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  • Sections 30 and 33 of the Arbitration Act, 1940
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  • Sections 30 and 33 of the Arbitration Act, 1940
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion addresses objections filed by the respondent, Delhi Development Authority (DDA), under Sections 30 and 33 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, challenging an arbitral award dated 6.8.1993 made by Shri R.C Malhotra, the sole arbitrator appointed by the respondent/DDA. The objections and replies, along with the arbitral record, were treated as evidence for disposal of these objections. The case proceeded with arguments on 3.11.1999 and 15.11.1999.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the arbitral award directing refund of the security deposit was liable to be set aside on the ground that the arbitrator erred in holding that the respondent/DDA could not rescind the contract once time was set at large.
  2. Whether the arbitrator erred in rejecting the respondent's evidence and wrongly attributing delay to the respondent.
  3. Whether the award allowing loss of profit as damages without overlapping with other damages was justified.
  4. Whether the arbitrator had jurisdiction to adjudicate on the levy of compensation under Clause-2 of the contract and whether the rejection of the respondent's levy of compensation was lawful.

Arguments of the Parties

Respondent/DDA's Arguments

  • The award directing refund of the security deposit was liable to be set aside due to an apparent error: the arbitrator wrongly held that DDA could not rescind the contract once time was set at large, relying on State Of Maharashtra v. Digambar Balwant Kulkarni.
  • The arbitrator erroneously rejected evidence produced by the respondents and failed to appreciate that the contractor was responsible for the delay.
  • Reliance on Union of India v. Jain Associates and another to argue that awarding loss of profit along with other damages without proper application of mind invalidated the award.
  • The rejection of the respondent's levy of compensation under Clause-2 of Rs. 1,34,130/- was illegal and contrary to Supreme Court precedent in Vishwanath Sood v. Union of India and the Division Bench decision in Delhi Development Authority v. Ms Sudhir Br, which held that compensation matters were outside the arbitrator’s jurisdiction.

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The arbitrator’s award was reasoned and based on evidence showing the respondent’s breach and unjustifiable rescission of the contract.
  • Loss of profit was awarded only on the unexecuted portion of the contract, distinct from damages for prolongation, making the award plausible and supported by judicial pronouncements.
  • The arbitrator held that the judgment of the Apex Court did not apply to the levy of compensation under Clause-2 in this case.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
State Of Maharashtra v. Digambar Balwant Kulkarni, 1979 (III) SCR Time is of essence only in respect of compensation liability; rescission accrues when compensation exceeds security deposit or abandonment occurs. Court found the arbitrator’s reasoning consistent with this principle and rejected the objection that rescission was improper once time was set at large.
Union of India v. Jain Associates and another, 1994(1) Arbitration Law Reporter 494 Arbitrator must apply mind when awarding loss of profit along with damages to avoid double recovery. Court upheld the arbitrator’s award of loss of profit only on unexecuted contract portion, finding no overlap with other damages.
Vishwanath Sood v. Union of India, AIR 1989 SC 952 Compensation matters decided by engineer are outside arbitrator’s jurisdiction. Court held the arbitrator exceeded jurisdiction in rejecting levy of compensation under Clause-2 and set aside that part of the award.
Delhi Development Authority v. Ms Sudhir Br, 1995 (2) Arbitration Law Reporter 306 Arbitrator cannot decide on compensation levy where contract excludes such matters from arbitration. Court relied on this to hold the arbitrator acted without jurisdiction in disallowing compensation under Clause-2.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court examined the objections filed under Sections 30 and 33 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, against the arbitral award. It noted that the award was reasoned and based on evidence showing the respondent’s breach of contract and unjustifiable rescission. The court rejected the objection that rescission was invalid once time was set at large, relying on precedent and the arbitrator’s findings that the contract termination was not justified due to respondent defaults.

Regarding the delay, the court held that assessment of responsibility was within the arbitrator’s domain and refused to reappraise factual findings.

On the loss of profit claim, the court found the arbitrator’s approach plausible and consistent with judicial authority, awarding loss of profit only on the unexecuted portion of the contract, distinct from damages for prolongation.

Concerning the levy of compensation under Clause-2, the court held that the arbitrator misdirected himself and exceeded jurisdiction by adjudicating on a matter excluded from arbitration by contract and precedent. Consequently, that part of the award was set aside.

Overall, objections were dismissed except for the part setting aside the arbitrator’s decision on the compensation levy under Clause-2.

Holding and Implications

The court’s final decision is as follows:

Objections filed by the respondent/DDA under Sections 30 and 33 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, are dismissed except to the extent that the award relating to the respondent’s counter claim No. B (levy of compensation under Clause-2) is set aside as being without jurisdiction.

The award is made rule of the Court, and a decree in terms of the award, except for the set-aside portion, is to be drawn up. The decision directly affects the parties by upholding the majority of the arbitral award while limiting the arbitrator’s jurisdiction on compensation levy. No new precedent is established beyond applying existing authority to the facts of the case.

    Harinder Anand. v. Dda.

    Manmohan Sarin, J. (Oral):— By this order, objections filed by the respondent/DDA under Sections 30 and 33 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 against the award dated 6.8.1993, made and published by Shri R.C Malhotra, Sole Arbitrator appointed by the respondent/DDA are being disposed of. The award is a reasoned one. Counsel for the parties agreed that the objections filed by the respondent/DDA as well as the reply thereto and the arbitral record be treated as evidence for the purposes of disposal of these objections. With the consent of the parties, the case was fixed for arguments on 3.11.1999 for 15.11.1999

    2. I have heard the learned counsel for the defendant in support of objections. Learned counsel first urged that the award directing refund of security deposit was liable to be set aside as it suffered from an apparent error inasmuch as the arbitrator had proceeded on the basis that it was not open to DDA to rescind the contract once the time has been set at large. Learned counsel in this regard relied on State Of Maharashtra v. Digambar Balwant Kulkarni., 1979 Volume-III Supreme Court Reports. In the cited case, it was held that:—

    Time was of the essence only in the sence that if the plaintiff completed it within the original period of one year, he would not be liable to pay any compensation but in case he overstepped that limit he would have to compensate for every day of delay and that the right to rescission would accrue only when compensation due exceeded the amount of the security deposit or the plaintiff abandoned the work. Till the time it was rescinded, the contract was in force.”

    3. On a perusal of the award in respect of claim No. 1, I find that though the arbitrator has noted the submission of the petitioner that recission of the contract by DDA was bad since time had elapsed and had been set at large. Hence security deposit could not have been forfeited. However, this is not the only basis on which the arbitrator had reached the conclusion that forfeiture was bad. He had appraised the evidence and reached the conclusion that defendant was in breach. Arbitrator has specifically recorded the finding that in view of the respondents own defaults and failure to fulfil the contractual obligations, the recission of the contract by the respondent was not justifiable. The award directing refund of security deposit is therefore based on the recission of the contract, which has been found to be unjustifiable by the arbitrator on merits. In this view of the matter objection of the learned counsel is devoid of merit and is rejected.

    4. Learned counsel also urged that the arbitrator had erroneously rejected the evidence produced on behalf of the respondents and had failed to appreciate that it was the contractor, who was responsible for the delay. These are matters squarely within the domain of the arbitrator and this court would not sit in appeal over the said findings.

    5. At this stage, I may notice another submission made by the learned counsel for the respondent with regard to the award in respect of claim No. 6. Learned counsel sub-emitted, relying on Union of India v. Jain Associates and another -1994(1) Arbitration Law Reporter 494 in support of her submission that if the arbitrator allows loss of profit as also damages without applying his mind the entire award was liable to be set aside. Learned counsel submits that once the petitioner was being compensated for idle labour and material as well as for hire charges for T & P Scaffolding materials etc., under claim No. 5, there was no justification to award loss of profit, due to wrongful recission. From a perusal of the award, it is noticed that in the instant case the element of overlapping is not there in as much as the learned arbitrator has held as under:

    “Total value of the contract was about Rs. 18.08 lakhs. Out of this the claimant could execute the work to the extent of about Rs. 9.47 lakhs only before the contract was terminated. Thus the work amount to Rs. 8.61 lakhs remained unexecuted and the claimant was prevented from making the anticipated profit on this amount.”

    Thus, it would be seen that the loss of profit is being awarded only in respect of the unexecuted portion of the contract for which the contractor had not been awarded damages due to prolongation of the work. The view taken by the arbitrator is a plausible view and is also supported by judicial pronouncements.

    6. Learned counsel submitted that the rejection of the respondent's levy of compensation under Clause-2 of Rs. 1,34,130/- was illegal and contrary to the judgment of the Apex court in Vishwanath Sood v. Union of India - AIR 1989 SC 952 and Delhi Development Authority v. Ms Sudhir Br, 1995 (2) Arbitration Law Reporter Volume (23) 306. Learned counsel relied on the following observations of the Division Bench in Delhi Development Authority v. Ms Sudhir Br, (Supra).

    “Our attention has been drawn to the arbitration clause and also the relevant clause which relates to exclusion of certain matters from the purview of arbitration. The relevant clause 2 in the arbitration agreement deals with the question of compensation and directs that the concerned engineer should decide this question and his decision is final. The arbitration clause opens with the words, “Unless otherwise provided”. In view of this language, it is obvious from the decision of the Supreme Court in Vishwanath Sood v. Union of India and another, that the Arbitrator could not have gone into the merits of the levy of compensation by the engineer. In that view of the matter, the D.D.A ought not to have requested the Arbitrator to include the said amount in the arbitration award.”

    “We, therefore, find that the entire procedure adopted by both the parties was totally unwarranted. If the DDA considered that it was entitled to the recovery of Rs. 5,69,473 outside the arbitration, it could have taken such steps as it thought necessary instead of asking the Arbitrator to include the said amount in the award. The contractor was also wrong in taking advantage of the same and asking the Arbitrator to give a finding on the merits of the claim. The Arbitrator acted totally without jurisdiction in going into the said question and deleting the said item of counter claim for Rs. 5,69,473/- and holding that the contractor not liable for payment of compensation. That was not within the power of the Arbitrator. In view of the said unfortunate events, we have no option but to set aside that part of the award of the Arbitrator wherein he has come to the conclusion that the sum of Rs. 4,69,743/- was not payable by the contract. The validity of the levy of compensation is, therefore, taken out from the award.”

    Learned arbitrator, in the present case, held that the action of the respondent in levying compensation under Clause-2 of the Contract was wrong and unwarranted and he, therefore, disallowed the penalty/compensation of Rs. 1,34,130/-. The arbitrator held that the judgment of the Apex Court did not apply in the case.

    In my view learned arbitrator has mis-directed himself and exceeded his jurisdiction in holding that levy of compensation under Clause-2 was wrong and unwarranted. This was not the matter over which the arbitrator had jurisdiction and could adjudicate upon. Accordingly, the award of the arbitrator rejecting the levy of compensation under Clause-2 of the terms is set aside and is held to be without jurisdiction. Objections are dismissed except to the extent that the award of the arbitrator in respect of counter claim No. B is set aside. The award is made rule of the Court. Decree in terms of the award, except for the award in respect of the counter claim No. B, which has been set aside, be drawn up.

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    Comments

    Harinder Anand. v. Dda.
    (Nov 15, 1999)