AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 27 of the Evidence Act
  • Section 155 of the Evidence Act
  • Sections 147, 149, 302 read with Sections 149, 324 and 326 of the Penal Code, 1860
  • Section 3 of the Evidence Act
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Section 145 of the Evidence Act
  • Section 302 read with Section 149 of the Penal Code, 1860
  • Section 436 of the Penal Code, 1860
  • Sections 324 and 326 read with Section 149 of the Penal Code, 1860
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 27 of the Evidence Act
  • Section 155 of the Evidence Act
  • Sections 147, 149, 302 read with Sections 149, 324 and 326 of the Penal Code, 1860
  • Section 3 of the Evidence Act
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Section 145 of the Evidence Act
  • Section 302 read with Section 149 of the Penal Code, 1860
  • Section 436 of the Penal Code, 1860
  • Sections 324 and 326 read with Section 149 of the Penal Code, 1860
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The case arises out of a violent incident on 13-11-1988 in which one Bibhishan Vithoba Khadle was killed and six members of the complainant party sustained injuries. Sixteen persons were originally arraigned for offences under the Indian Penal Code, including Sections 147, 149, 302, 324 and 326. The Trial Court acquitted all 16 accused. On appeal, the Bombay High Court reversed the acquittal of nine accused (A-1 to A-7, A-10 and A-11) and sentenced them to life imprisonment while upholding the acquittal of the remaining seven. Eight of the convicted persons (Accused 1, 3-7, 10 and 11; Accused 2 having died) appealed to the Supreme Court, challenging the High Court’s reversal of their acquittal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the High Court was justified in reversing a trial-court acquittal when such acquittal was allegedly a “possible view” of the evidence.
  2. Whether contradictions and omissions in eyewitness testimony were so material as to render the prosecution version unreliable.
  3. Whether a cryptic telephonic message (a General Diary entry made on the basis of PW-12’s call) constituted the First Information Report under Section 154 CrPC.
  4. Whether non-explanation of injuries on one of the accused (A-5) vitiated the prosecution case.
  5. Whether the appellants could be held vicariously liable under Section 149 IPC for offences committed in prosecution of the common object of an unlawful assembly.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

  • The trial court’s acquittal was based on a plausible appreciation of evidence; hence the High Court had no grounds to interfere absent clear perversity.
  • Eyewitness accounts contained significant omissions and contradictions, and the FIR was based on an “improved” version given by PW-10 rather than the earlier telephonic message from PW-12.
  • Injury sustained by Accused 5 was not explained by the prosecution, undermining its credibility.
  • Because of long passage of time (incident occurred in 1988) and advanced age of some appellants, a conviction at this stage would be harsh.
  • Cited decisions such as Padam Singh, Lalita Kumari and Majjal to emphasise restraint in appellate reversal of acquittals and treatment of cryptic information as FIR.

State/Complainant's Arguments

  • The trial court’s approach was “totally perverse”; it rejected consistent injured-eyewitness testimony for immaterial discrepancies.
  • The High Court adequately dealt with and overturned each trial-court reason; minor omissions are natural when many assailants and victims are involved.
  • The telephone message lacked essential particulars and therefore could not be treated as the FIR; PW-10’s prompt written statement properly constituted the FIR.
  • Non-explanation of a single injury on Accused 5 is not fatal where overall prosecution evidence is trustworthy.
  • All appellants shared a common object; hence individual roles need not be proved for liability under Sections 302/149, 324/149 and 326/149 IPC.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Masalti v. State of U.P., AIR 1965 SC 202 Difficulty of assigning specific roles in a large unlawful assembly does not absolve liability under §149 IPC. Relied upon to uphold conviction despite inability to describe precise act of every assailant.
Gangadhar Behera v. State of Orissa, (2002) 8 SCC 381 Members of unlawful assembly can be convicted without individual overt act; principle of vicarious liability. Cited to endorse High Court’s view that A-1 to A-7 shared common object.
Lalita Kumari v. State of U.P., (2014) 2 SCC 1 A General Diary entry can, in appropriate cases, constitute an FIR. Court distinguished: held PW-12’s cryptic phone call did not qualify as FIR.
Anand Mohan v. State of Bihar, (2012) 7 SCC 225 Cryptic information lacking material particulars is not an FIR under §154 CrPC. Applied to reject appellants’ plea that telephonic message was FIR.
Sk. Ishaque v. State of Bihar, (1995) 3 SCC 392 Cryptic message not disclosing cognisable offence is not an FIR. Reinforced reasoning on telephonic information.
Binay Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar, (1997) 1 SCC 283 Insufficient, vague information cannot be treated as FIR. Cited in same context regarding telephonic message.
Patai v. State of U.P., (2010) 4 SCC 429 Reiterated requirement of detailed information for FIR. Support for holding that PW-10’s written statement was the valid FIR.
Damodar v. State of Rajasthan, (2004) 12 SCC 336 Similar principle on FIR and cryptic information. Referenced in discussion rejecting appellants’ FIR argument.
T.T. Antony v. State of Kerala, (2001) 6 SCC 181 Limits on treating multiple informations as FIRs. Used to conclude only PW-10’s statement could be FIR.
Bava Hajee Hamsa v. State of Kerala, (1974) 4 SCC 479 High Court may reverse acquittal where trial court’s “scheme of approach” is faulty. Quoted to justify High Court’s interference with perverse trial-court findings.
Padam Singh v. State of U.P., (2000) 1 SCC 621 (and similar cases: Devatha Venkataswamy, Narendra Singh, Majjal, Baby) Appellate standards for reversing acquittals; need to address trial-court reasoning. Distinguished; Supreme Court held High Court had indeed met these standards.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court found the trial court’s wholesale rejection of eyewitness testimony “perverse.” It reiterated settled principles that:

  • Minor inconsistencies are natural and do not erode otherwise credible injured-eyewitness evidence.
  • Presumption of innocence does not prevent an appellate court from reversing an acquittal when the lower court’s appreciation of evidence is unreasonable.
  • Non-explanation of injuries on an accused is a factor for consideration but not, by itself, fatal where the prosecution evidence is trustworthy.
  • Liability under Section 149 IPC depends on shared common object, which can be inferred from the conduct of the assembly, the weapons carried and the nature of the assault.
  • The telephonic message from PW-12 lacked essential particulars; consistent with precedents, it could not be treated as the FIR. PW-10’s prompt written statement at the police station was the valid FIR.

Applying these principles, the Court upheld the credibility of PWs 10, 11, 12, 15 and 18. All five consistently named A-1 to A-7 as active assailants. Because PW-11 and PW-18 did not name A-10 and A-11, the Court granted those two appellants the benefit of doubt. The remainder of the High Court’s reasoning—with respect to unlawful assembly, common object and the weight of injured-eyewitness testimony—was affirmed.

Holding and Implications

Partly Allowed / Convictions of A-1 to A-7 Confirmed; A-10 and A-11 Acquitted.

The Supreme Court:

  • Acquitted Appellants 7 and 8 (A-10 Babu Rama Berad and A-11 Balu Naradeo Berad) and ordered their immediate release unless required in any other case.
  • Maintained the convictions and life sentences of A-1, A-3, A-4, A-5, A-6 and A-7 under Sections 302/149, 324/149 and 326/149 IPC.
  • Allowed A-5 and A-6 to remain on bail for one month to pursue remission on grounds of advanced age, with surrender required only if remission is refused.

Implications are limited to the parties but the judgment reinforces established doctrines: (i) an appellate court may overturn acquittal where the trial court’s evaluation is demonstrably perverse; (ii) cryptic or vague information does not qualify as an FIR; and (iii) consistent injured-eyewitness testimony can sustain convictions notwithstanding minor discrepancies.

To access the original judgment, please Sign In or Subscribe.

    Bhagwan Jagannath Markad And Others v. State Of Maharashtra .

    Adarsh Kumar Goel, J.— The appellants are aggrieved by the judgment and order dated 20-4-2007 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in State of Maharashtra v. Bhagwan Jagannath Markad 2007 SCC OnLine Bom 1454 whereby they have been convicted under Sections 147, 149, 302 read with Sections 149, 324 and 326 of the Penal Code, 1860 and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life, apart from other lesser sentences which are to run concurrently and payment of fine, setting aside their acquittal by the trial court.

    2. Originally there were 16 accused, namely:

    (1) Bhagwan Jagannath Markad,
    (2) Janardhan Rambhau Tate,
    (3) Dada Sayyednoor Mulani,
    (4) Sayyed Sayyadnoor Mulani,
    (5) Sandipan Sakhara Koyale,
    (6) Nivrutti Sakharam Koyale,
    (7) Krishna Sakharam Koyale,
    (8) Shailendra Sandipan Koyale,
    (9) Chandrakant Shankar Markad,
    (10) Babu Rama Berad,
    (11) Balu Naradeo Berad,
    (12) Manik Rama Berad,
    (13) Pandurang Babu Arade,
    (14) Sadashiv Shahu Arade,
    (15) Kisan Rama Berad, and
    (16) Appa Shabu Arade.

    3. The trial court acquitted all the accused. The High Court upheld acquittal of Accused 8, 9, 12, 13, 14, 15 and 16.

    4. Accused 2 is reported to have died. Thus, eight appellants are before this Court. They are A-1, Bhagwan Jagannath Markad; A-3, Dada Sayyednoor Mulani; A-4, Sayyed Sayyadnoor Mulani; A-5, Sandipan Sakhara Koyale; A-6, Nivrutti Sakharam Koyale; A-7, Krishna Sakharam Koyale; A-10, Babu Rama Berad; and A-11, Balu Naradeo Berad respectively.

    5. According to the prosecution, one Bibhishan Vithoba Khadle has been murdered and six persons have been injured being Indubai; PW 11, Dagadu Gopinath Koyale; PW 18, Chaturbhuj Khade; PW 15, Bibhishan Kshirsagar; Gopinath Mahadev Koyale and PW 12, Kernath Koyale in the attack by the accused.

    6. As per the prosecution version recorded in the FIR lodged by PW 10, Satyabhama; her husband PW 11 Dagadu Gopinath Koyale; father-in-law Gopinath Koyale; deceased Bibhishan Vithoba Khadle; PW 18 Chaturbhuj Khade; PW 15 Bibhishan Kshirsagar along with others were present in their house on the date of the occurrence on 13-11-1988 at 12.00 noon when all the accused came there to attack her husband. Accused 3 Dada Sayyednoor Mulani put the house on fire on account of which everyone came out. Accused 1 and 2 Bhagwan Jagannath Markad and Janardhan Rambhau Tate attacked Dagadu with swords on hands, legs and knees. Accused 3 Dada Sayyednoor had barchi. Accused 4 Sayyed Sayyadnoor Mulani had knife. Accused 5 Sandipan Sakharam Koyale had iron rods. Accused 6 Nivrutti Sakharam Koyale had barchi. Accused 7 Krishna Sakharam Koyale had axe. Accused 10 and 11 Babu Rama Berad and Balu Naradeo Berad had axes. Accused 8 Shailendra Sandipan Koyale had sticks. PW 11 Dagadu fell down on account of beating and became unconscious. Accused 3 Dada Sayyednoor, Accused 4 Sayyed Sayyadnoor Mulani, Accused 5 Sandipan Sakharam Koyale, Accused 6 Nivrutti Sakharam Koyale, Accused 7 Krishna Sakharam Koyale caused beating to the deceased Bibhishan Vithoba Khadle. Accused 1 and 2 Bhagwan Jagannath Markad and Janardhan Rambhau Tate also attacked deceased Bibhishan Vithoba Khadle. The accused then beat PW 11 Dagadu Gopinath Koyale and PW 18 Chaturbhuj Khade with sticks and swords. The occurrence was a result of the enmity on account of party faction in panchayat and cooperative society elections.

    7. In the statement before the court, apart from repeating above version, PW 10 Satyabhama further stated that a bullock cart was arranged to carry injured Dagadu and the deceased Bibhishan Vithoba Khadle up to the main road and thereafter they were carried in a jeep. On the way, the FIR was lodged at 5.30 p.m. and thereafter the injured and the deceased were taken to the PHC and then to the civil hospital. PW 11 Dagadu remained in the hospital for three to four months and thereafter in private hospital for two to three months.

    8. After registering the FIR, investigation was carried out and charge-sheet was submitted before the court. The accused denied the charge. Accused 5 Sandipan Sakharam, however, stated that he was called by Dagadu through deceased Bibhishan Vithoba Khadle to his place where PW 18 Chaturbhuj Khade and PW 12 Kernath Koyale were also present. PW 11 Dagadu told him that he should not contest the election. The said accused, however, replied that PW 11 Dagadu had been Sarpanch for 10-12 years and thus, accused should be allowed to become Sarpanch. This led to inter se assault between PW 11 Dagadu and deceased Bibhishan Vithoba Khadle and the said accused was also assaulted by PW 11 Dagadu.

    9. The prosecution led evidence comprising of medical evidence, recovery of material objects, eyewitnesses and the investigation. We will make reference only to the relevant evidence on record. PW 4, Dr Shravan Gavhane conducted the post-mortem on the body of the deceased and found seven injuries. Injury 1 was on the head which was found to be fatal. Injuries 2 to 7 were said to be with hard and blunt object like sticks or swords. PW 5, Dr Dinesh Kumar examined the injured PW 11 Dagadu and found 10 injuries which included eight incised wounds, two injuries on Gopinath Mahadev Koyale, one contused wound on PW 18 Chaturbhuj Khade, three injuries on Murlidhar Yeshu Kshirsagar. He also found one incised wound on the right forearm of Accused 5 Sandipan Sakharam. He found two injuries on Bibhishan PW 15.

    10. The prosecution relied upon the eyewitness account rendered by PW 10 Satyabhama, PW 11 Dagadu, PW 15 Bibhishan Kshirsagar, PW 18 Chaturbhuj Khade, PW 12 Kernath Koyale. PW 2, Shivaji Fuge, PW 3, Yuvraj Koyale, PW 7, Bhimrao and PW 9, Bhimrao Dhavale are witnesses to the recovery in pursuance of the statements under Section 27 of the Evidence Act. The chemical analyser's report was also produced about the blood group on some of the recovered articles.

    11. The trial court rejected the prosecution version inter alia for the following reasons:

    (i) Recovery was not admissible as the location of the articles recovered was already known;
    (ii) There was inordinate delay in sending the case property to the chemical analyser and possibility of tampering was not ruled out;
    (iii) There was inconsistency in the evidence of PWs Kernath Koyale, Bibhishan Vithoba Khadle and Chaturbhuj Khade in the manner of assault and the weapon used;
    (iv) The prosecution did not examine Indubai and Gopinath;
    (v) Motive was not established as there was no immediate election of the panchayat or of the cooperative society;
    (vi) There was improvement in the version initially given to the police and the version put forward before the court; and
    (vii) All the material witnesses are either related or otherwise interested and their testimony could not be accepted in absence of corroboration in material particulars.

    12. The High Court observed that acquittal by the trial court was based on omissions and contradictions which were not material and did not affect the veracity of the prosecution case. Thus, the trial court adopted a “totally perverse approach”. It was observed: (Bhagwan Jagannath case 2007 SCC OnLine Bom 1454, SCC OnLine Bom paras 38-39)

    “38. It is true that there are contradictions and omissions but none of them, according to us, is vital or material. They are regarding the particulars. When 7/8 persons are injured and assailants are about 16, then these omissions are bound to be there. They are natural omissions and contradictions and the most important fact that wipes out the effect of these contradictions and omissions is that many persons from the side of complainant had received injuries, so also Accused 5.
    39. This is not a case of exercising the right of self-defence of the accused. No such plea was raised before us nor from the case of the prosecution any such plea can be permitted to be raised directly or indirectly by the accused. The accused are aggressors. They have launched attack while persons from the complainant's side had assembled to celebrate their Diwali. Vasti was set to fire. Bibhishan Khade died in the said attack and many persons from the side of complainant had received injuries. The assault was by deadly weapons like sword, barchi, knife, gupti and sticks. This was, therefore, not a case of clear cut acquittal of all the 16 accused. No further corroboration is necessary. Investigation is prompt and swift and even if other evidence regarding recovery of incriminating articles is not considered, the oral evidence and ocular evidence of the aforesaid witnesses i.e. PWs 10, 11, 12, 13, 15 and 18 and others discussed by us including those two doctors fully prove the prosecution case. The findings of the trial court are totally perverse and therefore this appeal is required to be allowed, but to what extent and against which of the accused is the question. The close scrutiny of the evidence of eyewitnesses particularly PWs 10, 11, 15 and 18 shows that PW 10 has implicated Accused 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 10 and 11. PW 11 has implicated Accused 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and according to PW 11, Accused 3 set fire to the vasti. PW 15 has implicated Accused 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 10 and 11. PW 18 has implicated Accused 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7 and according to him, Accused 3 set fire to the vasti. Presence of Accused 5 Sandipan at the spot is fully proved, apart from other evidence, because of the injuries suffered by him. There are in all 16 accused. Considering the aforesaid evidence, this appeal against acquittal has to be allowed in respect of Accused 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 10 and 11, and their acquittal is required to be set aside. So far as Accused 8, 9, 12, 13, 14, 15 and 16 are concerned, their acquittal is required to be upheld. Undoubtedly, Accused 1 to 7 and 10 and 11 had formed an unlawful assembly with a common object of launching an assault. The house or vasti of Dagadu was set to fire. In the attack Bibhishan Khade died and PWs 11, 15 and 18 and others received injuries by deadly weapons. Therefore, for causing death of Bibhishan Khade the accused are required to be held guilty under Section 302 read with Section 149 of the Penal Code, 1860 and for causing severe injuries to the aforesaid prosecution witnesses and others, they are required to be held guilty under Sections 324 and 326 read with Section 149 of the Penal Code, 1860. So far as offence under Section 436 of the Penal Code, 1860 is concerned, the evidence of the prosecution witnesses is not consistent and, therefore, nobody can be convicted under that section.”

    13. We have heard the learned counsel for the appellants on the one hand as also the learned counsel for the State and the complainant on the other and with their assistance, gone through the material on record.

    14. The main contention raised on behalf of the appellants is that the judgment of acquittal rendered by the trial court was certainly a possible view on appreciation of evidence and the High Court could not reverse the same as there was no perversity. The High Court has not fully discussed the evidence nor dealt with the reasons recorded by the trial court for rejecting the prosecution version. There was no explanation for the injury suffered by Accused 5. There are omissions and contradictions in the version of the prosecution witnesses. In the first version given by PW 12, the accused have not been named and instead of recording the said version as FIR, it was on belated statement of PW 10, which was an improved version that the FIR was registered. The omissions in the statement made to the police amount to contradictions as per Explanation to Section 162 CrPC. Thus, the evidence of eyewitnesses PWs 10, 11, 12, 15 and 18 has been rightly rejected by the trial court and could not be relied upon by the High Court. Since there was enmity between the parties, there was possibility of exaggeration and false implication and it was not safe to convict the appellants. It was also submitted that since the incident was 28 years old, some of the appellants have become very old and ought not to be convicted at this stage. Reliance has been placed on the judgments of this Court in Padam Singh v. State of U.P. (2000) 1 SCC 621, Devatha Venkataswamy v. Public Prosecutor (2003) 10 SCC 700, Narendra Singh v. State of M.P. (2004) 10 SCC 699, Prasanna Das v. State of Orissa (2004) 13 SCC 30, Majjal v. State of Haryana (2013) 6 SCC 798, Lalita Kumari v. State of U.P. (2014) 2 SCC 1 and Baby v. Inspector of Police (2016) 13 SCC 333, (2016) 7 Scale 444.

    15. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the State and the complainant, supported the judgment of the High Court and pointed out that the reasons for acquittal by the trial court were perverse and the High Court has duly dealt with the said reasons and found them to be perverse. There is consistent evidence of injured eyewitnesses which could not be altogether brushed aside. Contradictions and omissions which are not vital or material are bound to be there in every case. The same did not affect the credibility of the main version that the accused caused the death of the deceased and injuries to six persons on the complainant side. The accused formed unlawful assembly and action of even one accused in prosecution of common object of the unlawful assembly or which was known to likely to be so committed was action of all the accused in law. It was not necessary to prove individual role of different accused. The information given by PW 12 on telephone was cryptic and could not be treated as FIR. Therein though name of Accused 5 was mentioned and it was further stated that he was accompanied by others also, other details were not mentioned. This was not on a par with the statement to be recorded by the officer in charge of the police station under Section 154 CrPC which can be treated as FIR. Thus, the telephonic message could not be treated as FIR. The statement of PW 10 made in the police station has rightly been treated as FIR. The said statement was prompt and could not be treated as an improved version. The statement was corroborated by sworn testimony of the author of the FIR before the court which has been corroborated in all material particulars by four other injured witnesses. Thus, the evidence on record fully warranted conviction of the appellants and no interference was called for by this Court. Reliance has been placed on the judgments of this Court in Damodar v. State of Rajasthan (2004) 12 SCC 336, Mano Dutt v. State of U.P. (2012) 4 SCC 79, Sanjeev v. State of Haryana (2015) 4 SCC 387, A. Shankar v. State of Karnataka (2011) 6 SCC 279, State of Karnataka v. Suvarnamma (2015) 1 SCC 323, Bava Hajee Hamsa v. State of Kerala (1974) 4 SCC 479, Patai v. State of U.P. (2010) 4 SCC 429, Ravishwar Manjhi v. State of Jharkhand (2008) 16 SCC 561 and T.T. Antony v. State of Kerala (2001) 6 SCC 181.

    16. We have given due consideration to the rival submissions. The question for consideration is whether the High Court was justified in reversing the acquittal of the appellants on the basis of evidence available on record?

    17. Before considering this aspect with reference to the evidence on record, we may advert to the settled principles of law dealing with the issues arising in the present case. The approach to be adopted by the court generally in appreciating the evidence in a criminal case as also the approach of the appellate court is discussed in several decisions of this Court, some of which have been cited by the learned counsel for the parties.

    18. It is accepted principle of criminal jurisprudence that the burden of proof is always on the prosecution and the accused is presumed to be innocent unless proved guilty. The prosecution has to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt and the accused is entitled to the benefit of the reasonable doubt. The reasonable doubt is one which occurs to a prudent and reasonable man. Section 3 of the Evidence Act refers to two conditions—(i) when a person feels absolutely certain of a fact—“believes it to exist”, and (ii) when he is not absolutely certain and thinks it so extremely probable that a prudent man would, under the circumstances, act on the assumption of its existence. The doubt which the law contemplates is not of a confused mind but of prudent man who is assumed to possess the capacity to “separate the chaff from the grain”. The degree of proof need not reach certainty but must carry a high degree of probability (1990) 3 SCC 190.

    19. While appreciating the evidence of a witness, the court has to assess whether read as a whole, it is truthful. In doing so, the court has to keep in mind the deficiencies, drawbacks and infirmities to find out whether such discrepancies shake the truthfulness. Some discrepancies not touching the core of the case are not enough to reject the evidence as a whole. No true witness can escape from giving some discrepant details. Only when discrepancies are so incompatible as to affect the credibility of the version of a witness, the court may reject the evidence. Section 155 of the Evidence Act enables the doubt to impeach the credibility of the witness by proof of former inconsistent statement. Section 145 of the Evidence Act lays down the procedure for contradicting a witness by drawing his attention to the part of the previous statement which is to be used for contradiction. The former statement should have the effect of discrediting the present statement but merely because the latter statement is at variance to the former to some extent, it is not enough to be treated as a contradiction. It is not every discrepancy which affects the creditworthiness and the trustworthiness of a witness. There may at times be exaggeration or embellishment not affecting the credibility. The court has to sift the chaff from the grain and find out the truth. A statement may be partly rejected or partly accepted (1999) 9 SCC 525. Want of independent witnesses or unusual behaviour of witnesses of a crime is not enough to reject evidence. A witness being a close relative is not enough to reject his testimony if it is otherwise credible. A relation may not conceal the actual culprit. The evidence may be closely scrutinised to assess whether an innocent person is falsely implicated. Mechanical rejection of evidence even of a “partisan” or “interested” witness may lead to failure of justice. It is well known that principle “falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus” has no general acceptability (2002) 8 SCC 381. On the same evidence, some accused persons may be acquitted while others may be convicted, depending upon the nature of the offence. The court can differentiate the accused who is acquitted from those who are convicted. A witness may be untruthful in some aspects but the other part of the evidence may be worthy of acceptance. Discrepancies may arise due to error of observations, loss of memory due to lapse of time, mental disposition such as shock at the time of occurrence and as such the normal discrepancy does not affect the credibility of a witness.

    20. Exaggerated to the rule of benefit of doubt can result in miscarriage of justice. Letting the guilty escape is not doing justice. A Judge presides over the trial not only to ensure that no innocent is punished but also to see that guilty does not escape. (2002) 8 SCC 381

    21. An offence committed in prosecution of common object of an unlawful assembly by one person renders members of unlawful assembly sharing the common object vicariously liable for the offence. The common object has to be ascertained from the acts and language of the members of the assembly and all the surrounding circumstances. It can be gathered from the course of conduct of the members. It is to be assessed keeping in view the nature of the assembly, arms carried by the members and the behaviour of the members at or near the scene of incident. Sharing of common object is a mental attitude which is to be gathered from the act of a person and result thereof. No hard-and-fast rule can be laid down as to when common object can be inferred. When a crowd of assailants are members of an unlawful assembly, it may not be possible for witnesses to accurately describe the part played by each one of the assailants. It may not be necessary that all members take part in the actual assault (2002) 8 SCC 381. In Gangadhar Behera (2002) 8 SCC 381, this Court observed:

    “25. The other plea that definite roles have not been ascribed to the accused and therefore Section 149 is not applicable, is untenable. A four-Judge Bench of this Court in Masalti case AIR 1965 SC 202, (1965) 1 Cri LJ 226, (1964) 8 SCR 133 observed as follows: (AIR p. 210, para 15)
    ‘15. Then it is urged that the evidence given by the witnesses conforms to the same uniform pattern and since no specific part is assigned to all the assailants, that evidence should not have been accepted. This criticism again is not well founded. Where a crowd of assailants who are members of an unlawful assembly proceeds to commit an offence of murder in pursuance of the common object of the unlawful assembly, it is often not possible for witnesses to describe accurately the part played by each one of the assailants. Besides, if a large crowd of persons armed with weapons assaults the intended victims, it may not be necessary that all of them have to take part in the actual assault. In the present case, for instance, several weapons were carried by different members of the unlawful assembly, but it appears that the guns were used and that was enough to kill 5 persons. In such a case, it would be unreasonable to contend that because the other weapons carried by the members of the unlawful assembly were not used, the story in regard to the said weapons itself should be rejected. Appreciation of evidence in such a complex case is no doubt a difficult task; but criminal courts have to do their best in dealing with such cases and it is their duty to sift the evidence carefully and decide which part of it is true and which is not.’”

    22. We have referred to the above-settled principles as the trial court has adopted perverse approach in rejecting the entire evidence comprising of injured eyewitnesses when one person has been killed and six others have been injured. The trial court ignored the above principles by mechanically rejecting the evidence of all the witnesses by finding one or the other contradiction. The occurrence has taken place in broad daylight. One of the accused himself mentioned about the enmity on account of the panchayat election. The said accused himself is injured which proves his presence at the scene of the occurrence. This version further shows the presence of the deceased and the injured. But his version fails to explain as to why the deceased would have been killed by PW 11 when the deceased was the messenger of PW 11 himself. Except for some contradictions, the version of eyewitnesses PWs 10, 11, 15, 12 and 18 is consistent. There is no reason to reject the said version. Of course, the court has to be cautious in appreciating evidence and rule out exaggeration.

    23. We may also note that version of A-5 is not probable and mere fact that injury on him is not explained is not enough to reject the prosecution version. In such a case, the court is to examine whether evidence is trustworthy. This aspect has been repeatedly examined by this Court and settled law is that non-explanation of injuries on accused is an important circumstance which requires the court to satisfy itself that true version is not suppressed and whether defence version is probable (1990) 3 SCC 190 (2001) 6 SCC 145 (2012) 4 SCC 79. This by itself is not enough to reject the prosecution case.

    24. To demonstrate that the approach of the trial court is outrightly perverse, some of the observations are put in:

    “But in general terms she has stated that the accused came with weapons. Similarly it is admitted by her during the cross-examination that she has not stated assault by particular accused on the person of Bibhishan Khade. But she has stated in general terms that Bibhishan was assaulted by the accused.
    Moreover, it is to be noted that she has admitted that Dagadu and Bibhishan were assaulted by said weapons like cutting a wood by an axe, sword and barchi. But there is no piercing wound or cut injury on the person of deceased Bibhishan as well as Dagadu.
    Moreover, it is in her complaint that she had been to the vasti of Murlidhar and Bibhishan Kshirsagar to hand over the breakfast to Dagadu. But the evidence of PWs and Dagadu and other eyewitnesses disclose that they all had been to the house of Murlidhar Kshirsagar for Diwali snacks and there Dagadu invited for meals in the noontime. Hence, all the eyewitnesses mentioned above had been to the vasti of Dagadu. But PWs Dagadu, Kernath, PW Bibhishan Kshirsagar and PW Chaturbhuj disclose that they were called for the Diwali snacks and not for meals in the house of Dagadu. It is to be noted that if Dagadu was invited for Diwali snacks in the house of Murlidhar Kshirsagar then there was no necessity to take breakfast for Dagadu to the house of Murlidhar Kshirsagar. Considering all the aspects the evidence of the complainant cannot be accepted.”

    25. Similar is the appreciation by the trial court of other witnesses. Since rejection of eyewitness account is uncalled for, other reasons given by trial court are not sufficient to reject the prosecution case. Even if recoveries or chemical analyser's report are disregarded the same have only corroborative value, prosecution case is established by credible eyewitness account. Mere fact that some of the witnesses have not been examined is also of no consequence when credible evidence to prove the case has been produced. We thus, find that the High Court rightly reversed the trial court judgment.

    26. One of the submissions of the learned counsel for the appellants is that telephonic message by PW 12 recorded at the police station should have been treated as FIR. We have been taken through the said message which is to the effect that A-5 and other accused assaulted the complainant party. The learned counsel relied upon the observation in Lalita Kumari (2014) 2 SCC 1 to the effect that a GD Entry can also be treated as FIR in an appropriate case. From the said observation, it cannot be laid down that every GD Entry or every cryptic information must be treated as FIR.

    27. In Anand Mohan v. State of Bihar (2012) 7 SCC 225 while referring to Section 154 CrPC, this Court observed that every cryptic information, even if not signed by the person giving the information, cannot be treated as FIR. The information should sufficiently disclose the nature of the offence and the manner in which the offence was committed. It was observed:

    “50. In Sk. Ishaque v. State of Bihar (1995) 3 SCC 392 Gulabi Paswan gave a cryptic information at the police station to the effect that there was a commotion at the village as firing and brickbatting was going on and this Court held that this cryptic information did not even disclose the commission of a cognizable offence nor did it disclose who were the assailants and such a cryptic statement of Gulabi Paswan cannot be treated to be an FIR within the meaning of Section 154 CrPC.
    51. Similarly, in Binay Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar (1997) 1 SCC 283 information was furnished to the police in Ext. 10/3 by Rabindra Bhagat that the sons of late Ram Niranjan Sharma along with large number of persons in his village had set fire to the houses and piles of straws and had also resorted to firing. This Court held that Ext. 10/3 is evidently a cryptic information and is hardly sufficient to discern the commission of any cognizable offence therefrom.”

    28. Similar view has been taken by this Court in Damodar (2004) 12 SCC 336, T.T. Antony (2001) 6 SCC 181, Patai (2010) 4 SCC 429 and Ravishwar Manjhi (2008) 16 SCC 561.

    29. The learned counsel for the appellants also criticised the judgment of the High Court by submitting that the principles laid down by this Court in Padam Singh (2000) 1 SCC 621, Devatha Venkataswamy (2003) 10 SCC 700, Narendra Singh (2004) 10 SCC 699, Prasanna Das (2004) 13 SCC 30, Majjal (2013) 6 SCC 798, Lalita Kumari (2014) 2 SCC 1 and Baby (2016) 13 SCC 333, (2016) 7 Scale 444 for exercise of appellate jurisdiction have not been followed. The appellate court should deal with reasons for acquittal and interfere only if acquittal is perverse. There is no doubt about the proposition that the appellate court has to arrive at an independent conclusion about the credibility of the evidence and to reappreciate the evidence to arrive at a just conclusion. If the appellate court is to reverse the judgment of the trial court, the reasoning of the trial court has to be adverted to and reversal of acquittal is permissible only if the view of the trial court is not only erroneous but also unreasonable and perverse. At the same time, the appellate court has full power to review the evidence and to reach at its own conclusion. The appellate court can set aside the acquittal if the acquittal is not justified. Of course, the appellate court has to consider the fact that the trial court has the benefit of seeing the witnesses in the witness box and the presumption of innocence is not weakened by the acquittal. If two reasonable conclusions can be reached, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of the trial court. In the present case, the High Court has followed the above principles.

    30. In Bava Hajee Hamsa (1974) 4 SCC 479 while approving the reversal of acquittal by the High Court, it was held that erroneous approach of the trial court led to misdirection in appraising the evidence and the High Court was justified in rejecting the approach of the trial court and in analysing the evidence in its own way. This Court observed:

    “30. We agree with the High Court that the very “scheme of approach” adopted by the trial Judge was faulty and misleading. It led to aberration and misdirection in appraising evidence, and vitiated his conclusions. The learned trial Judge started correctly when on a broad look of the evidence, he found the evidence of PWs 1, 8 and 9 prima facie acceptable. But after the second lap of discussion, he became sceptical; and reversed his mind at the end of the third round of circumgyratory discussion. In such cases where large number of persons are involved and in the commotion some persons cause injuries to others and the evidence is of a partisan character, it is often safer for the Judge of fact to be guided by the compass of probabilities along the rock-ribbed contours of the case converging on the heart of the matter. Once the court goes astray from the basic features of the case, it is apt to lose itself in the labyrinths of immaterial details, desultory discussion and vacillation arising from unfounded suspicions. This is exactly what has happened in the instant case. Despite the pains taken and the conscientious effort put in to write an elaborate judgment, the trial Judge had, as it were, missed the wood for the trees. The learned Judges of the High Court were, therefore, right in discarding altogether the basically wrong “scheme of approach” adopted by the trial court, and in analysing the evidence in their own way.”

    31. As already observed, the discrepancies of trivial nature could not be the basis of rejecting the evidence of injured eyewitnesses nor non-examination of some of the witnesses be a ground to reject the prosecution case when injured eyewitnesses were examined.

    32. We may also refer to the judgment of this Court in Masalti v. State of U.P. AIR 1965 SC 202, (1965) 1 Cri LJ 226, (1964) 8 SCR 133 to the effect that the evidence of interested partisan witnesses though required to be carefully weighed, the same could not be discredited mechanically. When a crowd of unlawful assembly commits an offence, it is often not possible to accurately describe the part played by each of the assailants. Though the appreciation of evidence in such cases may be a difficult task, the court has to perform its duty of sifting the evidence carefully.

    33. Applying the above principles to the present case, it is clear that all the five eyewitnesses have named A-1 to A-7. Other accused have not been named by PW 11 and PW 18. By way of abundant caution, we give benefit of doubt to A-10 and A-11 for the reason that they have not been named by PW 11 and PW 18 and also for the reason that PW 10 has attributed specific role only to A-1 to A-7. But as far as A-1 to A-7 are concerned (A-2 has already died) all the five witnesses have consistently named them. A-1 to A-7 have been assigned specific role in assaulting the deceased. Their conviction and sentence under Sections 302/149 IPC has to be upheld.

    34. For the above reasons, this appeal is partly allowed to the extent that Appellants 7 and 8 (Babu Rama Berad and Balu Naradeo Berad) are given benefit of doubt and are acquitted. They be released from custody, if not required in any other case. The appeal of the other appellants is dismissed. However, Appellants 5 and 6 (Nivrutti Sakharam Koyale and Krishna Sakharam Koyale) will continue to remain on bail for one month and if they make an application for remission of the remaining sentence on the ground of advanced age within one month, they will continue to remain on bail thereafter till the decision of the said application by the appropriate authority. If their application for remission is not accepted, they will surrender to serve out the remaining sentence.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Bhagwan Jagannath Markad And Others v. State Of Maharashtra .
    (Oct 4, 2016)