REG. 21. PRICE 111853-541 -* VI11 MOORE, 203
E2031 ON APPEAL FROM THE SVPREME COURT AT CEYLON.
The QI%!EN, by HER MAJESTY’S ADVOCATE-GENERAL for CEYLON,-
dpl /e / lan t ; WILLIAM NICHOLAS PRICE, JAMES SMITH, and GEORGE
STET1.’BRT,-Reslionc2ents * [Fel). 2, 1653, and Feb. 17, 18541.
HEARD px parte.
By the 23rd clause of the Charter of Justice of Ceylon (1833), District Courts
were established with certain powers, such District Courts consisting of a
Judge and three Assessors, and, by the 36th clause of the m a r t e r , an appeal
is given froni suFh Courts to the Supreme Court in all matters of law and fact.
By Ordiiiance (for the e s t a ~ l i s h ~ ~ e l ~ t of Police Courts), No. 11, of 1843, sec. 14,
of Ceylon, the Supreme Court has f u l l power and authority to review the pro-
ceedings of the Police Courts, and, if necessary, to set aside o r correct the
same, for incompetency of the Court in respect of excess of jurisdiction, or
for gross irregularity in the proceedings, etc.
By the Ordinance, KO. 11, of 1814, see. 7, power is given to a District Judge or
I’olice Magistrate to enforce any recognizance taken before a Justice of the
I’eac >, upon proof of its forfeiture.
Held by the Judicial Committee (affirining the decision of the Supreme Court of
Ceylon), that a decision of a Police Magistrate, under sec. 7 of tlie Ordinance,
No. 11,’of 18-1-4, declaring the rerwgiiizance of sureties forfeited, in default
of itppearance of the principal party, charged criminally, was a “ proceed-
iiig ’’ within the fourteenth section of the Ordinance, No. 11, of 1843, and the
proper subject of review by the Supreme Court i8 Moo. P.C. 212:.
On the 7th of August, 1851, a
notice requiring A. to appear “ forthwith ” before the Supretrie Court at
Colombo, was issued. This notice was left on the 12th of the Pame month
i r t the last place of abode of A., who was not to be found, arid, on the 13t11,
the day after, the Court was held, and, as A. when called did iiot appear,
his rrcognizaiice was declared to b? forfeited. The sureties were then pro-
ceeded against, and the Magistrate, under sec. 7 of the Ordinance, No. 11.
of 11344, declaied that their recognizances were forfeited. The Supreme
Court on review reversed the decision. Upon appeal, the Judicial Com-
niittee sustained this decisioii, holding, that it was a ‘‘ gross irregularity ‘’
urthin tlie meaning of section 14 of Ordinaiice, No. 11, of 1843 ; for, as it
t v a b a case against sureties, it niubt be clearly shown that the conditioirb on
which their liability depended had been literally complied with, which had
iiot b e a done, as the notice was imperfect, and the proceedings under it
irregular; A. being entitled to a distinct and intellig~ble notice of the place
and time of ~ i , o l d i i ~ ~ of the Court [.U Moo. P.C. 2161.
l’lie word “ forthwith,” in a notice to a party charged criminally and out on
bail, to appear, on pain of forfeiting his recognizance, means, “within a
reasonable time from the sei vice,” rind not from the date of the notice 18 Moo.
P.C. 2131.
In the month of March, 1851, the Iityondeiit, Price, b xing charged before Joliil
i)alAiel, a Justice of [204] the Peace for thc Midlaod Circuit a t Colombo, in tlie
I laud of Ceylon, with fraud ttnd theft, in the course of his employment as Assistant
Couiinissary-Gene~al in C-,ylon, entered into a recognizance with two sureties (James
Sriiith and George Stewart, the other Respondents), hiinself ill the su111 of 21000,
a ~ i d the sureties in the sun i of &SO0 each, the conditio11 to be void if Price should
appear and answer to any iirforriiation, indictment, or sufficient cornplairit which
shoiiId be presented Zigainst him in any competent Court for the bfidlilnd Circuit,
upori receiving notice of the tirile ‘tnd place of holding such Court a t Colombo,
which place ’i? as thereby elect#,d by hirii, Price, for that purpose.
* Present : The Right Hon. Dr. Lushtrigton, the Right Hon. T. Pembertol) Leigli.
the Right Iion. Sir Edward Rpaii. and the Right Ron. Sir John Patteson.
A, was out oii bail upon a critiiinal charge.
- ___ -~ - ---_____ ~ __
78
REG. ‘U. PRICE [ 1853-541 VI11 MOORE, aoII
On the 28th of July, 1851, the above-named Justice of the Peace issued an order
for the commitment of Price, to take his t r ia l upon the above charge, before the
Supreme Court of Ceylon; and on the 7th of August, 1851, a notice was issued froiii
the Fiscal’s office a t Colombo, signed by the Deputy Fiscal, and directed to Price,
by which he was required to appear [ZOS] before the Supreme Court at Colombo
fo~.thwith, on pain of forfeit in^ his recognizance. Price was not then to be found
in Colombo, and a copy of the notice was, therefore, on the 12th of August, 1851,
aEsed a t his last place of abode In Colombo, and also on the walls of the premisis
occupied by Smith (one of the sureties) u t Colpetty, in the Island. On the 12th of
August, 1851, another notice was issued from the same office, signed by the Deputy
Fiscal, and directed to Smith and Stewart;, the sureties, whereby they were directed
to appear before the Supreme Court a t Hulfsdorp forthwith, on pain of forfeiting
their recognizance as security of Price, a copy of which notice was on the same day
personally served on them. On the 13th of August, 1851, Her Majesty’s Advocate-
General for Ceylon presented to the Supreme Court at Colombo (being a conipetent
Court for the Midland Circuit), an indictment against Price for fraud and theft,
and the officer of the Court was required to place him a t the bar ; bu t Price, after
being duly called by the officer of the Court, faifed to appear.
On the 13th of March, 1852, notices signed by the Clerk of the Police Court a t
Colunibo, were served on Smith and Stewart, requiring them to take notice that
on Tuesday then next, the 16th of March, proof of the f o ~ f e i t u r ~ of the bail-bond to
thr Queen, entered into by them and Price as aforesaid, would be taken by that
Police Court.
Accordingly, on the 16th of March, a t the Police Court at Colombo, before
John Spencer Collpeper, Esquire, Police Magistrate, the Deputy Queen’s Advocate
moved, in conformity with the Ordinance of 1844, No. 11, to prove the forfeiture of
the recognizance, the same then being in tha t Court, and for that @06] purpose
adduced evidence of the facts before set forth.
Upon that occasion, the Police Magistrate having (notwithstanding an objection
taken by the Advocate of Smith and Stewart, tha t the Police Court had no juris-
diction in the ease) heard the evidence adduced, decided, that the recognizance bad
become and was forfeited, and accordingly ordered, tha t Price should pay into
Court, on or before the 31sii of bfarch, the sum of .S lOOO, and tha t Smith aiid
Stewart should each pay into Court, on or before the same day, the sum of $500
each; tha t notice of such order should be sent to Smith and Stewart, and, in default
of payment, a warrant of distress should issue. Notice of the last-mentioned order
was given to Smith and Stewart, who thereupon applied by petition of review to
the Supreme Court, stating tha t they were aggrieved at such finding of the Police
Court, and praying, that the Supreme Court would set aside and correct the same
in review, for the following reasons: First, 6hat the Court or Magistrate bad no
jurisdiction in the subject-matter, and could not entertain the same, or declare the
recognizance forfeited. Second, that assuming tha t there was no excess of juris-
diction, the recognizance was void and contrary to law, and the Justice of the Peace
had no authority t o order or accept the same. Third, that assuming that there was
no excess of jurisdiction, and that the recogriizance was not void, there WRS 110
forfeiture thereof, the examination of Price having been unduly and unnecess~~rily
delayed, there having been no warrant of c o n ~ ~ i t m e n t or recommit~ient either
pending such examination, or after it was closed, and Price not having been daly
co~nmitted for trial, [ZOrJ and no due notice having issued to hini, or to his
sureties, of the alleged co~mi tmen t , either before or after it took place, or calling
upon him to appear and take his trial, or his sureties to surrender him for such
purpose; and not giving him, Price, or his sureties, any notice of such trial, or of
the indictment intended to be presented against him; and not giving Price due
notice of the proceedings to declare the bond forfeited ; and that all the proceed-
ings had or taken against Price, and in respect of the charge again& him, were
otherwise grossly irregular. Fourth, tha t much illegal and incompetent evidence
v a s received.
The Queen’s Advocate objected to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court io
rexriew the proceedings; but the Supreme Court reserved the matter of the petition
79
VI11 MOORE, 208 REG. $ 7 . PRICE [ 185:3-543
~ U L ' the decisioii of the Judges collectively, before whom the case came on to be
Iieard at their General SeRsions at Colombo, on the 16th of June, 1852, when the
Queen's Advocate again objected to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, contend-
ing, that it was the intention of the ~ g i s l a t u r e in the Ordinance of 1844, No.'II:
set. 7, that matters of this description should not be subject to appeal or review.
Tile Court, after c o ~ ~ s i d e r a t i o ~ (the Chief Justice d i s s e ~ ~ ~ n g ) , decided against the
an of tlie Queeti's Advocate, arid held, tha t the objection to the appellate
ction of the Court to entertain these proceedings in review was untenable.
The discussion of the case on the merits was afterwards resumed; and, on the
30th d June, 1862, the Supreme Court, by its judgment, determined that the pro-
ccvdirigs before the Police Magistrate ought to be set aside, upon the ground, that
there vias no valid or sufficient proof of the forfeiture of the recognizance, [208]
iiiasnirich as tlie notice to Price, of the time and place of holding the Court before
a iiicli he was to be tried, was insufficient ; because, being dated on the 7th, and served
0'1 the 12th of August, 1851, it required him to appear before the Court "forth-
uittr," whereby he was left in uncertainty as to what was the time specified for his
%i i'"rance.
i l s the j u r ~ s d ~ c t i o n of the Supreme Court was denied, a petition was presented
hy the Advocate-General, on behalf of the Crown, to the Judicial Committee, praying
i'm leave to appeal, which their Lordships granted (2nd Feb., 1853 *>.
1 ' 1 ~ ~ e s r ~ ~ ~ ~ d e ~ ~ t ~ did not app ar, arid the appeal was heard ez p n ~ b e .
The Attorney-General (Sir Alexander Cockburn), and Mr. N. S. Welsby, for the
C i o n i r . - In support of the appeal, i t was contended, First, that the proceedings
under the seventh section of the Ordinance, No. 11, of 1844, before the Police
trate, were not subject to be Itrouglkt by way of review o r appeal before the
me Court, or before the Judges of the Court at General Sessions, as tbe power
given to the DiGtrict Judge, or Police Magistrate, was to the District Judge or the
Police Magistrate i n his magisterial character, and not t o the Police Court, as a
Court. That this was apparent from the circumsta~ce, that the District Court,
weated by clause 23 of the Ceylon Charter of Justice, consists not, of a single
Judge only, but also of three Assessors, wliile by Ordinance, No. 11, of 1844, tbe
1hq:tYic-t Judge or Police ~ a g i s t r a t e indi~rid~ially is to [209] carry out the law J and
such aas the opinion of the Chief Justice, who dissented from the other Judges upon
this questioir of jurisdiction; the nature of the appeal provided by the Charter
being d ~ f f e r ~ I ~ t froiii the s u b j e c t ~ ~ ~ ~ t t e r of the appeal given by the ~ r d ~ ~ ~ a n c ~ , No.
i 1, of 184 3, sec. 14. Secondly, that the notice to the Defendant, Price, which directed
I:im to appear before the Court at Colombo '' forthwith," on pain of forfeiting his
riizancc", was a sufficient notice in point of law f o r tha t purpose; the legal
thereof being, a notice to appear within a reasonable time after the service
tl1ereof.
,Tudgiiient was reserved.
Sir Jolin Patteson (23rd Feb., 1854).-In this cage, a recogni~aiice m m taken
bpfore Jolw Dalziel, Justice of the Peace for the Midland Circuit, Ceylon, with a
condition, as prescribed by the Ordinance of 1843, No. 15, see. 36, in the followiag
--[His ~ o r d s l ~ i p read the r ~ o ~ n i z a n c e , and proceeded :]-This r e c o ~ ~ i z a ~ c e
1)cinp lxought before a Police Magistrate, under the 7th section of the Ordinance,
:in, 'I 1, of 1844, tr~ts decided by him CO he forfeited, and Price and his two sureties
'is ere directed to pay the moneys in which they were bound.
The sureties appealed to the Supreme Court ; which Court decided, that the
forfeiture of the recognizance had not been proved.
The first question now raised is, whether any appeal lay to the Supreme Court?
This question was also discussed in the Supreme Court, where a majority of tlie
Judges held, tha t an appeal did lie j the Chief Justice dissenting.
[glo] By the Charter of Ceylon, District Courts are established, consisting of a
Present :-The Lord Justice Knight Bruce, the Lord Justice Turner, the Right
Hon. Dr. Lushington, the Right Hon. S i r Edward Ryan, and the Eight Hon. S i r
Solin Patteeon.
80
~ _____ - I ___
REG. ‘L’, PRICE [1553-541 VI11 IOORE, 211
Judge and three Assessors, from which Courts an appeal is given to the S ~ I ~ ~ r e ~ 1 ~ c
Court as to all nratters of law and fact,.
The Police Courts were estabIished by an Ord i~ance , No. 11, of 1843, and by the
14th section of that Ordinance an appeal is given to the Supreme Court 0x1 certaiii
specified grounds. That section enacts, “ That the Supreme Court shall hare full
power and au tho r i~y to review the proceediii~s of the said Police Courts, and i f
uecessary to set aside or correct the same for incompetency of the said Police Court,
in respect of any excess of jurisdiction, or that the cause has been already tried, or
forms tire subject of a tr ial pending in sonie other competent Court, o r for incoxn-
pcterrcy of the Court in respect of the ~ a ~ ~ s t ~ a t e himself, o r that either tlie Magis-
trate or his near kinsman had a n interest in the cause, o r for malice or cor-
r u p t i o ~ ~ on the part of the Magistrate, o r for gross irregularity in the proccedi
or on account of the admission of illegal or i n c o ~ ~ ~ e t e ~ i t evidence, or of the rejectlo*.
as illegal, of legat and competent evidence. Provided always, that when any party
slrall ritalie a p ~ l i c a t ~ o n to haye any such proceedixigs reviewed by the Supreme
Court, such application shall distinctly set forth the particular facts and grounds
on which such review is applied for. And, provided further, that KLO such appltca-
tion shall have the effect of staying the execution of any sentence o r j ~ ~ c ~ ~ ~ n ~ n t
pronounced by any such Police Court.”
By the Ordina~ce , No. 11, of 1844, see. 7, power is given to a D i ~ ~ r ~ ~ ~ Jiidqe,
or Police Magistrate, to enforce any recognizance taken before a [Zll] Justice of
the Peace, upon proof of its forfeiture, This section is in these words: .‘ If 291y
recopizance or bail-bond entered into before a Justice of the Peace shall I , ex ) i i~
foifeited, it shall be lawful for any District Judge, or Police ~ ~ a g ~ s t ~ a t c l i av i l i g
jurisdietioii iu the place where such recognizance or bail-bond was elitered iiitu.
turd he is hereby required upon proof of such forfeiture, to enforce payinent of the
arnctuiit hereof, unless the same shall be made, into Court, a t a certain time to be
by hiin named for that purpose, and all the charges relating thereto, and l o dcitl
with tthe party or parties having incurred such forfeiture, in such and the same
manner as he is by this Ordinance directed, to reco’ier the amount of fiiies, penalties,
and forfeitures imposed by his own Court, and the charges relating thereto, and to
deal with the party or parties who aha11 have incurred the same.’’
The lawofficers of the Crown now contend, that this power is given to t1w
District Judge, or Police M a g ~ s t r a t ~ ~ , as ai1 ~ x ~ d ~ ~ ~ i d u a ~ , axi not as a Court, and of
this opinioii was the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.
The principal reason for this opinion Lippears to be, that the District, Court
consists not only of a Judge, but of three Assessors, who are not mentioned in this
Ordinance, and, therefore, it is inferred, that the power was intended to be giver1 to
the Judge of the District Court individually, and not to the District Court, as a
Court, and by a parity of reasoning to the Police ~ a g i s t r a t e individual~y, arid not
to the Police Court, &s a Court; and further, that the appeal from tlie District
Courts given by the Charter, and from the Police Court by the Ordinance of 18\13,
30. 11, are different in their terms and extent.
12121 Their I~ordships, however, think, t ha t these reasons arc3 not sufficient, tlritt
the power may well be given to the Judge of the District Court, apart from the
Assessors, a i d yet not ta him ~ n d i ~ i d u a ~ l ~ ~ , and separated from his e ~ i a ~ ~ c t e ~ %IS
Judge and a constituent p a r t of the Court, and they cannot distinguish tile Police
&fagistrat?, as an individual, from the Court in which he presides. And this x-iew
of the cam is s~reI~gthened by the reference made to the first section of the
Ordinance, 1844, No. 11, in which the Police Magistrate is plainly treated a q a
Court, m d which section is in a great rneahure incorporated into the sereutli
sect ion.
Their ~ o r d s l ~ i p s , therefore, are of @pinion, tha t an appeal lay in this ease 011
ariy of the grounds specified- in the 14th section of the Ordinance, No. II , of t R 4 3 ,
The next question is, whether any of those grounds mere es tab~is~ed .
It is said, tha t the recognizance itself was irregularly taken by the Justice of
the Peace, before ariy mitnesses were examiIied ; but the Court below anmered, and,
their Lor~sh ips think rightly, that the Police ~ a g i s t r a t e could not enter into that
81
VI11 IOORE, 213 REG. u. PMCE C1853-543
qwestion, but was bound to take the recogn~zarice as he found it, and inquire only
whether it was forfeited.
It is slso said, tha t the Police gistra rate exceeded his jurisdiction on account
or“ the a r ~ ~ o u n t of the recogii~ance being greater than he had power to deal with ;
but tlicir Lords~~ ips think, that there is no ground for this objection, the Ordinance
being quite general in its terms.
The real and main question is, whether the notice of the holding of the Court
at CoIornbo, left at the 12131 last place of abode of Price, ha himself not being
found, i s suflicient. The notice is dated the 7th of August, and requires Price to
appear before the Supreme Court at Colombo, “ forthwith.” It was left a t Price’s
h a t place of abode, on the 12th of August, and on the 13th, Price was called in th+
Court. but did not appear. Now, the more regular form of notice would seem to
have been, that ‘‘ the Court would be holden ” on the 13th of August, a t Colombo
{.r probably sonie specified place in Colornbo~, and tha t Price was required to appear
at that place on that day, and the question is, whether the notice actually served
(for leaving it a t the last place of abode must be considered as sufficient service), 18
equivalent to such rnme regular notice.
The word ‘‘ f o r ~ h ~ ~ ~ t h ~ when used in an Act of Parlianlent, bas been construed
t- mean “ in a reasonable time;” as soon as the party who is to perform the act
‘
fkp. G84), in an tiction against an overseer for not delivering to an ~ n ~ ~ a ~ ? i t a n t
‘‘ f o r t l ~ ~ ~ i t ~ ~ , ~ ’ on denland, a copy of a poor-rate, under the provisiol~s of the 17th
Geo. II., c. 3, s. 2. The demand there was on the 24th of October, and the copy was
not tendered till the 6th of December, but i t was held sufficient, under the circuni-
starices which had occurred. A similar construction had been put upon that Statute,
111 ,YpsrLceley v. Bobirmn (3 Bar. and Cr. 658). The same construction was put on
{fie xord “ forthwith ” in Hydc v. Wntts (1 2 Mee. and Wels. 254), on a coverisnt to
iilxiire ‘‘ forthwith.” The word (‘ forthwith ” in the present notice must, therefore,
be taken to mean ‘* so soon as you reasor~a~)ly can.’’ But, as the notice is dated the
7th of [ Z l Q August, and was not served till the 12th, the Court below Reems to have
considered, that if Price had been personally served, he might well suppose that
.‘ forth\vith ” had reference to the date of the notice (7th of August), and tha t the
time for his appearance had already expired.
Their Lordships cannot agree in this view, for it is a general and unixrersaf
rule, as to all notices, which is well understood, that they operate only from the time
of’ service, artd not from the day of the date. The t rue construction, therefore, of
the notice is, “ s o soon as you reasoiiiibly can, after service of this notice ;” and if
Price had appeared in the Court in such reasonable time, there cannot be any
dcubt but that he would have fulfilled the condition of the recognizance; or, if the
Court had arisen before the expiration of such reasonable time, and Price had corne
within such reasonable time to the place where the Court had been held, he would
not have forfeited the recognizance, though possibly i t might have been competent
for the Crown to give hiin a further notice to appear at some subsequent Court.
The real quest~on is, whether the notice of the place and time of holding the
Court i s sufficient. It is a case against sureties, with respect to whom i t must be
slt,:wn tha t the condition on -ivhich their liability depends has been literally
pc t formed.
Now, Price was entitled to notice-First, of the Court in which the indictment
wat: to he preferred. Second, of the place of holding the Court. Third, of the time
of holding it. And i t s eem very doubtful, aihether the meaning of this i s not tha t
nctice must be given before the holding of the Court.
As to the first matter, the notice states the Court [215] to be, “ t h e Supremo
Court,” and probably that is a sufficient statement,
As to the second matter, the notice states “ a t Colombo.” It is extremely doubt-
ful whether this is s u ~ c i e n t , for it does not, appear whether the Supreme Court,
considered as a Court of Midland Circuit, i s held in the same place in Colombo a8
the Supreme Court generally is; it is observable that i n the notice to the sureties
(which is not necessary, however, to give) the st,atem~nt is “ the S u ~ r e ~ e Court a t
Huifsdorp,” which is in Colombo.
A s to the third matter, nanrelv, the time of holding the Court, the notice see1124
$2
HEAL’H’S PATENT ( ILV 1iB) [ 1 8 5 31 VI11 MOORE, 216
plainly insufficient. The word “ forthwith ’’ applies not to the holding of the Court,
but to the appearance of Price. Indeed, being construed “ within a reasonable tirne,”
it cannot be applied to the holding of the Court, for, of c o ~ r s e , it cannot be meant,
that the Court was to be held within a reasonable time from the service of the notice.
Therefore, no time for holding of the Court is distinctly specified. Neither can
it be necessarily collected from the terms of the notice that the Court was actually
sitting, either a t the date of the notice, or a t the time of the service. Even suppos-
ing that i t is not necessary that the notice should be served before the holding of the
Court, Price was entitled to a distinct and intelligible notice of the time of the
holding of the Court, and we are clearly of opinion, that such notice was not given
to him.
The only remaining question is, whether the decision of the Police Magistrate,
that the recognizance was proved to have been forfeited, being a decision without
sufficient evidence, was a “ gross irregularity ” [216] within the meaning of the 14th
section of the Ordinance of 1843, No. 11, so as to give the Supreme Court jurisdic-
tion by way of review or appeal.
Their Lordships are of opinion, that i t was a (‘ gross irregularity,” within that
section. A mere erroneous decision upon a question, simply of law, would aniount
only to a mistake in judgment, but the holding a recognizance to be forfeited, when
there is no proof of such forfeiture, cannot but be considered, as a “gross ir-
regularity,” unless those words are to he restricted to mere informalities, which
we think they cannot be; and if, as is plain by the 14th section, an appeal lies in
the case of wrong reception, or rejection of evidence, much more must it have I)een
intended to lie, when there is no evidence a t all to warrant the decision.
Their Lordships will, therefore, advise Her Majesty to dismiss this appeal.
[Uews’ Dig. tit. CRIMINAL LAW, D. PROCEDURE & ~ N D PRACTICE, 111. T?TuZ, 5.
Ziecognisnnces. c. Porfezture and Dzschni.~ye; SIT. RAIL, 3. Other l’oznts; also tit.
TIME, 1. CO3IIPUT9TION OF, f . 7’ai.t icidnr i io in ’s (CY to . As to meaning of ‘( forth-
mith,” cf. Cosfeq- v. Hether ington, 1859, 1 E. and E. 82 ; R P ~ . v. Wovcpstershzre,
with,” cf. Co.star v. Hetherington, 1859, I E. and E. 802 ; Reg. v. Worcestershire,
1846, 10 Jur. 595; 8 x p r t e Lamb, 1881, 19 Ch. D. 173; and see Stroud, Jud.
DLct. S.V. “ Forthwith.”]
~2171 I n r e HEATH’S PATENT * [Feb. 1 and 8, 18531.
The circumstance of there being Eis p e d e n s , respecting the validity of the Letters
Patent, is no objection to the grant of an evtension of the original Letters
Patent.
Term of Letters Patent extended for seven years on the ground of the meritorious
nature of the invention, and the extensive litigation the Patentee had been
put to in protecting his patent rights which had prevented any remuneration
[8 Moo. P.C. 223, 2241.
Form of Order in Council, pursuant to the Statute, 15th and 16th Vict., c. 53, e.
40, directing the Lord Chancellor to make and seal new Letters Patent, upon
tile report of the Judicial Committee recommending an extension of the term,
under the provisions of the Statutes, 5th and 6th T’ict., s. S3, and 7th and 8th
T’ict., c. 69 [8 Moo. P.C. 2241.
KO accounts were kept by the deceamed Patentee of the expenditure or receipts,
on account of his Patent. Upon its appearing that his estate was of little
value (his effects being sworn for administration under $100) the Petitioner,
the administratrix of the Patentee, on the allegation that there had been no
profits, but considerable loss, to such estate, was examined to prove that
fact [8 Moo. P.C. 2221.
This was a petition by Mrs. Heath, the administratrix of the Patentee, for an
* Present: The Lord Chief Justice of the Common Pleas (Sir John Jervis), tlie
Right Hon. Dr. Lushington, the Right Hon. Sir Edward Ryan, and the Right Hon.
Sir John Patteson.
83
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