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citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
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Acts
  • Maintenance Act, 1948 (hereafter referred to as the Act), referred
  • Sub-Section 2 of S. 9
  • Maintenance Act, 1946,
  • act. section 29(3)
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Maintenance Act, 1948 (hereafter referred to as the Act), referred
  • Sub-Section 2 of S. 9
  • Maintenance Act, 1946,
  • act. section 29(3)
Smart Summary

Comprehensive Summary of the Full Bench Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The respondent (plaintiff) filed a suit on 12-4-1951 for restitution of conjugal rights against his wife, the 2nd appellant (Parameshwaramma). It was common ground that the respondent had married a second wife; the second marriage took place before 23-4-1946 (the date the Hindu Married Women’s Right to Separate Residence and Maintenance Act, 1946 became law), though the precise year for the second marriage was not disclosed. One of the defenses raised by the appellants was that because the husband had married again (prior to the Act coming into force in 1946 and prior to the Act being made applicable to Hyderabad State on 7-2-1953), he was not entitled to the decree for restitution of conjugal rights.

The District Judge of Karimnagar overruled the wife's objection without detailed discussion. On appeal, a Division Bench of the High Court observed a conflict of authority in various High Courts about the meaning of clause (4) of Section 2 of the 1946 Act ("if he marries again") and referred the specific question of interpretation to a Full Bench. The Division Bench's referral was dated 14-11-1957. The Full Bench (K. Subba Rao, C.J., Satyanarayana Raju and Ranganadham Chetty, JJ.) then considered the referred question and delivered an opinion dated 27-11-1957, followed by a final judgment allowing the appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether clause (4) of Section 2 of the Hindu Married Women's Right to Separate Residence and Maintenance Act, 1946 ("if he marries again") is applicable only if the husband contracts a second marriage after the Act came into force, or whether the words "marries again" are merely descriptive of the husband's status as a twice-married man at the date when proceedings are taken under the Act, thereby including husbands who had taken a second wife before the Act.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

  • The appellants (wife and her father) contended that clause (4) of Section 2 was declaratory in nature and had retrospective operation; the words "marries again" merely described the husband's position as a twice-married man and did not exclude husbands who had contracted a second marriage before the Act came into operation.
  • The appellants' counsel relied on the Bench decision of the Madras High Court in Nagendramma v. Ramakotayya, AIR 1954 Mad 713, and the decision of the Hyderabad High Court in Varalakshmi v. Viramuhi, AIR 1956 Hyd 75 in support of the view that pre-Act second marriages fell within clause (4).
  • The appellants also relied upon the Full Bench decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Subbarayudu v. State, (S) AIR 1955 Andhra 87, to argue that an earlier Division Bench decision of Madras pronounced before 5-7-1954 should be treated as binding on this Court even if subsequently overruled by a Madras Full Bench.

Respondent / Other Relevant Positions

  • The respondent sought restitution of conjugal rights; at the District Court the objection based on his second marriage was overruled (the District Judge stated: "He cannot be deprived of the decree merely because he has married another woman now.").
  • The Full Bench also considered intervening central legislation — the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 — which post-dated the 1946 Act and materially affected the legal position available to spouses in restitution proceedings.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For (as stated in the opinion) Application by the Court (how the opinion treated the precedent)
Nagendramma v. Ramakotayya, AIR 1954 Mad 713 Bench decision of Madras HC that clause (4) is declaratory/retrospective and "marries again" describes a twice-married husband's position. Counsel for appellants relied on this decision; the Full Bench noted that it was a Bench decision subsequently overruled by the Madras Full Bench (AIR 1956 Mad 337) and therefore deprived of authority as a precedent.
Varalakshmi v. Viramuhi, AIR 1956 Hyd 75 Hyderabad High Court decision that followed the Madras decisions (AIR 1950 Mad 321 and AIR 1954 Mad 713). Noted as having followed the Madras line of authority; cited as supporting the appellants' position but treated in the context of conflicting authorities.
Palaniswami Gounder v. Devanai Ammal (Full Bench), (S) AIR 1956 Mad 337 Full Bench of Madras: the words "if he marries again" mean "if he contracts a marriage after the Act". Identified as a Full Bench authority that deprived the earlier Madras Bench decisions of binding force; regarded as persuasive but not binding on this Court given subsequent procedural/contextual considerations.
Sidda Setty v. Muniamma, AIR 1953 Mad 712 Single-judge Madras decision (Krishnaswami Nayudu, J.) holding a view contrary to the Madras Full Bench (interpreting "marries again" more broadly). The Full Bench noted this decision and observed that as a single-judge decision it is not binding on a Division Bench of this Court, though it had been accepted by some other High Courts.
Mt. Sukhri Bai v. Pokhalsingh, AIR 1950 Nag 33 Nagpur High Court decision aligned with the view that a prior second marriage could bring the husband within clause (4). Referenced as part of the group of decisions (Nagpur and Bombay) that supported the broader interpretation of clause (4); the Full Bench noted this as part of the conflicting authorities.
Laxmibai v. Waman Rao, AIR 1953 Bom 342 Bombay High Court decision aligned with the view that a husband's earlier second marriage falls within clause (4). Cited as supporting the same view as Nagpur and as part of the conflict of authorities considered by the Division Bench and Full Bench.
Lakshmi Ammal v. Narayanaswami, AIR 1950 Mad 321 Earlier Madras decision on the interpretation of clause (4) (contrasting view). Referred to as one of the earlier Madras decisions that were later treated as overruled by the Madras Full Bench decision (AIR 1956 Mad 337).
Anjani Devi v. Krishna Chandra, AIR 1954 Orissa 117 Orissa High Court view favouring the interpretation contrary to Nagpur/Bombay in the conflict of authority. Noted as part of the body of authority that some High Courts preferred over the Nagpur/Bombay line; the Hyderabad High Court had preferred such views.
Baijnath Dharamadass v. Hiraman Ram Rasik, AIR 1951 Vindh-Pra 10 Judicial Commissioner, Vindhya Pradesh view in the conflict of authorities. Mentioned as another authority followed by some courts (including Hyderabad High Court) in preference to the Nagpur/Bombay line.
Ratan Chand v. Mt. Kalawati (S), AIR 1955 All 364 Allahabad High Court decision aligning with Nagpur/Bombay view. Noted as an authority in the group of courts favouring the broader interpretation that included pre-Act second marriages.
Subbarayudu v. State, (S) AIR 1955 Andhra 87 Full Bench of Andhra — discussed in relation to the binding effect of Madras decisions and procedure after 5-7-1954. Cited by appellants in support of procedural arguments about the binding nature of Madras decisions; the Full Bench opinion of this High Court referred to Subba Rao, C.J.'s observations in that case about when Andhra Division Benches might refer matters to Full Bench.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Full Bench proceeded in a sequence of legal steps and contextual observations:

  1. The Division Bench referred the specific interpretive question because of an admitted conflict of authority among several High Courts and because the question had significant practical consequences (a successful claim to separate residence and maintenance under the 1946 Act would preclude restitution of conjugal rights).
  2. The Full Bench summarized the competing lines of authority: (a) Madras Full Bench (AIR 1956 Mad 337) had held that the phrase "if he marries again" contemplates a future event and therefore applies only to marriages contracted after the Act; (b) other decisions (Nagpur, Bombay, and some Madras single-judge decisions) had treated the phrase more broadly to include husbands who had married again before the Act.
  3. The Full Bench observed that the Madras Full Bench decision (AIR 1956 Mad 337) was delivered after the Andhra High Court came into existence and therefore, while of great persuasive value, was not binding authority on this Court. However, the Full Bench did not ultimately decide the referred question solely by choosing between the conflicting precedents on the 1946 Act.
  4. Instead, the Full Bench found that the question as formulated did not need resolution solely by interpreting the 1946 Act because of the subsequent enactment of central legislation: the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (Act XXV of 1955), which became law on 18-5-1955.
  5. The Full Bench analyzed provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955:
    • Section 9(2) (procedure for restitution petitions) restricts what may be pleaded in answer to a petition for restitution of conjugal rights to matters which would be a ground for judicial separation or for nullity/divorce.
    • Section 13(2) expressly permits a wife to present a petition for dissolution of marriage where, in the case of marriages solemnised before the commencement of the Act, the husband had married again before such commencement (i.e., the 1955 Act contemplates that a prior second marriage may be a ground for divorce/resistance).
  6. The Full Bench concluded that under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, a wife could resist a petition for restitution of conjugal rights on the ground that the husband had married another wife before the commencement of the 1955 Act. The Full Bench observed that section 29(3) of the 1955 Act (savings provision) did not save proceedings for restitution of conjugal rights and therefore the 1955 Act operated to remove the respondent's entitlement to a decree for restitution of conjugal rights in the present case.
  7. On that basis (application of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 to the case), the Full Bench held that after the 1955 Act came into force the respondent was not entitled to the relief sought and answered the reference accordingly.

Holding and Implications

Core Holding:

The Full Bench held that, in view of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, the respondent was not entitled to a decree for restitution of conjugal rights where the husband had contracted a second marriage before the commencement of the 1955 Act. The reference was answered accordingly and the appeal was allowed.

Direct consequences and orders recorded in the opinion:

  • The appeal was allowed with costs of this Court.
  • There was no order as to costs in the Court below.
  • The Full Bench answered the referred question by applying the provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 and holding that under that Act a wife may resist a petition for restitution of conjugal rights on the ground that the husband had married again before the commencement of the 1955 Act; consequently the respondent in this case was not entitled to the decree.

Broader implications discussed in the opinion: the Full Bench relied on the later central legislation (Hindu Marriage Act, 1955) to resolve the practical effect of the dispute rather than issuing a final authoritative resolution purely on the conflicting earlier High Court precedents under the 1946 Act. The opinion does not purport to set aside or overrule all earlier case law beyond the effect that the 1955 Act had on the entitlement to restitution of conjugal rights; the Full Bench explicitly answered the referred question in the terms set out above.

This summary is based exclusively on the information contained in the provided Full Bench opinion and does not add facts or inferences not present in the opinion itself.

    Thenku Veeriah And Another v. Tammisetti Nagiah

    Judgement

    ORDER OF REFERENCE OF THE DIVISION BENCH :-

    This appeal raises an important and interesting question of law in regard to the interpretation of cl. 4 of s. 2 of the hindu married womens right to separate residence and maintenance act (xix of 1946) hereinafter referred to as the act. the section in so far as it is relevant runs as follows :

    "Notwithstanding any custom or law to the contrary, a Hindu married woman shall be entitled to separate residence and maintenance from her husband on one or more of the following grounds, namely :

    x x x x x x

    (4) if he marries again;"

    This Act was made applicable to Hyderabad State on 7-2-1953.

    2. The suit out of which this appeal arises was filed by the respondent on 12-4-1951 for restitution of conjugal rights against his wife, the 2nd appellant herein. One of the contentions raised by the wife was that as the husband had married again in 1951 (though prior to the Act being made applicable to Hyderabad State), he was not entitled to maintain the suit. The Dt. Judge of Karimnagar overruled this objection without any discussion in the following sentence :

    "He cannot be deprived of the decree merely because he has married another woman now." The learned Advocate for the appellants contended that cl. (4) of S. 2 was declaratory in nature and had retrospective operation and that the words "marries again" are merely descriptive of the position of the husband as a twice married man and do not exclude as husband who had taken a second wife before the Act came into operation. In support of this view, he relied on the Bench decision of the Madras High Court, in Nagendramma v. Ramakotayya, AIR 1954 Mad 713, and the decision of the Hyderabad High Court in Varalakshmi v. Viramuhi, AIR 1956 Hyd 75. The correctness of the Bench decision in AIR 1954 Mad 713 was canvassed in the Full Bench decision in Palaniswami Gounder v. Devanai Ammal, (S) AIR 1956 Mad 337. The order of reference was made by Govinda Menon and Krishnaswami Nayudu, JJ. The learned Chief Justice who delivered the Full Bench judgment held that the words "if he marries again mean" "if he contracts a marriage after the Act".

    3. The view taken by Krishnaswami Nayudu, JJ. in Sidda Setty v. Muniamma, AIR 1953 Mad 712 and by the Nagpur and Bombay High Courts in Mt. Sukhri Bai v. Pokhalsingh, AIR 1950 Nag 33 and Laxmibai v. Waman Rao, AIR 1953 Bom 342, was accepted and the decision in Lakshmi Ammal v. Narayanaswami, AIR 1950 Mad 321 and AIR 1954 Mad 713, were overruled. The learned Judges of the Hyderabad High Court in AIR 1956 Hyd 75, followed the decisions of the Madras High Court in AIR 1950 Mad 321 and AIR 1954 Mad 713 and the view of Panigrahi, C.J. in Anjani Devi v. Krishna Chandra, AIR 1954 Orissa 117 and of the Judicial Commissioner, of Vindhya Pradesh in Baijnath Dharamadass v. Hiraman Ram Rasik, AIR 1951 Vindh-Pra 10 in preference to the view expressed by the Nagpur and Bombay High Courts in the cases referred to supra and that of the Allahabad High Court in Ratan Chand v. Mt. Kalawati (S) AIR 1955 All 364.

    The learned advocate for the appellants relied upon the Full Bench decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Subbarayudu v. State, (S) AIR 1955 Andhra 87 and contended that the Bench decision of the Madras High Court pronounced before 5-7-1954 is binding on this Court and that we should follow it even though it was subsequently overruled by the Full Bench decision in AIR 1956 Mad 337. In Salmonds Jurisprudence, 10th, Edn. page 189, it is stated as follows :

    "A precedent overruled is definitely and formally deprived of all authority. It becomes null and void, like a repealed statute, and a new principle is authoritatively substituted for the old."

    So, the effect of the Full Bench decision in AIR 1956 Mad 337 is to deprive the Bench decision in AIR 1954 Mad 713 of all authority as a precedent and to render it null and void. If this view is correct, the Bench decision has no binding force on this Court and the decision of Krishnaswami Nayudu, J. pronounced prior to 5-7-1954 and approved by the Full Bench subsequent thereto remains to be considered by this Court. As it is only a decision of a single Judge, it is not binding upon a Bench of this Court. The question will, therefore, have to be considered only on the language of the enactment. As there is considerable divergence of authority on the question and as the question involved is one of considerable importance, we consider it necessary that the whole question may be considered by a Full Bench.

    4. It may also be pointed out that Subba Rao, C.J. pointed out in (S) AIR 1955 Andhra 87 at page 93 that if a judgment of a Division Bench of the Madras High Court is reversed by a Full Bench of that Court after 5-7-1954 the Division Bench of the Andhra High Court might, if they agree with the decision of the Full Bench, refer the matter to a Full Bench of the Andhra High Court (now Andhra Pradesh High Court). As we are prima facie inclined, on a plain reading of the terms of the section, to agree with the Full Bench decision of the Madras and Nagpur High Courts and the decisions of the Bombay and Allahabad High Courts in preference to the view of the Orissa and Vindhya Pradesh Courts, and as we consider that there should be an authoritative ruling on this important question, the matter is referred to a Full Bench. The question of cruelty will be decided, if necessary, after the Full Bench reference is disposed of.

    question :

    Is cl. (4) of s. 3 of the hindu married womens right to separate residence and maintenance act (xix of 1946) applicable only if the husband contracts a marriage after the Act or are the words "marries again" merely descriptive of the position of the husband as a twice married man at the date when the proceedings are taken under the Act and they do not exclude from their operation the husband who has taken a second wife before the Act ?" (In pursuance of the above order of the High Court (Division Bench) dated 14-11-1957 and made herein referring the case to the Full Bench of this High Court, the Full Bench consisting of the Honble Mr. K. Subba Rao, Chief Justice, the Honble Mr. Justice Satyanarayana Raju and the Honble Mr. Justice Ranganadham Chetty expressed the following opinion) :

    OPINION OF THE FULL BENCH

    K. SUBBA RAO, C.J. :-

    5. The fallowing question has been referred to the Full Bench by a Division Bench of this High Court :

    "Is cl. (4) of s. 2 of the hindu married womens right to separate residence and maintenance act (ix of 1946) applicable only if the husband contracts a marriage after the Act or are the words marries again merely descriptive of the position of the husband as twice married man at the date when the proceedings are taken under the Act and they do not exclude from their operation the husband who has taken a second wife before the Act ?"

    6. The facts relevant to the question formulated may be briefly stated. The 2nd appellant Parameshwaramma is one of the wives of the respondent Nayiah. They were married in or about the year 1944. The first appellant is the father of the 2nd defendant. The respondent also married another wife and, though the year of the marriage is not disclosed, it is common case that the second marriage also took place before 23-4-1946. The respondent filed O.V.S. No. 14/1/1953-54 in the Court of the Dt. Judge, Karimnagar, for restitution of conjugal rights.

    The appellants pleaded, inter alia, that the respondent was not entitled to that relief on the ground that he had a second wife living at the time the suit was filed. The learned Dt. Judge held that that was not a valid ground for non-suiting the respondent. On appeal, Umamaheswaram and Jaganmoban Reddy, JJ. finding that there was a conflict of decisions on the question whether a wife would be entitled to separate residence and maintenance on the ground that her husband had married a second wife prior to the passing of the Hindu Marriage Womens Right to Separate Residence and Maintenance Act, 1948 (hereafter referred to as the Act), referred the aforesaid question to the Full Bench.

    7. The suit was for restitution of conjugal rights. The Act entitles a wife to separate residence and maintenance if the husband marries again. If she is entitled to separate residence and maintenance under the Act the suit for restitution of conjugal rights obviously would not lie. From this perspective, the interpretation of the relevant provisions of S. 2, which entitles a wife to claim a right to separate residence and maintenance becomes relevant. The material part of the said Section reads :

    Section 2 :

    "Notwithstanding any custom or law to the contrary, Hindu married woman shall be entitled to separate residence and maintenance from her husband on one or more of the following grounds, namely,

    (4) if he marries again."

    This Act became law on 23-4-1946 and the question is whether the clause "if he marries again applies :

    to a second marriage of the husband prior to the Act coming into force.

    8. There was a conflict of decisions in the Madras High Court on the interpretation of S. 2(4) of the Act which necessitated a reference to a Full Bench. A Full Bench of the Madras High Court in (S) AIR 1956 Mad 337 ruled that a Hindu wife is entitled to claim separate residence and maintenance under the Hindu Married Womens Right to Separate Residence and Maintenance Act, 1946, on the ground that her husband has married a second time only when the second marriage took place after the passing of the said Act and not before. Rajamannar, C.J. who delivered the judgment on behalf of the Full Bench, observed at page 484 (of ILR Mad) : (at p. 338 of AIR) thus :

    "The language, as it is, contemplates the event happening in the future and is not at all appropriate to refer to an act which has already been done."

    This Full Bench decision was delivered after the inauguration of the Andhra High Court and, therefore, is not a binding authority on this Court, though of great persuasive effect. But, in this case, we are relieved of our duty of considering the correctness of this decision as the question raised does not arise in view of the provision of the hindu marriage act (act xxv of 1955) which became law on 18-5-1955. If this Act had been brought to the notice of the learned Judges, I am certain that they would not have referred the case to the Full Bench. I shall, therefore, proceed to consider the applicability of the provisions of that Act to the plea raised by the appellant.

    9. The hindu marriage act, 1955, is a central act and it extends to the whole of India except the State of Jammu and Kashmir. Section 9 enables a husband or wife to file an application in the District Court for restitution of conjugal rights. Sub-Section 2 of S. 9 particularises the pleas available to the other spouse in such an action. It says :

    "Nothing shall be pleaded in answer to a petition for restitution of conjugal rights which shall not be a ground for judicial separation or for nullity of marriage for divorce."

    Section 13 lays down the conditions under which a husband or a wife can get a divorce1 from the other. Sub-Section (2) says that a wife may present a petition for the dissolution of her marriage by a decree of divorce on the ground that "in the case of any marriage solemnised before the commencement of this Act that the husband had married again before such commencement or that any other wife of the husband married before such commencement was alive at the time of the solemnisation of the marriage of the petitioner". It is, therefore, manifest that under this Act a wife could resist a petition for restitution of conjugal rights on the ground that the husband had married another wife before the Act.

    Whatever might have been the rights of the respondent to claim restitution of conjugal rights before the Act he ceased to have any after this Act in view of the second marriage, though contracted before the act. section 29(3) which saves certain proceedings, does not include in its ambit a proceeding for the restitution of conjugal rights. I, therefore, hold that after the Act of 1955 the respondent is not entitled to have a decree for restitution of conjugal rights against the second appellant.

    10. The reference is answered accordingly.

    (This appeal coming on for final hearing after the opinion is expressed by the Full Bench of this High Court dated 27-11-1957 and made herein on the question referred by Division Bench, the Court delivered the following judgment) :

    11. Following the Full Bench decision, the appeal is allowed with costs of this

    Court. There will be no order as to costs in the Court below.

    Appeal allowed.

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    Comments

    Thenku Veeriah And Another v. Tammisetti Nagiah
    (Mar 6, 1959)