Shiva Kirti Singh, J.— Heard the learned counsel for both the parties. This appeal has been preferred to assail an order dated 20-3-2009 passed by the High Court of Calcutta in Sujitendra Nath Singh Roy v. State of W.B Sujitendra Nath Singh Roy v. State of W.B, WP LRT No. 54 of 2009, order dated 20-3-2009 Cal The High Court placed reliance upon a Division Bench judgment of that very Court in Manju Banerjee v. Debabrata Pal Manju Banerjee v. Debabrata Pal, 2005 SCC OnLine Cal 538 and held the writ petition preferred by the appellant to be not maintainable.
2. The issue raised in this appeal is whether a writ application is maintainable against an order of the West Bengal Land Reforms and Tenancy Tribunal (the Tribunal), refusing to initiate contempt proceedings against an authority arrayed as Respondent 5 before the Tribunal. Such pristine question of law does not require any reference to the facts which led the appellant to file OA No. 2744 of 2007 corresponding to MA No. 24 of 2008 before the Tribunal with a prayer to initiate proceeding under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.
3. The learned counsel for the appellant has placed before us the Division Bench judgment of the Calcutta High Court in Manju Banerjee and has submitted that the view taken therein that there is no right of appeal against dismissal of contempt proceeding, is correct and requires no discussion but the further view that even in gross cases of palpable contempt the informant concerned aggrieved by the refusal to initiate contempt proceeding can move only the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution of India, has been assailed on the ground that such observation in the judgment is on account of non-appreciation of the relevant facts in the judgment of the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India, 1997 3 SCC 261.
4. On behalf of the appellant, it was further submitted that the judgment in L. Chandra Kumar was rendered on 18-3-1997. The relevant Act i.e the West Bengal Land Reforms and Tenancy Tribunal Act, 1997 (for brevity referred to as “the 1997 Act”) was enacted subsequently in terms of the enabling provisions under Article 323-B of the Constitution of India. Under Section 15 of the 1997 Act, the Tribunal has been vested with such power to punish for its contempt as is vested in the High Court under the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. For convenience, Section 15 is set out hereinbelow:
“15. Power to punish for contempt of Tribunal.—The Tribunal shall have, and shall exercise, the same jurisdiction, power and authority in respect of contempt of the Tribunal as a High Court has and may exercise, and, for this purpose, the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, shall have effect, subject to the modifications that—
(a) the reference therein to a High Court shall be construed as a reference to the Tribunal, and
(b) the reference therein to the Advocate General in Section 15 of the said Act shall be construed as a reference to the Advocate General of the State.”
5. There is no caveat to the proposition of law that under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 an appeal lies before the Supreme Court only against such order of the High Court which imposes punishment for contempt and no appeal will lie against an interlocutory order or an order dropping or refusing to initiate contempt proceedings. This was clearly laid down in State of Maharashtra v. Mahboob S. Allibhoy State of Maharashtra v. Mahboob S. Allibhoy, 1996 4 SCC 411. This view was also followed in several cases including in Midnapore Peoples' Coop. Bank Ltd. v. Chunilal Nanda Midnapore Peoples' Coop. Bank Ltd. v. Chunilal Nanda, 2006 5 SCC 399.
6. In L. Chandra Kumar a Constitution Bench of this Court declared certain clauses in Articles 323-A and 323-B of the Constitution of India to be unconstitutional to the extent they excluded the jurisdiction of the High Courts and the Supreme Court under Articles 226/227 and 32 of the Constitution. This was on the premise that power of judicial review is a basic and essential feature of the Constitution and, therefore, could not be taken away even by a constitutional amendment. Paras 91, 92 and 93 of this judgment were highlighted by the learned counsel for the appellant in support of his submission that all the decisions of tribunals created pursuant to Article 323-A or Article 323-B of the Constitution have been held to be subject to the High Courts' writ jurisdiction under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution.
7. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondents relied upon para 4 in Mahboob S. Allibhoy wherein it was clarified that no appeal is maintainable against an order dropping proceeding for contempt or refusing to initiate a proceeding for contempt in terms of Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. It was also submitted that since under Section 15 of the 1997 Act the Tribunal enjoys same jurisdiction, power and authority as a High Court in respect of contempt under the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, therefore, the High Court cannot exercise power of judicial review when the Tribunal exercises same powers as that of the High Court to reject or drop a contempt petition.
8. On a careful consideration of the judgment of the Division Bench in Manju Banerjee which has been followed in the impugned order, we are unable to agree with the view that the writ petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution is not maintainable when the Tribunal refuses to initiate a contempt proceeding. Such inference has been drawn by the Division Bench on the basis of some judgments of this Court such as in D.N Taneja v. Bhajan Lal D.N Taneja v. Bhajan Lal, 1988 3 SCC 26. In those cases the order refusing to initiate proceeding had been passed by the High Court and not by a tribunal and, therefore, this Court observed that in a fit and proper case the aggrieved person who informed the court of the alleged act of contempt can approach the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. Obviously in those cases there could be no occasion to observe that the aggrieved person can also approach the High Court under Articles 226/227. The submission that because of similar powers of contempt vested in the Tribunal under Section 15 of the 1997 Act, the Tribunal ceases to be inferior to the High Court for exercise of writ jurisdiction, is devoid of any substance because it ignores that the High Courts have constitutional status and are vested with extraordinary writ jurisdiction whereas the Tribunal is only a creature of statute. Hence, in our considered view, in Manju Banerjee the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court does not lay down the law correctly that when the tribunal refuses to initiate contempt proceeding, the aggrieved person has remedy only under Article 136 and not under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution.
9. As held by the Constitution Bench in L. Chandra Kumar the power of judicial review of the High Court under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution cannot be taken away by a law or even by a constitutional amendment. Hence, it will be indeed a rare case where the High Court can hold that a writ petition against any order of the inferior court or the Tribunal is not maintainable. However, we hasten to add that it is always open for the High Court, in appropriate cases, to hold that a writ petition is not entertainable on account of propriety, the constitutional scheme, some settled rules of self-restraint or its peculiar facts.
10. In view of the aforesaid discussion, the impugned order is set aside and the matter is remitted back to the High Court for considering the writ petition of the appellant afresh on its own merits and as per law. We make it clear that we have not applied ourselves to the merits of the matter. The appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent. No costs.