Date of Decision: 08.07.2016
_________________________________________________________________ . ___ P __ State of Himachal Pradesh and others …..A H ppellants. Vs. Devender Singh … ..Respondent.
Coram: f The Hon'ble Mr. Justice Ajay Mohan Goel, Judge Whether approved for reporting?1 Yes. o
For the appellants: Mr. V.S r . C t hauhan, Additional Advocate General, with Ms. Parul Negi, Deputy Ad u vocate General. For the respondent: o Mr. Bhupender Gupta, Senior Advocate, with Mr. Janesh Gupta, Advocate.
Ajay Mohan Goe l, C J. : By way of the present appeal, the State has challenged the judgment a h nd decree passed by the Court of learned Additional District Ju i dg g e, Shimla in Civil Appeal No. 3-R/13 of 2004/01 dated 25.02.2006 vide which, learned Appellate Court has allowed the appeal and set aside
H the judgment and decree passed by learned trial Court and decreed the suit of the plaintiff for recovery of Rs.52,250/- alongwith interest pendente lite and future @ 6% till realization.
2. This appeal was admitted on the following substantial question of law on 21.08.2008:
Whether the reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the Judgment? Yes.
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"Whether the provision of Section 70 of the Indian Contract Act as discussed by the Ld. Lower Appellate Court is attracted in the facts and circumstances of this case?" .
3. Brief facts necessary for the purpose of adjudication o P f the present case are that the plaintiff filed a suit for reco.very of Rs.67,141.25/- on the grounds that the plaintiff was a reg H istered potato grower with the Agriculture Department of Himachal f Pra desh and used to sell his produce in the market and he also used o to supply the same to the Department on demand. According to him, on the instructions/orders placed by the representatives of Dis r trictt Agricultural Officer, Kinnaur confirmed on telephone by Shri u R.S. Verma, District Agriculture Officer, Kinnaur, plaintiff supplied o 55 bags of certified seed potato in the month of December, 1998 C @ of Rs.950/- per bag to defendant No. 3 at Reckong Peo, District Kin naur through challan dated 17.12.1998 from Tikkar to Reckong P h eo by Truck bearing registration No. HP-51-1535, which was duly g received by defendant No. 3. His further case was that the said co i nsignment of 55 bags after being duly received was supplied by the H Department to the Growers of Kinnaur District under some Government subsidy Scheme and the value of the said consignment @Rs.950 per bag for 55 bags came to Rs.52,250/-. Despite requests and reminders, the defendant No. 3 did not care to pay the said amount to the plaintiff. It was averred in the plaint that several other crowers had also sent
potatoes on demand to defendant No. 3 and out of these growers, about 8
growers had been left high and dry to whom payment had not been made.
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In these circumstances, the suit was filed by the plaintiff for recovery of the said amount alongwith interest.
4. In the written statement, the defendants denied the case of .
the plaintiff. As per the defendants, defendant No. 3 never gave any supply order to the plaintiff for the supply of seed potatoes. The . plaPintiff prepared the challan alongwith bill in the name of defen da H nt No. 3 from Tikkar and unloaded 55 bags of seed potatoes at Bhawanagar of Nichar Block at his own on 17.12.1998, though no sup o ply or f der had been placed by defendant No. 3. Plaintiff also manage t d re ceipt for 55 bags from some grass root level officers of the same station and some other farmers of Shimla District followed the same c r ourse which was adopted by the
plaintiff and unloaded potatoes u at Nichar Block. Defendant No. 3 issued
telegrams to those grower o s, who unloaded the seed potato without any supply order, to lift C back their seed potato, but of no avail. This resulted in pilling up of h uge quantity of 1006 bags of seed potato in Nichar Block. Out of this h , 532 bags of seed potato could be sold by making all out effort g s by the defendants and remaining 470 bags got rotten. It was fur i ther the case of the defendants that it had become very difficult to H identify as to whose consignment was sold and whose had become rotten. In these circumstances, in order to know the factual position, an inquiry was ordered by defendant No. 3 and as per the averments made in the written statement, the decision regarding release of payment of the seed potato could be made after finalization of the said enquiry which was in
progress.
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5. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, learned trial Court framed the following issues:
Issue No. 1: Whether the plaintiff is entitled to a decree for the suit amount? OPP .
Issue No. 2: Whether the suit is not maintainable . in P the present form? OPD Issue No. 3: Whether the suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties? OPD H
Issue No. 4: Whether the suit is not f with in limitation? OPD Issue No. 5: Whether the t re wa o s no supply order/c r ontract? If so, its effect? OPD Issue No. 6: Whether the suit is bad for want of better particulars? OPD Issue No. 7: Relief.
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6. The following o findings were returned on the issues so framed by the learned trial Court on the basis of the pleadings of the parties:
Ch Issue No. 1: No. Issue No. 2: Yes. g Issue No. 3: Yes. i
Issue No. 4: No. Issue No. 5: Yes.
H Issue No. 6: No. Issue No. 7: Suit dismissed. 7. Learned trial Court thus dismissed the suit of the plaintiff after holding that in view of the fact that neither written orders were
placed nor potatoes were received by any authorized officer at
Bhawanagar, the plaintiff was not entitled to get the payment of potatoes,
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since for any contract to be entered with the State Government, the same has to be entered with the Governor or with the Officer authorized by the Governor in this behalf and that agreement must be in writing and unless .
an agreement is in writing, no enforceable agreement can be said to be in existence in between the parties. Learned trial Court also held t . haPt any contract between the State and an individual has to be in writing, which is a pre-requisite of Article 299 (1) of the Constitution of IndHia.
8. Feeling aggrieved by the said judgm o ent p f assed by the learned trial Court, the plaintiff filed an appeal. t Th e appeal of the plaintiff was allowed by the Court of learned Additional District Judge, Shimla vide its judgment dated 25.02.2006. Learne r d Appellate Court held that the
absence of contract or order for u supply of seed potato is not sufficient to
exonerate the defendants o from the liability for the payment of the amount, as the de C fendants after sending telegrams to the plaintiff had retained the proceeds and exercised control over disposal thereof. Learned A h ppella te Court held that out of 1006 bags received by the plain g tiff, the defendants sold 532 bags of seed potato and remaining 474 ba i gs got rotten. The defendants did not bring any material on record to H substantiate that the consignment sent by the plaintiff was not sold. It was the own case of the defendants that it was difficult to identify the ownership of the consignment. Learned Appellate Court further held that the seed potato retained by the defendants had been sold by it and, therefore, it did not lie in the mouth of defendants to assert that the
plaintiff was not entitled to the payment of the price of the same. It
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further held that selling of part of the consignment without establishing the identity makes it evident that presumption has to be drawn that the consignment of the plaintiff was also sold by the defendants. Learned .
Appellate Court also held that in view of the provisions of Sectio . n P 70 of the Indian Contract Act, the State was bound to make compensation to the plaintiff. Learned Appellate Court further held that the defendants
had sent telegrams to many growers, namely Prade f ep RaHnta, Harender Chauhan, Durga Singh, Krishan Lal, Jitender, o Surinder Ranta, Rajinder Paul, Keshav Ram, Purshotam Ranta, Narian Singh, Joginder Singh and Het Ram and afterwards, the defen r dan t ts had made payments of the amount to S/Sh. Pradeep Ran u ta, Durga Singh, Krishan Lal, Jatinder, Surinder Ranta, Rajinder Paul, Kashev Ram, Purushotam Ranta, Narian Singh, Partap Singh, Jogi o nder Singh and Het Ram as was evident from the testimony of D C W-1 Sh. Sadhu Ram, District Agriculture Officer, Kinnaur. Therefore, as per the learned Appellate Court, it was evident that the d h efend ants had accepted the receipt of consignment of the growe g rs and as such, they were liable to make payment of the bags of se i ed potato supplied by the plaintiff. Accordingly, learned Appellate Court H decreed the suit of the plaintiff for recovery of Rs.52,250/- alongwith interest pendente lite and future @ 6% till realization. These findings returned by the learned Appellate Court are under challenge by way of the present Regular Second Appeal.
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9. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and also gone through the records of the case as well as the judgments passed by both the learned Courts below. .
10. Section 70 of the Indian Contract Act provides as under:
"70. Obligation of person enjoying benefit of P non-gratuitous act.—Where a person lawfully .
does anything for another person, or deliv H ers anything to him, not intending to d o so gratuitously, and such other person en f joys the benefit thereof, the latter is bound to make compensation to the former in reospect of, or to restore, the thing so done or d t elivered.1 —Where a person lawfully does any r thing for another person, or delivers anything u to him, not intending to do so gratuitously, a o nd such other person enjoys the benefit thereof, the latter is bound to make compen C sation to the former in respect of, or to resto re, the thing so done or delivered. h Illustrations (a) A, a tradesman, leaves goods at B's house by g
mistake. B treats the goods as his own. He is i
bound to pay A for them. (a) A, a tradesman, leaves goods at B's house by mistake. B treats the goods
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as his own. He is bound to pay A for them." (b) A saves B's property from fire. A is not entitled to compensation from B, if the circumstances show that he intended to act gratuitously. (b) A saves B's property from fire. A is not entitled to compensation
from B, if the circumstances show that he intended
to act gratuitously."
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11. The factum of receipt of 55 bags of seed potato from the plaintiff is not disputed by the defendants. Case of the defendants is that the supply of the said seed bags by the plaintiff was a unilateral act and .
there was no order placed by the defendants to the plaintiff in this regard. It is further the case of the defendants, as is evident from the con . tenPts of the written statement that plaintiff managed receipt of sa id H 55 bags from some grass root level officers who were at the stat f ion where said seed bags were supplied. In other words, receipt of the said seed potato bags by the defendants supplied by the plaintif t f ag ain o st receipt is not disputed, but as per the defendants, the receipt r was issued by some grass root level officer. It is not the case of the d u efendants that the receipt was not issued by a Government Officer. It is further evident from the material on record especially the deposition o o f DW-1 that bags of potato seeds were received by defendant No. 3 C not only from the plaintiff but from various other growers in the sa me mode and manner in which it was received from the plaintiff. In h fact, it is the defendants own case that after the consignment of se g ed potatoes was received, it issued telegrams to the land owners to lift i the same and when the same was not lifted, part of it was sold and H part of it rotted. It is also apparent and clear from the records of the case that other growers similarly situated as the plaintiff have been duly compensated by the Government and they have been made payments for the supply of said seed potato by the defendants. It is also relevant to refer to the testimony of DW-1 Salu Ram who has stated that payments
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have been made to land owners named by him in his statement in April,
2001.
12. Therefore, here is a case where produce of the plaintiff and .
similarly situated land owners after receipt by the defendants was sold by it and money was received by the defendants in lieu of the sale . oPf the same. It is defendants' own case that it was not possible to establish that produce of which land owner had been sold and produ ceH of which land owner was destroyed on account of its getting rotten. f
13. In my considered view, learned A o ppellate Court has rightly decreed the suit of the plaintiff in r vie t w of the provisions of Indian Contract Act. The provisions of u Section 70 of the Indian Contract Act are in fact attracted in the facts and circumstances of the case, as has been rightly discussed and held o by the learned lower Appellate Court. 14. Section 70 of the Contract Act envisages that where a person
lawfully does an yth C ing for another person, or delivers anything to him, not intend h ing to do so gratuitously, and such other person enjoys the benefit thereof, the latter is bound to make compensation to the former in res i pe g ct of, or to restore, the thing so done or delivered. H 15. In the present case, it stands proved on record that the produce of the plaintiff was received against receipt by the defendants. No material has been produced on record by the defendants to demonstrate that 'grass root officers' who received the consignment of the plaintiff were not authorized to receive the same. Be that as it may, it is the own
case of the defendants that part of the produce which was received was
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sold by it and the remaining part rotted down. It is also the admitted case of the defendants that many owners similarly situated as the plaintiff have been compensated by them by making payments for the seed .
potatoes supplied by them. In these circumstances, in my considered view, the defendants cannot apply a different yardstick for the p . laPintiff. The defendants having sold the produce so received from the plaintiff and similarly situated owners are bound to compensate th f e p laiHntiff in respect thereof, especially keeping in view the fact t o hat the defendants have already compensated other owners similarly situated as the plaintiff.
16. It has been held by the t H on'ble Supreme Court in
Mulamchand Vs. State of Madhya P r radesh, AIR 1968 Supreme Court 1218 that a person whose contr u act is void for noncompliance with Article 299(1) of the Constitutio o n would be entitled to compensation under Section 70 of the Contract Act if he had adduced evidence in support of his claim. The r C elevant paragraphs of the judgment are quoted hereinbelow h :
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"6. In our. opinion,, the reasoning adopted by the trial court and by the High Court for H
rejecting the claim of the appellant is not correct. It is now well-established that here a contract between the Dominion of India and a private individual is not in the form required by s. 175 (3) of the Government of India Act, 1935, it was void and could not be enforced and therefore the Union
of India cannot be sued by a private individual
breach of such contract (See the decision in Seth
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Bikhrai Jaipuria v. Union of India(1). It was stated in that case that under.s. 175(3) of the Government. of India Act, 1935, the contracts had
(a) to be expressed to be made by the Governor-
.
General, (b) to be executed on behalf of the Governor-General and (c) to be executed by offcers P
duly appointed in that behalf and in such man H ner .as the Governor- General directed or autho rised. The evidence in the case showed that the contracts were not expressed to be made by the f Governor- General add were not executed on o his behalf. It was held by this Court that th t e provisions of s. 175 (3) were mandatory an r d the contracts were therefore void and not binding on the Union of India which was not liable u for damages for breach of the contracts. The o same principle was reiterated by this Court in a later case-State of West Bengal v. Mls. B. C K. Mondal and ,Sons(2). The principle is that the provisions of s. 175(3) of the Government of India Act, 1935 or the corresponding provisions h if Art. 299 (1) of the Constitution of India are g
mandatory in character and the contravention of i
these provisions nullifies the contracts and makes them void. There is no question of estoppel Or H
ratification in such a case. The reason is that the provisions of section 175(3) of the Government of India Act and the corresponding 'provisions of Art. 299 ( 1 ) of the Constitution have not been enacted for the sake of mere form but, they have been enacted or safeguarding the Government against
unauthorised contracts. 'he provisions are
embodied in s.'175(3) of the Government of India
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Act and Art. 299(1) of the Constitution on the ground of public policy-on the ground of protection of general public and these formalities cannot be waived- or dispensed with. If the plea of the .
respondent regarding estoppel or ratification is admitted that would mean in effect the repeal of an P
important constitutional provision intended for the .
protection of the general public. that is wh y the plea of estoppel or ratification cannot be permitHted in such a case. But if money is depos f ited and goods are supplied r if services a o re rendered in terms of the void contract, the t provisions of s. 70 of the Indian Contract Act ma r y be applicable. In other words, if the conditions imposed by s. 70 of the Indian- Con-act Act are satisfied then the provisions of o that s u ection can be invoked by the aggrieved party ,to the void contract. The first conditio C n is that a person should lawfully do some thing for another person or deliver something to him; the second condition is that i doing the said h thing or delivering the said thing Ike must, not g
intend to act gratuitously; and the third condition is i
that the other person for whom something is done or to whom something is delivered must enjoy the H
benefit thereof. If these conditions are satisfied, s. 70 imposes upon the latter person the liability to make con sensation to the former in respect of, or to restore, the thing done or delivered. The important point to notice is that in a case falling under s. 70 the person doing something for another delivering
something to another cannot sue for the specific
performance of the contract, nor ask for damages
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for the breach the contract, for the simple reason that there is no contract between him and the other person for whom he does something to whom he delivers something. So where a claim for .
compensation is made by one person against another under s. 70, it is not on the basis of any P
subsisting contract between the parties but a .
different kind of obligation. The juristic basis of the obligation in such a case is not founded f upon aHny contract or tort but upon a third c o ategory o f law,
namely, quasi contract or restitu tion. 1' Fibrosa v. Fairbairn(1) Lord Wright ha t s stated the legal position as follows ".......... r .. any civilised system of law is bound to provide remedies for cases of that has been called unjust enrichment or unjust benefit, that is o , to pr u event a man from retaining the money of, or some benefit derived from, another which i C t is against conscience that he should keep. Such remedies in English Law are generally different from remedies in contract or in tort, and h are now recognised to fall within a third category of g
the common law which has been called quasi- i
contract or restitution." H
7. In Nelson v. Larholt (2) Lord Denning has observed as follows: "It is no longer appropriate to draw a distinction between law and equity. Principles have. now to be stated in the light of their
combined effect. Nor is it necessary to canvass the
niceties of the old forms of action. Remedies now
depend on the substance of the right, not on
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whether they can be fitted into a particular framework. The right here is not peculiar to equity or contract or tort, but falls naturally within the important category of cases where the court orders .
restitution if the justice of the case so requires." P
17. The five Judges Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court i . n State of West Bengal Vs. B.K. Mondal and sons, AIR 1962 S H upreme Court 779 has held as under:
"14. It is plain that three cfonditions must be satisfied before this s o ection can be invoked. The first condition is that a person should lawfully do something t for another person or deliver something to h r im. The second condition is that in doing the said thing or delivering the said thing he must o nuot intend to act gratuitously; and the third is that the other person for whom some th C ing is done or to whom something is delivered must enjoy the benefit thereof. When h these conditions are satisfied s. 70 imposes upon the latter person, the liability to make
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compensation to the former in respect of or to restore, the thing so done or delivered. In H
appreciating the scope and effect of the provisions of this section it would be useful to illustrate how this section it would operate. If a person delivers something to another it would be open to the latter person to refuse to accept the thing or to return it; in that case s.70 would not come in to operation.
Similarly, if a person does something for another it
would be open to the latter person not to accept
what has been done by the former; in that case
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again s. 70 would not apply. In other words, the person said to be made liable under s. 70 always has the option not to accept the thing or to return it. It is only where he voluntarily accepts the thing .
or enjoys the work done that the liability under s.70 arises. P
16. It is true that s. 70 requires that a .
person should lawfully do something or lawfully deliver something to another. The word "lawfuHlly" is not a surplus age and must be treated a f s a n essential part of the requiremen t o of s. 70. What then does the word "lawfully" t in s. 70 denote? Mr. Sen contends that the wor r d "lawfully" in s. 70 must be read in the light of s. 23 of the said Act; and he argues that a thing u cannot be said to have been done lawfully o if the doing of it is forbidden by law. However, even if this test is applied it is not possibl C e to hold that the delivery of a thing or a doin g of a thing the acceptance and enjoyment of which gives rise to a claim for compensation h under s. 70 is forbidden by s. 175(3) of the Act; g
and so the interpretation of the word i
"lawfully" suggested by Mr. Sen does not show that s.70 cannot be applied to the facts in the H
present case. 17. Another argument has been placed before us on the strength of the word "lawfully" and that is based upon the observations of Mr. Justice Straight in Chedi Lal v. Bhagwan Dass (1). Dealing with the construction of s. 70 Straight,
J., observed: "I presume that the legislature
intended something when it used the word
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"lawfully" and that it had in contemplation cases in which a person held such a relation to another as either directly to create or by implication reasonably to justify an inference that by some .
act done for another person the party doing the act was entitled to look for compensation for it to P
the person for whom it was done." It is urged that .
in the light of this test it cannot be said th at the respondent held such a relation to the f appellHant as to be able to claim compensation from the appellant. With respect, we are not satisfied that
the test laid down by Straigh t t, J ., o can be said to be justified by the terms r of s. 70. It is of course true that between the person claiming compensation and u person against whom it is claimed some o lawful relationship must subsist, for that is the implication of the use of the word "lawfully" in s. 70; but the said lawful relat ion C ship arises not because the party claiming compensation has done something for the h party against whom the compensation is g
claimed but because what has been done by the i
former has been accepted and enjoyed by the latter. It is only when the latter accepts and enjoys H
what is done by the former that a lawful relationship arises between the two and it is the existence of the said lawful relationship which gives rise to the claim for compensation. This aspect of the matter has not been properly brought into the picture when Straight, J., laid
down the test on which Mr. Sen's argument is
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based. If the said test is literally applied then it is open to the comment that if one person is entitled by reason of the relationship as therein contemplated to receive compensation from the .
other s. 70 would be hardly necessary. Therefore, in our opinion, all that the word "lawfully" in the P
context indicates is that after something is .
delivered or something is done by one person for another and that thing is accepted and en f joy edH by the latter, a lawful relationship is born between the two which under the provisions of s. 70 gives
rise to a claim for compensation." o
t
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enrich himself inequitably at the expense of another and that a right of recovery under the doctrine of "unjust enrichment" arises where retention of a benefit is considered contrary to justice or against equity. .
21. In my considered view, in view of discussion held ab . ove, the provisions of Section 70 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 are attractPed in the facts and circumstances of the case and the findings returned in this regard by the learned Appellate Court are in consonance wHith the law as declared by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India o as ap f plied on the facts of the present case and I agree with the sa t me. The substantial question of law is answered accordingly.
22. Thus, there is neither an r y perversity nor any infirmity with the judgment and decree passed u by the learned first Appellate Court and the same is accordingly confirmed and the present appeal being devoid of any merit is dismissed. o
C (Ajay Mohan Goel) Judge
July 08, 2016
(bhu g pender h )
Hi