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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 302 IPC and Section 27 of the Arms Act
  • Section 155 of the Evidence Act
  • Section 161 of the Code
  • Section 162 of Code
  • Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
  • Section 145 of the Evidence Act
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 302 IPC and Section 27 of the Arms Act
  • Section 155 of the Evidence Act
  • Section 161 of the Code
  • Section 162 of Code
  • Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
  • Section 145 of the Evidence Act
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

On 16 July 1983, at about noon in Village Alipur Barota, the accused Om Prakash allegedly attempted to dig an irrigation channel (“khal”) through the agricultural land of Maman Ram. After objections were raised, the village Sarpanch convened a Panchayat to resolve the dispute. The Panchayat—comprising Kurra Ram (PW 2), Leela Ram (PW 1 and son of the deceased), Ram Kumar, and Bhim Sen (PW 4)—walked with Maman Ram toward the accused’s field. Maman Ram was several paces ahead of the group.

As he approached the field of Kundan Singh, the accused emerged with a double-barrelled 12-bore gun, shouted “pani na dene ka maza chakhata hun,” and fired. A first shot struck Maman Ram, who fell; a second shot followed. Leela Ram immediately lodged the First Information Report at Police Station Fatehabad. Sub-Inspector Devi Dutt inspected the scene, collected blood-stained earth and two empty cartridges, and sent the body for post-mortem.

Dr A.S. Chaudhary (PW 3) conducted the autopsy the same evening, recording multiple entry and exit wounds, extensive internal damage, and opining that death was due to shock and haemorrhage caused by gunshot injuries.

The accused was arrested on 18 July 1983; a licensed double-barrel gun and three live cartridges were seized. A ballistic expert later certified that the empties recovered at the scene had been fired from this gun.

The Sessions Judge convicted Om Prakash under Section 302 IPC and Section 27 of the Arms Act, sentencing him to life imprisonment. The Punjab & Haryana High Court, however, reversed the conviction and acquitted him, holding that medical evidence contradicted the eyewitness version regarding the number and trajectory of shots and criticising alleged investigative fabrication. The State appealed to the Supreme Court by special leave.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the High Court correctly discarded the eyewitness testimony and medical evidence by treating minor discrepancies as fatal to the prosecution case.
  2. Whether irregularities in investigation and alleged fabrication warranted reversal of the trial court’s conviction.
  3. Whether the Supreme Court should restore the conviction and sentence imposed by the Sessions Judge.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
State of Rajasthan v. Kishore (1996) 8 SCC 217 Irregularities or even illegalities in investigation are not by themselves grounds to reject the prosecution case. Used to rebut the High Court’s criticism of the investigation.
State of U.P. v. M.K. Anthony (1985) 1 SCC 505 Minor discrepancies that do not touch the core of the case should not result in total rejection of eyewitness testimony. Relied on to hold that inconsistencies about the first injury were trivial.
Rammi @ Rameshwar v. State of M.P. (1999) 8 SCC 649 (with Bhura v. State of M.P.) True witnesses often exhibit some discrepancies; only contradictions undermining credibility justify rejection. Cited to emphasise that variations in details did not warrant acquittal.
Tahsildar Singh v. State of U.P., AIR 1959 SC 1012 Not all prior inconsistent statements impeach a witness; only those potent enough to discredit current testimony do. Used to show eyewitness contradictions were not of the impeaching kind.
Appabhai v. State of Gujarat, 1988 Supp SCC 241 Courts should not expect uniform or “normal” reactions from crime-scene witnesses; minor embellishments are common. Applied to uphold credibility of the son and brother-in-law as natural witnesses despite being related to the deceased.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court acknowledged that the High Court, as the first appellate court, could reassess evidence but held that its approach was “improper and unimaginative.” The key steps in the Court’s analysis were:

  • Minor discrepancies are not fatal: Quoting multiple precedents, the Court reiterated that variations in the precise site of entry wounds or the number of shots do not negate otherwise credible eyewitness testimony.
  • Medical evidence not contradictory: Dr Chaudhary’s testimony identified both entry and exit wounds; even though the doctor conceded under cross-examination that injuries could have resulted from one shot, this did not undermine the essential fact that the accused’s gun caused the fatal injuries.
  • Ballistic corroboration: Expert evidence unequivocally linked the spent cartridges to the accused’s seized gun, reinforcing the prosecution version.
  • Credibility of related witnesses: The presence of Leela Ram (son) and Kurra Ram (brother-in-law) at the scene was deemed natural given the land dispute and impending Panchayat mediation. Their testimony was further corroborated by the independent Sarpanch, whose evidence the Court found reliable.
  • Motive established: The ongoing quarrel over digging the water course furnished motive for the shooting.
  • Investigation irregularities immaterial: Even assuming lapses, they did not vitiate the substantive evidence pointing to guilt.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal is allowed; the Punjab & Haryana High Court’s order of acquittal is set aside; the conviction and sentence of life imprisonment imposed by the Sessions Judge are restored. The accused is directed to surrender, and the trial court shall ensure his reincarceration.

Implications: The judgment reaffirms that appellate courts should not overturn convictions on the basis of trivial inconsistencies or investigative lapses that do not affect the core evidence. While setting no new precedent, it strengthens existing principles on evaluating eyewitness testimony and the limited impact of minor contradictions.

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    Leela Ram (Dead) Through Duli Chand v. State Of Haryana And Another

    Umesh C. Banerjee, J.— This appeal by special leave is directed against an order of acquittal passed by the Punjab & Haryana High Court at Chandigarh, reversing the order of conviction and sentence of life imprisonment passed by the learned Sessions Judge under Section 302 IPC and Section 27 of the Arms Act.

    2. The occurrence dates back to 16-7-1983 at about 12.00 noon in a village called Alipur Barota. The prosecution case as made out depicts that the accused wanted to dig a khal forcibly through the field of one Maman Ram, which was objected to and the local Sarpanch was also informed accordingly. At a meeting called by the Sarpanch, it was decided that the matter ought to be resolved amicably and by reason therefor the Panchayat consisting of Kurra Ram (PW 2), Leela Ram (PW 1), Ram Kumar Panch and Bhim Sen (PW 4) along with deceased Maman Ram and a few other persons proceeded towards the field of the accused. Maman Ram, the deceased was a few paces ahead of the other members. When however the deceased Maman Ram was near the field of Kundan Singh, the accused came out of the field with a double-barrelled gun and on seeing Maman Ram, raised a lalkara to the effect “pani na dene ka maza chakhata hun”. The accused thereafter fired a shot from his gun, striking on the chest of the deceased Maman Ram. The other members of the group on hearing the gunshot stopped there and immediately thereafter the second shot was fired by the accused who then left the place running with his gun towards Village Aharwan. The Sarpanch arrived there a little later and he and Kurra Ram remained at the place whereas Leela Ram (son of the deceased) went to Police Station Fatehabad and gave the first information statement being recorded as Exh. PA before the trial court. Upon compliance with the formalities, Sub-Inspector Devi Dutt along with Leela Ram went to the place of occurrence and prepared the inquest report (Ex. PG) and despatched the dead body to Civil Hospital, Fatehabad for post-mortem examination. Bloodstained earth and two empty cartridges were also taken into custody. All these recoveries were effected in the presence of Kurra Ram and Bhim Sen.

    3. The post-mortem examination on the body of Maman Ram was conducted by Dr A.S Chaudhary (PW 3) at Fatehabad on 16-7-1983 at 6.00 p.m and he had found the following ante-mortem injuries on the body:

    “1. There was a lacerated wound 1½″ in diameter with inverted margins showing blackening at edges, situated at front of lower end of sternum over xiphisternum. On further exploration of wound, it led towards the left side obliquely upward and laterally, causing laceration of the heart, the left lung had passed through another wound, with averted margins on lateral side of left chest wall just below left armpit measuring 2½″ × 2½″ shown in the diagram.

    2. A lacerated wound with inverted margins measuring 6×2″ on the medial and upper end of left upper arm. On dissection, there were laceration of muscles, vessel, nerves and humerus bone was badly fractured in pieces. The wound passed on lateral side of upper left arm, with averted margins, resulting in Injury 4 measuring 7″ × 2½″. There was skin tag hanging between Injuries 3 and 4 in front, there were corresponding holes in the left sleeve of the shirt.

    3. There were four bulges and four lacerated wounds situated on the back between and/of scapula in midline in an area of about 6″ in diameter. Wounds were of averted margins of size about ½″ × ½″ in oval shape, on dissection of the bulges, four pellets and 3 pieces of cardboard with marking ‘Tiger’ were recovered and sealed in a bottle. On further exploration of Ribs 3, 4, 5 and 6 at their junction with the vertebrae were fractured in pieces on left side. There were holes in the body of Vertebrae 2, 5 and 6 on left side with fracture of transverse processes and laceration of the spinal cord corresponding to the hole in the vertebrae. There were corresponding holes in the shirt on the back side.

    Stomach contained semi-digested food material.

    Semen discharged at urethral end.”

    4. In his opinion Dr Chaudhary recorded that the cause of death was shock and haemorrhage and the injuries were sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature.

    5. Without much of a factual detail, be it noted that on 18-7-1983, the accused was arrested and from his possession one DBBL gun along with 3 live cartridges of .12 bore and a licence in his name were recovered. The empty cartridges along with the gun were sent to the ballistic expert on 21-7-1983 and who in no uncertain terms recorded that the empty cartridges had been fired from the gun belonging to the accused. The prosecution examined nine witnesses in all and in the statement under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the accused alleged false implication in the case at the instance of Bhim Sen, Sarpanch by reason of his brother Ramji Lal having contested an election against Bhim Sen.

    6. The reason recorded by the High Court in the support of acquittal is that the eyewitnesses' account regarding the number of shots fired by the appellant on the deceased stands contradicted by medical evidence. In this context the High Court observed:

    “The positive case of the prosecution as set up by Leela Ram and Ram Kumar, eyewitnesses is that two shots were fired by Om Prakash, appellant at Maman (deceased). They do not seem to be clear about the site of the first injury. In examination-in-chief they stated that the first gunshot had hit on the left side of the chest of Maman, but during cross-examination both of them stated consistently that it was on the left upper arm. According to Leela Ram, it had hit on the left shoulder and Kurra Ram's position was that it had hit the left upper arm, near the armpit. The injury has been described by the doctor as Injury 3. The injury was on the medial and upper end of left upper arm and its exit was on the lateral side. To describe in a more simple language, the wound of entry was on the inner side of the left arm. The exit wound was just opposite, that is on the outer side of the arm. The injury was from .12 bore gun. We cannot imagine any situation in which the appellant could cause Injury 3 to Maman from any angle. We asked the learned State Counsel to caricature any position in which a man can strike such an injury with a .12 bore gun, as was Injury 3, on Maman, without causing injury on another part of the body. This injury is simply impossible and cannot be caused from any angle. The circumstances of the case suggest that all the injuries were the result of the gunshot, noted as Injury 1. PW 1 Dr A.S Chaudhary, during cross-examination, had also to agree to this position. The shot which was from a close range had entered the chest of Maman (deceased) at the point of strike, after encountering the bony resistance, it appears, the pellets got scattered into two groups: one group which was forcing the overshot cardboard reached the point which was noted as Injury 5 by Dr Chaudhary. The other group, after bony resistance, split from the main charge and travelled to the left side. After puncturing the heart, it went out at Point 2 and re-entered the left arm under the armpit to make an exit on the lateral side of the left arm. The route of the scattered pellets is almost in line from the point of entry till the point of exit on the lateral side of the left arm. We are, therefore, satisfied that these injuries on the dead body of Maman were the result of one gunshot and not of two shots, as stated by the eyewitnesses.”

    7. This longish quotation probably could have been avoided but we thought it fit to reproduce it verbatim so as to assess the situation in the proper perspective, more so when there is an order of acquittal by the High Court in reversal of the conviction and sentence for life imprisonment passed by the trial court. Apart from the comment on the method of investigation, the High Court mainly proceeded on two counts. On the first, the learned Judges commented that the discrepancies and contradictions between the witnesses do not inspire confidence and on the second count they noted that there was fabrication of evidence by the investigating agency.

    8. Before however, proceeding with the matter on the counts as above, it would be convenient to note another aspect of the matter, namely, the observations pertaining to the investigation by the investigating agency. It is now a well-settled principle that any irregularity or even an illegality during investigation ought not to be treated as a ground to reject the prosecution case and we need not dilate on the issue excepting referring to a decision of this Court (vide State of Rajasthan v. Kishore (1996) 8 SCC 217, AIR 1996 SC 3035).

    9. Be it noted that the High Court is within its jurisdiction being the first appellate court to reappraise the evidence, but the discrepancies found in the ocular account of two witnesses unless they are so vital, cannot affect the credibility of the evidence of the witnesses. There are bound to be some discrepancies between the narrations of different witnesses when they speak on details, and unless the contradictions are of a material dimension, the same should not be used to jettison the evidence in its entirety. Incidentally, corroboration of evidence with mathematical niceties cannot be expected in criminal cases. Minor embellishment, there may be, but variations by reason therefor should not render the evidence of eyewitnesses unbelievable. Trivial discrepancies ought not to obliterate an otherwise acceptable evidence. In this context, reference may be made to the decision of this Court in State of U.P v. M.K Anthony (1985) 1 SCC 505, AIR 1985 SC 48. In para 10 of the Report, this Court observed:

    “10. While appreciating the evidence of a witness, the approach must be whether the evidence of the witness read as a whole appears to have a ring of truth. Once that impression is formed, it is undoubtedly necessary for the court to scrutinise the evidence more particularly keeping in view the deficiencies, drawbacks and infirmities pointed out in the evidence as a whole and evaluate them to find out whether it is against the general tenor of the evidence given by the witness and whether the earlier evaluation of the evidence is shaken as to render it unworthy of belief. Minor discrepancies on trivial matters not touching the core of the case, hypertechnical approach by taking sentences torn out of context here or there from the evidence, attaching importance to some technical error committed by the investigating officer not going to the root of the matter would not ordinarily permit rejection of the evidence as a whole. If the court before whom the witness gives evidence had the opportunity to form the opinion about the general tenor of evidence given by the witness, the appellate court which had not this benefit will have to attach due weight to the appreciation of evidence by the trial court and unless there are reasons weighty and formidable it would not be proper to reject the evidence on the ground of minor variations or infirmities in the matter of trivial details. Even honest and truthful witnesses may differ in some details unrelated to the main incident because power of observation, retention and reproduction differ with individuals.”

    10. In a very recent decision in Rammi v. State M.P (1999) 8 SCC 649 with Bhura v. State of M.P (1999) 8 SCC 649 this Court observed:

    “24. When an eyewitness is examined at length it is quite possible for him to make some discrepancies. No true witness can possibly escape from making some discrepant details. Perhaps an untrue witness who is well tutored can successfully make his testimony totally non-discrepant. But courts should bear in mind that it is only when discrepancies in the evidence of a witness are so incompatible with the credibility of his version that the court is justified in jettisoning his evidence. But too serious a view to be adopted on mere variations falling in the narration of an incident (either as between the evidence of two witnesses or as between two statements of the same witness) is an unrealistic approach for judicial scrutiny.”

    This Court further observed:

    “25. It is a common practice in trial courts to make out contradictions from the previous statement of a witness for confronting him during cross-examination. Merely because there is inconsistency in evidence it is not sufficient to impair the credit of the witness. No doubt Section 155 of the Evidence Act provides scope for impeaching the credit of a witness by proof of an inconsistent former statement. But a reading of the section would indicate that all inconsistent statements are not sufficient to impeach the credit of the witness. The material portion of the section is extracted below:

    ‘155. Impeaching credit of witness.—The credit of a witness may be impeached in the following ways by the adverse party, or, with the consent of the court, by the party who calls him—

    (3) by proof of former statements inconsistent with any part of his evidence which is liable to be contradicted;’

    26. A former statement though seemingly inconsistent with the evidence need not necessarily be sufficient to amount to contradiction. Only such of the inconsistent statement which is liable to be ‘contradicted’ would affect the credit of the witness. Section 145 of the Evidence Act also enables the cross-examiner to use any former statement of the witness, but it cautions that if it is intended to ‘contradict’ the witness the cross-examiner is enjoined to comply with the formality prescribed therein. Section 162 of Code also permits the cross-examiner to use the previous statement of the witness (recorded under Section 161 of the Code) for the only limited purpose i.e to ‘contradict’ the witness.

    27. To contradict a witness, therefore, must be to discredit the particular version of the witness. Unless the former statement has the potency to discredit the present statement, even if the latter is at variance with the former to some extent it would not be helpful to contradict that witness (vide Tahsildar Singh v. State of U.P AIR 1959 SC 1012, 1959 Supp (2) SCR 875).”

    11. The Court shall have to bear in mind that different witnesses react differently under different situations: whereas some become speechless, some start wailing while some others run away from the scene and yet there are some who may come forward with courage, conviction and belief that the wrong should be remedied. As a matter of fact it depends upon individuals and individuals. There cannot be any set pattern or uniform rule of human reaction and to discard a piece of evidence on the ground of his reaction not falling within a set pattern is unproductive and a pedantic exercise.

    12. It is indeed necessary to note that one hardly comes across a witness whose evidence does not contain some exaggeration or embellishment — sometimes there could even be a deliberate attempt to offer embellishment and sometimes in their overanxiety they may give a slightly exaggerated account. The court can sift the chaff from the grain and find out the truth from the testimony of the witnesses. Total repulsion of the evidence is unnecessary. The evidence is to be considered from the point of view of trustworthiness. If this element is satisfied, it ought to inspire confidence in the mind of the court to accept the stated evidence though not however in the absence of the same.

    13. In this context, reference may be made to the decision of this Court in the case of Appabhai v. State of Gujarat 1988 Supp SCC 241, AIR 1988 SC 696 wherein this Court in para 11 of the Report observed:

    “Experience reminds us that civilized people are generally insensitive when a crime is committed even in their presence. They withdraw both from the victim and the vigilante. They keep themselves away from the court unless it is inevitable. They think that crime like civil dispute is between two individuals or parties and they should not involve themselves. This kind of apathy of the general public is indeed unfortunate, but it is there everywhere whether in village life, towns or cities. One cannot ignore this handicap with which the investigating agency has to discharge its duties. The court therefore, instead of doubting the prosecution case for want of independent witness must consider the broad spectrum of the prosecution version and then search for the nugget of truth with due regard to probability, if any, suggested by the accused. The court, however, must bear in mind that witnesses to a serious crime may not react in a normal manner. Nor do they react uniformly. The horror-stricken witnesses at a dastardly crime or an act of egregious nature may react differently. Their course of conduct may not be of ordinary type in the normal circumstances. The court, therefore, cannot reject their evidence merely because they have behaved or reacted in an unusual manner.”

    In para 13 of the Report this Court further observed:

    “The court while appreciating the evidence must not attach undue importance to minor discrepancies. The discrepancies which do not shake the basic version of the prosecution case may be discarded. The discrepancies which are due to normal errors of perception or observation should not be given importance. The errors due to lapse of memory may be given due allowance. The court by calling into aid its vast experience of men and matters in different cases must evaluate the entire material on record by excluding the exaggerated version given by any witness. When a doubt arises in respect of certain facts alleged by such witness, the proper course is to ignore that fact only unless it goes into the root of the matter so as to demolish the entire prosecution story. The witnesses nowadays go on adding embellishments to their version perhaps for the fear of their testimony being rejected by the court. The courts, however, should not disbelieve the evidence of such witnesses altogether if they are otherwise trustworthy.”

    14. The basic reason for non-acceptance of the prosecution case so far as the High Court is concerned is the contradiction said to have been effected by not being clear about the side (sic site) of the first injury on the body of the deceased Maman insofar as the evidence of Leela Ram (PW 1) is concerned. Be it noted, Leela Ram is the son of deceased Maman. In his examination-in-chief he stated:

    “My father was 7-8 paces ahead of me. When my father reached the field of Kundan Singh, then the accused came out from the field of Kundan Singh, he was having a double-barrelled gun. The field of Kundan Singh was having charri crop. The accused uttered the words ‘pani na dene ka maza chakhata hun’. The accused fired a gunshot at my father which struck him on the upper part of the chest to the left side. On receiving this shot, my father fell down on the ground. The second gunshot fired by the accused struck my father on his chest. After this, myself, Kurra Ram and Ram Kumar, Member of Panchayat ran back. In the meanwhile, the Panchayat had reached the canal bridge. I told the Sarpanch that Om Prakash accused had fired at my father, who was running towards Village Aharwan with his weapon.”

    15. In cross-examination however, the evidence records as below:

    “I was at a distance of 5 karams when the accused fired the first shot at my father. The accused had fired first shot on my father from the left side hitting him on the chest on the left side. Again said (sic) on the left shoulder. My father fell down on receipt of that shot. He fell down with his face towards the sky. The head of my father was towards the bridge. The second shot was fired by the accused while standing towards the side of his feet. I cannot tell the distance between the feet of my father and the accused, where he was standing. He was at a distance of a few feet from the feet of my father, when he fired the second shot — I remained at the place where I was when the first shot was fired. When the second shot was fired then I ran backward by two paces. Kurra also went backwards by 2-3 paces. After the firing of two shots, I ran towards the Panchayat. I had raised noise when the two fires were shot at my father. When I was retreating backwards, then the second shot was fired.”

    16. It is the above evidence which has prompted the High Court to ask the learned advocate appearing for the prosecution “to caricature any position in which a man can strike such an injury with a .12 bore gun …”. Whether there was one shot or two shots, can it not be termed to be immaterial in the matter of assessing the culpability of the accused? The son who saw his father had been shot at and thereafter fell dead — total stunning effect on the son and it is on this score that mere hair-splitting on the available evidence ought not to be undertaken and instead the totality of the situation ought to have been reviewed. The empty cartridges were found and the ballistic expert's report that the cartridges match with the injury. The High Court ascribes this to be an immaterial piece of evidence. We, however, do not think so. The ballistic expert's evidence cannot be brushed aside since that is in the normal course of events, a valuable material vis-à-vis the use of the gun and the injury. The High Court went on to record the contradiction from the medical evidence but unfortunately the same does not find support from the evidence on record. Dr A.S Chaudhary having done the post-mortem examination on the deceased Maman, has stated in his evidence that “Injuries 2, 4 and 5 are the exit wounds. Injuries 1 and 3 are the entry wounds”. Dr Chaudhary further said that “Injury 1 is an entry wound of point-blank range”. The doctor has been subjected to cross-examination and he at the end of it all said that: “It can be said that the injuries on the person of the deceased were the result of one shot”. It is on this count, the High Court recorded that Dr Chaudhary “had also to agree to this position”. (emphasis supplied) Needless to say that the doctor probably has not been able to match the cross-examining lawyer and there was thus an unequal duel between the medical man and a refined lawyer. Can it be said that by reason of the evidence of Dr Chaudhary the contradictions are galore in nature, so far as the evidence of Leela Ram is concerned — the High Court upon consideration of the factum of such a contradiction answers the same on a positive note. This however is not acceptable to this Court: the discrepancy does not seem to be of such a nature so as to effect the creditworthiness or the trustworthiness of the witness. As a matter of fact, it does not do so by reason of the fact that Maman fell a victim of gunshot injuries and died: it is immaterial as to whether one or two gunshots were fired — the contradiction at its highest cannot but be stated to be in regard to a minor incident and does not travel to the root of the nature of the offence. The other piece of evidence is that the Sarpanch and the members of the Village Panchayat saw the accused running away towards Village Aharwan just after firing with his gun.

    17. Incidentally, the Sarpanch also stated that there were two gunshot sounds which he heard. Then there is the ballistic expert report as noticed above — these pieces of evidence as available on record cannot be ascribed to be untrustworthy, neither can it be said that they do not inspire confidence. There is thus no discrepancy in the totality of the situation and witnesses without any major contradiction deposed before the Court of Session with an unbiased mind and in a manner which in our view unmistakably point to the guilt of the accused and the appreciation of evidence by the High Court, in our view is wholly unwarranted, improper and unimaginative in the contextual facts.

    18. Admittedly, there was some dispute pertaining to digging of a water course through the land of the deceased Maman. There is such evidence that the Sarpanch of the village was going to resolve the dispute between the parties and it was at this juncture this gruesome murder took place; motive therefore, cannot be ruled out. The High Court has proceeded on the basis that the two eyewitnesses being the son and brother-in-law of the deceased are interested witnesses, and hence their evidence ought not to be relied upon. We are unable to concur therewith. The ocular account though may have been given by the son and the brother-in-law it does not by itself lose its efficacy or its evidentiary value unless some other factor is brought on record to discredit the creditworthiness of the witnesses. On the facts of the matter under consideration, the presence of Leela Ram being the son of the deceased appears to be quite natural by reason of the fact that the father had a land dispute with someone else and the son in the normal way could be interested in settlement of the dispute. As such his presence during parley cannot be termed unnatural. Similar was the situation as regards the presence of Kurra Ram, brother-in-law of the deceased, who has lodged a complaint to the Panchayat. If Kurra Ram also accompanied the Panchayat members for the amicable settlement of the dispute, in our view, there is nothing unnatural about it. Evidence of both the eyewitnesses stands fully corroborated by the Sarpanch who is an independent witness. The High Court has doubted the veracity of his evidence only on the ground that the brother of the accused once lost election against the witness. We consider that as too feeble a ground to doubt the evidence of the Sarpanch. The core of his testimony remains reliable and no good reason can be traced out to reject it.

    19. In our view the High Court relying upon some minor contradictions fell into a clear error in passing the order of the acquittal of the accused. According to us the learned Sessions Judge has reached the conclusion correctly and such a well-merited conviction should not have been so lightly interfered with.

    20. We therefore, allow this appeal and set aside the judgment of the High Court. The conviction and sentence passed by the Sessions Judge shall stand restored. The accused is hereby directed to surrender before the trial court. We direct the Sessions Judge concerned to take prompt steps to put the accused back in jail to undergo the sentence imposed on him.

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    Leela Ram (Dead) Through Duli Chand v. State Of Haryana And Another
    (Oct 6, 1999)