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Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion (D.N. Patel, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion deals with two related items on the court's roster.

  • I.A. No. 3420 of 2015: An interlocutory application filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act seeking condonation of delay of 277 days in preferring the instant appeal. At the hearing, counsel for the appellant was absent.
  • L.P.A. No. 277 of 2015 (Letters Patent Appeal): The appeal arises from a writ petition dismissed by a Single Judge. The factual matrix as recited in the opinion: the respondents fixed 24 May 2013 as the cut-off date for submission of original certificates for the Teachers' Eligibility Training Examination. The appellant (original petitioner) was studying a Diploma in Primary Education at Indira Gandhi National Open University (IGNOU); IGNOU declared the appellant's result and the appellant procured the mark-sheet on 4 June 2013 — after the 24 May 2013 cut-off. The appellant had sought extension of time to submit original documents, arguing it was not practicable to submit before 24 May 2013 because the results were available only on 4 June 2013. The Single Judge had dismissed the writ application; the present appeal challenges that dismissal. At the hearing before D.N. Patel, J., counsel for the appellant was absent and learned counsel for the respondent was heard.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the delay of 277 days in preferring the appeal should be condoned under Section 5 of the Limitation Act (I.A. No. 3420 of 2015).
  2. Whether the Single Judge erred in refusing to extend the deadline for submission of original certificates (fixed as 24 May 2013) to accommodate an appellant whose result and mark-sheet were obtained on 4 June 2013, and whether the cut-off date fixed by the authority was arbitrary or subject to judicial interference (L.P.A. No. 277 of 2015).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The appellant (original petitioner) contended that it was not practicably possible to submit the original mark-sheet and documents by the respondents' cut-off date of 24 May 2013 because the result and mark-sheet were issued by IGNOU on 4 June 2013; therefore the appellant sought an extension of time to submit the documents.

Respondent's Arguments

This information was not available in the provided opinion.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Union of India v. Parameswaran Match Works, (1975) 1 SCC 305 Choice of a date as basis for classification can be reasonable; a date-based classification is not per se arbitrary unless capricious or whimsical. Cited to support the proposition that fixation of a cut-off date can be valid even if no specific reason for choosing that date is present; used to justify refusing to extend the cut-off.
Hatisingh Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. Union of India; Dr. Mohammad Saheb Mahboob Medico v. Deputy Custodian-General; Bhikuse Yamasa Kshatriya (P) Ltd. v. Union of India; Daruka & Co. v. Union of India (cited within Parameswaran) Instances where classification founded on a particular date was held reasonable. Referenced within the Parameswaran discussion to reinforce that date-based classifications have been upheld.
Louisville Gas Co. v. Alabama Power Co. (per Justice Holmes) (cited within Parameswaran) Support for accepting legislative or delegated choices of a date unless very wide off the reasonable mark. Used as part of Parameswaran reasoning to justify acceptance of a chosen cut-off date.
Sushma Sharma v. State of Rajasthan, 1985 Supp SCC 45 Meaning of cut-off/continuity in context of eligibility — continuity and a sensible reading of temporal words consistent with legislative purpose. Cited to show that temporal qualifications and continuity are interpreted to serve the object of the statute and that cut-off-based eligibility is a reasonable legislative choice.
A.P. Public Service Commission v. B. Sarat Chandra, (1990) 2 SCC 669 Eligibility (age) must be determined as on a specific, determinate date rather than an uncertain or fluctuating date tied to stages of selection. Relied upon to support the proposition that a specific cut-off date is desirable and valid to avoid uncertainty in selection processes.
State of Bihar v. Ramjee Prasad, (1990) 3 SCC 368 Fixation of last date for receipt of applications (cut-off date) is not arbitrary merely because it produces hardship for some; choice of date valid unless capricious or wide off reasonable mark. Applied to reject the argument that the cut-off date was arbitrary and to uphold administrative discretion in fixing dates.
Union of India v. Sudhir Kumar Jaiswal, (1994) 4 SCC 212 Judicial review is limited; mere errors do not justify interference — only palpably arbitrary exercises can be struck down. Used to emphasize judicial restraint and that fixation of a cut-off date will not be struck down unless palpably arbitrary.
University Grants Commission v. Sadhana Chaudhary, (1996) 10 SCC 536 Choice of a date as basis for classification cannot be dubbed arbitrary unless capricious or whimsical; date must not be very wide off the reasonable mark. Cited to reinforce that cut-off dates have reasonable basis and are ordinarily acceptable.
Ami Lal Bhat (Dr.) v. State of Rajasthan, (1997) 6 SCC 614 Fixing a cut-off date for determining age/eligibility is within rule-making discretion; cut-off necessarily causes some to fall on wrong side but is not per se arbitrary. Relied upon to hold that independent, uniform cut-off dates are permissible and help provide certainty; supports refusal to relax cut-off wholesale.
Shankar K. Mandal v. State of Bihar, (2003) 9 SCC 519 Principles: (1) cut-off date is the date fixed by service rules; (2) if none, the date in advertisement; (3) if none, last date for receipt of applications. Cited to show the hierarchy of determining cut-off dates and to support using the prescribed/date-specified cut-off without judicial deviation.
Ramrao v. All India Backward Class Bank Employees Welfare Assn., (2004) 2 SCC 76 Cut-off date for promotion/benefits is valid unless arbitrary; such classification does not necessarily offend Article 14. Used to stress that hardship to some does not invalidate a cut-off date; supports non-interference absent arbitrariness.
State of W.B. v. Monotosh Roy (cited within other authorities) Contextual support for the principle that cut-off dates for schemes and benefits are for the executive to fix, subject to judicial review only in extreme cases. Reiterated general principle of deference to executive fixation of cut-off dates.
Vice-Chairman & Managing Director, A.P SIDC Ltd. v. R. Varaprasad Cut-off date effects in Voluntary Retirement Scheme — benefits calculated as on the cut-off date; subsequent changes do not alter calculation point. Cited to show that benefits or rights are fixed with reference to the cut-off point chosen by authority.
Government of Andhra Pradesh v. N. Subbarayudu, (2008) 14 SCC 702 Fixing cut-off dates is within executive domain; courts should not normally interfere unless the fixation is blatantly discriminatory or arbitrary. Relied upon to underscore judicial restraint and to conclude that courts should respect executive choices of cut-off dates absent blatant arbitrariness.
D.S. Nakara v. Union of India (referenced) Earlier case on striking down cut-off date in pension context; later decisions have limited its reach. Mentioned to note that although Nakara struck down a cut-off in its context, subsequent jurisprudence has moderated its application.
Additional authorities referenced (e.g., All India Reserve Bank Retired Officers Assn. v. Union of India; P.N. Menon; State of Rajasthan v. Amrit Lal Gandhi; State of U.P. v. Jogendra Singh; V. Kasturi v. MD, State Bank of India; Aravali Golf Club v. Chander Hass; Govt. of A.P. v. P. Laxmi Devi) Various supporting propositions concerning fixation of cut-off dates, effect on retiral and benefits, and scope of judicial review. Collectively relied upon to form the background principle: cut-off dates are generally within executive/regulatory discretion and courts should defer unless the date is capricious or blatantly arbitrary.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeds in two parts corresponding to the two items before it.

I.A. No. 3420 of 2015 (Condonation Application)

  1. The interlocutory application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act sought condonation of delay of 277 days.
  2. The record showed reasons stated in paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 of the interlocutory application; the court found those reasons to be reasonable.
  3. On that basis, the court allowed the interlocutory application and condoned the delay in filing the appeal.

L.P.A. No. 277 of 2015 (Letters Patent Appeal on cut-off date)

  1. The court reviewed the material facts: the respondents fixed 24 May 2013 as the cut-off date for submission of original certificates; the appellant's result and mark-sheet were available only on 4 June 2013 (i.e., after the cut-off).
  2. The appellant's core contention was inability to submit documents prior to 24 May 2013 because the result and mark-sheet were obtained on 4 June 2013, and thus an extension should be allowed.
  3. The court explained the administrative consequences of permitting submissions after a fixed cut-off: it would invite repeated extensions, lead to phase-wise declarations of results, and undermine finality and administrative certainty.
  4. The court then surveyed and relied upon an extensive line of Supreme Court authorities (as enumerated above) establishing the legal principle that fixation of a cut-off date by administrative authorities is generally a valid exercise of discretion and will not be set aside by courts unless the choice is capricious, whimsical, blatantly arbitrary or violative of Article 14 in a demonstrable way.
  5. Applying those authorities and the practical considerations, the court concluded there was no error in the Single Judge's refusal to extend the cut-off date and upheld the Single Judge's dismissal of the writ petition.

Holding and Implications

Holdings:

  • I.A. No. 3420 of 2015 — ALLOWED: The interlocutory application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act seeking condonation of delay of 277 days is allowed and the delay in filing the instant appeal is condoned.
  • L.P.A. No. 277 of 2015 — DISMISSED: The Letters Patent Appeal is dismissed; the court found no substance in the appeal and upheld the Single Judge's dismissal of the writ petition challenging the respondents' cut-off date.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on parties: The appellant's interlocutory application for condonation succeeded (delay condoned), but the substantive challenge to the cut-off date failed and the appellant's writ challenge to compel extension of the document-submission cut-off was dismissed.
  • The court relied on established Supreme Court principles that generally sustain administrative fixation of cut-off dates; the opinion applies those authorities to the facts and does not create or announce any novel legal principle. In other words, no new precedent was set beyond applying existing jurisprudence to the facts of this case.

    Sanjay Kumar Tiwari v. Jharkhand Academic Council

    D.N Patel, J.

    I.A No. 3420 of 2015

    1. When the matter is called out, counsel for the appellant is absent.

    2. This interlocutory application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act has been filed by the appellant for condonation of delay of 277 days in preferring the instant appeal.

    3. Looking to the reasons stated in paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 of the interlocutory application, there are reasonable reasons for condoning the delay in preferring the appeal.

    4. Accordingly, I.A No. 3420 of 2015 is allowed and delay in filing the instant appeal is condoned.

    L.P.A No. 277 of 2015

    5. When the case is called out, counsel for the appellant is absent.

    6. Having heard learned counsel for the respondent and looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, it appears that last date for submission of the original certificates, etc. for Teachers' Eligibility Training Examination before the respondents-authorities was 24th May, 2013. This appellant (original petitioner) was studying in Indira Gandhi National Open University in Diploma Primary Education Course. After the last date was over, the result was declared by the Indira Gandhi National Open University and on 04.06.2013 the appellant procured the mark-sheet, etc. The contention before the learned Single Judge of the original petitioner was that no fault lie on the part of the petitioner in submission of the original document which was not practicably possible till 24 May, 2013 as the same was procured on 4 June, 2013 and hence, further time may be allowed to be presented the mark-sheet before the Jharkhand Academic Council by extending the date of submission of the documents. The cut-off date for submission of the documents, mark-sheet etc. was 24 May, 2013 as fixed by the Jharkhand Academic Council. Admittedly, this appellant (original petitioner) cleared his examination and the result was declared on 04.06.2013 for the Diploma in Primary Education. The cut-off date was 24 May, 2013 and the result was published on 4 June, 2013 which is after 8-9 days of the cut-off date.

    7. In view of the aforesaid submissions, whenever there is any cut-off date prescribed by the authorities, there are bound that few candidates who are falling on the wrong side of the cut-off date. There are aways few candidates who are going to submit their documents after the last date of submission of the documents. This Court will not extend the last date of submission of the documents, otherwise, there will be no end of such eventualities and the period of submission of the documents will be extended every time. If this eventuality is permitted to submit the documents even after the cut-off date is over, perhaps, no result can be declared finally by the respondents-authorities. If this type of documents are permitted to be submitted after the cut-off date, every time the result will be declared in phase-wise and there will be no end of phase-wise declaration.

    8. It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India v. Parameswaran Match Works, as reported in (1975) 1 SCC 305, at paragraph no. 10 as under:

    “10. The concessional rate of duty can be availed of only by those who satisfy the conditions which have been laid down under the notification. The respondent was not a manufacturer before September 4, 1967 as it had applied for licence only on September 5, 1967 and it could not have made a declaration before September 4, 1967 that its total clearance for the financial year 1967-68 is not estimated to exceed 75 million matches. In the matter of granting concession or exemption from tax, the Government has a wide latitude of discretion. It need not give exemption or concession to everyone in order that it may grant the same to some. As we said, the object of granting the concessional rate of duty was to protect the smaller units in the industry from the competition by the larger ones and that object would have been frustrated, if, by adopting the device of fragmentation, the larger units could become the ultimate beneficiaries of the bounty. That a classification can be founded on a particular date and yet be reasonable, has been held by this Court in several decisions (see Hatisingh Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. Union of India, Dr. Mohammad Saheb Mahboob Medico v. Deputy Custodian-General, Bhikuse Yamasa Kshatriya (P) Ltd. v. Union of India and Daruka & Co. v. Union of India. The choice of a date as a basis for classification cannot always be dubbed as arbitrary even if no particular reason is forthcoming for the choice unless it is shown to be capricious or whimsical in the circumstances. When it is seen that a line or a point there must be and there is no mathematical or logical way of fixing it precisely, the decision of the legislature or its delegate must be accepted unless we can say that it is very wide off the reasonable mark See Louisville Gas Co. v. Alabama Power Co. per Justice Holmes.”

    (Emphasis supplied)

    9. It was held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Sushma Sharma v. State of Rajasthan, reported in 1985 Supp SCC 45, in paragraph No. 30 as under: -

    The object of this legislation was to provide for absorption of temporary lecturers of long standing. So therefore experience and continuous employment were necessary ingredients. The Hindi version of the Ordinance used the expression “ke prarambh ke samaya is roop me karya kar rahe hein” is capable of meaning “and are continuing” to work as such at the time of the commencement of the Ordinance. Keeping the background of the purpose of the Act in view that would be the proper construction and if that is the proper construction which is in consonance with the English version of the Ordinance and the Act as well as with the object of the Act then in our opinion the Act and the Ordinance should be construed to mean that only those would be eligible for screening who were appointed prior to June 25, 1975 and were continuing at the time of the commencement of the Ordinance i.e June 12, 1978 i.e approximately about three years. If that is the correct reading, then we are unable to accept the criticism that those who were for a short period appointed prior to June 25, 1975 then again with interruption were working only at the time of the commencement of the Ordinance i.e June 12, 1978 would also be eligible. In other words people with very short experience would be eligible for absorption. That cannot be the purpose of the Act. It cannot be so read reasonably. Therefore on a proper construction it means that all temporary lecturers who were appointed as such on or before June 25, 1975 and were continuing as such at the commencement of the Ordinance shall be considered by the University for screening for absorption. The expression “were continuing” is significant. This is in consonance with the object of the Act to ensure continuity of experience and service as one of the factors for regularising the appointment of the temporary lecturers. For regularising the appointment of temporary lecturers, certain continuous experience is necessary. If a Legislature considers a particular period of experience to be necessary, the wisdom of such a decision is not subject to judicial review. Keeping the aforesaid reasonable meaning of clause 3 of the Ordinance and Section 3 of the Act in view, we are of the opinion that the criterion fixed for screening for absorption was not an irrational criterion not having any nexus with the purpose of the Act. Therefore, the criticism that a teacher who was working even for two or three months only before June 25, 1975 and then with long interruptions was in employment of the University at the time of the commencement of the Ordinance would be eligible but a teacher who had worked continuously from June 26, 1975 i.e after the date fixed i.e June 25, 1975 for three years would be ineligible and as such that will be discrimination against long experience, cannot be accepted. Such a construction would be an unreasonable construction unwarranted by the language used in the provisions concerned. It is well-settled that if a particular period of experience is fixed for screening or for absorption, it is within the wisdom of the Legislature, and what period should be sufficient for a particular job or a particular employment is not subject to judicial review. We need not refer to a large number of decisions on this point.”

    (Emphasis supplied)

    10. It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of A.P Public Service Commission v. B. Sarat Chandra, as reported in (1990) 2 SCC 669, at paragraph nos. 6, 7 and 8 as under:-

    “6. There is no dispute that the eligibility of a candidate as to age for appointment as Deputy Superintendent of Police should be determined according to Rule 5 of the A.P Police Services Rules. It is, therefore, necessary to look first at that Rule. Rule 5 so far as is relevant provides:

    “5. Qualifications.— (A) No person shall be eligible for appointment as a Deputy Superintendent of Police, Category 2 by direct recruitment unless he —

    (i) has completed the age of 21 years and had not completed the age of 26 years on the first day of July of the year in which the selection is made.

    * * *”

    7. The rule prescribes the minimum as well as the maximum age for appointment as Deputy Superintendent of Police. Minimum age is 21 years. The candidate must have completed 21 years on the first day of July of the year in which the selection is made. He should not have also completed 26 years as on that day. The Tribunal while construing this rule has observed:

    “According to the procedure the process of selection begins with the issue of the advertisement and culminates in forwarding the list to the appointing authority. The essence of the process lies in the preparation of the list. A selection can be said to have been done only when the list is prepared. In this view the eligibility of the candidates as to age has to be determined at this stage.”

    If the word ‘selection’ is understood in a sense meaning thereby only the final act of selecting candidates with preparation of the list for appointment, then the conclusion of the Tribunal may not be unjustified. But round phrases cannot give square answers. Before accepting that meaning, we must see the consequences, anomalies and uncertainties that it may lead to. The Tribunal in fact does not dispute that the process of selection begins with the issuance of advertisement and ends with the preparation of select list for appointment. Indeed, it consists of various steps like inviting applications, scrutiny of applications, rejection of defective applications or elimination of ineligible candidates, conducting examinations, calling for interview or viva voce and preparation of list of successful candidates for appointment. Rule 3 of the Rules of Procedure of the Public Service Commission is also indicative of all these steps. When such are the different steps in the process of selection, the minimum or maximum age for suitability of a candidate for appointment cannot be allowed to depend upon any fluctuating or uncertain date. If the final stage of selection is delayed and more often it happens for various reasons, the candidates who are eligible on the date of application may find themselves eliminated at the final stage for no fault of theirs. The date to attain the minimum or maximum age must, therefore, be specific, and determinate as on a particular date for candidates to apply and for recruiting agency to scrutinise applications. It would be, therefore, unreasonable to construe the word selection only as the factum of preparation of the select list. Nothing so bad would have been intended by the rule making authority.

    8. The appeal therefore, is allowed setting aside the order of the Tribunal.”

    (Emphasis supplied)

    11. In the aforesaid decision, the cut-off date was 1st July, 1983, because the advertisement was published in August, 1983. This cut-off date was under challenge, because Rule 5 of the Andhra Pradesh Police Service Rules states that maximum age limit is 26 years as on 1 July of the year in which the selection is made. Selection has different stages and, therefore, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that there cannot be any fluctuating cut-off date or uncertain cut-off date (due to different stages of selection process) and, therefore, whatever was fixed by Andhra Pradesh Public Service Commission as cut-off date i.e 1 July, 1983 was held as a valid one.

    12. It was held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Bihar v. Ramjee Prasad, reported in (1990) 3 SCC 368, in paragraph no. 8 as under:-

    “8. In the present case as pointed out earlier the past practice was to fix the last date for receipt of applications a month or one and a half months after the date of actual publication of the advertisement. Following the past practice the State Government fixed the last date for receipt of applications as January 31, 1988. Those who had completed the required experience of three years by that date were, therefore, eligible to apply for the posts in question. The respondents and some of the intervenors who were not completing the required experience by that date, therefore, challenged the fixation of the last date as arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. It is obvious that in fixing the last date as January 31, 1988 the State Government had only followed the past practice and if the High Court's attention had been invited to this fact it would perhaps have refused to interfere since its interference is based on the erroneous belief that the past practice was to fix June 30 of the relevant year as the last date for receipt of applications. Except for leaning on a past practice the High Court has not assigned any reasons for its choice of the date. As pointed out by this Court the choice of date cannot be dubbed as arbitrary even if no particular reason is forthcoming for the same unless it is shown to be capricious or whimsical or wide off the reasonable mark. The choice of the date for advertising the posts had to depend on several factors, e.g the number of vacancies in different disciplines, the need to fill up the posts, the availability of candidates, etc. It is not the case of anyone that experienced candidates were not available in sufficient numbers on the cut-off date. Merely because the respondents and some others would qualify for appointment if the last date for receipt of applications is shifted from January 31, 1988 to June 30, 1988 is no reason for dubbing the earlier date as arbitrary or irrational. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the High Court was clearly in error in striking down the government's action of fixing the last date for receipt of applications as January 31, 1988 as arbitrary.”

    (emphasis supplied)

    13. It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India v. Sudhir Kumar Jaiswal, as reported in (1994) 4 SCC 212, in paragraph nos. 7, 8 and 11, as under:

    “7. In this context, it would also be useful to state that when a court is called upon to decide such a matter, mere errors are not subject to correction in exercise of power of judicial review; it is only its palpable arbitrary exercise which can be declared to be void, as stated in Metropolis Theater Co. v. City of Chicago in which Justice McKenna observed as follows:

    “It may seem unjust and oppressive, yet be free from judicial interference. The problems of government are practical ones and may justify, if they do not require, rough accommodations, illogical, it may be, and unscientific. But even such criticism should not be hastily expressed. What is best is not always discernible; the wisdom of any choice may be disputed or condemned. Mere errors of government are not subject to our judicial review. It is only its palpably arbitrary exercises which can be declared void ….”

    The aforesaid was noted by this Court in Sushma Sharma v. State of Rajasthan in which case also reasonability of fixation of a date for a particular purpose had come up for examination.

    8. Having known the legal parameters within which we have to function, let it be seen whether fixation of 1 August as cut-off date for determining the eligibility of applicants qua their age can be held to be arbitrary despite preliminary examination being conducted before that date. As to why the cut-off date has not been changed despite the decision to hold preliminary examination, has been explained in paragraph 3 of the special leave petition. The sum and substance of the explanation is that preliminary examination is only a screening test and marks obtained in this examination do not count for determining the order of merit, for which purpose the marks obtained in the main examination, which is still being held after 1 August, alone are material. In view of this, it cannot be held that continuation of treating 1 August as the cut-off date, despite the Union Public Service Commission having introduced the method of preliminary examination which is held before 1 August, can be said to be “very wide off any reasonable mark” or so capricious or whimsical as to permit judicial interference.

    xx xx xx

    11. For the aforesaid reasons, equity does not demand any favour to be shown to the respondent. The result is that appeal is allowed with costs by setting aside the impugned order of the Tribunal. Cost assessed as Rs. 10,000. The respondent would not be treated or deemed to have passed the examination in question and whatever benefit of the same was given to him pursuant to Tribunal's directions shall stand cancelled.”

    (Emphasis supplied)

    14. Thus, in view of the aforesaid decision also, the cut-off date fixed as 1 August was held as a valid one. Such type of cut-off date may appear to be unjust or oppressive, yet it will be free from judicial interference. The problems of government are practical ones and may be justified.

    15. It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of University Grants Commission v. Sadhana Chaudhary, as reported in (1996) 10 SCC 536, in paragraph no. 21, as under:

    “21. We find considerable force in the aforesaid submissions of Shri. Banerjee. It is settled law that the choice of a date as a basis for classification cannot always be dubbed as arbitrary even if no particular reason is forthcoming for the choice unless it is shown to be capricious or whimsical in the circumstances. When it is seen that a line or a point there must be and there is no mathematical or logical way of fixing it precisely, the decision of the legislature or its delegate must be accepted unless it can be said that it is very wide off the reasonable mark. (See: Union of India v. Parameswaran Match Works at p. 579 and Sushma Sharma (Dr) v. State of Rajasthan at p. 269.) In the present case, the date, 31-12-1993, as fixed by notification dated 21-6-1995, in the matter of grant of exemption from the eligibility test for appointment on the post of lecturer has a reasonable basis keeping in view the time taken in submitting the Ph.D thesis or obtaining M.Phil degree by candidates who had undertaken the study for Ph.D or M.Phil degree prior to the issuance of the 1991 Regulations and the date, 31-12-1993, cannot be held to be capricious or whimsical or wide off the reasonable mark. The High Court of Punjab and Haryana has proceeded on the basis that the cut-off date for the purpose of granting exemption from eligibility test should have nexus with the date of the advertisement inviting applications for appointment on the post of Lecturers. The High Court was in error in taking this view. ………………………………..”

    (Emphasis supplied)

    16. Thus, in view of the aforesaid decision, the choice of cut-off date as a basis for classification cannot be held as arbitrary, even if no particular reason is forthcoming for the choice of that cut-off date.

    17. It was held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ami Lal Bhat (Dr.) v. State of Rajasthan, reported in (1997) 6 SCC 614, in paragraph nos. 5, 7, 11 and 17 as under: -

    “5. This contention, in our view, is not sustainable. In the first place the fixing of a cut-off date for determining the maximum or minimum age prescribed for a post is not, per se, arbitrary. Basically, the fixing of a cut-off date for determining the maximum or minimum age required for a post, is in the discretion of the rule-making authority or the employer as the case may be. One must accept that such a cut-off date cannot be fixed with any mathematical precision and in such a manner as would avoid hardship in all conceivable cases. As soon as a cut-off date is fixed there will be some persons who fall on the right side of the cut-off date and some persons who will fall on the wrong side of the cut-off date. That cannot make the cut-off date, per se, arbitrary unless the cut-off date is so wide off the mark as to make it wholly unreasonable. This view was expressed by this Court in Union of India v. Parameswaran Match Works and has been reiterated in subsequent cases. In the case of A.P Public Service Commission v. B. Sarat Chandra the relevant service rule stipulated that the candidate should not have completed the age of 26 years on the 1 day of July of the year in which the selection is made. Such a cut-off date was challenged. This Court considered the various steps required in the process of selection and said,

    “when such are the different steps in the process of selection the minimum or maximum age of suitability of a candidate for appointment cannot be allowed to depend upon any fluctuating or uncertain date. If the final stage of selection is delayed and more often it happens for various reasons, the candidates who are eligible on the date of application may find themselves eliminated at the final stage for no fault of theirs. The date to attain the minimum or maximum age must, therefore, be specific and determinate as on a particular date for candidates to apply and for the recruiting agency to scrutinise the applications”.

    This Court, therefore, held that in order to avoid uncertainty in respect of minimum or maximum age of a candidate, which may arise if such an age is linked to the process of selection which may take an uncertain time, it is desirable that such a cut-off date should be with reference to a fixed date. Therefore, fixing an independent cut-off date, far from being arbitrary, makes for certainty in determining the maximum age.

    7. In the present case, the cut-off date has been fixed by the State of Rajasthan under its Rules relating to various services with reference to the 1 of January following the year in which the applications are invited. All Service Rules are uniform on this point. Looking to the various dates on which different departments and different heads of administration may issue their advertisements for recruitment, a uniform cut-off date has been fixed in respect of all such advertisements as 1 January of the year following. This is to make for certainty. Such a uniform date prescribed under all Service Rules and Regulations makes it easier for the prospective candidates to understand their eligibility for applying for the post in question. Such a date is not so wide off the mark as to be construed as grossly unreasonable or arbitrary. The time-gap between the advertisement and the cut-off date is less than a year. It takes into account the fact that after the advertisement, time has to be allowed for receipt of applications, for their scrutiny, for calling candidates for interview, for preparing a panel of selected candidates and for actual appointment. The cut-off date, therefore, cannot be considered as unreasonable. It was, however, strenuously urged before us that the only acceptable cutoff date is the last date for receipt of applications under a given advertisement. Undoubtedly, this can be a possible cut-off date. But there is no basis for urging that this is the only reasonable cut-off date. Even such a date is liable to question in given circumstances. In the first place, making a cut-off date dependent on the last date for receiving applications, makes it more subject to vagaries of the department concerned, making it dependent on the date when each department issues an advertisement, and the date which each department concerned fixes as the last date for receiving applications. A person who may fall on the wrong side of such a cut-off date may well contend that the cut-off date is unfair, since the advertisement could have been issued earlier; or in the alternative that the cut-off date could have been fixed later at the point of selection or appointment. Such an argument is always open, irrespective of the cut-off date fixed and the manner in which it is fixed. That is why this Court has said in the case of Parameswaran Match Works and later cases that the cut-off date is valid unless it is so capricious or whimsical as to be wholly unreasonable. To say that the only cut-off date can be the last date for receiving applications, appears to be without any basis. In our view the cut-off date which is fixed in the present case with reference to the beginning of the calendar year following the date of application, cannot be considered as capricious or unreasonable. On the contrary, it is less prone to vagaries and is less uncertain.

    11. In our view this kind of an interpretation cannot be given to a rule for relaxation of age. The power of relaxation is required to be exercised in public interest in a given case; as for example, if other suitable candidates are not available for the post, and the only candidate who is suitable has crossed the maximum age-limit; or to mitigate hardship in a given case. Such a relaxation in special circumstances of a given case is to be exercised by the administration after referring that case to the Rajasthan Public Service Commission. There cannot be any wholesale relaxation because the advertisement is delayed or because the vacancy occurred earlier especially when there is no allegation of any mala fides in connection with any delay in issuing an advertisement. This kind of power of wholesale relaxation would make for total uncertainty in determining the maximum age of a candidate. It might be unfair to a large number of candidates who might be similarly situated, but who may not apply, thinking that they are age-barred. We fail to see how the power of relaxation can be exercised in the manner contended.

    17. In the premises the appeals of the candidates who have challenged the cut-off date under the relevant rules are dismissed while the appeals filed by the State of Rajasthan are allowed. The validity of the Rules concerned relating to the cut-off date being fixed with reference to 1 of January of the year following the application is upheld. There will be no order as to costs.

    (emphasis supplied)

    18. It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Shankar K. Mandal v. State of Bihar, as reported in (2003) 9 SCC 519, in paragraph no. 5, as under:

    “5. Pursuant to the directions contained in the earlier judgment of the High Court as affirmed by this Court, a fresh exercise was undertaken. Since the present appellants were not selected, writ petitions were filed before the High Court. In the writ petition which was filed by fifty-five persons and disposed of by the Division Bench the conclusions were essentially as follows: (1) Some of the writ petitioners (Writ Petitioners 5, 18, 23, 28, 41 and 53) were overage at the time of their initial appointment and their cases were, therefore, wholly covered by the directions given by the High Court, and they were not entitled to relaxation of age; (2) So far as Writ Petitioners 6, 26, 30 and 55 are concerned, the stand was that they had not crossed the age-limit at the time of making the applications for appointment and, therefore, were within the age-limit at the time of initial appointment and were, therefore, entitled to relaxation of age in terms of the judgment passed by the High Court earlier and affirmed by this Court. This plea was turned down on the ground that what was relevant for consideration related to the age at the time of initial appointment and not making of the application; (3) As regards Writ Petitioner 24, he was underage at the time of appointment. He was permitted to file a representation before the Director of Primary Education and the High Court ordered that his case would be considered afresh; (4) In respect of Writ Petitioners 9 and 17, it was noted that they were refused absorption on the ground that they had not made any application in response to advertisement issued pursuant to the order passed by this Court. Since no material was placed to substantiate this stand and no reasons had been communicated for non-absorption, direction was given to consider representations if made by them within one month from the date of judgment. The said judgment is under challenge in CA No. 916 of 1999. The appellants have taken the stand that in terms of this Court's judgment, a person who was not overage on the date of initial appointment was to be considered. Though it was conceded before the High Court that they were overage at the time of initial appointment, much would turn as to what is the date of initial appointment. The High Court had not considered as to what was the applicable rule so far as the eligibility regarding age is concerned. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent State however submitted that having made a concession before the High Court that they were overage on the date of appointment, it is not open to the appellants to take a different stand. The crucial question is whether appellants were overage on the date of their initial appointment. It is true that there was concession before the High Court that they were overage on the date of initial appointment. But there was no concession that they were overage at the time of making the application. There was no definite material before the High Court as to what was the eligibility criteria so far as age is concerned. No definite material was placed before the High Court and also before this Court to give a definite finding on that aspect. What happens when a cut-off date is fixed for fulfilling the prescribed qualification relating to age by a candidate for appointment and the effect of any non-prescription has been considered by this Court in several cases. The principles culled out from the decisions of this Court (see Ashok Kumar Sharma v. Chander Shekhar, Bhupinderpal Singh v. State of Punjab and Jasbir Rani v. State of Punjab) are as follows:

    (1) The cut-off date by reference to which the eligibility requirement must be satisfied by the candidate seeking a public employment is the date appointed by the relevant service rules.

    (2) If there is no cut-off date appointed by the rules then such date shall be as appointed for the purpose in the advertisement calling for applications.

    (3) If there is no such date appointed then the eligibility criteria shall be applied by reference to the last date appointed by which the applications were to be received by the competent authority.“

    (Emphasis supplied)

    19. In view of the aforesaid decision also, assuming without admitting that there are no statutory rules for the posts of Constables, to be appointed in the respondent State Government and assuming that there are no executive instructions then also, the cut-off date will be the date, as mentioned for the purpose in the advertisement. As per the aforesaid decision also, there is no reason for this Court to make any deviation from the cut-off date.

    20. It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ramrao v. All India Backward Class Bank Employees Welfare Assn., as reported in (2004) 2 SCC 76, from paragraph nos. 29 to 36, as under:

    “29. It is now well settled that for the purpose of effecting promotion, the employer is required to fix a date for the purpose of effecting promotion and, thus, unless a cut-off date so fixed is held to be arbitrary or unreasonable, the same cannot be set aside as offending Article 14 of the Constitution of India. In the instant case, the cut-off date so fixed having regard to the directions contained by the National Industrial Tribunal which had been given a retrospective effect cannot be said to be arbitrary, irrational, whimsical or capricious.

    30. The learned counsel could not point out as to how the said date can be said to be arbitrary and, thus, violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.

    31. It is not in dispute that a cut-off date can be provided in terms of the provisions of the statute or executive order. In University Grants Commission v. Sadhana Chaudhary it has been observed:

    “21. … It is settled law that the choice of a date as a basis for classification cannot always be dubbed as arbitrary even if no particular reason is forthcoming for the choice unless it is shown to be capricious or whimsical in the circumstances. When it is seen that a line or a point there must be and there is no mathematical or logical way of fixing it precisely, the decision of the legislature or its delegate must be accepted unless it can be said that it is very wide off the reasonable mark.

    32. If a cut-off date can be fixed, indisputably those who fall within the purview thereof would form a separate class. Such a classification has a reasonable nexus with the object which the decision of the Bank to promote its employees seeks to achieve. Such classifications would neither fall within the category of creating a class within a class or an artificial classification so as to offend Article 14 of the Constitution of India.

    33. Whenever such a cut-off date is fixed, a question may arise as to why a person would suffer only because he comes within the wrong side of the cut-off date, but, the fact that some persons or a section of society would face hardship, by itself cannot be a ground for holding that the cut-off date so fixed is ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution.

    34. In State of W.B v. Monotosh Roy it was held:

    “13. In All India Reserve Bank Retired Officers Assn. v. Union of India a Bench of this Court distinguished the judgment in Nakara and pointed out that it is for the Government to fix a cut-off date in the case of introducing a new pension scheme. The Court negatived the claim of the persons who had retired prior to the cut-off date and had collected their retiral benefits from the employer. A similar view was taken in Union of India v. P.N Menon. In State of Rajasthan v. Amrit Lal Gandhi the ruling in P.N Menon case was followed and it was reiterated that in matters of revising the pensionary benefits and even in respect of revision of scales of pay, a cut-off date on some rational or reasonable basis has to be fixed for extending the benefits.

    14. In State of U.P v. Jogendra Singh a Division Bench of this Court held that liberalized provisions introduced after an employee's retirement with regard to retiral benefits cannot be availed of by such an employee. In that case the employee retired voluntarily on 12-4-1976. Later on, the statutory rules were amended by notification dated 18-11-1976 granting benefit of additional qualifying service in case of voluntary retirement. The Court held that the employee was not entitled to get the benefit of the liberalized provision which came into existence after his retirement. A similar ruling was rendered in V. Kasturi v. Managing Director, State Bank of India.

    15. The present case will be governed squarely by the last two rulings referred to above. We have no doubt whatever that the first respondent is not entitled to the relief prayed for by him in the writ petition.”

    35. In Vice-Chairman & Managing Director, A.P SIDC Ltd. v. R. Varaprasad in relation to “cut-off” date fixed for the purpose of implementation of Voluntary Retirement Scheme, it was said:

    “The employee may continue in service in the interregnum by virtue of clause (i) but that cannot alter the date on which the benefits that were due to an employee under VRS were to be calculated. Clause (c) itself indicates that any increase in salary after the cutoff point/date cannot be taken into consideration for the purpose of calculation of payments to which an employee is entitled under

    36. The High Court in its impugned judgment has arrived at a finding of fact that the Association had failed to prove any malice on the part of the authorities of the Bank in fixing the cut-off date. A plea of malice as is well known must be specifically pleaded and proved. Even such a requirement has not been complied with by the writ petitioners.”

    (Emphasis supplied)

    21. In the aforesaid decision also, the whole concept of cut-off has been explained and it has been held that the cut-off date cannot be held as arbitrary, irrational, whimsical, capricious or violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India, merely because some candidates come within the wrong side of the cut-off date, especially when there is no malafide alleged for delayed advertisement.

    22. It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Government of Andhra Pradesh v. N. Subbarayudu, as reported in (2008) 14 SCC 702, in paragraph nos. 5 to 9, as under:

    “5. In a catena of decisions of this Court it has been held that the cut-off date is fixed by the executive authority keeping in view the economic conditions, financial constraints and many other administrative and other attending circumstances. This Court is also of the view that fixing cut-off dates is within the domain of the executive authority and the court should not normally interfere with the fixation of cut-off date by the executive authority unless such order appears to be on the face of it blatantly discriminatory and arbitrary.

    6. No doubt in D.S Nakara v. Union of India this Court had struck down the cut-off date in connection with the demand of pension. However, in subsequent decisions this Court has considerably watered down the rigid view taken in Nakara case as observed in para 29 of the decision of this Court in State of Punjab v. Amar Nath Goyal.

    7. There may be various considerations in the mind of the executive authorities due to which a particular cut-off date has been fixed. These considerations can be financial, administrative or other considerations. The court must exercise judicial restraint and must ordinarily leave it to the executive authorities to fix the cut-off date. The Government must be left with some leeway and free play at the joints in this connection.

    8. In fact several decisions of this Court have gone to the extent of saying that the choice of a cut-off date cannot be dubbed as arbitrary even if no particular reason is given for the same in the counter-affidavit filed by the Government (unless it is shown to be totally capricious or whimsical), vide State of Bihar v. Ramjee Prasad, Union of India v. Sudhir Kumar Jaiswal (vide SCC para 5), Ramrao v. All India Backward Class Bank Employees Welfare Assn. (vide SCC para 31), University Grants Commission v. Sadhana Chaudhary, etc. It follows, therefore, that even if no reason has been given in the counter-affidavit of the Government or the executive authority as to why a particular cut-off date has been chosen, the court must still not declare that date to be arbitrary and violative of Article 14 unless the said cut-off date leads to some blatantly capricious or outrageous result.

    9. As has been held by this Court in Aravali Golf Club v. Chander Hass and in Govt. of A.P v. P. Laxmi Devi the court must maintain judicial restraint in matters relating to the legislative or executive domain.”

    (Emphasis supplied)

    23. In view of the aforesaid decision, even if no reason has been given in the counter affidavit of the Government that why a particular cut-off date has been fixed or chosen, still the court must not declare it as arbitrary or violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India, because the fixation of cut-off date has various considerations.

    24. As a cumulative effect of aforesaid facts, reasons and judicial pronouncements, no error has been committed by the learned Single Judge in dismissing the writ application preferred by this appellant and we see no reason to take any other view than what is taken by the learned Single Judge. Hence, there is no substance in this Letters Patent Appeal and the same is hereby dismissed.

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