NGA Hoong and Others v. The Queen (India)

[72] XGA HOONG and ~ t h e r s , - ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ; THE U E E N , ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ e ~ ~ *

[Dec. 5, 18511.

0% ~ ~ e ~ l f T ~ the 8qreme ~~~~ a$ ~ ~ ~ ~ $ ~ .

Appeal to the Quean in Council allowed from a judgment on a c o n ~ i c ~ ~ o n of

the Supreme Court a t Calcutta, in a case of murder.

Statute, 9th Geo. IV., c. 74, W. 66, extends to the BritiBh territories in India,

the provisions of the Statute, 9th Geo. IT., e. 31, sec, 8, with rewect to offences

com~i~itted in two different places> or p a ~ ~ a l l y c o m m i t t ~ in one place and

completed in another, but such Statute does not render a person linlde to

p u n ~ s ~ ~ i i ~ c n t for he. commission of a complete offence, who was not liable

before the3 pass~ng of that Statute,

The words “ within the limits of the charter of the said United Company,” in the

56th section of the 9th Geo. IV., c. 74, held to mean, within the limits of the

trading charter of the East India Company [? Xoo. Ind. App 1011,

74, sec. 56, to t ry an indictment for m u r d ~ r c o m ~ ~ t t ~ and w ~ ~ ~ l y C O ~ -

pletcd at a place within the trading limits of the East India ~ompany’s

charter, by native subjects of ~ u r m a ~ i under the ~overnment of the East India

CompaK~y~ representing the ~ r o w n , who would not under former Statutes

regulating the jurisdiction of the Supreme1 Court, have been amenable to

its criminal jurisdiction [7 Moo. Ind. App. lOO-lOZ].

I n t h i s Case the appeal was allowed by the S u p r e ~ e Court a t Calcutta (a), from

a ~entenee on the c r i ~ i n a l side of that Court in a case of murder.

In the month of June, 1556, the appellant^, natives of Burmah9 and native

subjects of the East India ~ ~ m p a n y , represent^^^^ the Crown, were ~ p ~ r e h e n d ~

[73] on the charge of murdering a boat’s crew of natives of Tavoy, in certain

u~i~nhabited Islands cdled the Coco Islands, in the Bay of Bengal ; and were subse-

q ~ ~ e n t l y sent to Calcutta, to be tried in the upr re me Court there.

By the oharter establishing the Supreme C6urt a t Calcutta, the criminal juris-

diction of that Court extends to all m u r ~ e r s and other crimes c o m ~ ~ t t e ~ within the

town of Calcutta and factory of Fort ~ ~ l l i a m , and the limits thereof, and the

factories subord~nate thereto ; and also extends to all murders and crimes committed

in Bengal, Bahar, and Orissa, by any British subject, or any other person in the

1 service of the East India Company or of any British subject. By the Act, 39th

and 40th Geo. III., c. 79, sec. 20, the limit of Bengal, Bahar, and Orissa was extended

to Benares, and to all such ~ ~ s t ~ ~ c t s as should t ~ e r e a ~ r be made sub~ect o the

Presidency of F o r t Williarn. By the Act, 26th Gea. III., c. 57, sec. 29, all the

~ r v a n t ~ of the East India Company, and all other British subjects resident in India,

were made subject to the j u ~ ~ s d ~ c t ~ o n of the Supreme Court for all murders and

other crimes comIi~itted in any parts of Asia, Africa, or America, beyond the Cape

of Good Hope to the Straits of ~ a g e ~ l a n , within the limits of the exclusive trade of

the East India Company.

By the 56th section of the Act, 9th G ~ Q . IB., c. 7.1, it was enaeted, “ That where

any person, being feI5xi~ously str~cken, p~isoned, or otherw~se hurt, at any place

whatsoever, either upon land or a t sw, within the limits of the ~ i ~ a r t e r of the said

United ~ompany , shall die of Such stroke, po~soning, or hurt, at any place without

those limits ; or, being feloniously stricken, poisoned, or otherwise hurt, a t any

[74] place whatsoever d thou t those limits, either upon land or at sea, shall die of

such stroke, p o ~ ~ n i n g , or hurt, at any place within the limit6 aforesaid, every

The Supreme Court at Calcutta has no jurisd~ction under the 9th Gea, IV.,

* Present: The Right Hon. Lord ~ e n s l ~ y d ~ e ~ the Right Hon. T. P e ~ b e ~ t o n

f~eigh, the Right Hon. Sir Edward Ryan, and the Right Hon. Sir ~ i l l i a m If. Maule.

(a) By the Charter of Justice, dated the 26th of ~ a ~ h , 1774, sec. xxxiii., creating

the Supreme Court at Ca~cutta, that Court, in criminal suits, has sole power and

~uthori ty to allow or deny & p p ~ a ~ ~ tcE the Queen in Council. See The Qme* V,

~ ~ ~ ~ j ~ e ~ ~ ~ ~ j e (3 Moore’s Ind. App. Cases, 468); The Q~~ v. All00 P w m

(ib. 488).

33.1

VI1 MiOORE INI). APP.. 76 NGA ROONG ‘U. REG, [18 5 73

offence committed in respect of any such case, whether the same shall amount to

the offence of murder or of manslaughter, or of being accessory before or after the

fact> to murder or ~ a n s l a u g h ~ r , may be dealt with, inquired of, tried, determined

and punished, by any of His Majesty’s Courts of Justice within the British terri-

tories under the Government of the said United Comptmy, in the same manner in

all respects as if such offence- had been wholly committed within the ~urisdiction of

the Court Pvithin the jurisdiction of whioh such, offender shall be apprehended or

be in cust>ody” (t).

At the Criminal Sessions holden before the Supreme Courh on the 4th of

February, 1857, an indictment against the Appellants was presented to the grand

jury, the seventh count of which was as follows:--“The jurors of our Lady the

Queen, upon their oath, further 1751 present, that Nga Hoong, Nga Dzeen, Nga

Thoon, Nga Tzeen, and Nga Than Keh, on the first day of November, in the year of

Our Lord, 1855, being natives and i n h ~ b ~ t a n t s of the parts of India within the

dominions of our Lady the Queen, and as such being persons owing allegianee to

and under the peace and subjects of our Lady the Queen, and who now are in custody

in Calcutta, within the local jurisdic~ion of this Honourable Court, did within the

limits of the charter of the East India Company (to wit, at a certain Island in the

Bay of Bengal, in Asia, called Wah Gyoon), feloniously, wilfully, and of their

lualice aforethouglit, kill and murder a male native of the parts of India within

the dominions of our said Lady the Queen, ivhose name is to the jurors unknown.”

A true Bill was found by the grand jury against all the Appellants; and on the

7th of February, 1857, they were brought to trial in the Supreme Court, before the

Chief Justice, Sir Jaroes William Colvile. A t the trial the Appellants pleaded ‘‘ Not

guilty”; and the Counsel for the ~4ppellants objected and contended that the Court

had no jurisdiction to try the case, and that the Appellants were not subject to the

criminal jurisdiction of the Court.

The question as to the jurisdiction was reserved by the Chief Justice for the

decision of the full Court upon further argument. The jury found a verdict, as to

d l the Appellants, of “ Guilty ” upon the seventh, and three other counts not material

to the question a t issue.

The question of j~~r i sd i c t io~ i was argued, on the 12th of February, 1857, before

the full Court consisting of the Chief Justice and Hr. Justice Buller, and

Mr. E761 Justice Jackson, and the ~udgment of the Court was pronounced on the 17th

of the same month. The Chief Justice delivered the opinion of himself and Mr. JUS-

tice Buller, that the Court had jurisdiction. Mr. Justice Jackson was of opinion that

the Court had no jurisdiction.

The judement of the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Buller was in these terms :-

‘‘ The following are the considerations upon which we think that the Court has juris-

diction to try and determine this case : The 56th section of the 9th Geo. IT., c. 74, is

unlimited as to persons. It must necessarily receive that reasonable limitation

which applies to every penal enactment, namely, that it cannot be %ken to afFect

any person who does not owe a permanent or temporary allegiance to the Crown,

But, there i a nothing in ita terms which rwtricb its operation, whether within or

without the Queen’s dominions, to one class of Her Majesty’s subjecta; it compre-

hends every case of criminal homicide in which the person killed dies within the

( a ) Shortly before the passing of this Act, the 9th Geo. IV., cap. 31, ConsoIidat~ng

and amending the Criminal law in England, was passed, the 8th section of which

provided, ‘‘ That where any person, being feloniously stricken, poisoned, or other-

wise hurt, upon the sea, or a t any place out of England, bhall die of such stroke,

poisoning, or hurt, in England; or, being feloniously stricken, ppisoned, or other-

wise h u r t , a t any place in England, shall die of such stroke, poisoning, or hurt,, upon

the sea, or at any place out of England, every offence committed in respect of any

such case, whether the same shall amount to the offence of murder o r of mans laugh~r ,

or of being accessory before the fact to murder, or after the fact to murder or man-

slaughter, may be dealt with, inquired of, tried, determined, and punished, in the

county or place in England in which such deat,h, stroke, poisoning, or hurt, shall

happen, in the same manner in all respect8 as if such offence had been wholly

committed in that county or place.”

238

-~

NGA HOONG U. REG. f1857-j vu XOORE IND. APP., 77

wide limits of the Company’s charter, and in which the offender is in custody within

the jurisdiction which we understand to be the ordinary jurisdiction of the Court.

It contempla t~ two classes of such cases, one in whicli the mortal injury is inflicted

beyond the limits of the Company’s charter, and the other in which the whole

offence i s completed within those limits. The words, therefore, of this enactment,

if construed literally, unquestionably comprehend the present case. There is no

general rule of law which militates against that construction. The jurisdictiorl

over offences committed beyond the territories of the East India Company, and

within these wide geographical limits, is undoubtedly of an excep-[77]-tional char-

acter, but it is beyond dispute %hat Parliament has granted it over British subjects,

and that in respect not only of these heinous offences against the person, but of

many other offences, by the 26th Geo. III., c. 57, s. 29. There can be IIO doubt

that the object of that enactment was to provide for the punishment in India, of

offences committed by British subjects within those geographical limits, which, i f

not altogether dispunishable by any British Tribunal, could only be tried in

England under such Statutes as the 33rd Ben. TTIII., c. 23, the 57th Geo. 111.’ c. 53,

or now by the 9th Geo. IT., e. 31, s. 7. Even as regards offences which could be tried

in England, it was obviously expedient to provide some Tribunal, with power to t ry

such off enders in the country of their residence, and in one presumably less distant

than England from the place in which the offence was committed. The same

reasons would apply to those offences committed by native subjects of the Crown

which by reason of their locality would not fall within the ordinary jurisdiction of

either the Crown or the Company’s Courts, and there is, therefore, no antecedent

improbability in the hypothesis, that the section under consideration was designed

to give to the Crown Courts such a jurisdiction over offences touching life {to which

the extraordinary jurisdiction created by several of the English Statutes is limited),

when committed by natives. But it has been contended that other parts of the

Statute in question, as well as particular expressions in the section itself, afford

strong arguments against the construction which the Counsel for the Crown would

put upon it. It is said that the preamble tends to show that there was no intention

to confer upon any E781 of the Crown Courts in India a new ~ur i~dic t ion , or to do

more than introduce here some of those amer~dme~ts in the administratios~ of the

criniinal law which had been effected at home by the 9th Geo. IT., c. 31, and other

Statutes. It is said, in particular, that the real object and intention of the 56th

section of the Indian Statute, were to do no more than was done by the 8th section of

the English Statute, and a further objection to the construction contended for by

the Counsel for the Crown, which, when 1 first considered the subject, struck me as

plausible, is drawn from the provision in the first section, which says, that the Act

shall extend to all persons over whom the criminal jurisdiction of the Crown Courts

does or shall hereafter extend, whence it is argued that the general provisions of

the Act are not to be taken to apply to natives, who are not subject to the ordinary

criminal jurisdiction of the Court. The answer to the first objection seems to be;

that, in whatever degree the passing of the Indian Statute was prompted by the

contemporaneous amendments in the criminal law of England, that Statute does

unquestionably in several instances give to the Crown Courts a new and extended

jurisd~ction, and confer upon them the power of trying natives, who would no!,

otherwise be triable there. The 7th and 8th sections relating to accessariep, tb!

70th section relating to the offence of bigamy, the 109th section relating to re-

ceivers of stolen property, afford instances of this. Nor can it be said that the

jurisdiction supposed to be given, waR wholly unconnected with the recent amend-

ments of the criminal law of England ; on the contrary, the argument of the Crown

Counsel assumes, that the intention was to make some kind of provision in India

[79] for the trial of that kind of offence, which was the subject of the 7th section of

the 9th Geo. IV., e. 31. That enactment co~solidated and amended the English

law relating to the trial of murder and mansla~ghter committed out of England,

and if a similar jurisdiction Kas to be given to the Courts here, their circumstances

required some modification of the machinery by means of which it was to be exer-

cised. Again, it is clear that whatever the 56th section of the Indian Statute means,

it means something different from, if not something more than, the introduction

into India of the 8th section of the English Statute. The latter section seeks merely

’239

VXI XOORE fND. APP., 80 NGA HOONG e. REC. [[1857]

to provide for the cases in which the deceased being stricken in England dies abroad,

or, being stricken abroad, dies in ~ n g l a n d ; and it does so by enacting, that in

either case the trial niay be had in that country in which either the death or

stroke happened, as if the offence had been wholly committed in that place. But the

56th section of the Indian Statute does not merely contemplate a stroke without, and

a death within, certain limits, or vice versa; it seems to contemplate also offences

wholly committed within the limits defined (the words are, ‘ OF being feloniously

stricken, poisoncd, or otherwise hurt, at any place whatsoever, either upon land,

or a t sea, shall die of such stroke, poisoning, or hurt, a t any place within the limits

aforesaid ’), and it provides for the trial of the offenders, not hy any Court within

the limits of whose ordinary jurisdiction either the stroke or the death has happened,

but by any of the Crown Courts within whose ordinary jurisdiction the offender may

Ite appre~~ended or be in custody. And as Mr. Advocat~General has shown by

several of the cases put by him, it i s quite consistent with this [80] section, that the

offender should be tried by a Court within whose jurisdiction neither stroke nor

death has happened ; or by one within whose ~ u r ~ s d i c t ~ o n b th or either of those

events has happened. The word ‘ wholly ’ which has been contrasted with the word

‘ actually ’ in the 70th section, is not inappropriate, because the section does embrace

some c a m in which the stroke may have been given beyond, and the death may have

taken place within, certain limits. In some of the other cases which are embraced

by this section, it would not be strictly appropriate; but we cannot, from the use of

it, infer that the object of the section was merely to incorporate into the Indian Act I.

a provision analogous to those of the 8th section of the English Statute. On the

contrary, we think that it was intended to answer the double purpose of

introducing provisions analogous to those of the 7th as well as to those of the 8th

section of the EngIish Act; and to provide the means of trying, by any of the

Crown Courts within whose ordinary jurisdiction be might be found, a person

guilty of inurder or mandaughter, whether his offence had been wholly or

only partially committed within the limits of the Company’s charter. I t may

possibly be argued that in that member of the section which contemplate^ a crime

c o ~ ~ p ~ e t e d within the limits of the Company’s charter, the Legislature may have had

in view cases in which the stroke might be given at sea, and the death happen on

the land, or w k e uersa, within these finiits ; but surely, if that were the ~ ~ ~ ~ e ~ ~ t i o n , it

would have been easy to express it8 by words iniport~ng either contingeI~cy; the

words used are applicable to either case, but they equally include every case of

murder or manslaughter, in which the party [SI] injured dies within the limits

of the charter. Nor do we think that the first section of the Statute really affords

any intrinsic reason for excluding from the operation of this section the native

subjects of the Crown. That clause at most declared that the operation of the

Statute should be confined to the place& and persons over whom or which the criminal

jurisdict~on of the Crown Courts did o r should thereafter extend. This would of

course exclude those who owed neither permanent nor temporary allegiance to the.

Crown ; it would also exclude such native subjects as might commit offences beyond

the local and ordinary limits of the jurisd~ction of those Courts ; but it would include

British subject^ c o ~ i t t ~ n g offences within the limits of the Company’s charter or

any of the narrower limits within which, by Statutes, other than the 26th Geo. III.,

c. 57, jur~sdiction has been given over that class of persons, and it would also ~nclude

natives who either: by reason of the commission of the offence within the Presidency

towns or upon any special ground might be amenable to the jurisdiction of the

Court, and such a special jurisdiction aver natives might, notwithstanding that

clause, be given by the subsequent provisions of the Statute itself. We find i t

un~ues t ionab l~ given by the 70th section, given also as they are generally under-

stood, by the 7th, 8th and 109th sections, why then should it not be given by the

56th section? Again, this section either applies to the native and East Indian

suhjects of the Crown or it does not. If it does not, what becomes of the ass~imption

that, the intention was to introduce a provision analogous to that of the 8th section

of thc English Statute$ Why should such a proTision be confined to British sub-

jects? We [82] learn from the c o m m e n ~ on this Statute contained in the charge of

Nr. Justice Ryan to the grand jury, that in a case tried not long before in this

Court, one Anthony had escaped from justice, because the murdered man having

been stricken in the town of Calcutta had died in the Twenty-four Pergunnahs ; that

240

NGA HOONC ‘U. REG. [1857] VI1 POORE IND. UP., 83

that case had been brought to the knowledge of the advisers of the Crown, and

that in the opinion of the learned Judge that defect ih the law was remedied by this

very clause of the Act. It is quite clear that had Anthony been proved to be a

British subject, the difficulty in that. case could not have arisen. Therefore, i t

cannot but be supposed that in so f a r as this section was designed to remedy that

defect in the law, it was intended to apply to natives, as well as to British subjects.

And, if i t were intended to apply to the former, we cannot see by what rule of

construction the words of the enactment are to be expanded or narrowed according to

the character or status of the person to whom they are applied. It cannot be said

that the first section or any other part of the Statute makes the applicability of the

56th section depend upon the circumstance of the person being subject to the general

jurisdiction of the Court; for the criminal jurisdiction of the Court is never ex-

clusively determined by the charter or status of the person. The local limits of

that jurisdiction may be wider in the case of British subjects, and narromer in the

ca3e of natives; but in either case its existence is drterminec! by :he locality of thc

offence. A native who has never slept a night in Calcutta, who comniits an offence

in Calcutta, can only be tried here. If one whose domicile is unquestionably in

Calcutta, who has never slept a night out of Calcutta, walks beyond the ditch and

1831 commits a larceny in the Twenty-four Pergunnahs, he cannot be tried here.

Therefore, to make this section applicable to natives in those cases only in which

the offence has been partially committed in Calcutta, you must re-write every

clause, I had almost said every word of it. If the intention had been merely to pro-

vide for the trial by the Court, of casea of murder and manslaughter when the

offence was partly but not wholly committed within its jurisdiction, it would have

been easy to express by apt words such a n intention with reference to both natives

and British subjects. It is more reasonable to suppose that the Legislature omitted

to do SO, because, by this section i t had provided generally for the trial and punish-

ment of every case of murder and manslaughter, committed wholly or partially

within the broad limits of the Company’s charter, either by native or British subjects

in the Crown Court within whose jurisdiction the offender should be in custody.

It did not express the smaller because it was included in the larger proposition : ill

fine, we think that the clause must apply to natives to some extent, since otherwise

there would be no law for such cases as that of Anthony. We think it cannot, as

against natives, be limited to cases in which some part of the offence has been com-

mitted within the local limits of the jurisdiction of the Court, both because the

Court is empowered to try in any of the Crown Courts within whose jurisdiction

the prisoners may have been apprehended or be in custody; and also, because the

application of the clause cannot be so narrowed without doing great violence to its

language; and lastly, we think that a construction which makes it a necessary

condition to the application of the clause, that the stroke should be given in

[a41 one place, and the death happen in another, is neither necessary nor reason-

able. I n such a case as this it would have given the Court jurisdiction over these

prisoners, if the man killed had been wounded on the smaller and had died on the

larger Island, whilst it denies the jurisdiction of the Court over them, because the man

killed died on the spot on which he was wounded. Another argument against the

jurisdiction that has been suggested is, that any construction of the 56th section

which supports it against these prisoners, must also give to this Court, in every

case of murder, or manslaughter, committed in the Mofussil, a jurisdiction con-

current with that of the Company’s Courts. The word used is, however, ‘ may,’ not

‘shall,’ the jurisdiction is a t most concurrent with that of the local Courts, and

though this consequence may not have been foreseen by the framers of the Statute,

and might lead to practical inconvenience, it cannot control the construction of the

enactment. It is further to be observed that the existence of the jurisdiction depends

upon a further circumstance which can rarely happen, and can never be created in

order to oust the jurisdiction of a Company’s Court, namely, that the prisoner must

be apprehended or be in-custody within the local limits of the Crown Court’s juris-

diction. Upon the whole, then, we are of opinion that this Court, as a Court of

oyer and terminer and general gaol delivery, had power to t ry the prisoners for the

felony of which they stand convicted on the seventh count of the second indictment.

In coming to this conclusion we have not been influenced, and we ought not to be

241

*

influenced, by the consideration, that, if we decide otherwise, great crimes, and in

this and perhaps in other [s] like instances, would either go ~ n p u n ~ s h e d , or be

left to such uncertain remedy as proceedings in ~ n g ~ a n d might afford, But, if we

ought not to ’be astute in seeking for jur isdi~t~on, so neither ought we to be astute-

in evading a jurisdiction, which, upoii the best consideration which we can give to

this d ~ ~ c u ~ t and novel ~ u e s t ~ o n . we think has been conferred upon us. We would

not unduly strain the Statute, either to avoid or to cause a failure of justice; we

have tried fairly to interpret it, and the result is, that we think this conviction

can be supported. Having come to this conc~usion, we have considered anxiously

what course i t is the duty of the Court to follow, and in this X believe we are all

agreed. m e crime of which these men have been convicted is of the deepest dye,

It involves nut merely the murder charged in the ~ndictment, but nine others. In

such a case, but for this question of jurisdiction, we should unquest~onably have

deemed i t our duty, however painful, to let the law take its course against some, if

not all, of the prisoners, But to inflict capita1 pun~shment, if there is the slightest

doubt of our jurisdiction, is a serious respons~b~lity. On the other hand i t would

be objectiona~le to allow great criminals to escape with inadequa~e p u n ~ s h ~ e n t ~

because on the trial a question of this kind had been raised and determ~ned against

them ; though with that u n c e ~ a i n t y which necessarily attaches to the decision

of any Court but one of ultimate resort. In the present case the Court is not unani-

mous, and that affords a strong additional reason for the course which we intend

to pursue. But had we been unanimous, we should have felt that, t h k is the first

decision on the section in question; and that the practice of the Court, whenever i t

has [86] tried a case of homicide c o ~ ~ ~ t t e d in the Mofussil, has been to require

proof that the accused is a British subject in the strict sense of the term; and SO

far affords an a r ~ ~ r n ~ n t against the construct~on which two of us have to-day

ado~~ted. If these unhappy men had the means of appearing by legal advisers

regularly ~nstructed, and had petit~oned for leave to appeal against our ~ u d ~ ~ ~ i e n t ,

we should not on these c~rcumstances have refused to allow their appeal. It i s in

every way desirable, as regards the public, that this question of jurisdiction should

bo author~ta t ive l~ settled. What we propose to do, therefore, is to pass sentence on

them now upon the second indictment ; but to suspend the execution of that sentence

until the Queen’s pleasure can be known. We shall, whether there ix a regular

appeal or not, send home the proc~dings, and endeavour to obtain, in the ~ a ~ i i e ~

which may be thought most satisfactory, an authoritative decision, which will both

determine the propriety of this conviction, and set at rest the question on which itq

legality depends.”

The other Judge, Sir Charles Sackson, delivered his judgment as folIows :-‘‘ As

1 take a view somewhat different from the rest of the Court upon the question of

jurisdiceion under the Statute, 9th Geu. IV., e. 74, I think it as well to express that

opin~on shortly. It appears from the preamble of that Act, that it was passed with

the view of introduc~ng some of the alterations of the criminal law contained in the

English Act, 9th Geo. IV., c. 31 ; and clause 56 of the 9th Geo. IV., c. 74, appears tu

be the one which was intended as an introduction, to some exient at least, o f section

8 of the E n ~ l ~ s h Act into this country. This i s adm~tted by the Counsel for the

Crown, who contend, however, [87] that the 56th section was intended as an intro-

dnction of the 7th section of the english act, as well as the 8th-an a r g u ~ e n t o

which I shall hereafter advert. The general intention of section 8 of the Engl~sh

Act, was to provide for cases of murder or manslavghter where the blow was struck

up011 the sea, or at any place o u t of England, and the death occurred in England,

or where the blow was struck a t any place in England, and the death occurred out

of Eagland. The words of the 56th section of the indian act are certainly different.

At first it provides for the case of a person struck a t any place on land or sea within

the Emits of the Company’s charter and dying without those limits. So far this

section r~sembies the second state of c i r c u ~ ~ a n c e s referred to in section 8 of the

English Act; hut, instead of proceeding with a provision for the ease of a person

struck a t any place without the Emits, and dying within those limits, the phraseo~og~

i s changed, and the section runs thus: or being feloniously stricken,’ etc., a t any

* place whatsoever either upon iaxid or sea shall die of such stroke,’ etc., at any

place within the limitx aforesaid.’ The section then proceeds to give ~ u r i s d ~ e t ~ o n t

242

NGA HOONG ‘U. REG. [ 18571 VI1 MOORE IND. APP., 88

the Court to t r y and punish all such cases, ‘ as if such offence had been wholly com-

mitted within the jurisdiction of the Court within the jurisdiction of

which such offender shall be apprehended or be in custody.’ It is not

diecult to account for the language being different in the English

and Indian Acts. If the Indian Act had merely provided for cases

where the blow was struck without the limits of the Company’s charter, and

the death occurred within, there would have been many cases of murder and man-

slaughter, in which the blow was struck in one [a] jurisdiction and the death

ensued in another, which would be excluded from the operation of the section. The

framer of the Act, if he glanced a t the map, would see that he had not to deal with

limits consisting of a coinpact territory under one jurisdiction like England, but

with limits including a large portion of the surface of the globe, with many in-

dependent jurisdictions, native and foreign, within them, and he would be anxious

to provide for cases where the offence was committed in one of these jurisdictions

within the limits of the Company’s charter, and consummated in another, also

within the same limits, as well as for offences committed without the limits, and

consummated within them. As instances, suppose two Lascars, natives of India,

but not inhabitants of Calcutta, were on shore a t Madagascar, or at the Isle of

Bourbon, and one of thcni inflicted a mortal wound on the other ; that both natives

then embarked, and the wounded man died a t sea, and the slayer was afterwards

arrested in Calcutta ; or suppose the case of two native subjects, quarrelling on the

road from Lucknow (in the thec Kingdom of Oude) to Cawnpore, and that one of

them received a mortal wound from the other, and afterwards both crossed the river

to Cawnpore, where the wounded man died. Numerous other cases might be put,

in which the blow would be given within one jurisdiction and the death would take

place in another, and yet both jurisdictions would be within the geographical limits

of the Company’s charter, and it is, I think, more probable that the phraseology was

changed to meet such cases as these, which are similar in their nature t o those

provided for in section 8 of the English Act, than that it was altered with a view of

giving this Court concurrent jurisdiction with [89] the Mofussil Courts in all cases

of homicide ccmmitted in the Mofussil, when the prisoner is in custody in the

Fresidrncy town. I see no ground for supposing that the words were altered with

the view of embodying into this section the 7th section of the english act, as well

as section 8; for section 7 of Lhe English Act deals with an entirely different matter

to that contemplated in section 56 of the Indian Act, inasmuch as section 7 applies

exclusively to cases where the whole offence is committed out of England, whereas

section 56 applies to cases committed partly within and partly without, or wholly

within, the limits of the Company’s charter, and does not in any aspect contemplate

a case of murder wholly without those limits. We have next to consider the effect

of the words as they stand in this section 56. It first provides for cases of murder,

etc., where the blow is struck within the limits and the death occurs without, and i t

then proceeds-‘ or being feloniously stricken,’ etc., ‘ a t any place whatsoever, either

upon land or a t sea, shall die of such stroke,’ etc., ‘ at any place within the limits

aforesaid.’ I concede a t once that this language gives the Court jurisdiction when

the blow is struck without the limits of the Company’s charter, and death ensues

within those limits, and also in cases where the blow is struck in one jurisdiction or

place within the limits of the Company’s charter, and death ensues in another juris-

diction or place within those limits. I think the clause was expressly framed to meet

such cases, but I doubt whether the section was ever intended to apply to a case of

murder or manslaughter where the offence was completed, that is, where the blow

was struck and the death ensued a t one and the same place within the [go] limits

of the Company’s charter. It is t rue that the words ‘being stricken a t any place

whatsoever,’ and the words ‘ shall die of such stroke a t any place within the limits

aforesaid,’ if taken literally, admit of the construction that the blow may be struck

and the death ensue in one place, if within the limits ; but I nevertheless doubt the

propriety of such a ccnstruction. The whole section must be taken together, and the

general intent of the provision, and the other words contained in it, must also be

considered. I think that the whole section is framed diverso imtuitu, and solely with

the view of providing for certain exceptional cases where the blow is struck in one

jurisdiction and the death ensues in another ; and, if I am right in my premises, that

this section is merely an adaptation of the 8th section of the English Act, that section

343

VI1 NOORE IND. APP., 91 NGA EIOOXG 9. REG. [I 85’71

supports niy view, inasmuch as it does not contemplate the blow and the deilth

occurring a t the same place, but is expressly fra,med with the view of meeting the

difficulty of cases where the bIow is struck in one place, and the death ensues in

another. I also think that the word ‘ wholly,’ which is found towards the end of this

section, is unnecessary and inappropr~ate to the case of a murder committed in one

place, and that it, therefore, throws a doubt on construction insisted upon by the

Crown. The passage in which it atands, runs thus: ‘may be dealt with, inquired of,

tried, determined, and punished by any of His Majesty’s Courts,’ etc., ‘ in the same

manner in all respects as if such offence had been wholly committed within the juris-

diction of the Court within the jurisdiction of which such offender shall be appre-

hended or be in custody.’ The section here again reverts to the language of section

8 of the [Sl] English Act, which also contains this word ‘ wholly,’ ‘ wholly committed

in that coucty,’ and it seems clear that the jurisdiction here spoken of is that juris-

diction which we exercise within our local limits, and in which the prisoner is in

custody. Bearing this in mind, the word ‘ wholly’ would be most appropriately

used if applied simply to the case of an offence commenced or consummated partly

within the local jurisdiction. Still that expression would not be inappropriate, if

applied to oAeences consisting of two parts, respectively committed in different juris-

dictions without the local limits. But the word ‘ wholly ’ is both inappropriate aiid

unnecessary if applied to the case of a murder committed in one place within the

Company’s charter, though without the local jurisdiction; for in such. a case, there

is no question whether it was committed wholly or in part in any particular place,

and it would have been sufficient in such a ca8e to say ‘ as if such offence had been

committed within the jurisdiction of the Court,’ omitting the word ‘ wholly ’

altogether. And if it were the intention of the draughtsman to include offences

committed in one place, he might have added the words ‘ or actually,’ words which

he could appropriately use in the 70th section of this Act, in which case the words

might be read d~str~butively, and the word ‘ actually ’ applied to cases where the

offence was c ~ ~ ~ ~ i t t e d in one place. If this 56th section was framed, as the

Counsel for the Crown insist, with a view of giving this Court jurisdiction in all

cases of murder and manslaughter occurring within the limits, one would not expect

to find so important a jurisdiction, one that gives us concurrent jurisdiction with

the ~ o f u s s ~ ~ Courts ih all cases of murder and ansl slaughter occurring in the Mofua-

fQ2]-sil, when the offender is in custody in the Presidency town, to be thus incidently

and obscurely given in a section which has for its main object, at least, a provision

for cases where the blow is given in one jurisdiction, and the death ensues in another.

It is hardly possible to conceive, that, if it were the intention of the Legislature ta

give us so important a concurrent jurisdiction, it would have remained undiscovered

and unknown until this argument; for if the a rgu~ ien t for the crown be correct,

this Court has been in error for the last twenty-eight years, inasmuch as it has

always, during that period, required proof in all cases of murder and mandaughter

committed in the Mofussil, that the offender was a British subject. On the whole,

then, I have great doubts whether this section applics to a case where the murder

was committed at one place within the limits of the Company’s charter. I am

inclined to think that the section was framed diverscl i&zs.itu, with the intention of

giving this Court jurisdiction in a few exceptional cases, where the blow occurs in

one place and the death in another, and the person is in custody a t the Presidency

town, and that it is very d i ~ c ~ i l t to extract out of these obscure words, an entirely

new range of jurisdiction, whicii no other Statute, authority, or practice, has ever

treated as exitking. I am glad, therefore, that tho c’ourse about to be adopted by

the Court n7ill set at rest all doubts on this question before the execution of the

sentence.”

The majority of the Court being of opinion that the Court had jurisd~ct~oI;,

judgment of death was recorded against the Ap~3ellants on the seventh count : but

execution of the sentence was respited.

The Appellants having obtained Ieare of the Su-tS33preme Court to appeal

from this judgment to Her Majesty in Council, the same now caiiie on for hearing.

Mr. ~ ~ g r a ~ 1 , Q.C., Hr. Forsyth, Q.C., and ?T, PI. Melvill, for the Appellants.--

The Supreme Court a t Calcutta had no jurisdiction to t ry this indictment, as the

Appellants were not subject to the criminal iurisdiction of that Court, or liable to

244

NGB HOOXG ‘U. BEG. [I8571 VI1 ~ 0 0 ~ ~ Em. APP, BQ

be tried before i t fur the offence with which they were charged. That Court was

created by the Act, 13th Geo. III., c, 63, sec. 13, which enabled the Crown to erect a

Supreme Court with civil and criminal jurisd~ction ; and by the Charter of Justice,

dated 26th of Xarch, 1774, founded upon this Statute, the Supreme Court at

C ~ ~ c u t t a w s e s ~ b l ~ s h e d , with a cr~minal jur~sd~ct ion e ~ t e n d ~ n g to all murders and

other crimes c o ~ n ~ i t t e d withjn the town of Calcutta, in Bengal, Bahar and Orissa,

by any British fiubject, or any other person in the service of the East India Company.

The term “ British subject ” did not include native subjects, but only Europeans ;

it being intended to exempt Britisli subjects from the Mofussil ~urisdiction. Statute,

39th and -20th Geo. E X . , c. 79, sec. 20, exte~~ded the limits to Benares. The Statute,

26th Geo. III., c. 57, sec. 20, made all the servalits of the East India Company resident

in India amenable to the jurisdiction a€ the Supreme Court for all murders or other

crimes within the liniits of the trade of the East India Co~iIpany. The p r i n c i p ~ e ~

of these e n ~ c t m e ~ ~ t s were fully considered in their app~ jca t~on to the Supreme Courts

at Madras and Bombay in the cases of ~ a ~ ~ ~ i Ci&y v. R a ~ ~ u ~ ~ ~ (I Strange’s

Mad. Cases, 152), and I?& /7: TRe JwtiCes of the S u p m m Gkwt of ~ ~ ~ ~ a ~ ~ e [$@I

a$ ~~~~ (1 Knapp’s P.C. Cases, 1). Under the provisions of these Statutes the

c r i ~ ~ i n a l jurisdiction of the Supreme Court has always practical~y been treated as

applying only to crimes co~ini t ted w~thin the residency town of Ca~cutta, and its

€actories, and to crimes committed by the British subjects of the Crown within the

mercantile limits of the C o m ~ a n ~ ’ s charter, or over natives, for crimes con~mitted

within the limits of the town of Calcutta. Here the COCO Isiands are not within the

town of Calcutta, and the Appe~lants are not British, but native subjects of the

Crown. This was the position in which the law stood at the time of the passing of

the Statute, 9th of G o , IV,, c. 74. Now, the object of that Statute, as it a p ~ e a r s by the

preamble, wa8 to extend to India, and to those persons who were then sub~ect o the

jur~sdiction of the S u ~ r ~ e Court before the alterations made in the criminal law

of England, the benefit of the ~ n g ~ i s h Statute, 9th Geo. IV., c. 31, sec. 8; and section

56 of Statute, 9th Geo. IV., c, 74, was framed and intended to be an adaptation of

section 8 of the Statute, 9th Geo, IT., c. 31, so as to make similar alterations in the

criminal law ad~inis tered in India, but was never intended to render any person

subject to the criminal jurisdiction of the Supreme Caurt who was not previously

subject to that ~ u r i s d i c t i ~ ~ . Certa~nly it was never intended to give the Supreme

Court a general ~ u r ~ s d i c t ~ o n over all natives in cases of murder and inansla~~ghter.

Nor even over aliens in the service of the East India Company, Rea v. ~ ~ a ~ ~ ~ ~ c ~

Jose ( ~ o ~ o n ’ ~ Rep. 218), where that Court held, that a foreigner who had c o ~ n ~ t t e d

an offence beyond the province of Bengal was not subject to the jurisd~ction of the

Supreme Court, under the Statute, [gfjl 26th Geo. III., c. 57, sec. 29. If the offence

was c o ~ i t t e d by a native subject in the town of ~a lcu t ta , the Court would have

jurisd~ction, ~ a ~ ~ ~ e e Do88 v. The K&g (1 Moore’s Ind. App. Cases, 67 ; S.C. Morton~s

&p. 222) The language of the Statute in q u e ~ i o ~ clearly shows that it wits to be

solely a ~ p l ~ c a b l e tu English subjects. Sections 2, 59, 60, 67, 69 and 97, ~ e s p ~ t ~ v e l y

contain the word “ felony.‘, Thia is a technical phrase of English law, and not in

general use, like “ m i ~ d e m e a ~ o u r ~ showing it was intended only to apply to British

subjects, It i s not to be found in the Bengal Regulations d a t i n g to the adminis-

tration of the Foujdarry, or Criminal Courts, which are in force in the Mafussif,

Ben. Regs. Dec. 3rd, 1’790; IX. of 1793 ; XII. of 1825 ; and XfI. of 1829. It follows,

therefore, that the use of the word “ felon~ously ” in the 56th sect~on implies that the

Fersons c o m ~ ~ i t i i n g the ogences to which that section refers were already under the

English jurisdiction. Again, the word “ person ” in that section cannot apply to

native subjects as contradistinguished from British subjects. If the Supreme Court

a t Calcutta had ju~isdiction over natives before the passing of this Statute, then the

word used in this section is super~uous, The first section should be ~ricorporated

with the other sections where that word occurs, and to the word “ persons ” should

be added (‘ subject to the jurisdict~on of the criminal ktw.” such a cons t ruc t~o~

make all the sections i~ t e l~~g ib le . Courts in this c o u ~ t ~ y have done so,

VaJlasce v, ~~~~~ (6 Ad. and Ell. 932), P. ~ a r ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ (1 Mee. and Wets. 101).

Again, the phrase “within the limits of the charter’2 must be taken to mean the

judicial and a d ~ i n i s t r a t ~ v e limits, not the trading limits. Section 56, under f96]

n+ioh this conviction is founded, therefore, cannot apply : the murder took place

245

VI1 BbOORE INR. UP., 97

indeed within the trading limits of the charter, but not the judicial limits. When-

ever the trading limits are ~ntended, such intention is expressly m~ntioned in the

Acts of Parliament; as in the 26th Geo, 111.) c. 57, sec. 29; 53rd Geo. III., c. 155,

sec. 2 ; 7th Geo. IV., c. 56, sec, 3 ; 9th Geo. IV., c. 73, secs. 19, 24, 54; 3rd and 4th

Will. IV., e. 52, sec. 119; 3rd and 4th Vict., e. 56, sec. 9.-[Mr. Pemberton Leigh:

In this particular case would there be any other Tribunal, than the Supreme Court,

to entertain the charge?]-The native criminal Courts, the Foujdarry and the

Nizarnut Adawlut, had jurisdiction by Ben. Regs. V. of 1809, SEC. 3 j VIII. of 1813,

sec. 2 ; I. of 1822, sec. 6 ; VIII. of 1829, sec. 3. These R~gulations were repealed by

Act of the ~ o v e ~ n ~ ~ e n t of India, No. I. of 1849, and fresh enactments made for thrtt

purpose. Another fatal objection to the eon~iction under this 56tsh section of the

9th Geo. IV., c, 74, is, that the murders were “ wholly ” committed at one place.

This secgion was intended to meet ~h case of d ~ ~ c u l t y , where the blow was struck in

one place and death took place in another, and to that extent only has the English

A&, 9th Geo. IV., e. 31, sec. 8, been introduced into India by the Act, 9th Geo. IY.,

c. 74,

The Solicitor-General (Sir Henry S. Keating), and Mr. Welsby, for the Crown.-

The whole question turns upon the proper interpret&tion of the 56th section of the

9th Gee. IV., c. 74. Our contention is, that the Supreme Court had jurisdiction to

t ry the Appellants by virtue of that section, which was passed to meet a case of

this [97) kind. It is true that in former Statutes a diatinction was made between

English and native British subjects, but we submit that no such distinction i s to be

found in the Act, 9th Geo. IV., c. 74. The preamble fully bears this out. There the

word “ extend” i s used, which clearly indicates that i t s operation is not to be con-

fined to British subjects, but on the contrary to embrace native subjects, and to en-

large the jurisdiction of the Court. The first object of the 56th section i s protection.

There is, therefore, no reason why any class of natives should be excluded from the

benefit of that protect~on. There i s nothing which can justify the Court in con-

struing this Statute so as to limit the word ‘‘ person ” to British subjects and not

60 native subjects. The words relied upon by the Appel~ant’s Counsel, ‘‘ within the

Iiniits of the charter of the said United Company; necessarily mean the geographical

or trading limit@, and such an interpretation must be so put on the Act, 9th Geo. IV.,

e. 14, as in the former Statute, 26th Geo. III., c. 57, sec. 29. The object of the charter

was to gipe the East India Company a nionopoly of trade, therefore the limits of

the charter must mean the trading limits, Where those limits are intended they

are expressly mentioned. Another ground taken by the Appellants, as an argument

against the application of this Statute to native subjects, was the use of the word

‘, f e l o n i ~ u s ~ y ~ ’ and it was contended that it was a technical word which applied only

to individuals liable to the ~ n g ~ ~ s h law: we submit, however, that the word

“ fe lonio~s ly” refers only to the nature of the crime, and not to the person who

commits it.

NGA HOONG ‘U. REG, Cl8571

The j u d g ~ ~ ~ n t ca not be sustained.

Mr. ~ i g r a m , Q.C., was heard in reply.

[98] The Bight Won Lord ~~~ens~eyda~e . -The~r T~ordships in this case have had

an opportunity of consulting the judgments in the Court of Calcutta, which are

ably and perspicuou~ly stated by the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Buller on one

side, and by Mr. Justice Jackson on tha other. They hare heard as well every argu-

ment which couId be advanced, either in favour of the conviction, or against it, at

the Bar ; and having formed their conclusion, and entertain in^ no doubt upon the

question, they think it would be improper to create any further delay for the pur-

pose of considering this caae. They are all quite satisfied that the judgment cannot

be supported, and that the conviction was wrong.

The question in this case depends entirely. upon the construct~on of the Aet, 9th

Geo. IV., c. 74, and of the 56th section of that Act, taken in conjunction with the

preamble. Now, there is nothing more clear that that, with respect to the criminal

law, the cor~str~iction is always to be strict; and putting a strict constr~ction upon

the 56th section of this Act, we have no doubt that it was not meant to apply to a case

of this kind, but that in the first place it extends only to persons who were otherwise

a ~ ~ ~ a b l e to the criminal jur~sdiction of the Court a t ~ a l c u t t ~ , who are the persons

described in the first section, and that by the language of the section in quMion, it

246

NGA HOONG 2). REG. [ 18 5 71 VII MOORE IND. UP., ss

applies only to cases in which the felony or crime has been committed, by persons

who committed that crime, partly within the jurisdiction, and partly without.

The object of the Statute, as appears by the recital, was for the purpose of apply-

ing and extending to the British territories in India the same provision as had

[99] been recently made for England with respect to offences committed in two

different places, or partially committed in one place, and accomplished in another,

which provisions had been the subject of a recent enactment in the Statute, 9th of

Geo. IV., c. 31. The preamble describes that to have been the object of the Statute;

and there can be no doubt that we must consider the preamble as a key to the con-

struction of the Statute, though it would not, of course, control every provision, for

we very often find that the subsequent provisions of a Statute extend beyond the

limits of the preamble.

The Statute goes on to say, that the object being that the “ alteration should be

extended to the British territories under the Government of the United Company

of Merchants of England trading to the East Indies,”.it is, therefore, enacted that

the Act ‘( shall extend to all persons and all places, as well on land as on the high seas,

over whom, or which, the criminal jurisdiction of any of His Majesty’s Courts of

Justice erected, or to be erected, within the British territories under the Government

of the United Company does or shall hereafter extend.” Now,that clause clearly shows

that the object of the Statute was that it should apply to such persons. The Solicitor-

General says that the word (( extend ” is not to be construed to confine it to such

persons, and that it is not to limit the jurisdiction. But the word (‘ extend ” is to be

explained by the preamble, which states the object of the Statute to be to extend the

recent enactments of the Act which is in force, to the East Indies, and the word

“ extend )) is to be read the same as if it were (( apply.”

Then we must consider whether the 56th section [loo] applies merely to those

persons, or whether, as the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Buller have stated, it ex-

tends beyond the preamble, and applies to an offence completely Committed within

the limits of the Company’s trading charter, but not within the limits of the town of

Calcutta. Now, reading that clause, we think that there is really no difficulty in

saying that the sole object of it was, that it should apply to offences partially com-

mitted in one district and completed in another. The words of the clause are, “ That

where any person being feloniously stricken, poisoned, or otherwise hurt,”-the word

“feloniously” seems to show that it was meant that a t the time when the person

gave the original stroke, he was a person capable of committing felony--“ a t any

place whatsoever, either upon the land or a t sea, within the limits of the charter of

the said United Company, shall die of such stroke, poisoning, or hurt, a t any place

without those limits; or being feloniously stricken, poisoned, or otherwise hurt, a t

any place whatsoever, either upon land or a t sea, shall die of such stroke, poisoning,

or hurt, a t any place within the limits aforesaid, every offence committed in respect

of any such case, whether the same shall amount to the offence of murder or of

manslaughter, or of being accessory before or after the fact to murder or

manslaughter, may be dealt with, inquired of, tried, determined, and punished by

any of His Majesty’s Courts of Justice within the British territories under the

Government of the said United Company, in the same manner in all respects as if

such offence had been wholly committed within the jurisdiction of the Court within

the jurisdiction of which such offender shall be apprehended or be in custody.”

[loll One question raised before us by the learned Counsel for the Appellants,

is as to the meaning of the term ‘‘ within the limits of the charter of the said United

Company.” On that point I believe their Lordships have not the slightest difficulty.

Those words are to be construed in the same way as they are used in the Statute,

26th Geo. III., c. 57, to which this Statute forms an addition. They are to be con-

strued to mean “ within the limits of the trading charter of the Company.” s o far,

therefore, as regards the place of committing the offence, this was an offence com-

mitted within those limits, and the Court had in that respect jurisdiction. But the

words of the section do not apply to entire offences, begun and completed within the

jurisdiction, but to those partly committed within, and partly without, which are

put on the same footing as if they had bpen “ wholly committed within the juris-

diction.” It is perfectly clear that the terAn “ wholly )) shows the intention of the

Legislature to be, that the section shall apply 0-9 to that description of case; and it

247

VXI xwm INR. APP., mz NGA HOONG o. RECL [1857]

cannot ,have the sense of ‘‘ actually committed )’ put upon it, 8s is contended on the

part of the Crown, without doing violence t o the words. Therefore, it appears to US,

proceeding upon the ordinary rules of the construction of penal enactments, that the

object of this section was merely to apply the improve men^ of the law, which had

lately taken place in England, to the case of persons amenable to the Court of Justice

a t Calcutta, who had partly c o ~ m i t t e d an offence in one place, which was a€terwards

completed in another J that it does not apply at all to a case of this kind, where the

persons committing the offence were not amenable to the Court of Calcutta, and

where the [102] whole offence which has been committed was within one jurisdiction.

The Court are confirmed in their opinion as to the meaning of the Statute with

respect to the persons to whom it is applicable, by the last section. It is introduced

at the end of this Statute obviously with the purpose of showing what class of persons

were liable to the provisions of this Statute; and it extends the liability of persons

to the jurisdiction of the Courts beyond what it had been before. That section

enacts, ‘‘ That all persons, whether British subjects o r others, employed by or in the

service of Ntis Majesty, shall be held subject and amenable to the criminal juris-

diction of Ris ~ a ~ e s t ~ s Courts of Justice, erected or to be erected within the British

territories under the Governm~nt of the said India Company, in the same manner

as persons empioyed by or in the service of the said United Company are now by law

subject and amenable to the said j~risdiction.” Before the Statute, British subjects,

properly designated as British subjects, that is, British-born subjects, and persons in

the service of the East India Company, were liable to the jurisdiction of the Court of

Calcutta ; persons not in the employment of the East India Company, but in the em-

ployment of His Majesty, were not so liable. This Statute extends the liability to

those who are servants of the Crown ; and that provision, finding its place in this

Act of ~ a r ~ i a ~ e n t . , raises, in their Lordsh~ps’ opinion, a strong in€erence that the

Statute vas meant to apply to no other persons than those who were liable to the

jurisdiction of the Court of Calcutta, to which the last clause makes a con-

siderable add~t~oR.

Therefore, looking at this Act of Parliament a l ~ o - ~ l ~ l - g e t h e r , their Lordships

have not any doubt what, the object of that Statute was : it was only to apply the law

which had been lately enacted i n ~ n g l a n d , as to an offence partly c o m ~ i t t e d in one

part and completed in another, to the East Indies, and not to make a new enact-

ment rendering persons liable to pun~shment for a complete offence, who would not

have been liable before. If the result of our decision should be, that these Ap~ellants

are to escape from justice, we shall regret it; but that is a matter which cannot in-

fluence our judgment. If the Mofussil Court has no jurisdiction now, by virtue of

the East India Oompany’s Regulations, to dispose of this case, they must escape

justice; but we are not, in any way, to alter or construe differently the rules of the

criminal law in consequence of the s u ~ p o ~ e d justice of a particular ease. The

rule is, that such law is to be strictly construed ; and 80 construing it, o r even with-

out that strictness, the construction of this 56th section appears to us to be such as

to require us to pronounce in favour of the Appell&nts.

.

248