner that this sale deed is of 1970 is also not of much use since as per the sale deed itself original agreement was executed by Delhi Improvement Trust in favour of the third party who in turn had transferred the land by an agreement dated 03-06-1949. The deed dated 07-09-1970 only crystallized the rights. I thus do not find any force in the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner on this plea of ownership.

19. The respondent had entered the witness box and proved on record a communication addressed to him by his brother ExAW 1/2 dated 16-09-1996 requesting the respondent to vacate the portion owned by the brother. The respondent claims to be living in the ground floor portion of the tenanted premises as a licensee since his brother was staying abroad.

20. It is not a case that the respondent is owning any other property. Learned counsel for the petitioner sought to emphasize that the brother is really not interested in coming back to India. It cannot be lost sight of that the petition is not by the brother of the respondent for bona fide requirement but by the respondent. The respondent cannot be compelled to stay in the portion of his brother merely to accommodate the petitioner.

21. Insofar as the plea of non-joinder of necessary parties is concerned, it has been rightly observed by the trial court that it is Sh. Ravi Kapoor alone who was staying in the tenanted premises and paying the rent as admitted by him. The tenancy right devolves upon the sons, daughters and wife but if it is only one of the legal heirs who has paid the rent and has conducted himself as the tenant. He alone is a necessary party. The trial court in this behalf has relied upon the observation of the Supreme Court in H.C Pandey v. G.C Paul; AIR 1989 SC 1470 to this effect.

22. I am thus of the considered view that there is no patent error or erroneous exercise of jurisdiction by the Additional Rent Controller and the impugned order is in accordance with law.

23. There is no merit in the petition.

24. Dismissed.