Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff, OK Play India Limited, a leading manufacturer and distributor of plastic moulded products such as toys, school furniture, and playground equipment, filed suit against eight defendants including Playwell Impex Private Limited and its directors, alleging infringement of intellectual property rights, passing off, and unfair competition by manufacturing and selling products identical or deceptively similar to those of the plaintiff. The plaintiff claimed to be the assignee of intellectual property rights owned by OK Play Limited (UK), including trademarks and rights in designs related to toys. The plaintiff sought permanent injunctions restraining the defendants from such infringement and ancillary reliefs.

In August 2015, the Court granted an ex parte ad interim injunction restraining the defendants from dealing with the infringing goods and appointed Court Commissioners to seize such goods. Subsequently, the defendants filed applications for vacation of the injunction and release of seized goods. The defendants contested the suit and filed written statements, with defendant no.8 also filing a counter claim for damages. The matter proceeded to hearing on interim relief, with the key issue being whether the plaintiff, without registration under the Designs Act, 2000, could claim intellectual property rights and obtain interim injunctions against the defendants.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the plaintiff, without registration of designs under the Designs Act, 2000, is entitled to claim intellectual property rights, including copyright and Common Law Rights, in the designs of its toys for the purpose of obtaining interim injunctions against infringement.
  2. Whether copyright subsists in the drawings of toys prepared by the plaintiff when such designs are capable of registration under the Designs Act and the articles have been reproduced more than fifty times by industrial process, thereby ceasing copyright protection under Section 15(2) of the Copyright Act, 1957.
  3. Whether Common Law Rights can be invoked by the plaintiff to restrain the defendants at the interim stage in the absence of statutory protection under the Designs Act or Copyright Act.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's (Plaintiff's) Arguments

  • The plaintiff asserted copyright in the drawings of the toys and claimed "Common Law Rights" to protect its intellectual property.
  • It was contended that the drawings in which copyright was claimed do not constitute a design under the Designs Act and are thus not registrable as designs.
  • The plaintiff relied on the Division Bench judgment in Microfibres Inc. Vs. Girdhar & Co. to argue that "artistic work" under the Copyright Act has a wide meaning and includes original artistic works distinct from industrial designs.
  • The plaintiff cited a Single Judge judgment from Bombay High Court in Photoquip India Limited Vs. Delhi Photo Store to support the claim that drawings serving only functional purposes and not reflecting finished products are not designs and thus entitled to copyright protection.
  • The plaintiff argued that the defendants' admission of replication from the plaintiff's brochure evidences infringement.
  • Reliance was placed on precedents such as Pankaj Goel Vs. Dabur India Ltd., Essel Packaging Limited Vs. Sridhar Narra, and others to support entitlement to interim injunctions and Common Law Rights.
  • The plaintiff contended that commercial exigencies require copyright and patent laws to encourage inventive activities and investments.

Respondents' (Defendants') Arguments

  • The defendants contended that without registration under the Designs Act, the plaintiff cannot claim intellectual property rights in the designs of the toys, especially at the interim stage.
  • They argued that Section 15 of the Copyright Act precludes copyright subsistence in designs registered or capable of registration under the Designs Act once the article has been reproduced more than fifty times industrially.
  • The defendants maintained that the plaintiff's copyright claim is not maintainable because the drawings are part of the design and the protection under the Designs Act is exclusive.
  • They challenged the applicability of the Photoquip India Limited judgment, arguing it was decided per incuriam and not concerned with finished products.
  • The defendants submitted that Common Law Rights cannot support interim injunctions without evidence, especially since the toys are generic and available from other manufacturers.
  • They relied on the Division Bench judgment in Kiran Shoes Manufacturers Vs. Registrar of Copyrights to emphasize that copyright ceases where designs are capable of registration and commercially exploited.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Microfibres Inc. Vs. Girdhar & Co. (2009 (6) R.A.J. 106 (Del)) Definition of "artistic work" under Section 2(c) of Copyright Act and distinction between artistic work and design under Designs Act. The court considered this judgment but found it applicable primarily to appeal by Microfibres Inc., and used it to understand the scope of artistic works vs. designs.
Mattel, Inc. Vs. Jayant Agarwalla (2008 (38) PTC 416 (Del)) Clarification that industrial designs are protected under the Designs Act and not the Copyright Act; copyright protection is for artistic works, not industrial designs. The court relied heavily on this judgment to hold that the plaintiff must register under the Designs Act to claim protection and that copyright cannot be claimed for industrial designs.
Photoquip India Limited Vs. Delhi Photo Store (2014 (60) PTC 563) Drawings not reflecting finished products and serving functional purposes are not designs and may be entitled to copyright protection. The court noted this judgment but accepted defendants’ argument that it was decided per incuriam and not fully applicable here.
Pankaj Goel Vs. Dabur India Ltd. (2008 (38) PTC 49 (Del)) Support for entitlement to interim injunction in intellectual property disputes. Relied upon by plaintiff to argue for interim injunctions, but court found statutory provisions overriding.
Essel Packaging Limited Vs. Sridhar Narra (2002) 98 DLT 565 Support for protection of intellectual property rights and injunctions. Referenced by plaintiff; court noted but did not grant interim relief on this basis.
Mohan Lal, Proprietor of Mourya Industries vs. Sona Paint & Hardwares AIR 2013 Delhi 143 (FB) Common Law Rights and their interplay with statutory intellectual property rights. Referenced by plaintiff to support Common Law Rights claim; court was circumspect about extending protection beyond statutory limits.
Laxmikant V. Patel Vs. Chetanbhai Shah ((2002) 3 SCC 65) Principles relating to passing off and protection of goodwill. Relied upon by plaintiff to support passing off claim.
Escorts Construction Equipment Ltd. Vs. Action Construction Equipment Pvt. Ltd. (1998 Lawsuit (Del) 811) Commercial exigencies justify copyright/patent protection to encourage innovation and investment. Invoked by plaintiff; court acknowledged but found statutory provisions controlling.
Kiran Shoes Manufacturers Vs. Registrar of Copyrights (Division Bench, 2012) Section 15(2) of Copyright Act means copyright ceases if design capable of registration is commercially exploited without registration. Court relied on this binding precedent to hold that plaintiff’s copyright claim fails without design registration.
Midas Hygiene Industries Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Sudhir Bhatia (2015) 225 DLT 178 Clarification of copyright protection vis-à-vis designs and trademarks; copyright ceases where design is registered or exploited industrially. The court’s reasoning was consonant with this judgment in concluding copyright does not subsist in industrially exploited designs without registration.
Ritika Private Limited Vs. Biba Apparels Private Ltd. (MANU/DE/0784/2016) Suit dismissed as barred by Section 15(2) of Copyright Act for failure to register designs. Referenced as a recent authority supporting dismissal of claims without design registration.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court analyzed the interplay between the Copyright Act, 1957 and the Designs Act, 2000, focusing on Sections 14 and 15 of the Copyright Act and relevant provisions of the Designs Act. It noted that while the plaintiff claimed copyright in the drawings of its toys as artistic works, the statutory framework excludes copyright protection for designs that are registered or capable of registration under the Designs Act once the article has been reproduced industrially more than fifty times.

The Court found that the plaintiff’s own pleadings demonstrated that the design and colour theme is prepared first and the drawings claimed to be copyrighted are part of the process of applying the design for industrial manufacture. Consequently, these drawings cannot be considered independent artistic works separate from the design.

The Court emphasized that allowing copyright protection in such drawings to override the Designs Act would undermine the legislative intent and the limited duration of design protection (maximum 15 years) under the Designs Act. It held that the plaintiff’s failure to register the designs under the Designs Act and the industrial reproduction of the toys more than fifty times led to cessation of any copyright protection under Section 15(2) of the Copyright Act.

The Court also expressed skepticism about the plaintiff’s claim of Common Law Rights, noting absence of evidence and the generic nature of the toys. It relied on binding precedents, including the Division Bench judgment in Kiran Shoes Manufacturers, to conclude that the plaintiff could not claim interim injunctions based on copyright or Common Law Rights without design registration.

The Court further distinguished earlier judgments cited by the plaintiff, noting limitations or inapplicability in the present facts, and aligned its reasoning with recent authoritative decisions.

Holding and Implications

The Court dismissed the plaintiff’s application for interim relief and allowed the defendants’ applications for vacation of the ex parte ad interim injunction granted on 7th August, 2015. The order dated 7th August, 2015 was vacated. Additionally, the defendants' application for release of seized goods was allowed, and the seized goods were ordered to be released forthwith to defendant Playwell Impex Private Limited.

The direct effect of this decision is that the plaintiff cannot restrain the defendants at the interim stage from manufacturing, selling, and marketing the allegedly infringing toys without registration under the Designs Act. The Court did not set any new precedent beyond applying existing statutory provisions and established case law. The ruling underscores the necessity of design registration for protection of industrial designs and limits the scope of copyright claims in such contexts.

To access the original judgment, please Sign In or Subscribe.

    Ok Play India Limited v. Mayank Aggarwal

    *IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

    %thDate of decision: 15 July, 2016.

    + CS(OS) No.2355/2015 & CC No.6/2016 (of the defendant no.8) OK PLAY INDIA LIMITED ..... Plaintiff

    Through: Mr. Jayant Mehta, Mr. Kapil Wadhwa, Mr. Anirudh Wadhwa and Ms. Tanya Sharma, Advs.

    Versus

    MAYANK AGGARWAL & ORS ..... Defendants

    Through: Mr. Saikrishna Rajagopal, Mr. Sidharth Chopra, Mr. Nitin Sharma and Mr. Avijit Sharma, Advs. for D-1 to 7.

    Mr. Bharat Deepak, Adv. for D-8.

    CORAM:-

    HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW IA No.16099/2015 (of the plaintiff u/O 39 R-1&2 CPC), IA No.18726/2015 & IA No.24796/2015 (of defendants u/O 39 R-4 of the CPC) & IA No.18727/2015 (of the defendants for release of goods).

    1. The application of the plaintiff for interim injunction and the applications of the defendants for vacation of the ex parte ad interim injunction granted to the plaintiff vide order dated 7thAugust, 2015 and for release of the goods seized by the Court Commissioner appointed vide the same order and order dated 21stAugust, 2015 are for consideration.

    2. The plaintiff, claiming to be a leading manufacturer and distributor of quality products made using plastic moulding technology including toys,

    1

    school furniture and playground equipment, has sued the eight defendants namely Playwell Impex Private Limited and its Directors Mr. Mayank Aggarwal, Ms. Meenakshi Gupta, Mr. Pawan Kumar Gupta and Mr. Vishal Gupta and its Manager Mr. Darshan Singh Rawat and its distributor R.P. Associates and its manufacturer Funko India for the relief of permanent injunction restraining them from infringe upon the bundle of intellectual property rights including copyright and Common Law Rights in designs and/or from passing off or indulging in acts of unfair competition by manufacturing, distributing and selling products identical or deceptively similar to the products of the plaintiff and for ancillary reliefs.

    3. It is inter alia the case of the plaintiff (i) that it is the assignee of all the intellectual property rights owned by OK Play Limited (UK), a British Company specializinig in manufacture and distribution of toys, including trademarks and goodwill attached to the brand OK Play Limited (UK) and all rights to the drawings, designs, moulds, casts and dyes relating to the toys made by OK Play Limited (UK); (ii) that the plaintiff has been carrying on business under the brand OK PLAY and is the leading toy manufacturer in India having turnover of Rs.56,64,71,656/- in the financial year 2014-15;

    (iii) that the plaintiff in the year 2014-15 spent Rs.1,28,80,197/- in

    2

    marketing; (iv) that the plaintiff is the registered proprietor of the trademark 'OK PLAY' since 25thAugust, 2005 (w.e.f. 26thOctober, 1992); (v) that the mark OK PLAY is also used by the plaintiff in the form of a logo with the words OK PLAY set out in a stylized font in yellow coloured lettering over a red background and the plaintiff has also applied for registration of the said (device) mark; (vi) that each toy produced by the plaintiff is unique and has been conceptualized and designed under the strict control and supervision of the plaintiff and the conceptualization and production of toys by the plaintiff is confidential and proprietary and involves studying the market, coming up with a feasibility report and demand, conceptualising keeping the mental and physical development of the target age-bracket, coming up with the aesthetic elements of the toy including colour scheme, dimensions etc., preparation of the drawings, preparation of a dummy prototype, creation of the necessary moulds, dyes and creation of casts; (vii) all the drawings are created either in-house or by professionals engaged by the plaintiff; (viii) the plaintiff in the five years preceding the institution of the suit spent Rs.4 crores on research and development; (ix) the defendant no.2 Playwell Impex Private Limited, also engaged in the business of manufacture, distribution and sale of toys, in collusion with the defendant no.6 R.P. Associates which was the

    3

    distributor of the toys of the plaintiff and defendant no.7 Darshan Singh Rawat, who was earlier an employee of the plaintiff and privy to all confidential and proprietary information and data of the plaintiff, has launched a range of toys which are identical and deceptively similar to the toys made by the plaintiff and is thereby passing off its goods as those of the plaintiff, infringing the bundle of intellectual property rights of the plaintiff in its products; and, (x) that the toys manufactured and sold by the defendants under the brand FUNKO are a substantial re-production and colourable imitation of the products of the plaintiff.

    4. Vide ex parte ad interim order dated 7thAugust, 2015, while issuing summons of the suit, the defendants were restrained from manufacturing, selling, distributing, advertising or dealing with the products that are identical/deceptively similar to the plaintiff's products and Court Commissioners appointed to visit the premises of the defendants without notice and to prepare inventory of all the impugned material and to take into custody the infringing material. Vide subsequent order dated 21.08.2015, Additional Commissioners were appointed to visit other locations.

    4

    5. The Commission was executed and certain goods seized and for release whereof application has been filed by the defendants and is also under consideration.

    6. Needless to state, the defendants have contested the suit. Separate written statements have been filed by the defendant No.1, defendants no.2&5, by the defendant no.3, by the defendants no.4&6 and by the defendant no.8. The defendant no.8 Funko India has also filed a Counter Claim against the plaintiff for recovery of Rs.2 crores for causing loss and damage by having the commission executed. Pleadings have been completed. The counsels were heard on the aspect of interim relief on 08.07.2016 and order reserved.

    7. Having not found the plaintiff in the plaint to have claimed registration under the Designs Act, 2000 and being of the prima facie opinion that without the same the plaintiff cannot assert any intellectual property rights, at least at the interim stage to be entitled to injunction, during the hearing also the counsel for the plaintiff was straightaway quizzed on the said aspect and for this reason only need at this stage to summarize the defence of the defendants to the suit is not felt. Hearing was thus confined to, whether the plaintiff without obtaining registration as a design

    5

    with respect to any of the toys being manufactured by it is entitled to injunct the defendants at the interim stage from copying the design of its toys.

    8. The counsel for the plaintiff, in the "bundle of copyrights" of which infringement is claimed, asserts copyright in the drawings of the toys and

    "Common Law Rights". Mr. Saikrishna Rajagopal, Advocate appearing for the defendants no.1 to 7 on the other hand contended what was echoed by me i.e. that without registration as a design, no intellectual property rights can be claimed.

    9. Before going into the legal provisions on the aforesaid aspect it may be mentioned that it is the plea in para 19 of the plaint and it was argued by the counsel for the plaintiff with reference to pages 181 and 182 of the documents that the plaintiff, while conceptualizing a proposed toy, first comes up with the aesthetic elements of the proposed toy including the colour scheme, dimensions and functional requirements of the toy and on the basis thereof the technical team prepares the drawings and on the basis of which drawings prototype of the toy is prepared and subsequently the necessary moulds, dyes and casts are created. According to the plaintiff, first

    6

    a design and colour theme as under is prepared and thereafter the drawing thereof as under:-

    is prepared and in which the plaintiff claims copyright.

    10. The statutory provisions to which the hearing was confined are as under :-

    (i) Section 14(c) of the Copyright Act, 1957:-

    "For the purposes of this Act, "copyright" means the exclusive right subject to the provisions of this Act, to do or authorise the doing of any of the following acts in respect of a work or any substantial part thereof, namely:—

    (a) .......

    7

    (b) .......

    (c) in the case of an artistic work,-

    (i) to reproduce the work in any material form including -

    (A) the storing of it in any medium by electronic or other means; or

    (B) depiction in three-dimensions of a two-dimensional work or

    (C) depiction in two-dimensions of a three-dimensional work;

    (ii) to communicate the work to the public;

    (iii) to issue copies of the work to the public not being copies already in circulation;

    (iv) to include the work in any cinematograph film;

    (v) to make any adaptation of the work;

    (vi) to do in relation to an adaptation of the work any of the acts specified in relation to the work in sub-clauses (i) to (iv);

    (d) ……

    (e) …… Explanation. - For the purposes of this section, a copy which has been sold once shall be deemed to be a copy already in circulation."

    (ii) Section 15 of the Copyright Act.

    "15. Special provision regarding copyright in designs registered or capable of being registered under the [Designs Act, 2000 (16 of 2000)]-(1) Copyright shall not subsist under this Act in any design which is registered under the [Designs Act, 2000 (16 of

    2000)].

    8

    (2) Copyright in any design, which is capable of being registered under the [Designs Act, 2000 (16 of 2000)], but which has not been so registered, shall cease as soon as any article to which the design has been applied has been reproduced more than fifty times by an industrial process by the owner of the copyright, or, with his licence, by any other person."

    (iii) Sections 2(c) and (d), 6(1) and 11 of the Designs Act

    "2. Definitions. - In this Act, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context, -

    (c) "copyright" means the exclusive right to apply a design to any article in any class in which the design is registered;

    (d) "design" means only the features of shape, configuration, pattern, ornament or composition of lines or colours applied to any article whether in two dimensional or three dimensional or in both forms, by any industrial process or means, whether manual, mechanical or chemical, separate or combined, which in the finished article appeal to and are judged solely by the eye; but does not include any mode or principle of construction or anything which is in substance a mere mechanical device, and does not include any trade mark as defined in clause (v) of sub-section (1) of section 2 of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958 or property mark as defined in section 479 of the Indian Penal Code or any artistic work as defined in clause (c) of section 2 of the Copyright Act, 1957.

    6. Registration to be in respect of particular article. - (1) A design may be registered in respect of any or

    9

    all of the articles comprised in a prescribed class of articles.

    11. Copyright on registration. - (1) When a design is registered, the registered proprietor of the design shall, subject to the provisions of this Act, have copyright in the design during ten years from the date of registration.

    (2) If, before the expiration of the said ten years, application for the extension of the period of copyright is made to the Controller in the prescribed manner, the Controller shall, on payment of the prescribed fee, extend the period of copyright for a second period of five years from the expiration of the original period of ten years."

    11. It was enquired from the counsel for the plaintiff whether not the copyright under Section 14(c) supra, even if any of the plaintiff in the drawing as re-produced above, was a copyright in a design within the meaning of Section 2(d) and being capable of registration under the Designs Act and whether not, having not been so registered, and the plaintiff having applied the design to manufacture by industrial process of the toy concerned more than 50 times, the said copyright in design ceased under Section 15(2) supra.

    12. The contention of the counsel for the plaintiff is and as indeed cannot be anything else that the drawing aforesaid in which the plaintiff claims a

    10

    copyright does not constitute a design within the meaning of Section 2(d) supra and was thus not capable of being registered under the Designs Act.

    13. On enquiry whether not the said question had been the subject matter of any earlier judgment, the counsel for the plaintiff drew attention to the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in Microfibres Inc. Vs. Girdhar & Co. 2009 (6) R.A.J. 106 (Del). However it was found that the said judgment besides in the appeal preferred by Microfibres Inc. was also in FAO(OS) No.447/2008 preferred by Mattel Inc., also a manufacturer of toys, against Jayant Aggarwalla and further finding the judgment of the Division Bench copy of which was handed over to be pertaining more to the appeal preferred by Microfibres Inc., and having deferred the hearing of appeal by Mattel Inc., the judgment of the Single Judge of this Court in

    Mattel, Inc. Vs. Jayant Agarwalla and the judgment of the Division Bench in the said appeal being FAO(OS) No.447/2008 were enquired of. The counsel for the defendants no.1 to 7 handed over a copy of the judgment of the Single Judge in Mattel, Inc. Vs. Jayant Agarwalla 2008 (38) PTC 416 (Del.) and during the course of hearing the counsel for the plaintiff also procured from the internet the copy of the order dated 23rdApril, 2012 of the

    11

    Division Bench disposing of FAO(OS) No.447/2008 preferred by Mattel, Inc.

    14. Mattel, Inc., also claiming to be a leading manufacturer of toys, games and consumer products had filed the suit aforesaid in respect of its board game marketed and popularized by the name SCRABBLE and to restrain the defendants from adopting deceptively and confusingly similar online version of the plaintiff's games. It was the contention of the defendants therein that the question of the copyright protection being available to Mattel, Inc. did not arise due to Section 15 of the Copyright Act and the provisions of the Designs Act. Dismissing the application of Mattel, Inc. for interim injunction it was reasoned:-

    (a) relying on the judgment of the Single Judge in Microfibres Inc. Vs. Girdhar & Co. 2006 (32) PTC 157 (Del) that in India we have legislations governing the protection of different nature of rights;

    (b) insofar as the industrial designs are concerned, the protection is provided under the Designs Act;

    12

    (c) the legislative intent is also to be kept in mind which is to provide protection for a certain period of time for commercial exploitation;

    (d) thus, nature of protection is quite different for an artistic work under the Copyright Act which is for the lifetime of the author / creator + 60 years;

    (e) this is not so in the case of commercial exploitation as under the Designs Act and the Patent Act the period is much lesser;

    (f) if the configuration is made only with the object of putting it to industrial / commercial use then it has to be dealt with under the Designs Act;

    (g) the exclusion of an 'artistic work' as defined in Section 2(c) of the Copyright Act from the definition of 'design' under Section 2(d) of the Designs Act is only meant to exclude the nature of artistic works like paintings, sculptors and other works of art which are sought to be specifically excluded from the Designs Act;

    13

    (h) the concept behind excluding certain designs from protection under the Copyright Act is to avoid any hindrance being caused to the manufacturer in sale of industrial articles;

    (i) the intention of the Legislature is to protect any artistic work which has to be commercially exploited by the owner of the copyright by not providing the protection under the Copyright Act, but under the Designs Act;

    (j) that in the context of the Indian Law, it is the Designs Act which would give protection to the plaintiff and not the Copyright Act;

    (k) even where there is application of mind and skill and the defendant has copied the same, that would still not amount to the work in question being labeled as 'artistic work' within the definition of Section 2(c) of the Copyright Act and the protection under the Copyright Act would not be available;

    (l) the object of Copyright law is to protect the original literary, dramatic, musical and artistic works, cinematograph films, sound recordings, broadcasting rights and/or performers' rights;

    14

    (m) the object of Design Law on the other hand is protection of the features of shape, configuration, pattern, ornamentation, or composition of lines or colours applied to any article whether in two dimensional or three dimensional or in both forms, by industrial process or means;

    (n) the Copyright Act precludes the subsistence of Copyright in the Design which is registered or is capable of being registered as a design;

    (o) Section 47 (2) (c) of the Designs Act enables the Central Government to frame rules inter alia to facilitate registration thereunder; pursuant thereto the Designs Rules, 2001 were framed and which classify the various articles and one of the entries wherein deals with GAMES AND TOYS and another with OTHER AMUSEMENT AND ENTERTAINMENT

    ARTICLES - these prima facie cover all games and amusement articles as well as toys;

    15

    (p) designs in respect of various articles of games and other amusement articles including game boards therefore can prima facie be registered; and,

    (q) thus the defendants' objection that copyright could not be claimed was prima facie merited and plaintiffs' copyright claim could not be granted at the interim stage.

    15. The Division Bench in appeal preferred thereagainst and which was clubbed with the appeal preferred by Microfibres Inc. while dismissing the appeal of Microfibres Inc. ordered separate listing of the appeal preferred by Mattel, Inc.. However it appears that the appeal preferred by Mattel, Inc. was adjourned from time to time and is found to have been disposed of vide order dated 23rdApril, 2012 finding that the suit was at an advance stage and merely with the clarification that the observations made while dismissing the application for interim relief would not influence the final decision. However I further find through the website of this Court that the said suit has not been disposed of as yet.

    16. The fact however remains that though the Division Bench did not render any findings on merits but also did not set aside the judgment of the

    16

    learned Single Judge which holds good till now. Going by the rule of precedents, the plaintiff herein also cannot be granted any interim relief.

    17. Interestingly, the judgment of the Division Bench in Microfibres Inc. is also in FAO(OS) No.326/2007 preferred by Dart Industries Inc. against the order of the Single Judge refusing to grant interim injunction against infringement of its Tupperware Products. Just like FAO(OS) No.447/2008 preferred by Mattel Inc., FAO(OS) No.326/2007 preferred by Dart Industries Inc. was also ordered to be listed separately and judgment wherein is found to have been reserved by a Division Bench comprising of the same learned Judge who had sitting singly pronounced the judgment in Mattel Inc.

    18. Be that as it may, the counsel for the plaintiff argued (i) Section 15 being an exception to Section 14 of the Copyright Act has to be construed strictly; (ii) that the Division Bench in Microfibres Inc. in para 20 has held that the definition in Section 2(c) of the Copyright Act of "artistic work" has a very wide connotation and includes a work of architecture or an abstract work such as a few lines or curves arbitrarily drawn; (iii) that the Division Bench in Microfibres Inc. in para 23 has held that there is a clear distinction

    17

    between an original artistic work and design derived from it for industrial application on an article and that the original artistic work is something different from the design; (iv) that the Division Bench in Microfibres Inc. in para 46(f.) has held that the original artistic work which may be used to industrially produce the designed article would continue to fall within the meaning of the artistic work defined under Section 2(c) of the Copyright Act and would be entitled to the full period of copyright protection as evident from the definition of design under Section 2(d) of the Designs Act; (v) that a Single Judge of the High Court of Bombay also in Photoquip India Limited Vs. Delhi Photo Store 2014 (60) PTC 563 held that that drawings of the plaintiff therein being skilled diagrams that did not reflect any finished products, let alone a finished product of any 'visual' or aesthetic appeal and serving only a functional purpose were not a design and that the plaintiff herein also is claiming copyright only in the drawings and not in the articles and is thus entitled to interim injunction; (vi) that the defendants in their written statement have admitted the e-mail of the defendant Mr. Darshan Singh Rawat to the defendant Playwell Impex Private Limited forwarding the brochure of the toys of the plaintiff and therefrom it is evident that the defendant Playwell Impex Private Limited is replicating from the brochure

    18

    of the plaintiff; (vii) that the defence of the defendants in their written statements that identical toys of other brands were also available would not disentitle the plaintiff from interim injunction - reliance in this regard is placed on Pankaj Goel Vs. Dabur India Ltd. 2008 (38) PTC 49 (Del) and

    Essel Packaging Limited Vs. Sridhar Narra (2002) 98 DLT 565; (viii) that the plaintiff is entitled to interim injunction under the Common Law (on enquiry whether in the face of statutory provisions there can be Common Law to the contrary and whether not intellectual property rights are statutory rights and not Common Law Rights, reliance was placed on Mohan Lal, Proprietor of Mourya Industries vs. Sona Paint & Hardwares AIR 2013 Delhi 143 (FB)). (ix) reliance was placed on Laxmikant V. Patel Vs. Chetanbhai Shah (2002) 3 SCC 65 on the subject of passing off; and, (x) reliance was placed on Escorts Construction Equipment Ltd. Vs. Action Construction Equipment Pvt. Ltd. 1998 Lawsuit (Del) 811 to contend that commercial exigencies require that copyright/patent laws should be viewed in the context of giving protection and exclusive rights for the purpose of encouraging inventive activities and investments in research and development.

    19

    19. I had during the hearing enquired from the counsel for the plaintiff, whether not the manufacture by industrial process of any article is to be necessarily preceded by preparation of a drawing, and if it were to be held that the copyright in the said drawing as an art work under Section 14(c) supra is to be distinct from the design of the article manufactured, and to enjoy protection for the lifetime of the author / creator + 60 years and entitle him to injunct others during the said time from replicating that design, protection whereof under the Designs Act is of maximum 15 years only, why would anyone bother to register the design of an article and not chose to be better off having a copyright which will afford the same protection as registration of a design and for a much longer period.

    20. The only answer forthcoming was that only that is eligible for registration as a design which is without preceding art work. Attention in this regard was drawn to para 24 of Microfibres Inc. (DB) supra.

    21. The Division Bench in the said paragraph though observed that it is not necessary that in every case a design has to be preceded by a artistic work upon which it is founded and gave the example of a craftsman creating a design without first creating a basic artistic work viz. a weaver creating a

    20

    design while weaving a shawl but without going into the binding nature thereof, that is not the case here. Here it is the specific case of the plaintiff demonstrated as aforesaid from pages 181 and 182 of its documents that the design in the form of prototype precedes the artistic work and the process of manufacture by industrial process is preceded by the said artistic work.

    22. The questions posed by me to the counsel for the plaintiff demonstrates the incongruity of the contention of the counsel for the plaintiff. If protection as artistic work having copyright were to be made available to the drawing prepared/got prepared by plaintiff preceding manufacture of its toys, when the drawing of the plaintiff itself is preceded by "design and colour theme", then it will amount to saying that though the toys of the plaintiff have features of shape, configuration, pattern, composition of colours and further though the said features have been applied to the toys manufactured by industrial process and the said features in the finished article i.e. toys appeal to and are judged solely by the eye, all within the meaning of Section 2(d) supra but still do not constitute a design. Such an interpretation would sound the death knell for the Designs Act.

    21

    23. I reiterate that the pleading of the plaintiff and argument of counsel for plaintiff itself shows that the plaintiff while conceptualizing a new toy first prepares a design having features of shape, configuration, pattern, ornament, colour to appeal to children to whom such toys are to be marketed and only thereafter prepares a drawing for industrial manufacture of the said design. The same shows that the art work in which the plaintiff is claiming copyright is a step in manufacture of an article as per the design conceived and cannot stand independently from the design.

    24. I had yet further enquired from the counsel for the plaintiff whether not Section 15(2) supra referring to "copyright in any design", is itself indicative of a design also qualifying as a copyright and which copyright ceases as soon as the article to which design has been applied has been re- produced more than 50 times.

    25. The response of the counsel for the plaintiff was that since from the definition in Section 2(d) of Designs Act artistic work as defined in Section 2(c) of the Copyright Act has been expressly excluded, a design cannot be a copyright.

    22

    26. I am unable to agree. The provisions of Sections 2(c), 14 and 15 of the Copyright Act have to be read harmoniously with Section 2(d) of the Designs Act and cannot be read so as to undo what the Designs Act has been enacted to achieve. I reiterate that for a design to be applied to any article to be re-produced more than 50 times by industrial process drawings will necessarily have to be prepared and the preparation of such drawings in application of a design to any article is but a part of the process of application of the design to an article and the said drawings cannot be treated disjunctively from a design so as, to by vesting a copyright therein, extend the protection to which a design is otherwise entitled to under the Designs Act. Section 15(2) expressly ends the said protection. The principles of interpretation of a 'Proviso' as are sought to be invoked, cannot be applied to Section 15(2) which has to be given full effect to.

    27. The counsel for the defendants no.1 to 7 has also rightly clarified that the registration of a design is only in the context of an article and the copyright in the drawings ceases only qua that article though may subsist for other purposes.

    23

    28. It is also the contention of the counsel for the defendants no.1 to 7 that the judgment of the High Court of Bombay in Photoquip India Limited

    supra is per incuriam Section 52(w) brought into the Copyright Act by amendment of the year 2012 and that para 25 of the judgment shows that the Court in that case was not concerned with any furnished product. He has also drawn attention to the judgment dated 24thFebruary, 2012 of the Division Bench of this Court in RFA No.750/2010 titled Kiran Shoes Manufacturers Vs. Registrar of Copyrights observing in para 9 thereof that Section 15(2) of the Copyright Act means that even an artistic work which is commercially exploited in relation to goods in the manner provided under the Designs Act ceases to be a work which would get protection under the Copyright Act and proper course of action in such cases is to get the same registered under the Designs Act. (I am not only bound by the said judgment of Division Bench but was also a member thereof.)

    29. The counsel for the defendants no.1 to 7 with respect to the claim of the plaintiff for interim injunction on the basis of Common Law Rights contended that no interim injunction on the basis of Common Law Rights which are to be established by evidence can be granted. It was argued that the toys in which the plaintiff is claiming proprietary rights are generic

    24

    products and are being marketed by a number of other manufacturers also and all these questions cannot be decided at the interim stage.

    30. I tend to agree with the counsel for the defendants no.1 to 7 and after having perused the photographs of some of the toys in which the plaintiff is claiming proprietary rights have asked the counsel for the plaintiff the date/year since when the plaintiff has been manufacturing the said toys, as the toys look familiar, which have been available in the market for ages. The counsel for the plaintiff has generally stated that the said toys are being manufactured by the plaintiff since the year 1992.

    31. I am of the view that the articles of toys which indisputably have been manufactured more than 50 times by an industrial process and in which the plaintiff is claiming a bundle of intellectual property rights were/are registrable under the Designs Act and the plaintiff having not done so, the plaintiff at least at this interim stage cannot injunct the defendants from manufacturing, selling and marketing identical toys. It is also worth noticing that the protection of a design is for a maximum period of 15 years and which also as per the plaintiff has lapsed. No protection on the basis of copyright can be given to the plaintiff at this stage as I am of the prima facie

    25

    opinion that the copyright if any of the plaintiff in the drawings prepared in the course of manufacture of the toys by an industrial process was in the design of the toys and which ceased as soon as the toys as per the said design were manufactured more than 50 times by an industrial process. As far as the Common Law Rights asserted by the plaintiff are concerned, there at the moment is nothing to show that there were no toys of the design in which the plaintiff claims the copyright or that the plaintiff is the author/owner thereof. I am also circumspect though bound by the judgment of the full bench whether, inspite of the law having granted protection for a limited time, any protection under the Common Law can be afforded for longer, nullifying the statute.

    32. Recently a Division Bench of this Court in Midas Hygiene Industries Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Sudhir Bhatia (2015) 225 DLT 178 concerned with a challenge to the order of the Copyright Board expunging certain registrations of copyright in artistic work inter alia on the ground that the same was capable of design registration and having not been so registered resulted in cessation of copyright, though in the facts of that case set aside the order of the Copyright Board but otherwise inter alia held (i) that copyright protection is to the original expression of an idea; however the

    26

    right to exclude others from using the idea is restricted to the specific form, to the collocation devised; (ii) that on the other hand trademarks protect the distinctiveness of a mark, a logo, a symbol and its association with product or service and are badges of origin which act as markers for the consumer to identify the source of the goods or services; (iii) in distinction thereto the copyright and trademark, design rights protect novelty of the design elements (shape, presentation, etc) of an article; (iv) it is significantly based on the visual appeal of the product or article; (v) the rationale of the principle that a copyright does not subsist in a registered design is that someone's choice of design registration is a conscious decision to use a underlying work for mass production - the design then reaches through the medium of the product or the article, a wider audience; it has a commercial element; this is possible in the cases of designs of products and articles which are sold widely or for a market; (vi) however that is not always so in the case of an artistic work - typically a painting or a drawing or even a sculpture for instance; (vii) the transformation of a work of art into a design results in the possibility of its protection as a design; (viii) Section 15(1) dictates that if this kind of work is registered as a design, there is no copyright protection; (ix) Section 15(2) on the other hand says that if a work

    27

    is capable of design registration and is not registered but replicated as a product or article through a design more than 50 times through mechanical process, copyright in that work ceases; (x) that a work of art may answer to the description of subject matter capable of both design and copyright protection; (xi) however copyright in such a work of art can only subsist if it has not been registered as a design or while answering to the description of registrable design it has not been registered as such and not been applied to article which has been reproduced more than 50 times by an industrial process by the owner, licencee or any other person; (xii) the copyright in the work can continue to survive independent of the work's mere fitness for design protection.

    33. My reasoning recorded above is in consonance with the judgment supra of Division Bench.

    34. A Single Bench of this court also recently in Ritika Private Limited Vs. Biba Apparels Private Ltd. MANU/DE/0784/2016 finding that the plaintiff was creating dresses or creating articles by industrial means and process by application of the design or drawing or sketch and had not

    28

    obtained registration under the Designs Act, summarily dismissed the suit as barred by Section 15(2) of the Copyright Act.

    35. The application of the plaintiff for interim relief is thus dismissed and the applications of the defendants for vacation of the ex parte order dated 7th August, 2015 are allowed and the order dated 7thAugust, 2015 is vacated. IA No.18727/2015 of the defendants for return of the goods is also allowed. The goods seized by the Court Commissioner/s be forthwith released to the defendant Playwell Impex Private Limited.

    RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW, J.

    JULY 15, 2016

    'pp'

    29

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Ok Play India Limited v. Mayank Aggarwal
    (Jul 15, 2016)